Louis Rogers v. State
Louis Rogers v. State
Opinion
NUMBER 13-13-00432-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG LOUIS ROGERS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court of Calhoun County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Perkes and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria By one issue, appellant Louis Rogers appeals a judgment revoking his probation and sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment for delivery of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112, 481.134 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Appellant argues the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because his probation officer had no training in mental health issues or disabilities. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND Appellant initially pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance in 2003. See id. The trial court assessed punishment at seven years in prison, suspended the sentence, and placed appellant on probation for seven years. Appellant’s probation would have ended on January 30, 2010, but the court extended the probation three years after appellant violated the terms of his probation. On January 29, 2013, one day before the scheduled termination date of appellant’s probation, the State filed a timely motion to revoke, alleging that appellant again violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
The State alleged that appellant stalked a woman he formerly had a relationship with by constantly texting and calling her, leading her to believe appellant placed her in danger. 1 At the hearing, appellant pleaded true to every allegation in the State’s motion to revoke probation.2 The trial court revoked appellant’s probation and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division along with court costs. Appellant did not make any objection or file any motion for new trial.
II. DISCUSSION By his one issue, appellant contends that the revocation of his probation constituted cruel and unusual punishment because his probation officer had no training in mental health issues or disabilities and therefore did not recognize the need to tell appellant not to stalk a woman.
“It is axiomatic that errors that are asserted on the part of the trial court must generally be brought to the trial court's attention.” Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1). Furthermore, in order to preserve a complaint, the appellant must either make a timely and specific objection during trial or post-trial motion. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 303–04 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d). This Court has determined in the past that an appellant waives most constitutional claims, even a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, by failing to object to it at trial, sentencing, or in a post-trial motion. Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
Here, by failing to object to his sentence, we conclude that appellant has waived this issue for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927; see also Arevalo v. State, No. 13–13–00485–CR, 2014 WL 223230, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 16, 2014, pet. dism'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.) (A case involving a similar procedural posture where this Court held that
appellant waived his claims by not objecting during trial or post-trial). We overrule appellant’s sole issue.3 III. CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 3rd day of July, 2014.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.