NUMBERS 13-13-00605-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG GERALD DEE BELL, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 147th District Court of Travis County, Texas.1

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes Appellant, Gerald Dee Bell, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel has: (1) notified the appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided the appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant of appellant’s right to file a pro se response,2 review the record preparatory to

Pro se appellant timely filed a motion for access to the appellate record. On October 2, 2014, the court received verification of receipt of the record by pro se appellant, making the pro se response due on November 5, 2014. Pro se appellant then filed two motions for extension which this Court granted, making the pro se response due on March 3, 2015. On March 3, 2015, pro se appellant filed his pro se response,3 asserting two potential issues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing, over objection, inadmissible hearsay testimony of Della Phillips, Aaron Kelly, Michele Redic, and Quintera Redic; and (2) the evidence is insufficient for the conviction of capital murder.

In this regard, appellant’s counsel also requested that we consider whether the trial court erred by overruling the above testimonial hearsay objections.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

75, 80 (1988). A court of appeals has two options when an Anders brief and a subsequent pro se response are filed. After reviewing the entire record, it may: (1) determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it finds no reversible error; or (2) determine that there are arguable grounds for appeal and remand the case to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If the court finds arguable grounds for appeal, it may not review those grounds until after new counsel has briefed those issues on appeal. Id. We have reviewed the entire record, appellant’s counsel’s brief, appellant’s responsive brief, and the State’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See id. at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. After review, we have concluded that there is no reversible error in the record.4 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 5 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

GREGORY T. PERKES Justice Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 19th day of March, 2015.