Marcus Jenkins v. State
Marcus Jenkins v. State
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02-12-00395-CR
MARCUS JENKINS APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
---------- FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY ---------- MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 ---------- Appellant Marcus D. Jenkins appeals the revocation of his felony deferred adjudication community supervision, his conviction for the offense of continuous violence against the family, and his sentence of five years’ confinement. We affirm.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
On June 14, 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to the underlying offense of assault bodily injury (continuous violence against the family). See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 25.11
At the hearing, Appellant testified that he did not make payment arrangements because he forgot, and he never returned to set up a payment plan because he was scared. Appellant testified that he has six children and three more on the way and is unemployed. He denied having a drug problem, but occasionally smoked marijuana “to calm [himself] down” because he has an “anger problem.” Appellant stated that he lived with his mother but had not lived there long because he would get in trouble for “not wanting to follow the rules and do what [he] wanted to do.”
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, accompanied by a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel states that in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous and without merit. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Appellant had the opportunity to file a pro se brief but did not do so. The State has not filed a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the grounds that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we have a supervisory obligation to undertake an examination of the proceedings.
See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only after our independent review is complete may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with appellate counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
LEE GABRIEL JUSTICE PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) DELIVERED: August 1, 2013
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