in the Interest of J. P. M., a Child
in the Interest of J. P. M., a Child
Opinion
NUMBER 13-13-00686-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF J.P.M., A CHILD
On appeal from the County Court of Law No. 1 of Calhoun County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez Appellant C.H. appeals the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights with respect to J.P.M., a child.1 We affirm.
I. COMPLIANCE WITH ANDERS Appellant's court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief in which he states “this appeal presents no issues of arguable merit” and has requested that this Court permit him to withdraw as counsel. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 774–45 (1967); Porter v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief.”). In his brief, counsel addresses whether the evidence presented at trial supported the termination of the parent-child relationship between C.H. and J.P.M., including (1) whether appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed her child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of J.P.M., see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(E) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.); (2) whether appellant failed to comply with the provisions of the court order that set out what actions were necessary for her to obtain the return of J.P.M., see id. § 161.001(1)(O); and (3) whether termination was in J.P.M.’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(2). After reviewing the record, counsel concludes “that this appeal presents no issues of arguable merit and that the evidence presented at trial supports the termination of the parent-child relationship between the child and C.H.” Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation showing why there are no non-frivolous grounds for advancing an appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).2 In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), appellant's counsel has discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no reversible errors in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has demonstrated that he has complied with the requirements of Anders by examining the record and finding no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. Counsel has demonstrated that he has complied with the requirements of Anders by (1) examining the record and finding no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) serving a copy of the brief and his request to withdraw on appellant, and (3) informing appellant of her right to review the record and to file a pro se response. 3 More than an adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.
Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, this Court must conduct a full examination of all proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, counsel asks this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) ("If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.") (citations omitted)). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw.
Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, we order counsel to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of her right to pursue a
petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court.4 See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ Justice Delivered and filed the 17th day of April, 2014.
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