NUMBER 13-13-00479-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,

v.

LARRY GREEN, Appellee.

On appeal from the 319th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Perkes and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria The State has filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s order granting a motion to suppress evidence filed by Larry Green, the defendant in the underlying cause. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Appeal by state”).1 For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND According to the district court’s findings and conclusions, the “sole basis” for the defendant’s motion was that the suppressed “evidence was seized as a result of a warrantless entry onto premises in which . . . [the defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy and without consent of . . . [the defendant].” The district court granted the motion to suppress based on its findings that the suppressed evidence “was illegally obtained [by police officers] without a warrant and without exigent circumstances to support the absence of a warrant.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. See Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but [we] review the trial court’s application of law to the facts de novo.” Id. “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must afford great deference to the trial court’s findings of historical facts as long as the record supports those findings.” Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 150. “If a trial court’s ruling is supported by the

IV. DISCUSSION The record supports the district court’s findings that the officers acted “without a warrant and without exigent circumstances to support the absence of a warrant.” See Fernandez v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 1132 (Feb. 25, 2014) (“[A] warrant is generally required for a search of a home.”). Nevertheless, the State maintains that the officers acted lawfully because the owner of the property had given them valid consent. See Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that “consensual entry” is “one of a few well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement).

“As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in

In this case, the district court found that the officers obtained oral and written consent from the owner of the property. The district court also made a specific finding that the officers acted on “a good faith belief” that the owner had authority over the property. Accepting these findings as true because they are supported by the record, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the officers acted “illegally.” See id. The district court erred by granting the motion to suppress on the grounds that the officers did not have a warrant and there were no exigent circumstances. We sustain the State’s issue.3

Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quotations omitted). However, the “theory of law [must be] supported by the facts of the case.” Alford v. State, 400 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In this case, the defendant testified and offered the testimony of his parents to prove that he was renting the property, had exclusive control over it, objected and protested to the officers’ search, and did not grant them consent. None of the defendant’s evidence was accepted or even acknowledged by the district court in its findings, though we note that the district court did make one passing reference to the fact that, in his motion, the defendant had asserted lack of consent as a basis for relief. We find these omissions particularly significant because we abated the case for the district court to make all essential findings in support of its ruling, and in response, the district court entered twelve findings, none of which support the defendant’s version of events. In fact, all but two of the findings support the State’s version of events concerning the oral and written consent given by the owner of the property. Although this presents an odd and peculiar scenario, given that the district court’s findings essentially undermine rather than support its ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court remains the exclusive trier of facts in a hearing on a motion to suppress. See Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (“[T]he trial judge is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given their testimony at a hearing on a motion to suppress.”). “On appeal, the appellate court does not engage in its own factual review.” Id. Accordingly, we defer to the district court’s decision to disregard, in its entirety, the defendant’s evidence and version of events.

Moreover, as a practical matter, we note that our decision is supported by an alternative ground that is also based on the facts of the case as the district court found them to be true. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defendant conceded that suppression of the evidence would be improper if the district court found that the officers acted in “good faith” based on the owner’s consent. Specifically, the defendant’s attorney told the district court, “Your honor, the only issue that would allow the officers to search V. CONCLUSION We reverse the district court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 31st day of July, 2014.

in this particular case, is if the officer in good faith, relied on the father’s consent to search.” The record supports the district court’s findings that the officers had oral and written consent from the owner of the property (i.e., the defendant’s stepfather) and that the officers acted on “a good faith belief” that the owner had authority over the property. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that it was an error to grant the motion to suppress.