Jason Hendrix v. State
Jason Hendrix v. State
Opinion
NUMBER 13-13-00410-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG JASON RAY HENDRIX, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Williamson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes Appellant Jason Ray Hendrix appeals his conviction of driving while intoxicated, a class-B misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Appellant pleaded not guilty, but a jury found appellant guilty. The trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at 180 days’ confinement in county jail. Appellant timely perfected this appeal, and, as discussed below, his court-appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. We affirm.1 I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant’s court- appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response.2
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no reversible error in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)). appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Gregory T. Perkes Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 13th day of March, 2014.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.