R. L. M. v. State
Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-12-00384-CV R. L. M. v. The State of Texas
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 331ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-EX-12-000286, HONORABLE DAVID CRAIN, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION R.L.M., an inmate appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for expunction. Because R.L.M. did not receive notice of the hearing on his petition for expunction, we will reverse the district court’s order denying the petition and remand the cause for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On April 4, 2012, R.L.M. filed a petition for expunction in the district court, pursuant to chapter 55 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 55.01-.06 (expunction of criminal records). In his petition, R.L.M. sought expunction of records related to his 1999 arrest and indictment for capital murder. R.L.M. asserted that he was entitled to expunction because the charges had been dismissed by the State when, pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, he pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. Simultaneously with his petition, R.L.M. filed a motion for hearing by conference call, explaining that he is incarcerated and would be unable to personally appear before the court.
On the same day that R.L.M. filed his petition and motion, the district clerk set R.L.M.’s petition for a hearing on June 21, 2012. In response, R.L.M. filed another motion for hearing by conference call. Again, R.L.M. explained to the court that as a consequence of his incarceration, he would be unable to appear personally at the June 21 hearing and requested that he be allowed to participate in the hearing by telephone.
For reasons that do not appear in the record before us, the district court did not hear R.L.M.’s petition on June 21, 2012. Instead, the court heard the cause on May 24, 2012. Without ruling on R.L.M.’s motions to participate by telephone, and despite the fact that neither R.L.M. nor any representative from the State was present at the hearing, the court proceeded to consider the cause and deny R.L.M.’s petition.
Raising four issues on appeal, R.L.M. challenges the court’s judgment. In his first and second issues, R.L.M. challenges the district court’s substantive determination that he is not entitled to expunction. In his third and fourth issues, R.L.M. challenges the procedural circumstances under which the court ruled on his petition. We will first consider R.L.M.’s procedural challenges.
ANALYSIS
The remedy of expunction allows a person who has been arrested for the commission of an offense to have all information about the arrest removed from the State record if he meets the statutory requirements set out in article 55.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.01; Texas Dep’t of Public Safety v. Nail, 305 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.). A petitioner’s right to expunction is purely a matter of statutory privilege, and the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that each of the required statutory conditions have been met. Nail, 305 S.W.3d at 674; Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). We review a trial court’s decision granting or denying a petition for expunction for an abuse of discretion. See Heine v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied).
Article 55.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the procedures for obtaining expunction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.02. These include a requirement that the trial court “set a hearing” on the petition and “give to each official or agency or other governmental entity named in the petition reasonable notice of the hearing.” See id. art. 55.02, § 2(c). However, article 55.02 does not necessarily require that the court conduct an oral hearing. Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863; Ex parte Current, 877 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, no writ).1 A trial court may rule on an expunction petition without conducting an oral hearing and without the consideration of live testimony, if it has at its disposal all the information it needs to resolve the issues raised by the petition. Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863.
In his fourth issue, R.L.M. argues that the district court abused its discretion when it changed the date of the hearing without notifying him of the changed date. A party who has appeared in a case is entitled to notice of a trial setting as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. LBL Oil v. International Power Servs., Inc., 777 S.W.2d 390, 390-91 (Tex. 1989). “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstance, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84-85 (1988).
A hearing on an expunction petition is a civil proceeding and implicates the notice requirements generally applicable to civil trial proceedings. See Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 803 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (explaining that petition for expunction is civil proceeding and “notice requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P. 245 are in issue”). Consequently, while a trial court can, under the proper circumstances, dispense with the necessity of a formal hearing on a petition for expunction under article 55.02, it cannot deprive a petitioner of his right to notice of the statutorily required “hearing” altogether.
In this case, the district court, on its own motion, set R.L.M.’s petition for a hearing on the merits of his entire case. The record on its face demonstrates that R.L.M. did not receive any notice that this hearing was to be held on May 24, 2012. In fact, the only notice sent to R.L.M. informed him that the hearing would be held almost a month later, on June 21. Because the court changed the date of the hearing to an earlier hearing date, without any additional notice to R.L.M., he was deprived of the opportunity to make any argument or objection—including written argument or objection—in support of his expunction claim. See Heine, 92 S.W.3d at 650 (noting that “right to be heard includes the opportunity to be heard on questions of law”); cf. Ex parte Staner, No. 06-06-00088-CV, 2007 WL 79406, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 5, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that court did not err by considering State’s motion for summary judgment on expunction hearing without oral hearing when (1) court could determine issues based on pleadings and evidence in the record and (2) inmate had notice and opportunity to file written response and any controverting evidence). Under these circumstances, the court abused its discretion in conducting a hearing on the merits of R.L.M.’s petition for expunction.2 We sustain R.L.M.’s fourth issue on appeal.3
CONCLUSION
We reverse the order of the district court and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Scott K. Field, Justice
Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Goodwin and Field Reversed and Remanded Filed: November 27, 2013
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