Lashunda Lynette Nobles v. State
Opinion
NUMBER 13-11-00207-CR COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
LASHUNDA LYNETTE NOBLES, Appellant, v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 252nd District Court of Jefferson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez A Jefferson County grand jury indicted appellant, Lashunda Lynette Nobles, for the offense of possession of less than one gram of cocaine, a state jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (b) (West 2010); see also id. § 481.102(3)(D) (West 2010). Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Nobles pleaded guilty to this offense. The trial court placed Nobles on deferred adjudication community supervision for a term of three years and assessed a $500.00 fine.
The State then filed a motion to revoke alleging that Nobles had violated five conditions of her community supervision. Nobles pleaded ―true‖ to two of those violations. The trial court found the five violations to be true, revoked Nobles’s community supervision, found her guilty of the charge of possession of cocaine, and assessed punishment of confinement in the state jail for two years. The trial court certified Nobles’s right to appeal, and this appeal followed. We affirm.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), Nobles’s appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court stating that after diligently reviewing the record and researching the law, he has found no reversible error committed by the trial court and no arguable ground of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Although counsel’s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (AIn Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance >arguable= points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.@) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), Nobles’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served copies of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on Nobles; and (3) informed Nobles of her right to review the record and to file a pro se response.1 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and Nobles has not filed a pro se response.2 See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (ADue to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.@); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, Nobles’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (AIf an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.@) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to Nobles and advise her of her right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
_________________ ROGELIO VALDEZ Chief Justice
Do not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) Delivered and filed the 20th day of October, 2011.
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