Moses E. Wilcox, Sr., M.D. v. Maria G. Montalvo
Opinion
NUMBER 13-10-00611-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG MOSES E. WILCOX SR., M.D., Appellant, v.
MARIA G. MONTALVO, ET AL., Appellees.
On appeal from the 130th District Court of Matagorda County, Texas.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Garza, Vela, and Perkes Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
I respectfully dissent because I believe Dr. Downing’s report was sufficient. As the majority notes, to constitute a ―good faith‖ effort and survive a motion to dismiss under section 74.351(l), a medical expert report must (1) inform the defendant of the specific conduct the plaintiff has called into question, and (2) provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002); Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. 2001). Here, Dr. Downing’s report provided more than enough information to satisfy both prongs of this test.
The majority holds that Dr. Downing’s report does not ―articulate what specific negligent conduct has been called into question,‖ but it does—it states that Garcia’s being dropped to the floor was the conduct called into question. The majority holds that the report does not ―specifically describe the standard of care for transferring a disabled patient,‖ but it does—it states that the applicable standard is to avoid dropping patients to the floor. The majority holds that the report does not state ―what Dr. Wilcox and his staff did or failed to do‖ that breached the standard of care, but it does—it states that Dr. Wilcox or his staff breached the standard by dropping Garcia to the floor. The majority holds that the report does not state ―what a reasonable and prudent physician would have done in the same or similar circumstances,‖ but, again, it does—a reasonable physician and staff would not have dropped an elderly, amputee patient to the floor.
The Court is correct that ―[a]n expert must provide statements concerning the standard of care to identify the care expected that was not given with such specificity that inferences are not needed to discern them.‖ See Granbury Minor Emergency Clinic v. Thiel, 296 S.W.3d 261, 270 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). But no inferences are necessary here to advise Dr. Wilcox of the conduct being challenged, and no inferences are necessary to give the trial court a basis to conclude that Montalvo’s claims have merit. See Bowie Mem’l Hosp, 79 S.W.3d at 52. It is simply common sense that a patient should not be dropped while being transferred from place to place in a medical facility.
The majority appears to be desirous of further ―specifics‖ regarding the dropping of Garcia. This is apparently in reference to the Montalvos’ pleadings alleging that Dr. Wilcox ―allowed a hazardous condition to exist in his examining room, specifically wires and cords stretched out across the floor . . . .‖ However, it is well established that an expert report need not ―marshal all of a claimant’s proof.‖ Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. Instead, it merely must include the expert’s opinion on each of the elements identified in section 74.351—standard of care, breach, and causation. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(r)(6) (Vernon 2011). The expert report need not be as specific as a claimant’s pleadings in order to qualify as a ―good faith‖ effort. See Bowie Mem’l Hosp, 79 S.W.3d at 52. The mere fact that Dr. Downing’s report might have feasibly been more specific is not a legitimate basis upon which to find that a report is insufficient.1
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Dr. Wilcox’s motion to dismiss.
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA
Justice
Delivered and filed the 14th day of April, 2011.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.