NUMBERS 13-14-00008-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG BRYAN SOLIS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 36th District Court of Aransas County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Perkes and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes Appellant Bryan Solis pleaded guilty to the possession of cocaine in an amount between 4 and 200 grams, a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). The trial court placed him on five years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. The State subsequently moved to revoke his community supervision, alleging that he used a controlled substance and failed to pay his restitution and Crime Stoppers Fee in violation of his community- supervision conditions. Appellant pleaded true to not paying the restitution and the fee.1 The trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of cocaine possession, and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).

Appellant’s plea of true to nonpayment of the restitution is sufficient to support revocation. See Gipson, 428 S.W.3d at 109; see also Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding a plea of true is sufficient to support revocation); Nino v. State, No. 13-97-00930-CR, 1998 WL 34202482, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug.20, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (same).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel has: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant of appellant’s rights to file a pro se response,2 to review the record preparatory to filing that response and seek discretionary review if the court of appeals concludes the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record, including the mailing address for the court of appeals and instructions to file the motion within ten days and lacking only appellant’s signature and the date.

See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.

Adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed either a timely motion seeking pro se access to the appellate record or a motion for extension of time to do so. Appellant has not filed a pro se brief.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we find nothing that arguably supports an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827– (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no reversible error in the record, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (quoting Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.))). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman,

GREGORY T. PERKES Justice Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 22nd day of January, 2015.