Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2011

Anna Maria Salinas Saenz v. Thorp Petroleum Corp.

Anna Maria Salinas Saenz v. Thorp Petroleum Corp.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided April 6, 2011

Anna Maria Salinas Saenz v. Thorp Petroleum Corp.

Opinion

 

                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

                                                     No. 04-10-00837-CV

 

                                           Anna Maria Salinas SAENZ, et al.,

                                                             Appellants

 

                                                                    v.

 

                                       THORP PETROLEUM CORP., et al.,

                                                              Appellees

 

                        From the 229th Judicial District Court, Starr County, Texas

                                               Trial Court No. DC-04-120-A

                                 Honorable Alex William Gabert, Judge Presiding

 

PER CURIAM

 

Sitting:          Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

 

Delivered and Filed:  April 6, 2011

 

DISMISSED

           Appellants filed notice of appeal on November 19, 2010 declaring their intent to appeal several partial summary judgment orders that were severed into a new cause by written order signed on October 20, 2010, thereby making the summary judgments final and appealable.  Thereafter, the district clerk filed a certified copy of an order signed by the trial court on December 15, 2010, granting the defendants’ motion for reconsideration and vacating the October 20, 2010 severance order.  Having determined that the summary judgment orders appeared to be interlocutory, we ordered appellants to show cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Appellants responded and agreed that, while the summary judgment orders were final and appealable at the time they filed notice of appeal, the trial court’s subsequent vacating of its severance order during its plenary power means the summary judgment orders are no longer final and appealable.  Having confirmed that the summary judgment orders are interlocutory because they do not dispose of the appellants’ other pending claims against defendants, and there is no severance order in effect, we must dismiss this appeal.  See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205-06 (Tex. 2001).  Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). 

PER CURIAM

 

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