ACCEPTED 12-14-00336-CV TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 4/23/2015 3:09:33 PM CATHY LUSK CLERK NO. 12-14-00336-CV ______________________________ FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE TYLER, TEXAS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS 4/23/2015 3:09:33 PM AT TYLER, TEXAS CATHY S. LUSK Clerk ______________________________

FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM VS. DENA MARIE TURNER FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM, RESPONDENT/APPELLANT DENA MARIE TURNER, PETITIONER/APPELLEE ______________________________

Appealed from the County Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas ______________________________ APPELLANT’S BRIEF ______________________________

TOM RORIE State Bar No. 17238000 North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

In accordance with Rule 38.1(a) of the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE , Appellant Frederick Dawson Graham provides the following list of all parties, and the names and addresses of all counsel: Appellant: Frederick Dawson Graham Counsel: Mr. Tom Rorie North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 [email protected]

Appellee: Dena Marie Turner Counsel: Mr. Jarett T. LaRochelle One Riverway, Suite 1700 Houston, TX 77055 (713) 907-8668 FAX (713) 840-6351 [email protected]

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Identity of Parties and Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Statement of the Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Points of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii Argument and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Point of Error No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Appellee An Ownership Interest in Appellant’s Residence Point of Error No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Parties were Tenants in Common in Appellant’s Separate Property Residence Because the Evidence is Insufficient to Support that Holding Point of Error No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Trial Court Erred by Divesting Appellant of One-Half of His Ownership in His Separate Property Residence and Awarding that Interest to Appellee Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Basis for the Trial Court’s Ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Court Should Decline to Follow Harrington and Aaron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Evidence is Not Sufficient to Support a Finding that the Parties were Tenants in Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

iii Existence of Joint Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Looking for a Residence Together is Not Evidence of Ownership . . . . . . 9 Was there a Common Plan or Design in Acquiring the Residence? . . . . 10 Prior Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appellant Made a Substantial Down Payment with Separate Funds . . . . 11 Appellant Paid off the Residence Quickly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Subsequent Conduct of the Parties is Evidence of Intent . . . . . . . . . 13 The Trial Court had No Discretion to Divest Appellant of Any Interest in His Separate Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Point of Error No. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Find that the Residence was Not Purchased with Appellant’s Separate Property Funds When the Evidence Conclusively Showed a Purchase with His Separate Funds Point of Error No. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion when it Disregarded Uncontradicted Evidence that Appellee Committed Fraud on the Community Estate Point of Error No. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Disregarding Evidence of Substantial Benefits Received By Appellee During the Marriage Point of Error No. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Finding that Appellant at Fault in the Break-Up of the Marriage by Considering Evidence that was Not Relevant in Time and Not Supported by the Evidence Appellant “Assaulted” Appellee on Eight Occasions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

iv Appellant Held Appellee Captive Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Evidence of Conduct Before or After Marriage are Not Relevant as Fault in Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Point of Error No. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Ordered Appellant to Pay Spousal Support to Appellee Although He had No Ability to Pay Point of Error No. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding a Disproportionate Part of the Tract Adjoining the Residence Conclusion and Prayer for Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Certificate of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

v INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page Aaron v. Aaron 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Anchor Casualty Co. v. Bowers 393 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. V. McShane 239 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Butnaru v. Ford Motor Company 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Cameron v. Cameron 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14, 15 Chavez v. Chavez 269 S.W.3d 763 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008) no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Davis v. Huey 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Griffin v. Birkman 266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 17 Harrington v. Harrington 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Hooks v. Bridgewater 229 S.W. 1114 (Tex. 1921) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 In re Allstate Insurance Company 232 S.W.3d 340 (Tex.App-Tyler 2007, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 In re Bass 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

vi In re Case 28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 In the Interest of M.C.F. 121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Jackson v. Smith 703 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Knight v. Knight 301 S.W.3d 723 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc. 724 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 17 Lozano v. Lozano 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 9620, 2009 WL 4882816 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no writ hist.) 7 Mangum v. Turner 255 S.W.3d 223 (Tex.App.-Waco 2009, pet. den.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 McKeehan v. McKeehan 355 S.W.3d 282 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. den’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 28 Mea v. Mea 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1971, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Powell v. Powell 822 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1991, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Puntarelli v. Peterson 405 S.W.3d 131 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Schlueter v. Schlueter 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Verhage v. Verhage 2006 TexApp LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (TexApp-Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.) . 8, 9, 14 Walker v. Packer 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

vii Wilhoite v. Sims 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Zagorski v. Zagorski 116 S.W.3d 309 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2003, pet. den.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Codes, Rules and Statutes Page TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01(b)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 TEXAS CONSTITUTION , Article 16, §15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 TEXAS PROPERTY CODE §5.072(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , Rule 401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

viii STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE Appellant and Appellee were married in 2007 and in 2012 Appellee filed for divorce. The issues in the divorce case all involved property. A hearing on a request by Appellee for temporary orders was held on March 24, 2014, and Appellant was ordered to pay temporary spousal support to Appellee in the amount of $2,000 per month.

Trial on the merits was conducted by the trial court on May 30, 2014; July 17, 2014; and July 18, 2014.

The court granted the divorce, divided various items of personal property, and held that the residence acquired by Appellant prior to the marriage was owned by the parties as tenants in common. The trial court ordered a disproportionate division of the proceeds of the sale of a lot adjoining the residence to Appellee, ordered Appellant to pay $8,000 in unpaid temporary spousal support, and awarded Appellee $10,000 in attorney’s fees.

ix STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant is a native of the United Kingdom who was trained as an accountant and worked for Texaco for 28 years. His specialty was in the field of accounting for the oil and gas industry.

He held a number of very responsible positions. In that capacity he was also Texaco’s representative to international organizations that developed and implemented software and accounting systems for that industry.

Appellant was married and has three daughters. He retired from Texaco when that company was taken over by Chevron and had both vested retirement benefits and received what he called a “redundancy,” another term for severance pay. He received those benefits both in a lump sum and in periodic monthly installments of retirement benefits.

In 2001 Appellant was employed by Shell Oil Company in Houston, Texas and living in an apartment. Appellee was one of his neighbors. They met and began a romantic relationship.

Eventually they moved in together into Appellee’s apartment. Appellant began divorce proceedings to be divorced in the U.K. While the divorce proceeding was pending Appellant altered or forged some documents in order to mislead Appellee as to the status of his divorce.

Appellant explained at trial that in the UK one can be divorced either by separation, which is a longer process, or by alleging cruelty or adultery. Because of his concern about his family and in particular one daughter about whose mental health he had concerns, he wanted to seek a divorce by the less traumatic but slower divorce process. He modified the papers sent to him from the UK to represent that divorce was imminent when the process was actually slower.

Appellant left Shell and began to work as a international business consultant, taking jobs with oil and gas producers in Mexico, Asia, and other places where he would work for several months by

x contract for an agreed contract amount. In 2006 he formed an LLC named Graham Global Consulting to which his income as a consultant was paid. Appellant and Appellee lived together at the time but Appellee was not shown as an owner of the company.

Appellee wanted to move to Nacogdoches, her home town. The parties looked at residences in Nacogdoches to consider purchase. In 2006 Appellant purchased a residence in Nacogdoches.

He paid the initial down payment and closing costs with funds sent to him by wire transfer from the UK in the amount of $85,000. The residence was conveyed to Appellant alone as grantee and he alone signed the note and deed of trust in order to secure a loan for payment of the balance.

Appellant paid off the balance in monthly installment payments of several thousand dollars sent to him by wire transfer, and in less than two years had paid off the entire balance owed.

Appellee claimed at trial that the parties had purchased the residence together with the agreement that both would own it, and that Appellant had orally agreed to convey an interest in the home to her. Appellant denied any such agreement.

The parties were married on January 31, 2007. At the time of marriage Appellee had no property of any value. She had defaulted in payment of student loan debt and Appellant showed at trial that he had paid $63,000 of her student loan debt during their relationship.

In 2008 a lot adjoining the residence lot became available for purchase. Appellant purchased it in his name only and again solely signed a promissory note and deed of trust in order to secure a loan. He paid several thousand dollars down. The parties made several payments on the lot, but eventually they defaulted. Shortly before trial Appellant borrowed approximately $15,000 from his sister and brother in law to pay off the balance owed on the lot to avoid foreclosure.

xi During the marriage Appellee seldom worked and earned little income. The parties lived on income earned by Appellant in his consulting business. Appellant also had some income from his retirement benefits earned prior to marriage and some funds he received from his father’s estate after the father’s death.

Appellant experienced numerous health issues. He had four strokes, two heart attacks, and epileptic seizures. Both his physical health and mental capacity declined. He suffered from residual effects on his mental functioning, slurring of words at times, problems maintaining his balance or equilibrium, and memory problems. He has not worked since 2010. On several occasions he had funds wire-transferred from the UK to pay living expenses and by the time the parties had separated he had expended all his funds. At the time of trial his only income was his Texaco retirement check from which he netted $1,856 per month.

The parties had a tumultuous relationship, with numerous arguments and disputes. By the end of 2011 they were discussing divorce. At this time Appellee was aware of Appellant’s health issues. She testified at trial that she took him to see several medical specialists. She told Appellant at that time she it was her turn to take care of him. However, the parties continued to bicker and argue. In April of 2012 Appellant accompanied Appellee to Houston to help do repairs to the home of an aunt of Appellee. The parties again argued and Appellant decided to leave to drive back to Nacogdoches. They wrestled over the car keys which Appellee refused to give to Appellant.

Appellee claimed at trial that on this occasion Appellant assaulted her. Appellant drove home and when he arrived at his residence he discovered Appellee’s father removing personal property from the residence.

xii The parties again discussed divorce and Appellant prepared a written document as evidence of their agreement to divide their property. He secured $20,000 from the UK to pay to her as part of a settlement. Appellee accepted the money but later denied she was bound by any agreement because Appellant had “breached” that agreement because he had not executed all the documents necessary for divorce before he left for a trip to the UK.

According to Appellee’s divorce petition, the parties separated July 1, 2012. A few weeks later Appellant traveled to the UK to see his family members and attend the wedding of a daughter.

While Appellant was in the UK Appellee discovered that while he was there he had visited some porn sites on line and she discovered the papers regarding his divorce from his previous spouse that he had altered or forged.

Much of the trial was consumed with Appellee’s evidence, presented in numerous three-ring binders indexed and tabbed, itemizing all the wrongs that Appellant had done her, including numerous counts of fraud, allegations that Appellant had committed adultery, numerous allegations of assault or emotional distress, allegations that Appellant had visited porn sites while in the UK, and evidence of the substantial income she could have earned in her occupation had she not married Appellant. She testified at great length that her services to Appellant in connection with his consulting business were critical to his ability to perform his job, to the extent that she should be considered a partner in his business.

Appellant’s response was that Appellee had no experience in accounting, much less the specialized area in his expertise, that she never provided any services to a client, that she never worked in a client’s workplace, that he had clerical and secretarial support from his clients in the work place, and that he had never charged nor collected any compensation for any services by

xiii Appellee. He further showed that while she may have proof-read reports to clients, she lacked the knowledge and expertise to write any such reports.

In March of 2014 Appellee set a hearing on a request for temporary orders, including a request for temporary spousal support. Appellant appeared pro se, telling the court that his attorney had withdrawn due to his inability to pay, he had just returned from the UK where he had suffered another stroke, and that he could not pay spousal support. The trial court ordered him to pay to Appellee temporary spousal support of $2,000 per month. He has not done so. The trial court ordered him on final hearing to pay that support for four months, or $8,000.

In a hearing held after the trial on the merits Appellant showed the trial court that he had borrowed money to pay off the note on the lot which adjoined the residence and the trial court modified its ruling to allow payment of that debt out of the proceeds of any sale before the parties divided the remaining proceeds.

xiv SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The trial court abused its discretion by judicially finding and declaring that Appellant and Appellee are tenants in common as to the residence purchased by Appellant prior to their marriage.

The purported oral agreement for the conveyance of an interest in real property is not enforceable because of the Statute of Frauds, found in TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE 26.01.

If an oral agreement for the conveyance of an interest in real property is permitted under Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.) and Aaron v Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.), the evidence heard by the trial court is insufficient to support an oral agreement in this case.

To grant an interest to Appellee in Appellant’s residence is to divest him of an interest in his separate property, which is an abuse of discretion.

Any finding by the trial court that Appellant’s residence was not purchased with his separate funds is unsupported by the evidence, as Appellant conclusively established that his funds earned or acquired prior to marriage was the source of the down payment and mortgage payments.

The trial court abused its discretion in failing and refusing to consider in its division of the community property of the parties acts by Appellee which constitute fraud on the community estate and involve an amount of money that is significant in relation to the total community estate.

The trial court abused its discretion in failing and refusing to consider in its division of the community property of the parties financial benefits Appellee received, including Appellant’s payment of her student loans incurred prior to the marriage, when the amount involved was significant in relation to the total community estate.

xv The trial court abused its discretion by considering evidence of alleged wrongful acts by Appellant both prior to the marriage and after the parties had separated and agreed to divorce because such evidence was not relevant to the issue of the breakup of the marriage.

The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Appellant to pay temporary spousal support to Appellee when the evidence showed that the amount ordered was in excess of his income, he was disabled and unable to work, and he had no resources with which to pay support.

The trial court abused its discretion in awarding to Appellee a disproportionate ownership interest in a lot adjoining Appellant’s residence acquired during the marriage when the evidence showed that Appellant provided the down payment and incurred debt to pay off the mortgage note when foreclosure was threatened.

xvi POINTS OF ERROR POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING APPELLEE AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON IN APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT HOLDING.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 3: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DIVESTING APPELLANT OF ONE-HALF OF HIS OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE AND AWARDING THAT INTEREST TO APPELLEE.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE RESIDENCE WAS NOT PURCHASED WITH APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY FUNDS WHEN THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED A PURCHASE WITH HIS SEPARATE FUNDS.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 5: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISREGARDED UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLEE COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COMMUNITY ESTATE.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 6: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY APPELLEE DURING THE MARRIAGE.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 7: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT AT FAULT IN THE BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE BY CONSIDERING EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT RELEVANT IN TIME AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

xvii POINT OF ERROR NO. 8: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO APPELLEE ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO ABILITY TO PAY.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 9: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING A DISPROPORTIONATE PART OF THE TRACT ADJOINING THE RESIDENCE.

xviii ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES Appellant shows the court that the trial court in this divorce case abused its discretion and committed errors as a matter of law that in reasonable likelihood caused or contributed to an unjust or improper decision. Those errors are grouped by subject matter and argument is combined in order to avoid duplication. All issues involve either the division of marital property or temporary spousal support.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING APPELLEE AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON IN APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT HOLDING.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 3: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DIVESTING APPELLANT OF ONE-HALF OF HIS OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE AND AWARDING THAT INTEREST TO APPELLEE.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review in a family law case is clear: whether the trial court abused its discretion. “Abuse of discretion” occurs if a trial court makes a decision that is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it amounts to a clear error. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003). As long as the trial court does not abuse its discretion it may divide the marital property in such a way as it deems right. Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1971, no writ hist.). Despite that

broad discretion there must exist some reasonable basis for an unequal division of the property of the parties. Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.).

A trial court abuses its discretion if it makes a finding without sufficient facts on which to rationally base its ruling. Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.App.–Austin 2008, pet. ref’d).

While a trial court has discretion to weigh evidence that supports its decision, if the evidence is legally insufficient to support that decision the court abuses its discretion. In the Interest of M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d).

When a trial court fails to analyze or apply law correctly it may abuse its discretion. There is no discretion in either determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992); In re Allstate Insurance Company, 232 S.W.3d 340 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2007, no writ hist.). Even evidentiary rulings may abuse a trial court’s discretion if they violate the Rules of Evidence. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.App.–Austin 1987, no writ hist.).

THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING From comments made during the trial and the multitude of findings by the trial court against the interest of Appellant the trial judge’s disapproval of Appellant’s conduct is obvious. However, the court recognized that there was little community property and what is acquired prior to marriage cannot be community property (RR Vol. 2, p.80.) The evidence showed that Appellee already had almost all of it. She had all the operating motor vehicles the parties had acquired; had received $20,000 from Appellant, which he secured to carry out an agreement between them in contemplation of divorce (Ex. D-46, D-44); and she had emptied Appellant’s business bank account by taking

$9,400 without his consent, leaving that account overdrawn (Ex. D-44). The parties had already divided their personal property with a few exceptions.

The only property of any significant monetary value remaining was Appellant’s residence, purchased by him prior to marriage. Under the facts and law the trial court was limited in what it could do regarding that residence. The evidence was clear that the residence had been purchased prior to marriage and that all the closing documents showed Appellant as the sole owner (Ex. R-11, R-12, R-13). The substantial down payment made at closing of the purchase came from funds acquired by Appellant prior to marriage. Appellant was able to trace all the payments made on the mortgage note to their sources, his retirement benefits earned prior to marriage and his inheritance from his father.

There was no evidence of an enhancement in value of the residence by use of community funds, so Appellant neither sought nor did the trial court award any reimbursement to the community estate from Appellant’s separate estate.

Under these circumstances, if the trial court wanted to award property to Appellee only one option remained: find a way to give Appellee an interest in Appellant’s residence. So the trial judge adopted a theory advanced by Appellee, that the parties jointly acquired Appellant’s residence as “tenants in common.” The trial court then awarded Appellee an undivided one-half interest in Appellant’s residence and ordered it sold.

That theory has been adopted in only two cases of which Appellant is aware. In Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.), the court affirmed a finding by the trial court that the parties were “tenants in common” in a residence acquired solely in the husband’s name two years prior to marriage solely in his name. In 2012 the 14th Court of

Appeals followed Harrington as precedent in Aaron v. Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.). There the court found that the parties had an oral agreement to jointly own a residence purchased in the name of the husband solely as a matter of convenience.

The Findings of Fact signed by the trial judge are puzzling. For example, Findings 27 and purportedly state that the funds used to purchase Appellant’s residence were not his separate funds. Yet the trial court did not find that the residence was community property, and the actual judgment declares Appellee to be a tenant in common, not an owner as community property.

Finding 27 also finds that neither the down payment nor the monthly payments were made with funds from Appellant’s money market account. And Finding 24 finds (incorrectly) that the down payment was made with Appellant’s business income, not separate funds. Yet the purchase of the residence and the payment of the down payment occurred prior to marriage, and there is no evidence that Appellee ever contributed any monies of hers to the purchase. All monies used to purchase the residence were earned or acquired by Appellant prior to the marriage: by definition those funds must have been his separate property.

Since the Final Decree of Divorce signed by the trial judge adjudicates that the parties are tenants in common in the residence, Appellant focuses on that issue.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO FOLLOW HARRINGTON AND AARON It is public policy that any agreement to convey an interest in real property must be in writing.

TEX . BUS. & COMM . CODE § 26.01(b)(4). This means that when any performance of an agreement requires a transfer of property in land, that agreement must be in writing. Mangum v. Turner, 255

4 S.W.3d 223 (Tex.App.–Waco 2009, pet. den.). Traditionally this rule has been referred to as the “Statute of Frauds” and dates back to the earliest Texas jurisprudence. Even if the parties only agree to a future conveyance of an interest in real property a written contract is nonetheless required.

TEX .PROP .CODE § 5.072(a).

In the very limited instances in which Texas courts have allowed exceptions to the “Statute of Frauds,” specific evidence and performance by the vendee is required. The most common exception is that based on Hooks v. Bridgewater, 229 S.W. 1114, 1116 (Tex. 1921), which allows a party to enforce an oral agreement provided that he can show (1) payment of consideration, in either money or services, (2) possession by the vendee, which must be exclusive, and (3) the making by the vendee of valuable and permanent improvements to the property. This case does not show evidence that meets the Hooks v. Bridgewater standard. There is no evidence that Appellee paid any consideration for an interest in Appellant’s residence, that her possession was exclusive, or that she made any valuable and permanent improvements to the property (and if any improvements were made they were funded by Appellant’s income).

Given the public policy of Texas against oral agreements to convey real property, is there anything about the facts in this case that justified the trial court ignoring that public policy?

Appellant will show that given the facts in this case, and in all cases involving oral promises between persons in intimate relationships, there is even less reason to ignore that public policy and enforce such promises.

It is the policy of the State of Texas that promises between spouses or those who reside together without marriage should only be enforceable if they are in writing. TEX . BUS. & COMM .

CODE §26.01(b)(3). Texas recognizes that promises made in an intimate relationship may be less

reliable than arms-length transactions because of the nature of the relationship. The requirement of written agreements avoids elevating “pillow talk” to enforceable agreements.

Oral agreements between parties engaged in an intimate relationship are less likely to be confirmed by any written evidence or documentation. In arms-length transactions it is common to find communications between the parties, whether mailed correspondence as in the past or communications sent by email, or telecopier today. Those communications are available to a court as evidence that can either confirm or deny the existence of an oral agreement. When promises are made in intimate relationships written documentation is much less likely to be found because any communications are likely private.

In cases to enforce oral promises made by those in intimate relationship it is much less likely that any third party witnesses will be aware of the communications between the parties and available to testify. In arm’s length transactions it is much more likely that some third party, whether a realtor, real estate appraiser, loan officer at a potential lender, or property surveyor may have some knowledge of any oral agreement between the parties. Those engaged in intimate relationships are likely to discuss issues privately and without any witnesses.

Another reason to refuse to enforce oral agreements between persons in intimate relationships is that they almost always require reliance on testimony by an interested party. Testimony by an interested witness always requires a different level of scrutiny than other types. It has been recognized that in some instances the testimony of an interested witness may amount to no evidence at all. The exception to the interested witness rule is that evidence by an interested witness may be considered if it is not contradicted by any other witness or circumstances and is “direct and positive” and free of any contradiction, inaccuracy , or other conflicting circumstances. Anchor Casualty Co.

v. Bowers, 393 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1965); Lozano v. Lozano, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 9620, 2009 WL 4882816 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2009, no writ hist.). Such testimony may be quite difficult to find in cases involving persons in intimate relationships.

Finally, a reason to refuse to enforce oral agreements to convey real property between those in intimate relationships is that the language used in those relationships may differ from that which would be usual and customary in an arms-length transaction. For example, if two persons who do not co-habit and do not have an intimate relationship make mention of “our land” or “our property” the language used has some legal significance, i.e. that each of them owns an interest in the property.

On the other hand, if two people in an intimate relationship speak of “our home” that word has several possible meanings other than joint ownership. It means where they live. Parties can have a “home” in an apartment, in a rent house, in a mobile home in a mobile home park. Thus the words “our house” or “our home” may not be as reliable an indicator of ownership as in other circumstances.

With the increased frequency of co-habitation by unmarried persons it is likely that more cases of this nature will arise. The adoption of a theory of “tenancy in common” by those contemplating marriage threatens to become the exception that consumes the rule.

Harrington and Aaron are not based on the TEXAS FAMILY CODE or any other statutory provision adopted by the State of Texas. The theory of “tenancy in common” ignores the public policy of the state against enforceability of oral agreements for conveyances of land, strong presumption that ownership of property should be governed by its characterization as either community or separate under the Texas Constitution and the TEXAS FAMILY CODE, and the policy that agreements between spouses must be written. Those cases offer no reason why the courts

should uphold one rule prohibiting oral agreements in most cases but adopt a different rule for those who cohabit.

This court has recognized that rulings regarding ownership of real property of spouses must not disregard the distinction between separate and community property. Verhage v. Verhage, 2006 Tex.App.LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.). To adopt a theory that a spouse or potential spouse can acquire an interest in the separate property of the other party by some oral agreement threatens to upend the accepted rules of characterization of property, to simply allow a party to make an “end run” around accepted law.

Other than the Harrington and Aaron, Texas courts have declined to adopt a theory that persons in intimate relationships, or those who marry, may become tenants in common based on alleged oral promises. This court should likewise decline to adopt the reasoning of Harrington and Aaron and find that the trial judge abused his discretion in enforcing an alleged oral agreement between the parties to convey an interest in Appellant’s residence to Appellee.

THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A A FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON Even if the court declines to reject the reasoning of Harrington and Aaron the purported oral agreement in question in this suit should not be enforced as there are substantial differences in the facts between those cases and this one. The evidence in this case is insufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. Evidence that is so slight that any inference would be in effect a guess is no evidence at all. McKeehan v. McKeehan, 355 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. den’d).

Existence of Joint Tenancy Is a Question of Law: It is well established that a trial court hearing a divorce case has substantial discretion in dividing a marital estate. But the trial court does not have the same discretion on a question of law.

For example, although the court has discretion to decide what evidence it gives weight to, whether the agreement between the parties is governed by the Statute of Frauds is a question of law. Wilhoite v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2013, no writ hist.). The trial court has no discretion at all to award to one spouse an interest in the separate property of the other. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982); Powell v. Powell, 822 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1991, no writ hist.); In re Case, 28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2000, no writ hist.); Verhage v. Verhage, 2006 Tex.App.LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.).

Looking for a Residence Together is Not Evidence of Ownership: Appellee testified that she and Appellant looked for a residence together. In Harrington the court noted the testimony of the wife that the parties referred to the residence as “our home.” This leads to a simple question. How else would the parties who are co-habiting in a residence refer to it? Joint occupancy is not the same as joint ownership. So how legally significant is the use of the term “our house” or “our home?” At the time Appellant purchased his residence the parties had co- habited for several years and intended to continue to do so. Appellant expected that Appellee would reside with him in any residence he acquired, whether rented or owned. Doubtless he would have consulted with Appellee before acquiring any residence in which he expected both of them to reside, whether community or separate. It would be unusual indeed for one party to unilaterally make a decision to choose a residence for both of them without consulting with the other party.

Appellant’s testimony as to the circumstances under which the parties looked for a residence in Nacogdoches is consistent with this narrative (RR Vol. 3, pp. 79-80).

To illustrate this point, assume that the parents of one of the parties offered to purchase a house for their son or daughter in expectation of marriage, as a gift to their child. The betrothed couple then search for a house together in which they will begin their married life. They go to the closing of the conveyance together. Does their joint search convert the separate property acquired by gift into jointly owned property? The answer is clearly no. To further illustrate the point, assume one party owns a separate property business which he or she either owned prior to marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance. The other party works there.

She or he refers to the business as “our business.” Does that language convert the ownership from separate to community?

That the parties jointly searched for a residence acceptable to both is not an indicia of ownership, but a recognition that one member of a couple is likely to consider the wishes of the other in selecting a place for them to reside. Therefore, that evidence is of little import.

Was There a Common Plan or Design in Acquiring the Residence?

One factor mentioned in both Harrington and Aaron is evidence of a common plan or design to divide or allocate the expenses of the purchase of the residence and their living expenses. In Harrington the appellee testified that “she spent much of her separate property income on the house and on living expenses of the children.”

In Aaron the appellee testified that she paid the closing costs for the purchase of the residence, that she paid the mortgage payments for the first six months after they acquired the

residence, and that when the appellant began to make the mortgage payments she paid for their food and utilities, a contribution that was equal to the monthly mortgage payment.

The contrast between those cases and this case could not be more clear. The evidence showed that: !Appellant paid the entire down payment and all closing costs with his separate funds received by him by wire transfer from his accounts; ! Appellant paid, with his separate funds, all the mortgage payments after the purchase and fully paid the balance due on the note made to purchase the residence; ! Appellant paid all the living expenses of the parties, while Appellee paid none except with his income (RR Vol. 3, p. 47).

Appellee used any income she earned during their relationship for her own purposes and not as part of a common plan: Appellant paid all their living expenses. (RR Vol. 3, p. 47) There is no evidence that Appellee contributed, either directly or indirectly, to the purchase of the residence.

Prior Conduct: In Harrington the court noted that the parties had lived together “for about three years in residences leased in both their names.” In this case, there is no such indication of a prior joint residence. In fact, when asked whose residence the parties lived in prior to their marriage Appellee insisted it was her residence (RR Vol. 2, p. 82).

Appellant Made a Substantial Down Payment with Separate Funds: In Aaron the court noted that the wife was not able to “contribute” as much toward the down payment as the husband, clearly implying that there was a joint effort to accumulate funds in order to purchase the residence. In this case it is clear that all the funds used to purchase the residence

were acquired or earned before the parties even knew each other, as a result of Appellant’s long term employment with Texaco.

The size of the initial payment made by Appellant is significant evidence of his intent to purchase the home as his own (Ex. R-17; also see p. 20 of Exhibit P-4 showing instructions to wire transfer the funds and Ex. R-14 which shows the amount required for the closing). If Appellant’s intent was to acquire a jointly owned residence why commit such a large portion of his separate funds to the down payment instead of paying for the residence during the marriage?

Appellant Paid Off the Residence Quickly: If one assumes that the parties intended their relationship to last and it was agreed, as Appellee argues, to jointly own the residence, why would Appellant agree to such a short note term and such large monthly payments? He paid off the residence in less than two years after he purchased it with separate funds he had accumulated prior to the relationship of the parties (Ex. R- 19). If the parties’ intent was to jointly own the residence why not utilize a more common 15 to 25 year mortgage to be repaid by the earnings of the parties during their marriage?

The short payment schedule for payment of the mortgage on the residence is some evidence of Appellant’s intent to primarily rely upon his separate property funds to pay for the residence instead of community income he earned during their marriage. This shows an intent to treat the residence as his alone. Appellant provided the court with an itemized statement tracing all the funds used to make the monthly house payments to their source (Ex. R-19). Likewise, Respondent traced all the income earned during the marriage and how it was disposed of, what funds he had on hand at the time of the marriage, and showed that none of his post-marriage income was sent to the UK

and could have been the source of the funds used to make the payments on the residence (Ex. R19a-25).

The Subsequent Conduct of the Parties is Evidence of Intent: Appellee testified that Appellant told her that the residence would be theirs and that he would convey record title to her. Yet in 2008 Appellant purchased an adjoining lot in his name only (Ex. R-26, R-27, R-29, and R-33). Appellee was aware of this purchase.

If Appellee had an agreement that the residence would be conveyed to her and jointly owned, why did she not object to Appellant also acquiring title to the second tract in his name alone after their marriage? At the time of the second purchase she was aware that he had never conveyed any ownership interest in the residence to her although she says he had promised to do so. Her silence is evidence that contradicts her claim.

Appellee testified that “[i]t was joint ownership of everything, because we built the business together from 2003 forward.” (RR Vol. 2, p. 109). In 2006, the same year as when Appellant purchased the residence, he created an LLC named Global Energy Consulting (RR Vol. 2, 84-85) which showed Appellant as the only owner. So there again, even though she claimed they were “joint owners” Appellee knew she was not shown as an owner of the LLC.

For the reasons outlined above, the evidence is simply insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that the parties agreed to purchase Appellant’s residence and own it jointly, and the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a one-half interest in that residence to Appellee.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO DISCRETION TO DIVEST APPELLANT OF ANY INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY The Texas Supreme Court directly addressed an award to one spouse of an interest in the separate property of the other in Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982). The court explained the distinction between community and separate property this way: Community property owes its existence to the legal fact of marriage, and when the parties to that compact determine their relationship should end, property acquired during the marriage is and should be divided among them in a just and right manner. By way of contrast separate property, in the community property setting, owes its existence to wholly extramarital factors, things unrelated to the marriage. In relation to that property, the parties are, in essence, strangers; they are separate. Any property that arises independently of marriage as a means of “equitably” balancing the spouse’s positions on divorce cannot be justified.

An award of an interest in Appellant’s separate property residence to Appellee is actually an attempt to characterize his separate property as some other form of property so that the trial court can “equitably balance” the positions of the parties, exactly what the Texas Supreme Court said is not permissible.

As this court said, in Verhage v. Verhage, 2006 Tex.App. LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.).

Any judicial divestiture of separate property would essentially disregard the constitutionally mandated distinction between the separate and community property of spouses. . . . . Moreover, allowing a trial court to divest separate property from one spouse and award it to the other spouse as part of the latter’s separate estate would impermissibly enlarge the exclusive constitutional definition of separate property.

If the trial court mis-characterized Appellant’s separate property as either community property of the parties or as the separate property of his spouse, that error is reversible error, because

the effect would be to divest the spouse of his separate property. Tex.Const., art. 16, § 15; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977); Cameron v. Cameron.

This court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in divesting Appellant of his separate property and awarding Appellee an interest in it. The court should reverse and render judgment that Appellant’s residence remains his sole and separate property, not subject to sale by the order of the trial court, and that Appellee has no ownership interest therein.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE RESIDENCE WAS NOT PURCHASED WITH APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY FUNDS WHEN THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED A PURCHASE WITH HIS SEPARATE FUNDS.

As Appellant noted above, some confusion exists as to the effect of the trial court’s finding of fact that his separate property funds were neither used to pay the down payment on the residence nor the mortgage note payments, when the court then did not find the property to be community property. The purchase was made prior to the marriage of the parties with Appellant’s funds, so how could the funds used be anything other than separate property? Appellant is not aware of any authority that a spouse has a claim to income earned by the other spouse prior to marriage.

Appellant is also confused by the findings by the trial court because, if in fact community funds were used to improve or pay down debt against the residence the remedy or relief would be a right of contribution, not a transfer of ownership. Characterization of property is determined at the property’s inception of title. Chavez v. Chavez, 269 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2003, pet.den.)

Confusion also arises from the court’s finding because the actual evidence is at such odds with Findings of Fact 24, 25, 27, and 28. Appellant reviews the evidence regarding the purchase of the residence to explain the events and to make clear that the findings of fact by the trial court do not add up to the result.

Appellant’s residence was purchased on August 25, 2006 (Ex. R-11). Appellant was required to pay at the closing $83,934.95 (Ex. R-11, R-17). Appellant wire-transferred his funds for the down payment three days prior, on August 22, 2006, in the amount of $85,000 (Ex. R-18). The parties were not married until January 31, 2007.

Appellant showed the source of each payment made. He showed that the funds used for payments were sent to him by wire transfer from the United Kingdom and he traced each payment made to those funds. In support of his claim that his separate funds were used to make the payments on the residence he offered the testimony of an officer of his bank that he sent no monies abroad to the UK except for some specific funds used for a specific purpose (RR Vol. 3, p. 9-12). The purpose of that testimony was to establish that no funds had been transferred by Appellant to the UK after the marriage of the parties; therefore, any funds that came into the US to Appellant must be his separate funds because they had to be in the UK prior to the marriage of the parties.

Appellee’s testimony, that the payments made on the residence were actually funded by community income, is so weak as to be laughable. She claimed the source of the down payment was income earned by Appellant as a payment for his services through his business and those funds, coupled with a little of this and a little of that, somehow added up to the amount used to fund the purchase of the residence. Appellee failed to show how the parties could pay their living expenses with Appellant’s income, pay income taxes on it, and yet have 100% of it available as a down

payment on the residence. And no explanation was given as to how Appellant’s income prior to marriage became community funds.

If the trial court relied on Appellant’s testimony to support her claim that she should be an owner of Appellant’s house it clearly abused its discretion. The trial court’s findings of fact, if it even relied upon them, are at such odds with the credible evidence that it is raises the question if the trial judge even read them. A trial court abuses its discretion if it relied on facts that are so unreliable or weak to form a sufficient basis for a rational decision. Griffin v. Birkman, p. 197. A trial court that makes a decision which is not based on sufficient facts to make a decision either way abuses its discretion. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., p.938.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 5: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISREGARDED UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLEE COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COMMUNITY ESTATE.

Appellant offered evidence that during his marriage to Appellee she had used community funds to improve the residences of both her mother and her aunt (Ex. R-37; R-38a-38i) as well as payment of other expenses of her family members. He corroborated that testimony with checks and other records that showed the expenditures (Ex. R- 38a-38i). Appellant testified that these expenditures were made without his knowledge and consent, and only discovered by him at a later date (RR Vol. 3, p. 107-111; Ex. R-37; Ex. R-38A-38H; Ex. R-39-39E). Appellee never denied making those expenditures and never claimed that Appellant was either aware of or had consented to her expenditures.

The use of community funds by a spouse to improve the property of a relative, without the knowledge and consent of the other spouse, is what has been termed “fraud on the community.”

Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998). Fraud on the community occurs when one spouse breaches his fiduciary duty to the other by disposing of community property without the consent of the other. Puntarelli v. Peterson, 405 S.W.3d 131, 137-138 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] no pet.). Once a spouse produces evidence of such a transfer the burden shifts to the other spouse to rebut the presumption of constructive fraud. Jackson v. Smith, 703 S.W.2d 791, 795-796 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1985, no writ). Once Appellant produced evidence of use of community funds for the use and benefit of Appellee’s relatives the burden shifted to her to rebut the presumption that her expenditures were fraudulent.

Appellee was never required by the trial court to provide any explanation for her use of community funds to enhance the value of her relative’s residences. In fact, the court simply ignored this evidence. And Appellee never offered any evidence to rebut the presumption of fraud.

Appellant concedes that the trial court had discretion to hear this evidence and to consider it in making a fair and equitable division of the estates of the parties. But can the trial court simply ignore it? Appellant also acknowledges that if the amount involved is minimal in relation to the overall estate being divided by the court that the court may be justified in ignoring it. But in this case the amount involved was equal to or greater than the value of the community property the court was dividing.

A trial court has discretion to base its decision on conflicting evidence. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978). And a trial court has discretion to decide an issue if there is some evidence of a “substantive and probative character” to support a decision. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Company, 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002). But if there is no evidence that the use of funds by a spouse was for the benefit of the community estate and made with the consent of the spouse it is an

abuse of discretion for a trial court to ignore that evidence, especially when the amount involved is as great at the community estate being divided.

Appellant requests that the trial court remand the division of the community estate of the parties with directions to the trial court to consider the fraud on the community estate committed by Appellee in its division of the community estate.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 6: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY APPELLEE DURING THE MARRIAGE.

The testimony at trial showed that Appellant had by the time she met Appellant defaulted in repayment of her student loans1. Appellant provided evidence of payments of her student loans with his income of $63,000 (Ex. R-41). While Appellee questioned the amount paid, she did not question that Appellant had in fact paid her pre-existing student loan debt (RR Vol. 3, p. 178). The trial judge makes no mention of the payment of Appellee’s student loan debt in his findings or fact and there is no indication that these payments were even considered. While a trial judge has discretion to weigh evidence in making a just and right division of the parties to a divorce action, he has no discretion to simply ignore evidence. While the court has discretion to ignore transactions involving minimal amounts of money or amounts that are small in relation to the total estate of the parties, the amounts that Appellant paid toward Appellee’s student loan debt is approximately two times the value of the community estate the court divided. To ignore such evidence and facts is an abuse of discretion.

Appellee’s inability to pay her pre-existing student loan debt is puzzling in view of her testimony of her exceptional ability and the lucrative career she gave up to be married to Appellant.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 7: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT AT FAULT IN THE BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE BY CONSIDERING EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT RELEVANT IN TIME AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE The trial court found that Appellant was at “fault” in the breakup of the marriage (FF 32). If that finding had no effect on the rulings of the trial court Appellant would not address it; however, since it appears that this finding was the foundation for the trial court’s decision to award Appellee an interest in Appellant’s residence, Appellant must address it.

Appellant and Appellee had at times a rocky relationship, without any doubt. However, Appellee’s testimony is characterized by gross exaggerations and dramatization of events that the actual testimony frequently does not support.

Appellee alleged that several events occurred supporting her claim that Appellant’s conduct was the reason for the dissolution of the marriage of the parties. In her typical fashion, those events are documented at great length (“127 counts of fraud”). However, an examination of the actual evidence shows that she often testified more about her “conclusions” or “feeling” than about the actual facts of the event. An example is her testimony that they had a dispute over money while driving in a car one day, which she characterized as “financial terrorism.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 47).

Appellant raises this issue because that the evidence in the record does not actually support the findings of the trial court on several of these points, and the trial court has no discretion to ignore the actual evidence.

Appellant “Assaulted” Appellee On Eight Occasions: Finding of Fact No. 6 by the trial court finds that Appellant assaulted Appellee on eight different occasions. There are two major problems with this finding.

First, there is a complete lack of corroboration of any of these claims. There is no evidence that Appellee ever reported to any law enforcement officer that she had been assaulted. There is no evidence that she ever sought medical treatment. There is no photographic evidence that she was assaulted. No witness testified as to seeing any assault or sign of assault. And it is almost a certainty that anyone as verbose as Appellee would have told someone had she been assaulted; yet no family member, friend, or neighbor was called to confirm that Appellee had made a contemporaneous report of an assault.

Second, there is a marked disparity between the actual testimony and what Appellee referred to as an “assault.” The first instance of “assault” referred to by Appellee relates to events while the parties were traveling through Malaysia and Thailand (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). Appellee says that “there was a violent explosive that he has lunging and I went flying.” Yet there is no actual evidence that Appellant ever even touched Appellee.

The next instance which Appellee testified about concerned an event at home (RR Vol.1, p. 50). Appellee said that they had an argument. Even though she and her brother were having an argument about their mother’s care and they were “crosswise” by the time of trial it was Appellant who was solely responsible for their dispute. She went upstairs and he followed her, he was “screaming” and “she slid down the wall.” Nowhere is there any evidence that Appellant ever touched Appellee, much less assaulted her.

In the next event that Appellee related, a trip to Hot Springs, Arkansas, an argument between the parties occurred (RR Vol. 1, p. 54). Appellee says there was no reason for Appellant to be upset about anything. Appellant testified that he became upset when Appellee said to her friends that she wished she was not with him, which humiliated him in front of her friends (RR Vol. 3, pp. 139-140).

Appellant was upset but there is no evidence that he touched anyone, much less assaulted Appellee.

He went to bed, got up early the next morning, and drove home.

Next Appellee testified about an incident in which she claimed Appellant became angry over a power cord (RR Vol. 1, p. 56). She said he “got into a Rugby stance” and she was “fearful.”

However, there is no evidence that Appellant ever touched her.

According to Appellee there was another instance at the residence in which Appellant flew into a “rage” (RR Vol. 1, p. 60). She further said “he yelled at me and came at me. He didn’t hit me, but he came close. I raised my fist and I backed up.” She says that Appellant then ran around the house destroying personal property, one of many occasions on which she claimed he destroyed personal property. If in fact Appellant had destroyed the personal property of the parties as many times as Appellee claimed in her testimony there would have been no property for the court to divide.

The most telling incident is one that Appellee related at her aunt’s home in Houston (RR Vol.

1, p. 69.). The parties had gone to the aunt’s home to make repairs. Appellee yelled at Appellant.

She said that Appellant grabbed her, threw her up against the wall, and choked her. Appellant’s testimony was that he did not assault her but was trying to get his car keys which she refused to give to him so he could return home (RR Vol. 3, p. 143). Appellee herself admitted that they were in a tussle over the car keys, her refusing to give them to him. What is most interesting about these events is that when Appellant returned to his home in Nacogdoches he found Appellee’s father parked at the house removing his personal property. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 51-53).

Appellee admitted that she told her father to go the residence and gather up property from the house (RR Vol. 2, p. 104-105). The argument over the car keys was not because Appellant was being unreasonable but because Appellee wanted to detain him as long as possible in Houston while

her father cleaned out the house (RR Vol. 3, p. 143). It is also instructional that when law enforcement was called it was not for the purpose of charging Appellant with a crime but rather to ascertain if he was safely driving to his residence in Nacogdoches (RR Vol. 1, p. 69-71). And, Appellant, the man who had assaulted her, called her when he reached home to tell her he had arrived safely (RR Vol. 1, p. 71).

Of the eight instances of “assault” there is actual testimony of any touching by Appellant of Appellee on only one occasion, at Appellee’s aunt’s home, and the testimony there is conflicting and supports the conclusion that a disagreement arose when Appellee attempted to detain Appellant in Houston for a sufficient period to allow her father to clean out his residence of his personal property.

When the events of that day are understood in context it is more likely that no assault actually occurred but instead a “tussle” over the car keys happened.

On another occasion Appellee testified that “[h]e assaulted me.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 121). She says not that he hit her, or knocked her down, but instead “I broke down. I completely just fell out to the point of not being able to physically get up.” Again, while Appellee characterizes as an “assault” lacks any evidence of any touching by Appellant.

Appellant Held Appellee Captive Abroad: Appellee testified that Appellant had essentially held her captive for a period of five months on a trip to Malaysia and Thailand (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). Again, there is no evidence that Appellee reported that event to any authorities nor made any attempt to “escape.” There was no contact made reporting her status to local United States Diplomatic authorities. There is no evidence of how Appellant could have imprisoned Appellee in a hotel room and kept her there while he worked at the offices of the company for which he was contracted to provide consulting services. When Appellee

returned to the United States she sought no protection, from law enforcement or anyone else. She returned to her residence with Appellant, the man who she claimed held her captive abroad for five months.

Evidence of Conduct Before or After Marriage Not Relevant As Fault in Marriage: The evidence showed that prior to the marriage of the parties Appellant altered or modified some documents relating to his divorce from his previous spouse in the United Kingdom and showed those to Appellee. Appellant admitted to such conduct. (RR Vol. 3, p. 24-27). He explained at trial that in the UK there are different ways of seeking a divorce, the shorter procedures requiring proof of either cruelty or adultery, and that he chose the more lengthy option of separation in consideration of his family.

Appellee testified that she discovered Appellant’s forgery of divorce documents in September of 2012 after the parties had separated and after he had left the country to return to the UK for a family visit. Appellant objected to all this evidence on the basis of relevance. Evidence of conduct prior to the marriage is not relevant to the issue of fault in the breakup of the marriage, particularly when it is not discovered until the parties have already separated and filed for divorce.

Appellee had already decided to divorce Appellant the previous December. She said she remained with him only to care for him, and intended to stay no longer than one year.

She filed a petition for divorce herself on September 21, 2012. She contended that she was not bound by any agreement with Appellant to accept $20,000 and items of personal property because he had “breached” their agreement. The way he had done so? By not executing all the documents in full satisfaction of her claim to the community assets needed to finalize the divorce by the time he left to travel to the UK in July of 2012.

The evidence conclusively showed that Appellant’s action regarding his divorce papers occurred prior to the marriage and that Appellee did not discover his action until months after the parties had separated and filed for divorce. Therefore, that conduct could not have been a material factor causing the divorce.

Likewise, Appellant testified that learning that Appellant had visited pornographic web sites while he was in the UK was relevant to the issue of “fault” in the marriage. Again, this conduct occurred after the parties agreed to divorce, the parties had already separated, and Appellant left for the UK.

Appellant objected to all this testimony when offered on the grounds of relevance, i.e., that what occurred before the marriage and after the marriage over could not be relevant to the issue of fault in the breakup or dissolution of that marriage. Evidence must be both relevant and material.

Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2007).

Appellant concedes that a trial court has discretion to hear and weigh the evidence and reach conclusions based on it, that any evidentiary rulings by the trial court are committed to its discretion, and that reversal is justified only when the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, p. 234). But relevance has limits. Under Rule 401, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , the court is to determine the purpose of offering the evidence and whether there exists some logical or direct connection between the evidence offered and what the offering party seeks to prove. What is the scope of admissible evidence to prove fault in the breakup of the marriage?

First, the event must have happened during the marriage. Evidence of some act by Appellant before the parties married cannot, by definition, constitute fault during the marriage.

Second, the event must have happened prior to the decision of the parties to “break up.” Once the decision to terminate the marriage has been made, no act afterwards can be considered a cause of the decision to divorce.

The trial court found “fault” by Appellee and awarded both an interest in his separate property and a disproportionate part of the community property to Appellee; therefore, it cannot be said that this evidence was harmless or that it was not a cause of the trial court’s division of the marital estate.

Consideration of evidence which is not legally relevant is a breach of discretion.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 8: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO APPELLEE ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO ABILITY TO PAY A trial court has substantial, but not unlimited, discretion to order one party in a divorce proceeding to pay spousal support to the other. In this case the order of the court for payment of temporary spousal support was an abuse of discretion. The ability to pay support was not based on any actual evidence of ability, but upon mere suspicion or surmise.

At the time the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $2,000 monthly in temporary support Appellant was over 60 years of age and had suffered four mini-strokes (including one shortly before the hearing on temporary orders), and epileptic seizures, and two heart attacks. His physical condition prevented him from working and his last income was over two years before in 2010. While at one time his services as an accountant in the oil and gas industry were in demand, companies in that industry had completed their adoption of the accounting system he had helped develop so there was less demand for his services (RR Vol. 4, p. 40). In fact, he had experienced a stroke about a week before he returned for the temporary orders hearing (RR Vol. 3, p.138).

Appellant’s only source of income was his retirement benefits in the amount of $1,856 per month. That amount is less than he was ordered to pay Appellee as temporary support. His living expenses were $1,574. (RR Vol. 3, p. 72-73; Ex. R-9, R-10, R5-8).

Appellee herself, perhaps without meaning to do so, confirmed the decline in Appellant’s health and his inability to support even himself. In her testimony about the events that occurred at her aunt’s house in Houston she mentioned that she did not want Appellant on a ladder and that she thought it unsafe for him to drive himself home to Nacogdoches (RR Vol. 1, p. 70). She also acknowledged not long before she filed her petition for divorce that rather than expect Appellant to take care of her, she expected that his needs required her to take care of him (RR, Vol. 2, p. 120-121).

In the course of her testimony about their conversation at the time she emphasized that “I went all over the State of Texas for months running him to cardiologists and neurologists and post stroke specialists, biochemical specialists, speech therapists.” Yet this is the person she contends shall be supporting her.

Appellee herself is both younger and in substantially better health than Appellant. And if her testimony is to be believed she is capable of making literally hundreds of thousands of dollars from her occupation.

The only basis on which the trial court could have found an ability by Appellant to pay temporary spousal support is if it was believed that Appellant owned or controlled substantial funds in the United Kingdom. Appellee testified that he did, but her testimony was not based on any actual knowledge, but only on suspicion or surmise. If there was evidence that Appellant had funds in the UK available to him and there was a dispute over whether they were available for payment of support the trial court had discretion to decide who to believe. But when the only evidence is that “he has

money in the UK” without identifying those funds, that testimony amounts to nothing more than surmise or suspicion. Evidence of that nature is no evidence at all. McKeehan v McKeehan,, 365 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex.App.–Austin 2011, pet. den’d). The only actual evidence of Appellant’s ownership of any assets in the UK was his divorce decree from his previous spouse, which awarded all his assets in the UK to her. Even if the trial court simply concludes “I do not believe Appellant when he says he has no money in the UK” that does not prove that he does have money. It does no more than raise a suspicion. A suspicion is no evidence at all.

The only asset in the US which could possibly serve as collateral for a loan by Appellant to pay spousal support was his residence, but Appellee had filed a lis pendens as to that property which precluded any access to funds (RR Vol. 3, p.135; Ex. R-54, R-55). Thus he showed he had no capacity to borrow funds for that purpose.

Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to pay temporary spousal support to Appellee in an amount in excess of his monthly income and without reliable evidence that he had any other source of income or property to pay that support.

POINT OF ERROR NO. 9: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING A DISPROPORTIONATE PART OF THE TRACT ADJOINING THE RESIDENCE The trial court awarded a disproportionate part of the lot adjoining Appellant’s residence to the parties, 60% to Appellee and 40% to Appellant. Under the circumstances that disproportionate award is an abuse of discretion.

The adjoining lot was purchased for $54,000. Appellant paid at closing $10,681.07 in addition to $500 he had already deposited as earnest money (Ex. R-30). After he became unable to

work and his business income ended, he fell behind in making payments, risking foreclosure. The balance due to avoid foreclosure was $15, 229.64 (Ex. R-29, R-30). Appellant secured a loan from his sister and brother-in-law to pay off the lot, avoid foreclosure, and retain it (Ex. R-31).

Thus the trial court has awarded a disproportionate part of the lot to Appellee despite the fact that the purchase was only possible by the use of Appellant’s separate property at the time of purchase and his borrowing money to pay it off and avoid foreclosure. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award to Appellee a greater interest in property she would never have had except for Appellant’s expenditure of his separate funds and which she would have lost except for Appellant’s action in borrowing money to preserve it.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF Appellant, Frederick Graham requests that the court reverse the Final Decree of Divorce signed by the presiding judge of the Nacogdoches County Court at Law on September 3, 2014.

Appellant further requests that the court render judgment that Appellee has no ownership interest in his residence located at 3704 Raguet Street in the City of Nacogdoches, Texas.

Appellant further requests that the court remand the other issues regarding the division of the community property and spousal support of the parties to the Nacogdoches County Court at Law with instructions to (a) consider the evidence with regard to expenditures made by Appellee with community funds, (b) financial benefits received by Appellee during the marriage, including but not limited to payment of Appellee’s student loan debt, (c) the disproportionate division of the tract or parcel of land adjoining Appellant’s residence, and (d) the award to Appellee of temporary spousal support by order of that court on March 31, 2014.

Appellant further requests that he be awarded all costs of this appeal, that all costs be taxed against Appellee, and that he have such other relief as he may show himself entitled to receive.

Respectfully submitted,

Tom Rorie Tom Rorie State Bar No. 17238000 North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that this brief contains 9,141 words (excluding any caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix). This is a computer-generated document created in WordPerfect, using 12-point typeface for all text. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document.

Tom Rorie Tom Rorie

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been served on counsel for Appellants this 23rd day of April, 2015, by e-file notice, to-wit: Mr. Jarett T. LaRochelle Attorney at Law One Riverway, Suite 1700 Houston, TX 77055 [email protected]

Tom Rorie Tom Rorie

NO. 12-14-00336-CV ______________________________ IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS AT TYLER, TEXAS ______________________________

FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM VS. DENA MARIE TURNER FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM, RESPONDENT/APPELLANT DENA MARIE TURNER, PETITIONER/APPELLEE ______________________________

Appealed from the County Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas ______________________________ APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF ______________________________

TOM RORIE State Bar No. 17238000 North Street Nacogdoches, TX 75961 (936) 559-1188 FAX (936) 559-0099 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED APPENDIX No. Document 1. TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01 2. TEXAS PROPERTY CODE §5.072(a) 3. TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , Rule 401 4. TEXAS CONSTITUTION , Article 16, §15 5. Original Petition for Divorce 6. Temporary Orders 7. Final Decree of Divorce 8. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 9. Respondent’s Exhibit 52 - UK Decree of Divorce 10. Respondent’s Exhibit 11 - Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien for Raguet House 11. Respondent’s Exhibit 17 - Cashier’s Check for Raguet House Purchase 12. Respondent’s Exhibit 18 - Wire Transfer to Fund Raguet House Purchase 13. Page 20 of Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 - Email regarding Money Transfer 14. Respondent’s Exhibit 14 - Settlement Charges on Raguet House Purchase 15. Respondent’s Exhibit 19 - Schedule Showing House Payments 16. Respondent’s Exhibit 19a - Bank Statement Showing Pre-Marriage Balance 17. Respondent’s Exhibit 20 - Schedule Showing Transfers From Savings 18. Respondent’s Exhibit 21 - House Payment Transaction History 19. Respondent’s Exhibit 22 - Savings Account Summary 2006-2008 20. Respondent’s Exhibit 23 - Savings Account Summary 2007-2008 21. Respondent’s Exhibit 24 - Savings Account Spreadsheet 22. Respondent’s Exhibit 33 - Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien for Back Lot 23. Respondent’s Exhibit 26 - Real Estate Lien Note to Back Lot 24. Respondent’s Exhibit 27 - Deed of Trust to Back Lot 25. Respondent’s Exhibit 29 - Receipt of Payoff Amount for Back Lot 26. Respondent’s Exhibit 37 - Loans & Taxes Summary on Appellee’s Mother’s Home 27. Respondent’s Exhibit 38a-38i - Checks for Repairs to Appellee’s Family’s Homes 28. Respondent’s Exhibit 39-39e - Tax Receipts for Appellee’s Mother’s House 29. Respondent’s Exhibit 41 - Schedule of Appellee’s Student Loan Payments 30. Respondent’s Exhibit 9 - Spreadsheet of Income and Living Expenses 31. Respondent’s Exhibit 10 - Incoming Pension Wire Transfer 32. Respondent’s Exhibit 5 - Pension Letter from Chevron (2/26/14) 33. Respondent’s Exhibit 6 - Pension Letter from Chevron (7/30/13) 34. Respondent’s Exhibit 7 - Screen Shot of Pension Amount 35. Respondent’s Exhibit 8 - Monthly Payslip 36. Respondent’s Exhibit 54 - Notice of Lis Pendens on Raguet House 37. Respondent’s Exhibit 55 - Notice of Lis Pendens on Back Lot 38. Respondent’s Exhibit 31 - Loan Agreement with Robert & Kathleen McCatty l(A ,^ -, _ ;.),/1 i "o L|'LL$(015 'v(//,,)- -,a.| l.,- L.:,!, , - IN THE I\IATTER OF rN TtrE l)rsTntc'l'co@ ' THE MARRIACE OF $ s e.^ vtP^ -' DENA MARIIi TURNER ANI) $ N LIW* W- LrlA- .ruDrc'r^L,r,r', .tuDtc'tnl- </ 51- rPd I)|ST'Rtc'r' /7 2: Jg FRED EITICK DAWsON G R..\,TI $ Ail! 5 i{Ac oc DOCH tis co uxffrfrg,ry,p, ORIGIN.{[, PF,TITI0N FOR f)rVORCli "\tRft ^ I . Di.;t:111:gy-1: !,4p1,1

Discoverv i'this case is irtendcd to be c()nd'ctccl uncler revel 2 of rulc 190 ol'thc Te.ras Rrrles of Civil P roceC tr re.

Z. P ur.t ic.r This suir is brorrghr b1, t)cna -l-urner, pc-tif N4ar.ie iorrcr.

lrrcderick Darvsol Graharrr is Respondent.

3. Doni<'ile l)etitioner lras beerr a donriciliarv ol'"fe ras lirr the preceding six-nrrlnth pcriod arrd a residenr of this counr' fbr the prccerlinr.:. n inen'-dav period.

J. Sgn'icc l)roccss should [le served on ltespr:rrcle nt. ,j. Protactive ()rcJar Slarcmettl No protecli'c order ttnder title 4 of the Trxas Frrnil-r'Cocle is in e f fcct. and no applicarion tbr a protecrive ordcr rs pending rvirh r.egard to thc parties ro lhis suit 6. l)trte.tof'.,\lut-t.iugcuntlSall(tr(ttion Thl partics rverc ntarried on or abcrtr{ 2007 ancl ccascd lo livc togcthc'r as hrrsband arrcl rvil-c o. or abo.l .l*lv r.20t2.

7, ('irotrttcl.t .for Di,orcc '[he marriage has becomc insupporrable because of cliscord or conllicr oi'pcrsonalitic.s berwcen [,etilioncr and Rcspottclcnt rllar dcstr('t)'-s thc legitinrate ertcis r-rf'thc nrarrjoxc relatiorrshlp arrd prevc-rrls.ny reaso'rrble e"tpectati'n.l' leconciliation. ,Y Chilclrqn o/'the A4crrrioge Thcrc is no chiid bo'n or adoptcd'f rhis nrarriage- and rrollc is expectctJ, 9. Dit,ision rf'Comntuttitl, propert-y, Pe titioner reqtlcsts the Court to diviclc the cstatc ol'[)ctitirlner ancl Rcsporrdcnr irl a rnanrler tlat the court deerrrs .just arrd righr. rrs provided t:1, larv.

Pe titiorter sirould be arvardcd a disproponionale shafe of rhe panics'cstrrc lbr rlrc frrllorvirrg rcnso.rs" including but not limired ro: a. leuh in tlrc breakup ot.rhe ntarrirge: and b' bcneflts the innocenl spouse ma.r'iravc derived tiorn thc contintration ol'the nrarrrauc.

10. Reimbursenrt,nt Pct itioner rc<luests lhe Cortn lo reirnburse Petitioner's sepirrate csturc lbl frrnds or asscts c\ pcnded by peritioner's separale e'rtillc lbr the berrctlt of tlte contniurritl'. Thosc expenrlitures resultcrl in lr dilcc'r 5cnefit to glc comrnultry esll(e .

Petitioner's separalc estirtc has not been adeqtrately' conrpcnsulccl fbl'or bcrrellncri tiorrr the expcnditurc ot'tfrosc funcls or asscl.t- and a failrrre by the Court (cr allorv reitrrburscntent {r: Petitioner's separate estatc rvill result in arr uniust enriclttnent ol'thc cornrnuttitl'tstate at the cNpense of Petitioncris separnte eslate.

PctitiOner rcqtrests the CoIn to reinlburse Pctitioner's scptrate cstars fcr l'unds or assets eNpended bv pet itioncr,s scparale L'state lbr the bcnctlt of Respondent's separate cstatL'. -lhose erpenditures resulted in a direct belrefir ro Respondcnt's s?para(e estate. Petitioner's separate eslate has nor been aclequatell,colnpcnsated tbr or benc.firecl fiom the erpenditurt' of tlrost- tirnds or assets. and a failure b1'thc Court to illlou' rcinrllurscrrrerrilo Petiiiorrer's scparatc estate rvill r!'sult in an unitrst enrichttterrt of Rq'spc)lldenl's s!'parale estatc ltl llrc erpensu ol'l)elitioner's scparate estate.

1 I A/torne.y"5 Fces. [ixpense.r, (.'o.r'/s. und lnlera.sl lt \\'as necc-ssarv for Petili()ner to sccurc lhe services crf Jerenry S. Willi.s. a licerrsed aftorne),. 1p prepare anci prosL'ctl{cthissuit, Tocll.;ctlncquitabledivisionoftheestatcol'theparriesanda.sapartol-theclivision.judgnrcnrtirr attome,r,'s cxpenses. arrd costs tlrrough trial and aplleaI should be irranted a1].ainst Responclenr ancl in l.r,or-.l' ''ees Petitioner for thc use ancj bcnefrt of Pctiliortcr'J anornc\': or. in the altcrnative. Petiri<lner requcsts thar rcas'rrablc anome)"s fecs' cxpr'ttscs- and costs through trial and appeal bc laxcd as costs and ['re ordered pald clirectly to petirioner,s anorne\', \vho ma)'enforcc the ordcr irt the atlorne)"s o\vn rrarne. l)ctifionel requcsts postjudulncrrl iltcresl as allr,r'etl b1'larv i Prt[er Petitioner prays lhal citation and notice issue lr.s rcquirccl bv larv and that thc Court grant a divorce anrl all other rclicf reqrrcsled in this petirion.

Putitlc.rnct prlvs lbr iltlorlrev's ltcs. expcnses. ancj costs as r'tquestc(l above.

l)etirioncr prays lbr gcneral rciicf.

Rc-spectfu I lv sr,rbmitted.

IS 7596 r I

State Bi!/ No. 24(ti07t{ 5 r\nonre\, for l)etitioner. w46p5nf!.^Eo _i!?;l courry cAUSE No. c122863s ?01+ HAR 3t PH \t zB IN THE MATTER OF $ rN THE couNTy coTJRT AT LAw THE MARRIAGE OF $ -?'Lcl.L \-.t-"-i.r-" .- '1':-..i $ fltc*- utJ DNNA MARIE TURNER .",r c{.fpff IRIf n, _ \. $ AND $ FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM $ NACOGDOCHES COUNTY. TEXAS TEMPORARY ORDERS On the date set forth below the Court heard Petitioner's rnotion for temporary orders.

Appcarances Petitioner. Dena Marie Turner, appcared in person and through arrorney of record, Jarett T. LaRochelle. and announced ready.

Respondent, Frcderick Dawson Graharn, appearcd in person and announced ready.

Jurisdictiott Tlte Court, afterexarnining the record and hearing the evidence and argunienr of counsel, finds that all necessary prerequisite.s of the law have been legally sarisfied and that the Court has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parries.

Properry and Parties The Court finds that the following orders respecting the property and parries are necessary and equitable.

IT IS ORDERED that Frederick Darvson Graham pay to Dena Marie Turncr as temporary spousal support $2,000.00 per month, u,ith the first paymcnt bcing due and payable on Apnf 1,2014, and a like paymcnt bcing duc and payable on the first (lst) day of cach rn6nth thercafter until furrher ordcr of this Courr.

rT IS ORDERED that Petitioner have the exclusive and privare use and possession of the following property while this case i,s pending; Petitioner's cornpurer, camera and other tools. equipment and supplies as used for Petitioner's business purposes.

lT lS ORDERED tltat Respondent shall maintain Petitioner as insured beneficiarv on his health insurance policy.

Tentporan, Injntction Tlre tcmporary injunction granted below shall bc cffectivc irnmcdiarely and shall be binding on Respondcnt; on his agents, servants, cmployccs, and attomeys: and on those pcrsons in active concert or participation with hirn who receive actual notice of this order by personal servicc or othcrwisc. The rcquircment of a bond is waivcd.

IT lS ORDERED that Respondenr is enjoined fronr: l. Communicating with the other party in person, by telephone, or in writing in vulgar, profane. obscene, or indecent language or in a coarse or offensive manner.

2. Threatening the other party in person. by telephonc, or in writing ro take unlawful action against any pcrson.

3. Placing one or more telephone calls, anonymously, at any unreasonable hour, in an offcnsivc and repctitious manncr, or without a legitinratc purposc of communicarion.

4. Causing bodily injury ro rhc orhcr party.

5. Threatening the other parry with inrnrinent bodily in jury.

6. Destroying, retnoving, concealing, encurnbering, transferring, or otherwise harming or reducing the value of the property of one or both of the parries.

7 . Falsifying any writing or record relating to the property of eitlrer pafty.

8. Misrepresenting or refusing to disclose to the other party or to the Court, on proper requcst. thc existence, amount, or location of any property of one or both of thc par"ties.

9' Darnaging or destroying the tangiblc property of one or borh of the parri€s. including any docurnent that represcnts or embodies anything of value.

10. Tampering with the tangible property of one or both of the parries, including any document that represents or enrbodies anything of value. and causing pecuniary loss ro the other parry.

I L Selling, transferring, assigning, mortgaging, cncumbering, or in any other nranner alicnating any of thc property of Pctition0r or Rcspondent, u,hcthcr pcrsonalty or realty, and whether scparate or conlmunity, exccpt as specifically authorized by this ordel'.

l'2. Incurring any indebtcdncss, other than legal expenscs irr connection with this suit, except zrs specifically authorized by this order.

13. Making rvithdrawals fronr any checking or savings accounr in any llnancial institution for any purpose, except as specifically authorized by this order, 14 Spending any sum of cash in the possession or subject ro the control of Respondenr for any purpose, except as specifically authorizcd by this order.

15. Withdrawing or borrowing in any nlanner for any purpose from any retirernent. profit-sharing, pension, dcath. or other emplclyce bcnetjt plan or enrployec savings plan or frorn any individual retirement account or Kcogh account, cxccpt as specifically authorized by this order.

16. E,ntering any saf'e-depo.sit box in the name of'or sub.iect to the conrrol of Petitioner or Respondent, rvlrether individually or jointly with others.

17. Withdrawing or borrowing in any nranner all or any part ot' the cash surrender value of life insurance policies on thc lit'e of Petitioner or flespondent, except as specifically authorized by this order.

18. Changing or in any manner altering the beneficiary designarion on any life insurance on the lif-e of Petitioner or Respondent.

19. Canceling. altering, failing to renew or pay premiums, or in any manner affecting the present level of coverage of any life, casualty, autornobile, or health insurance policies insuring the parties' property or persons.

20. Opening or divcrting mail addrcsscd to the other party.

21. Signing or endorsing the othcr parry's namc on any negotiablc instrumcnt, check, or drafi. such as tax ref'unds, insurance payrnents. and tlividends, or attempting to negotiate any negotiable instrunrent payable to the parties or the othcr party without the pcrsonal signature of the other Darty.

22. Taking any action to tenninate or linrit credit or charge cards in the name of the parties or the other party, except as specifically authorized in this order.

23. Discontinuing or reducing thc withholding for fbderal income taxes on wages or salary while this case is pending.

24. Destroyng, disposing of, or altering any t-rnancial records of the parties, including but not limitcd to rccords frorn financial institutions (including cancclcd checks and dcposit slips), all records of credit purchascs or cash advances, tax returns, and financial statemcnts.

25. Destroying, disposing of, or altering any e-rnail or other electronic data relevant to the subject matters of this case, whether stored on a hard drive or on a diskette or other eiectronic storage device.

IT lS ORDERED that Respondent is further cnjoined tiorn: l. Ternrinating or in any nlanner affecting the service of water, electricity, gas, telephone. cable te levision. or other contractual services, such as security. pest control. landscaping, or yard maintenance, at37M Raguet Street. Nacogdoches, Texas 75965 or in any manner attempting to withdraw any deposits for service in connection with those services Excluding Petitioner from the use and enjoyment o1'the residence located at 3704 Raguet Street, Nacogdoches, Texas 75965.

3. Entering. operating, or exercising control over the 1999 Mercedes 430 E, WDBJF70H0XA847072 and 1992 Chcvrolet Suburban. lGNECl6K3PJ325569 in the possession of Petitioncr, 4. Exercising possession or control of any of this property: Petitioner's compurer, camera and other tools, cquiprner.t and supplies as used for Petitioncr's business purposes.

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent is specifically authorized: To make expenditures and incur indebtedness for reasonable and necessary living expenses for food, clothing, shelter, transportation. and rnedical care.

To make expendirures and incur indebtedness for reasonable attorney's f'ees and expenses in connection with this suit.

To engage in acts reasonable and necessary to conduct Respondent's usual business and occupation.

Duralion These Temporary Orders shall continue in tbrcc until the signing of the Final Decree of Divorce or until further order of this Coun. \I2,, , .-) -T I tt,<-21 t i. 7a ra-- SIGNED on 49/a3/2A1"4 14:.LZ 93556A783A NACOGDOCHES CCAI PAGE 8I/ 1.7

CitUSE NO. CI228635 IN THE MATTER OT TIIE MARRIAGE OF $ rN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW $ $ DEN,A. MARIE TURNER $ AND $ FREDERICK I}AWSON (;RAHAM $ NACOGDOCTIES COtnTr, TEXAS FT{AL DECREE OF DIVORCE On tlre 30th day of Mny, 2014, and l Tth and I Sth days of July, 2014, the Court heard thjs casc.

Appearances Petitioner, Dena Marie Tumer, appcarcd in pcrson and through attorney of reoord, Jarett T. LaRochclle. and alnoulced ready fbr rial.

Respondcnt. Frederick Dawson Graharrr, appeared in person and tbrough attomey of record, Tom Roric, and announced ready for trial.

Record The recotd of testimouy was duly reported by the court reporter for the County Court at Law.

Juris dict io n and D o mic i le The Court finds tbat the pleadings of Petitioner sre in due form and contain all tbe allegations, information, and prerequisites required by law. The Court, aftcr receiving evidence, firtds that it has jurisdiction of tltis case and of alt the parties and tsat at least sixty days have elapsed since the date the zuit was filed.

The court f.'ther finds that, at the time this suit was filed petitioner had been a domiciliary of Texas for the preceding six-month period and a resident of the county in which flris suit was filed for the preceding ninety-day period. All pcrsons entitled to citation werc 89/ A3/ 2E]-4 t4: IZ 93656A7830 NACOGDOCHES CCAL PAGE 82/TT

propcrly cited.

Jury A jury was waived, and questions of faet and ofllaw were zubrnitted to the Court.

Divorce IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Dena Maric Turncr. Petitioner, is granted a divorce from Frederick Dawson Graham, Respor:dent, and the marriage between them is dissolved on the ground of cruelty.

Child of the Marriage Thc Court finds that there is no child of the marriage o'f Petitionsr and Respondent and that none is expected.

Division of Marilal Estate The Court finds that the following is a just and right division of the parties'marital estato, having due r:egard for the rights of each party^ Prooertv Jointlv Owned tT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that tbe wife, Deua Marie Turner, and the hu-sband" Frederick Dawson Grahanr. are awarded the following to be jointly owned, as tenants in cofitmon: J-1. Tho following real properly, including but not li"rnited to any esuow funds, prepaid instuance, utility deposils, keys, house plans, home sesurity access and code, garage door opener, warranties and service coiltacts, and titlc and closing documents: Legal Description: All that certain lot or parcel of land in the city of Nacogdochcs, Nacogdochcs county, Tcxas aud bcing Lot No. I of rhe Replat of Lot 25- A9/ 83/ 2EI4 1.4:1,2 9BE5EA7B3B NACOGDOCHES CCAL PAGE E3/LT

C, City Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in Volume 9, page 25 of plat Rcoords, Nacogdoches County, Tcxas.

Being more comtnonly known as 3704 Raguet Street, Nacogdoches, Texas 75965 I'7. Thc following real property, including but not limited to any osorow funds.

prepaid insuraf,ce. utility dcposifs, keys, house plans. home sectrity access and cod.e, garage door opcncr, warranties and service conrracts, and title and closing documents: Legal Description (back lot): All that certain lot or paroel of land in the city of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches county, Texas zurd being Lot No. z of the Replat of Lot 25- c. city Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in Volurne 9. page 25 of plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texaq.

Being more commonly lcrown as Par-ker Sheet, Lot 2 of 25C Property to Husband IT IS ORDER-ED AND DECREED that the husband, Frederick Dawson Graham, is awarded the following as his sole and separate property, and the wife is divested of all rigf,rt. titlo, interest, and claim in and to that property: H-1. The furniture, fumishings, fixtures, goodsn arl objects, collecfibl.es, appliances, and equipment in the husband's posscssion, H-2' All individual retirement accounts, simplifiecl employee pensions, annuities. and variablc annuity lifc insrnance benefitt iu the husband's nnme.

H-3^ The 1992 Mercedes 4008 motor vehiclc, vchicle identification numbcr WDBEA34E9NB765399. tngether with all prepaid insurance, kcys, and title docunrents.

69/83/2A1.4 L4:LZ 936S6A293CI NACOGDOCHES CCAL PAGE 84/1.7

Frqqe4v to WifE IT lS ORDERED AND DECREED that tlre wife, Dena Marie Turner, is awarded the following as her sole and separate propcrfy, and the husband is divested of all right, title, interes!

and olaim in and to rhat property: W-1. The furniture, fumishings, fixrures, goods, art objects, collectibles, appliances, and equipment in the wife's 1)ossession.

W-2. The 1999 Msrcedes 4308 motor vehicle. vehicle idcntification numbsr WDBJF70H0XA847072, together with all prcpaid insurancen keys, and title documEnts.

w-3- The 1993 tlhewolet Suburban mofor vehicle. vchiclc identification numbcr 1GNEC16K3PJ325569. together with all prepaid insurnnc€, keys, u:cl title documents.

Division of Debt Debts to Husband IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that the husbald, Frederick Dawson Graham, shall PaI' as a part of the division of the cstale of the parties, and shall indemniff and hold the wife and her property harmlcss from any faihuc to so discharge, these itcms: FI-l . All debts. charges, liabilities, and other obligations incurred by the husband unless express provision is made in this decree to the contrary.

H-2, All encumbr&nces. ad vslorem taxes, liens, agse$sment$, 9r other cbarges due or to become due on the real and pcrsonal propcrty identified rn this deorse unlcss axpross provision is made in this decree to the contrary.

Debts to Wife IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that the wife, Dena Marie Tumer, shall pay, as a part of the division of the estatu of the parties, and shall indenurifu and hold the husband and hjs A9/83/2814 L4:LZ 93686A783A NACOGDDCHES CCAL PAGE 85/11

property harmless from any fbilure to so discharge, these iterns; W-1. All debts, chatges, liabilities, and othcr obligations incurred by the wife from and after .Iuly I,2012, unloss express provision is madc in this decree to the contrary.

N,o-tjge

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that cach party shall senct to thc other party, within three days of its receipt, a copy of any conespondence from a creditor or taxing authority concorning any potential liability of the other par:ty.

Pnovisions Derling with Sale of Residence IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that the following property and all improvemcnts located thereon :

Legal Description: All tlmt cerrain lot or parcel of land in the city of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches county, Tcxas and being Lot No. I of the Replat of Lot 25- c, city Block 67, as shown on PIat recorded in volume 9, page 25 of plat Records, Nacogdoches Countyo Texas.

Bei:rg more commonly known as 3704 Raguct street, Nacogdoches, Texas 7596s and Legal Desuiption (back lot): All that cfinin lot or parcel of larrd in the city of Nacogdoches, Naoogdoches county, Tcxas and bcrng Lot No. r of the Reprat of Lot 25- c' city Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in voiume 9, page 25 of plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texas.

A9/ g3/ 2A1,4 L4: i,2 93E5687B3A NACDGDOCHES CCAL PAGE 86/LT

Being more commonly known as Parker Stcct, Lot? af 25C shall be sold under the following terms and condilions: I. The partics shall list the property with a duly licensed real estate broker having sales experience in the area where the property is localed, provided further that ttrc real estate broker shall be an active member in the Multiple Listing Service with the Texas Board of Realtors, 2, The property shall ltc sold fbr a pricc that is mutrrally ngreeable to Pstitioner and Respondent.

3. Respondont shall continue to make ull payments of principal, intcrest, taxes, and insurance on the property during the penctency of the sale, ancl Respondent shall have thc cxclusive right to enjoy the use and possession of the premises until closing. AII maintenance end repairs necessary to keep the property in its present condition shall be paid by Rerpondent, 4^ The net sales proceeds (defrned as the gross sales price less cost of sale and full paymsnt of any mortgage indebtetlness or liens on tho propefty) shall bo disfibuted as follows: With respect to the sale of: All that certain lot or parcel of land in the city of Nacogdochcs, Nacogdoohcs County. Texae and being Lor No. I of the Repl.at of Lot 25, c, city Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in volumc 9. paee 2s of plat Recor{c, Nacogdoches County, Texas.

Being more cofirmonly known as 3704 Raguet Steet, Nacogdoches, Texas 75965; fifty percent (50%) lo the wife, Denr lvlarie Tumer, ard fifty perccnt (50%) to the husband Froderick Dawson Gralram; and 89/83/2814 L4:i.2 936F6a7836 NACOGDOCHES CCAL PAGE 87 / 1.L

with rcspoct to thc sale ofi AII flrat certain lot or parcel of land in thc city of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches county, Texas nnd being Lot No. 2 of the Rcplat of Lot 25- C, City Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in Volume 9, page 25 of plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texas.

Being more cofirmonly known as Parkcr Street. Lot 2 of 25C Net sales proceeds ftom this Lot No. 2 shall be applied first to thc repayment of the $15,000 indebtedncss owerl by Frederick Dawsou Graham to Robert McCatty and Kathleen McCatty, and the remaining net sales proceeds from this Lot No. 2 shall be rtivided as tbllows: sixty percent (60%) to the wife, Dena Marie Turner, and forty porccnt (40%) to tlre hr:.qband" Frederick Dawson Crraham.

Judgment to Satisfv Temporary Ordors ontored March 31. 2014 For the purpose of a just and right divjsion of property made in this doorcc, IT IS FIJBTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that Petitioner, Dona Marie Turner, is awarded judpgnent of eipft thousand dollars ($8,000.00) against Respondent. Frederick Dawson Graham, payable in accordance with the terms of the closing documents ordered in this decree to be executed, with interest at five percent per year compounded annually from the date ofjudgment, for which lct cxecution issuc.

Attorncys Fccs The Court finds that Dcna Marje Tumer has incurred $10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees, expeuses, and costs, which were oecessary as support fcr Dena Marie Trrner. IT IS ORDERED that good cause exists to award .Iarett T. LaRochelle a judgment in thc amount of $10,000,00 for attorney's fees, expenseq and costs, with iuterest at five percenl pcr yoar A9/83/28L4 L4:LZ 93EEFA7B36 NACOGDOCHES CCAL FAGE g8/LI

compounded onnually from the dnte this Finai Decrce of f)ivorce is sigped until paid. The judgmont, for which let execution issue, is awarded against Frederick Dawson Grnham, ancl Frederick Dawson Graham is ORDERED to pay the fecs, sxpen$es, costs, and interest to Jarctt T. LaRochelle at One Riverwayo $uite 1700, IJouston, Texas 77056 by cash, cashier's check, or monay order on or before Soptember 30. 2014. Jarett T. LaRochelle may onforce this judgment for fees, expensest and costs in the attomey's own name by aoy trileans available fbr the enforcement of a judgment for debt.

TreatmenVAllqcation of Community lncqme tbr yeg,r of Djy.grce m IS ORDERED AND DECREED that, for thc calendar year 2014, each parfy shall file an individual income tgx return in accorclance with the Internal Revetrue Code, IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that tbr oalendar year 20"14, each party sball indemniff and hold thc other party and his or her: property hannless trcm any tan liability associated with the reporting pa.rty's individual tnx rcturn for that ycar unless the parties have agreed to allocate their tax Iiabilily in a manner different from that reflected on thcir returns.

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that eacb party sball furnisb such information to the other party as is requcsted to prepara f'ederal incomc tax returns for 2014 within thirty days of receipt of a written request fbr the information. ancl in no event shall the availablc information be exchanged later than March l, 2015. As requested irrformation becodres available after that datc, il shall be providcd within tcn days of reccipt.

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that all payrnentt made to the other party in accordance with thc allocation provisions for paymcnt of fsdoral incomc taxes contained in this Final Decree of Divorce are not deemed income to the party receiving those paymcnts but sre part of the property division and necessary for n juqt and right division of the parties, estate.

83/A3/2AI4 I4ii.Z 936E6B7B3B NACOGDOCHES CCAL PAGE 89/ 1.1J

Tlansfer and Deltuery of Property Direction to Deliver Froperty Frederick Dawson Graham is ORDERED to deliver to Dena Marie T\rrner on or before Septernber 30,2014, the following items; L Disney lithoggaphs and other paraphernalia and any other items of persorral properly acquired by Dena Marie Turner bef:ore marriagc.

Dena Marie Tumer is ORDERED to deliver to Frederick Darvson Crraharn on or before September 30,2014, the following itenrs: 1. car battcry, one generetor, rugby shirts, family portraits, tools, rugs, cameral candy jar, and arty other items of personal property acquired by Frederick Dawson Graham trefore rnan{age, Court Costs IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Petitiouer, Dena Marie Turncr. is avrardecl a judgment againrt Respondont, Fredcrick Dawson Graham, for costs of court incurred in the coursc of this lawsuit, witlr interest at five percent per year compounded arrrually from the date the judgment is sipped until paid, fbr wtrich let cxecution issuc.

Resolutian of Temporary Orders ff IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Pctitioner and Rcspondeirt are discharged from all further liabilities and obligations imposed by the temporary order of this Court rendered on the date set fortlr below.

Dischar ge,fro m Dis cov ery Retention Requirem.ent IT IS ORDERED nND DECREED that tire parties and thcir rcspective aftomeys are discharged from the requircmcnt of keeping and storing the clocuments produccd in this case in A9/83/2814 14:LZ 93EE6A7B3B NACOGDOCHES CCAL PAGE 1A/U.

accordance with nrle 191.4(d) of the Tcxas Rules of Civil Frocedure.

Clarifyirtg Order,c Without affecting the finality of tlrjs Final Decree of Divorce. this Court exprcssly reserves the right to make orders necessary to clarifii and enforcc this decree.

Relief Not Gran,ted tT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that all relief requested in this oase and not expressly grsnted is denied. This is a final judgment, for which let exccution and all writs and processcs nccessary to enforce this judgmeilt issue. This judgrnont finally disposes of all claims and all parlies and is appealable, Dale oJ'Judgment This divorce judicially PRONOUNCED AND RENDERED in court at 101 W. Main Street, Room 240, Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County. Texas, on J 30. 2014^ snd fufiher noted on thc court's docket sheet on the same date, but sign

JLIDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:

Jarott T. LaRochelle Attorney for Petitioner State Bar No. 2404i296 One Riverway, Suite 1700 Houston. Tcxas 77056 Tel: (713) 622-3'766 Fax: (713) 840-6351 A9/83/zaL4 L4:L2 93656A7838 NACOGDOCHES CCAI. PAGE 1.]./ LI

j arettlarochell e@yahoo. com

APPROVED AS TO TORM ONLY:

By: Tom Rorie Attorney for Rcspondent State Bar No. I 7238000 North Street Nacogdoches, Texas 7 5961 Tel: (936) 559-1 188 Fax (936) 559-0099 [email protected] ,iA i : -^' CAUSE NO. C122863s ii!ii,,:,i{ry IN THE MATTER OF s rN rrrn corrNry effimt Aft [Ilg: 35 TIIE MARRHGE OF $ $ uUr-t{--,^--j,.: DENA MARIE TURNER $ ANI) s FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM $ NACOGDOCHES COUI\TY, TEXAS FIIYDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of [,aw.

FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The pleadings of Petitioner are in due form and contain all the allegations, information, and prerequisites required by law.

2. The Court has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties and that at least sixty days have elapsed since the date the s,,rit was filed.

3. At the time this suit was filed, Petitioner had been a domiciliary of Texas for the preceding six-month period and a resident of the county in which this suit was filed for the preceding ninety-day period.

4. All persons entitled to citation were properly cited.

5. The parties were rnarried on or about 2OO7 and ceased to live together as husband and wife on or about July l,2Al2.

6. The marriage has become insupporlable because of discord or conflict of personalities between Petitioner Dena Marie Turner and Respondent Frederick Dawson Graham that destroys the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. Specifically, Respondent is guilty of cruel treatment toward Petitioner, including but not limited to acts of assault and/or battery on or about April 20, 2012, in February of 2012, in December of 201 l, in October of 201 1, in August of 201 l, on or about July 4, 2010, in June of 2010, in August of 2009, and in June of 2008. Respondent is at fault in the breakup of the marriage.

7. Petitioner and Respondent lived together and were looking to purchase a residence together many years prior to their date of marriage.

8. Petitioner ceased working on her own independent ciueer to enter into a business parhership and service Respondent's career for which time was billed at a higher rate.

9. By written correspondence, Respondent acknowledging Petitioner's business services consistently from 2OM through 2011. Examples of Respondent's acknowledgment of Petitioner's business services are found in Petitioner's Exhibit l, email(s) dated May 25,20cFr; July 13, 2AMl' July 16, 20M; August 2,20A4; August 13,2ffi4; June 23,2005; May 2,2006; Apnl27,20M; May 3,2006; May 4,2006; July 12,2006; July 13,20A6; October 18,2006; April 4, 2007; November 14,2008; and January 14,201l.

10. The real prop€rty at issue in this matter is as follows: All that certain lot or parcel of land in the City of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County, Texas and being Lot No. I of the Replat of Lot 25-C, City Block 67,as shown on Plat recorded in Volume 9, Page 25 of Plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texas, being more conlmoniy known as 3704 Raguet Street, Nacogdoches, Texas 75965; (hereinafter the "House") and All that certain lot or parcel of land in the City of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County, Texas and being Lot No. 2 of the Replat of Lot 25-C, City Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in Volume 9, Page 25 of Plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texas, being more commonly known as Parker Street, Lot? of 25C (hereinafter the "Back I-ot") (the "House" and "Back Lot" being hereinafter referred to as the *Raguet Street residence').

I l. Petitioner and Respondent collaborated together to find and decide upon the purchase of the Ragrct Street residence in Nacngdoches. Prior to the purchase of the Raguet Street residence, Petitioner and Respondent had previously attempted to purchase another, more expensive, residence in Nacogdoches. Petitioner was the only connection with or inspiration to reside in Nacogdoches. Respondent had no independent connection with or incentive to reside in Nacogdoches.

12. The purchase of the House was prior to the date of marriage of the parties.

13. The pruchase of the Back lnt was after the date of marriage of the parties.

14, The Petitioner testified and Respondent conceded that title to the Raguet Street residence wa.s exclusively held in the name of Respondent because Petitioner's credit score would have resulted in a higher mortgage interest rate. By correspondence to Petitioner, Respondent acknowledged the savings received from their method of financing the Raguet Street residence in Petitioner's Exhibit 1; email dated August 17,2006.

15. Petitioner testified that she never anticipated Respondent would make claim to the House or the Raguet Street residence as his separate property.

16. Respondent had promised Petitioner to add Petitioner's rulme to title to the Raguet Street residence.

17. Petitioner served as the coordinator and "general contractor" for extensive repairs and remodeling to the Raguet Street residence. Petitioner would not have perfiormed all of the contracting and remodeling efforts at the Raguet Street residence but for the understanding in reliance upon Respndent's representations that it was'their" home.

18. Respondent represented to Petitioner that he intended the home to be jointly owned, used, and enjoyed by emails dated lvlay 25,20M; July 6, 2004; July 16, 20a4; July 30, 2a04; August 25,2004; September 2,2a04; July i3, 2006; August 3,2006: September 26,2006:December lg, ZaM; and October 14,2008, all included in Petitioner's Exhibit l.

19. There is no evidence of intent for the Petitioner to have no ownership interest in the House.

20. Respondent admitted on the stand to fabricating, falsi$ing, andlor fraudulently executing documents with the intention that Respondent rely upon the tnrthfulness of the information contained in zuch documents.

21. Respondent admitted on the stand to lying to Petitioner.

22. Respondent made an admission against his interests via telephone voice recording Petitioner that Respondent hid assets from Petitioner in the united Kingdom.

23. Respondent's testimony and evidence were found to not be credible.

24. The initial down payment on the Raguet Sfeet residence puchase was provided from business revenue generated by the cornbined efforts of Petitioner and Respondent.

25. The payments in reduction of principal on the mortgage secwed by the Raguet Stneet residence were made from business revenue generated by the combined efforts of Petitioner and Respondent- 26. Any and all inheritance or other separate property frrnds belonging to Respondent were deposited into a money market account and comingled with other firnds used to pay living expenses.

27. Neither the initial down payment nor lhe regular monthly payments on the mortgage secured by the Raguet Street residence were funded from Respondent's money market account.

28. Petitioner's exhibit(s) 4, 10, ll, and 12, evidence the business revenue used to firnd the initial down payment and regular monthly payments on the mortgage secued by the Raguet Steet residence.

29- In full and final payment of the mortgage due and owing on the "Back Lot", Respondent borrowed $15,000 from Robert McCatty and Kathleen McCatty.

30. On March 31,2014, Temporary Orders were entered in this matter ordering Respondent to make monthly payments of temporary spousal support to Petitioner in the amount of Two Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($2,000.00), on the first (lst) day of each month begrnning April l, 2014, and thereafter until fiuther order of this Court.

31. Respondent altogether faited to make any payment of temporary spousal support to Petitioner, in violation ofthe Temporary orders entered March 3r,zol4.

32. Due to Respondent's fault in the breakup of the marriage, Petitioner is entitled to a disproportionate division of the parties' marital estate.

33. Respondent has the use and er{oyment of his prior marital residence with his prior wife, Bridgett Graham, in the United Kingdom.

34. Respondent is awarded the personal property in his possession as well as his car battery, one generator, his rugby shirts, family porfaits, tools, rugs, camer4 candy jar, and any other property he acquired before marriage as well as anything related to his business, retiremen! or prop€rty located in the United Kingdom.

35. Petitioner is awarded the personal property in her possession other than the items specifically awarded to Respondent, including any Disney items in the possession of Respondent and any other properly she acquired before marriage.

36. Respondent is awarded the 1992 Mercedes 400E motor vehicle, VIN: WDBEA3 4E9NB 765 3 99, already in Respondent' s possession.

37. Petitioner is awarded the 1999 Mercedes 430E motor vehicle, VIN: WDBJF70H0XA847072, and the 1993 Chewolet Suburban motor vehicle. VIN: I GNEC I 6K3 PJ 325 5 69, already in Petitioner' s possession.

38. Respondent is obligated to pay and indemniS Petitioner against all debts, charges, liabilities and other obligations incurred by Respondent, including all encumbrances, ad valorem laxes, liens, assessments, or other charges due or to become due on the real and personal property of the parties' martial estate.

39. Petitioner is obligated to pay and indemnifu Respondent against all debts, charges, liabilities and other obligations incurred by Petitioner from and after July l, 2A12.

40. To effectuate the division of the parties'marital estate, the Raguet Sheet residence should be listed with a duly licensed real estate broker, sold for a price mutually agreeable to Petitioner and Respondent, and the net sale proceeds distributed as follows: With respect to the sale of, All that certain lot or parcel of land in the City of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County, Texas and being Lot No. I of the Replat of Lot 25- C, City Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in Volume 9, Page 25 of Plat Records, lr acogdoches County, Texas.

Being rnore commonly known as3704 Raguet Sheet, Nacogdoches, Texas 75965; fifty percent (50%) to the wife, Dena Marie Tumer, and fifty percent (SV/o) to the husban4 Frederick Dawson Graham; and with respect to the sale of: All that ceriain lot or parcel of land in the City of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches counry, Texas and being Lot No.2 of the Replat of Lot 25- c, city Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in volume 9, page 25 of plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texas.

Being more commonly known as Parker Steet, Lot 2 of 2SC Net sales proceeds from this Lot No. 2 shall be applied first to the repayment of the $15,000 indebtedness owed by Frederick Dawson Graham to Robert McCatty and Kathleen McCatty, and the remaining net sales proceeds from this Lot No. 2 shall be divided as follows: sixty percent (60q/o) to the wife, Dena Marie Turner, and forty percent (40%) to the husband, Frederick Dawson Gratram.

4l . Petitioner has incurred reasonable and necessary attorney's fees in excess of $ 10,000.00.

42. Petitioner is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney's fees from Respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW l. Although title to the House was acquired prior to marriage of the parties and recorded exclusively in Respondent's name, the House is jointly owned by Petitioner and Respondent, as teftmts in common. Aaron v. Aaron,2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.-Houston [4th Dist.l January 31, 2Ol2) (mem. Opinion) (Cause No. l4-10-00765-CV) and Harrington v. Hanington, 7 42 S.W .2d 7 22 (Tex.App.-Houston I I st Dist.] I 987).

2. The evidence clearly demonstrates that there was never any indication of intent for the Petitioner to have no ownership interest in the House.

3. The parties both benefitted from securing a mortgage and taking title solely in the Respondent's name, as a result of Petitioner's credit.

4. Respondent is guilty of crucl treahnent and fault in the breakup of the marriage.

5. Respondent's testimony and evidence are not credible.

6. Petitioner is entitled to an award of Eight Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($g,000.00) against Respondent for Respondent's failure to comply with the Temporary Orders entered March 31,2014.

7. To effectuate the division of the parties' marital estate, the Ragu* Street residence should be listed with a duly licensed real estate broker, sold for a price mutually agreeable to petitioner and Responden! and the net sale proceeds distributed as follows: With respect to the sale of: All that certain lot or parcel of land in the city of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches county, Texas and being Lot No. l of the Replat of Lot 25- c, city Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in volume 9, page 25 of plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texas.

Being mor€ commonly known as 3704 Raguet Street, Nacogdoches, Texas 75965: fifty percent $Ao/o) to the Petitioner, Dena Marie Turner, and fifty percent (sV/o) to the Respondent, Frederick Dawson Gratram; and with respect to the sale of: All that certain lot or parcel of land in the City of Nacogdocheg Nacogdoches County, Texas and being Lot No. 2 of the Replat of Lot 25- C, City Block 67, as shown on Plat recorded in Volume 9, page 25 of plat Records, Nacogdoches County, Texas.

Being more cornmonly known as Parker Street, Lot 2 of 25C Net sales proceeds fron this Lot No. 2 shall be applied first to the repayment of the $15,000 indebtedness owed by Frederick Dawson Graham to Robert McCatfy and Kathleen McCaffy, and the remaining net sales proceeds from this Lot No. 2 shall be divided as follows: sixty percent (60%) to the Petitioner, Dena Marie Turner, and forty percent (40o/o) to the Respondent, Frederick Dawson Gratram.

8. Good cause exists to award Jarett T. LaRochelle judgment againsl Respondent in the amount of $10,000.00 as reasonable and necessary attorney's fees incurred by Petitioner.

9. The marriage relationship has become insupportable and there is no reasonable expectation of reconciliation. All of the grounds necessary to grant a divorce have been established. The parties are divorced. The property division is just and right. The separate prop€rty findings are supported by the evidence.

If any finding of fact as listed herein shall be a conclusion of law then such finding of fact shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. If any conclusion of law as listed herein shall be a finding of fact then such conclusion of law shall be deemed to be a finding of fact.

SIGNED this 9e day of October,2014.

NO: SI-04Il0t 1"10

IN Tfm Slough County Courr ftr"_tq BETWEEN Frederick Dawson Graham ; , ;@: itioner AND Brigid Graham &ffi9 Respondent

Rel'erring to the decree made in this cause cln the lsr Augr.rst 2()05. whereiry ii r,,ls decrccd rhat t5e marrirr{e solemnised i-rr the 28rh September 1974 .I'III.:,C}IURCII AI OF ]'I{E }{OI,Y FAMIT,Y, TRIIAWNI]Y ,A.VLJNTJ[, LANGLEY, .|IIE DISTRICT SLOUGIi II,\ OF SLOUGI{ IN TIII C]OUNTY OF BERKSI{IR-E bctween Frederick Dawsr-rn Graiiani fhe petrtioncr rrnd tlrigid Graham the Respondenr bc dissrlli'cd unless sufilcienl cause be shou'n to rhe coun wirhin six weei-s from thc nraking thereof why the said decree sirtltrlcJ nol be rnade abisolute, and no such cause hai,ire hcen shc;u.n, rL rs heretrv r:erlilleil th.rrl the srid (lecree \!'iri (rn the 2{}rh l)ecenrher 20f]6. nratle finnl anil absolrrle ,;l;',i;^;;;'t -said nrarriage u,as lhereby," dissolved.

I)ated: 20th December 2006 Nolc: i D;rorcs affects inhlritance undsr a wrli Where a will has alieady ber-n nratle b.v eirher pany,ro the rnarriaEc rhen, b1,v:nue ol sccrron ig,A. ol-lhe Wrlis Ael ii{l?: (3) afl) provlslons 0i dte wiil appointing lhe fonncr spousc crccuioi or Inrsicc or conferlng a powcr of. app(rinlrnen{ ort the fcinncr spouse sirail take cifect as rf thc {bi.nrt,r spousc ii:j clted on tno dare on which :hc marriag: is dissolvcti iinjess I coritrary.inicn:ion appcars in lhl wiii; iD) ar-v- pfolleill which, or an inlerest in which, is devrseri or bcqrearhcrl ro rhe lb:;ncr:;pr.,r.rsc si,r,lp.rs:, as if tllc 1-orn:cr spouse had dicd ijn thc dare .n u'hich lire mai:i;ge is dissolreci rJriless tplears in ihe u ji1. .r ij.rr:lraf_v i;.*c.ti.' I D,!.)i:ri 3:lrtls t..c alp()iillnleti () j r guJrci;Jl Lrl-lcss e c'Jnlr2rlf intenliol js shown il thc iltsrnlnienr of app.rirrtnreni. il.,r ir1rtiornrrne.rt ri.rider lrirlo'jill Dr -51i; qrf Jre clhlidren Acr i98i) b1' ont spcuse ol'hls or lrer fr-rrnrer si:oir-\e as guertllar.: i:,, b1, i,rrtuc serlion 5 ,:l.ihal Ac!, dcenrec lo h;rv,., bern revokec ar ihc riatc <tf 'l the LiissolLlron cif tirc ntanl:rpc.

rir.; {@ 5jtujt. Acr),t rf. \L- r lfii. ,i rF: lr!, I ?!i^.r e:ii{r!i ri .:s iSri .rid frr:Ej d hrr frt i. 1., ;:nair\ t 1.i it ; r\ r .#r'!rr r.ttrr !L_..,!,. ,)it 1f,ra. !i Al.rj!.. ta,,\iri., RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 52 6.o'*"i ie; o \ee* &*tf .

SE PARATI O N AG RE E IVIE NT NO: S104D01140

THIS SEPARATION AGREEMENT (the "agreement") Dated this Znd August 2005 BETWEEN :

Frederick Dawson Graham of Slough Buckinghamshire, England (the "Husband")

OF THE FIRST PART

-and- Brigid Graham of Slough Euckinghamshire, England (the "Wife") OF THE SECOND PART BACKGROUND:

The Husband and Wifelindivid_ually the "Par1y" and collectively the "Partres") were la6ully married on September2S'n, 1974,in Langley County of Berkshire, England. bue to certain dtfferences that have developed between the Husband and the Wife they agree to live separate and apart from each other, and conditions in this Agreement.

R The Husband and Wife have made complete. fair and accurate disclosure to each other on ail Financial matters reflected in this Agreement. ? The terms of this Agreement are intended to settle the matters addressed and may be lncorporated into a final decree of divorce, except to the extent that specific matters are amended or addressed in a subsequent separation agreement.

D. The Husband and Wife have each voluntarily entered into this Agreement and have not been forced by anyone to sign this Agreement, and both the Husband and the Wife confirm that they are in sound mental health.

lN CONSIDERATION oF the mutual promises and covenants contained in this Agreement, and other valuable considerations, the receipt and sufficiency of which consideration ii herebv p;i+py$d the Parties agree as follows: -:,1!_.:)n' LrvrN,G SEPARATE.ANp APART 1. The husband and Wife have lived separate and apart since January 1,2A02 and will continue to live separate and apart as fully and completely as though they had never been married.

Neither Party will attend the other's home or work without invitation or approval, INTERFERENCE 2. Each Party will be free from interference, authority or control of the other party as fully as through each were single and unmanied. Each Party may engage in employment, business or profession, and reside where he or she my chose, free from any intertbrence, restriction, authority, or control of the other Party, Eqch Party agrees not to interfere, bother, harass, intimidate or othenrvise restrict the other Party or their family or friends at their respective residences, ptaces of ernptoyment of any othrer place.

succLsstoN RTGHTS 3. Upon the death of the Wife, the Husband waives, releases, discharges, qutte claims and renounces every and all rights, whether at common law in equity, or by statute to share in the estate of the Wife.

4. Upon the death of the Husband, the Wife waives, releases, discharges, quite claims and renounces every and all rights, whether at common law. In equity, or by statute, to share in the estate of the Husband.

CHILDREN 5. There are 3 children of the marriage, namely :

Date of Birth Erin Graham Auoust 29. 1980 I Siobhan Graham February 17, 1983 Rebecca Graham November 26. 1985

6. The Husband and Wife agree that sole legal custody is in the best interests of the children. The Husband and Wife agree that the Wife is granted sole legal custody, and has the primary right to make decisions regarding matters of their health, education and welfare In the children's best interest. The parent who has not been granted sole legal custody may make emergency decisions affecting the. health or safety of the chitdren when the ifriuien are in phyiical-care and control of that Party' The Husband and Wife agree that the grant of sote legal to one "*ioo' Party does not deprive the other Party of access to information regarding tie chitdren.

The Parties agree that the Wife will be the primary care giver for their minor or dependent Children. f6) Qq\r: he Husband and Wife aeree that the Husband will have the following visitation schedule with the children

N/A Frederick has decided to rematn in America

Child Support The husband will pay child support in the amount of IGBP monthly to the Wife. Chjld support payments will commence on the 16th August 2005 and will be paid on the 16rh day of each and every month.

10. The Husband will pay total of IGBP monthly to the wife for the children unrnsured health care costs, and for other extraotdinary expenses, such as. Subject lo rnutual agreement to be in the best interest of each individual child.

Child support payment for these expenses will commence on August 16 2005 and will be paid on the 16'n day of each and every month

11 The Wife will maintain health insurance, including medical and dental coverage. for the benefit of Erin Graham, Siobhan Graham and Rebecca Graham.

l1 Child suppoil payments, contributions to uninsured health care costs, child care costs and extraordinary expenses and the maintenance of health insurance will continue for each child so long as the child is: a. Under the age of majority, unmarried and financially dependent on the parents.

b. over the age of majority. unmarried and financially dependent on the parenls due to iilness or disabilitv: or

C Over the age of ma.lority, unmarried and attending an accredrted post secondary education institution as a fuil-time student and is dependent on the parents for support.

These child supporl benefits will continue uniil the child has completed his or her first post-secondary degree or dlploma or until the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age of 21 years, which ever come first. The Husband will not be required to pay a tuition amount greater than the tuition rate for a reasonable comparable program at the supported university or college nearest the residence of the child at the timJof entrance.

SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE 13. Neither Party Claims entitlement to Spousal maintenance. Both parties waive any claim to spousai maintenance now and in the future, regardless of any change in circumsiances experienced by either Party. zirGl-l -' g**,\

,'Q- X" ."V S t1, ii,A,n.! ':s:-- * i i-yff'' irx"''" Ti 'f _ ,rrt[ABlrnr-HoilE address o'me maritalhome is: 34, Azaleaway, George Green, Stough, Bucks, sL3 6RN. .\Q1i1ffil/n1e 15. The Husband will transfer his interest in the marital home to the Wife free of all circurnstances.

16. The expenses relating to the mailtal home, including but not limited to mortgage payments, utility bills. property taxes and repair costs, will be plio oy the Husband.

INCOME 11. Total annual wrployment {ncome for th,e Husband is [GB,P. The Husband has no otfier source of income.

18. Total annual employment income for the wife is €GBP. The wife ha3 no other source of income.

DIVISION OF PROPERW 19. The Parties acknowledge that they have agreed upon a division of all property, owned or possessed by them as marital property or separate property. The Husbano possession of all those properties to which he or she is.respectively wite are in entiiled."rio Accordingly, neither makes any claim.to any property or properties in the possession of the other, except as stated in Schedule A to this agreement.

pEBTs The Parties agree that any indebtedness.secured against, or attributable to, any item of property that either Party is receiving under this Agreement will be the sore resfionsibility of the Party receiving the particular property. This section does not apply to any debts or mortgage relating to the marital home,

21. Neither Party will incur any further debt or liability on the other parties credit. Any debt accumulated after this date of this agreement is ine oeut of the individual partv, iegardtess if the debt was incurred as a result of joint credit.

ADDITIONAL CLAUSES 22. All uK assets will remain in the sore property of Brigid Graham.

GENERAL PROVIS|OIT The Husband and wife will promptly sign and give to the other all documents necessary to effect to the terms of this agreement. t- | (% "Y" is Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Husband and Wife about attonship with each other. Except as provided elsewhere in this Agreement, this replaces any earlier written or oral agreement between the parties their Agreement

25 Shouid any portion of this Agreement be held by a court of law to be invalid, unenforceable, or void' such hoiding will not have the effect of invalidating or voiding the remainder of this Agreement' and the Parties agree that the portion so held tc be invalid, unenfoiceable. or void, will be deemed amended, reduced in scope, or otherwise stricken only to the exrent required for purposes of vaiidity and enforcement in the lurisdiction of sucfr a holdinq.

zo The Husband and Wife may only amend this Agreement in writing after both Farties have obtarned iegal advice on the changes.

27 ln the event that a dispute arises regarding this Agreement, the Parties will try to resolve the matter through negotiation or mediation. prior to initiation a court action

28 Notwithstanding that the Parties acknowledge and agree that their circumstances at the execution of this Agreement may change for any reaJon, including but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the passage of years, it is nonetheless their intention to be bound strictly by the terms of this Agreement at all times.

29 The parties agree to p;ovide and execute such lurther documentation as may be reasonably required in the future in order to continue to give fuli force and effect to the ternrs of this Agreement.

?n Headings are inserted for the convince of the Parties only and are not to be considered when r nterpreting this ag reement.

JI This Agreement and the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement apply to and are binding upon the Parties, their respective heirs, executors, adminiltrators, and'assiqns.

32. The terms of this Agreement will remain in effect unless.

a. The Parties terminate this Agreement in writing signed by both parties, or b lf the Parties resume marital reiations for a perioo'of 90 days or more 33. The laws of England will govern the interpretation of this Agreement and the status. ownership, and division of properiy between the Parties whereuer either or both of them may from time to time resrde 6rit lN WITNESS WHEREOD the Parties have duly affixed their signatures on oi Aurl,,uqb , 2.n o 5 tnis 2 day

a-%9 Signed by the Husband ln the presence of: {)/ ),--/ . / i :7 A /'''' L-,!: ITNESS

Signed by the Wife In the oresence of.

6oH t Y *.--**.

3.p Schedule A will be entitled to the following properties free of any claim by the Husband iitem _:.

I|-1r- All UK bank accounts includ -*- g_q_-valu,e-_, - - 2 4.ll-Lr'(!etr*eq!9!t_19._1!g!udlru_1qvj!gs _ -i| Pension contribution from TexiCo i-enevion io be sG;edxxxx -x*rn GBp G-gp - ;_-'.'--., i4l9n y_ou requeg_t,e! i!.q1rylenpgnsion is executed .F.ffi , :1" j ry?:eeds from any Texaco I Ch;vro" Sh;;;s Cnr - - r remarninglgl]gfygg rglltary retirement from Texaco l-xxxx I i I HMCrurts &Tribunals Servke TO: BRIGID GRAHAM From HM COURTS & TRTBUNALS SERVTCE 34, MALEA WAY, The Family Court at Slough, GEORGE GREEN The Law Courts, SLOUGH, Windsor Road, BERKSHIRE, Berkshire.

SL3 6RN SL1 2HE DX 98030 SLOUGH 3 www. h mcou rts-service. qov. u k Your Ref. smm/sm/bb/1 7g2\/z Date: 25'n April 2A14 Dear Brigid Graham.

Case Number: SL04D01 140 Graham vs Graham Following your email dated 17th April 2014, the fee paid for a copy of your Decree Absolute Please find copies of your Decree Absolute and the Settlement Agreement filed by your solicitor enclosed.

Family Section erin graham 13t()417014 Ttr : i- rcderick Crzrham, Boy Rider, Spegs 2

'Ihis is what we have received from the court x Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From : Erin Grerham <eri n. graham(?.bbc. co. uk> I)ate: 1 I April 2014 1i:02:53 RST To : " e rn i e grlgz hrl!:r ai I c o nl " .<e1lf1 sgl@ilq*llqgrj.c_g ql> .

Subject: FW: Divorce documentation

From: Slough County, Enquiries tnAf[[email protected] Sent: 11 April 2014 A7:47 To: Erin Graham Subject: RE: Divorce documentation

The flle is currentiy in storage, once the file is received I wili notiiy you of the Cour-t fee The file can take a number cf weeks to be received.

I{erm-za tBrougftton Mrs K Broughton Slough County Court Tel 01753 690300 I am not authorised to bind my Department contractually or to make representations or other statements whrch mav brnd the Department in any way via electronrc means. ttrt

Hil COURTS &T$A{'NAL$ $€RVICE

ffiffiffi Tle fardly ffit *t-Sl.o*gh Thr .Lar'.Cfil,t't: Win&orHoad St€itgft Bsrkshlrs sllzhrE DX 98000 SLOIJG|. 3 BHIGID GRAHAU T Or7&3 690300 AZAUAWAY F 01?53 573S{X} GEORGE GREEN tfinicon Vll 0i91 47814?6 (HEfpIns ts th€ deaf snd llard of hsartngl SLOI'GH BERKgHIRE *tw'l5laorffi -rslrloe. gw-uk SI3 6RN Our ret:

Vanr rd: srnnlsrvbbn 7BA5&

25thApril2014

Dear Brigidcr*am

Case number: Sl.o4DOl14O j4.

Gratram vs. Graham !t,F ti\ ' '44e*" - ' ' '}

Follsrtpg ysur sna[ dat€d fre l?th of frpfff 2Sl4 the be for a copy d your Becree Absolute iacrmsed trg gr0 6 a r€s-iltdchmgstoffre cerfB syEtern on ihe 22nd of April 2014.

Fsrtity Section Exbnsion: ,rr 'YnP -. 9:;1^ ?r_l - )lo't'ICE ot'CI0NITIDENTIALITY RrGlIl's: Il: You ARE A NAt.tiRAL pnRSoN. yoti o NlAY REI\{0VE OR STRIKE ANY O!'THE FOLLOIVING IN!'OIL\[A.'UON FROII 1 HIS fi, INSI'RU]VIENT BEFORE IT IS FILED FOR RECORD IN ]'HF], PUI}LIC R!]CORDS: YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY \TIMBER OR YOUR TJRIVI.:R'S I"ICI.]NSI] NUI\,IB}:R. li

WARRAN'I'Y D[,F],D WITI{ VNNT'OR'S LIEN l,t

l)ate: ,\ugust 15, 2$lfi tt Grtntor: S'I-EVF.N LUTZ and wifc, SIL4.NNON l-Ul'Z Grantor's Mailing Address (including ccu nry]:

II r:! (lrantee: FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM (irantce's l\lailing Address (including couniv): 3704 Raguet Nacogtloches. Te-ras 75965 Nacoi:doches Countl, Con siderstion: l'hN AND NOll()il DOLTARS ($1{}.(it}) and olhtr vaiuablc conside ration. anii a lore gl c'1r datc thar is in the principal ;imounr cf NINETY F'lvF.THousAND FIVE HUNDRF.D ANI) NOii0t) DOI--I-'\RS ($95,-5(j0.00)and is e xccuteti bv (irantcc. p:r1'ablc {o the ,:rdrr oI FIRST IIANK&TRUSTtTASl''fEXAS.'I'he noteissecuredbyaven<ior'slicnreiainrrtiinfliv6r rtf FIRS I' B;\NK & TRL,TS'| ITAST TE)LAS in rhrs dt:cci and ir;' a deed of trusr ol e ven rirtu from (irrntce to JOE C--. DENI\.{A\. I'rustcc.

Propertr' (ilciuriing ilnprovet.lrcnts): Ail lhai certairr lot or paicel of lantl in the (-itv of Nacogrjochcs, Nacogtiochcs L'ount,y. -I"exas. and heing l-.ot No, I of the Rcplat oi l.tlt 2,s-C, Citv lllock 67. as show'n on Plat rccor<jecl ur Voir:rlc a. Pagt' 25 of thc Plat Recortis. Nacogriochr:s L-'ounrr,. Tcxas.

Uxcrptions to and Rcservations lronr (lonve lancc and Warrant-v: Eascments, rigixs-of-wav. and prescriptive rights, whether of recortl 1r not: :.ril prescntlv rccclrtictl rcstric:tions, reservations. covenants, conditions. zonirrg ordinartccs. oil anrl gas leases, :ights of development. rrineral seveianccs. aric other iirslrurncnts. othrr thrn liens antl convevances, that a!1ect the propcrt,v-: rir:his of ad.ioining o*'ncrs in anv walis ar,d fcnc{ls situated on a comnron boundary; any discrtpirncies, conflicts, r:r shrrrtagcs in arca ol boundarv linest anv cncroachlnenls or overlappinl; r:l improvements; any conditions thal would lre rcvgalod bv a phvsical lnspcction :rni suncy ol the propdrty.

A<J valorem taxes iirr lhe vcar 2i)06 hrvc be en proralcd ber\r'ccn Crantor and (i . antcc. anri Crante e assumos pa)'ment oi taxes [t:r ihe:-car 2006 irnd subsequcn: r,ears.

Craotor. llr tic corsiderairor and subject kr the rescnalions liorn anrl exceptiorts t() con\/evan(e and warrant\'. grants. sells. and convel,s lo Gran(0c ihc propcriy. togclhcr with:rll ancl r, il.-i,r f-Jr r 1J_rlirif,.4,iur1l{;,airld..r *i{

,fo*ou*r,, ilBtT 11 -.- \ 1.' .:., -1 -l l_r

singular the nghts iind sppurtenanccs thereto in any wire be kjneing. to htlvc and holr.l it to (lranric, o C-irantce s ltcirs, cxecutots. adrninrstra$rs, successors, or assigns folevcr. Crantor hcrebv binds F.

fr firantoi irnd Cjraltlor's heirs, cxecutors, administrators, and successors to warrirnt anrl forsvcr dclcnd

illl antl singulaf the propcrtv lo Grantce and Grantce's hoirs^ erecutors, acirninisi.rarors. sucLrrjss()f s. t.tt 'j and assigns. against evcr-r petson whomsoever larr,'fglly claining of to rlainl ilrc sarnr or eny fijrt thefcof. r;-cept as to the resen'a',ions fronr and cxccp'.ions to warrantv. l_.1

Thc vcndor's lien against and siiperior titie to the prcpcrty are rrtaincd uniil ea(:h n{)t(l dcscrrLre d is lr:llv p:rid accoidtng t{) its tsnrs. at which timc this decd shall bccr)rnc abs<rlute, l_i Whcn the rrontcx', rcquircs^ singr.rlar n(iuns and pronouns include the frltrral. t-.1

r__l FIRS'i llANK & TR{.i51" EAST tEX,,\S, al thc instartce and rc.luus{ ,.rf thc Grantei: l:crcir, 5) having ativancc(l and paid in citsh ki the Grantor hcrcin lirat porliolr of the purcirase prii:r ol rhc he:cin dcscril'cd propcrtv as rs evidenced by the ht:rcinabove dcscril.er,i noric ol $1)-5.5tX).(){). thc ',cndor's lie n toge thcr rvith superitrr titli t.) said proper{y is hercin rctarncd for the bcnrfit. ol IjiRS'[ EANK & l"RUST EAS-I'TIIXAS, and lhc sarnc are hcrcby TRANSFEIiRIID irnd ASSIGNED unkr thc said bank.

'flll; STATLI 0P fl\AS $

( Ol.':v]'Y OF Nr\COCDOCHI-S $

'rhrs trstntmcrit was ackno*'lecgcti beiore rnc on tht 7' {au' of Auqrrst' 2{)(x>' by stevtrr L-'.rtz and wife, Shennon L.utz.

f7- ,Z STATE OF IIXAS NOTARY PT,;BLIC STATF d? TEXKS iltCotflr Erp. tOA2DSs

( j !rn, tj .f.\1 ,.i.lra. A.,(.:\l{int0(Jf .1$ril rdfD€ roc{rttor.6l !r-Ral€* At rEatfrY*tou,ll tt Purchagert Receifl-R*dn For Your Hecords ")c ffi rlr cancrl a'tcr( 0f nG s€orfiE! gr{rJ gltat rS €{rsEDOA itrrncD Xttt n t LoBt. tcPurDoq tr(I'lrr 95sS hrct*rd 9V InFSrtfr FWO&ICK CflAIUH o rE __4ryr 25r ;t{6 gInIfLIn?, ruDmffil & fLJgt}r fiISIIE fun&ta To s,3?934.95 ? li$! I ,s q $F '',1 *f ilEir {ili$,' r"r-E 'Dcs"r. Cnsrmn's Crmcr rn3 l95qgn rl I lll I lg0rrr: rOO IEO? Ig?r S:-e-r ---'+

RE$PONDENT'S EXHIBIT 17 $rnrpplnNr LIF Acccum 8*le Arlr&w, CDec6ot rfitrment Au$Bt 1, 20oi0 to Augurt 3"1,2O0G

Basic Business Checking: 1ss1 1al667 ATM/Iloblt Card transactlons thls etatoment psrlod (confnrnd| BrBS ilo|qnsa 9dr Artgtnf nFfibor Aug i4 .6.{B Vl$A Terget Oo0t9ffi8 Gbndate CO r+{8834{53S A!i$ 15 -1,s0 Pdi ATM thago Fee - Wil) Fm DDA 8+fiEfr0fles A,;g 16 -2.W Other gar* ATU Fee S4SO+0&Sil Aug 15 WDAt556 17th St.,Suite IEO Denrr€r CO 848g0t'Ce$g Aug 16 Vl$A Exenph Phyrician t+eturg03-40g.ggto CO lit+ jj-;, :- 'ti" 488mO584 Ar.rg"f 6 VISA 0056 Wild trsl00005€0 Denrrer CO {jrir f, e48$ggo580 Aug 16 -10.00 Vl$A Ampco Parkhg Eroadway Dorn"er CO e4ES{FOSS2 Aug 2t -40.16 VISA K&g P€tncb5t610042605 Ce*rta Rock CO Asg gr Avg22 ffi -2?.00 Vl$A Fedor $hp 08f15e6 Abr 857-3541b75S9 TN lLir, f r r._i,i{i VISA The Lcoplianltor.r Spgs GO s 8498*8571 !

8488686?13 s4g$o1+3?d Ar424 .'1.50 Pu'l ATM Usrg€ Fe6 - WD Fm DOA 848SO008s6 Aug ?t -2.00 Othar Bank AIU Fs€ 8{8€000887 Atrg24 -Yro.gg WDAI 555 lnh Et, Suit6 t50 Dorne( CO 8{S000008s Aug zrt -10.oo Vl$A Ampco Pe#ng Broedlray Denror CO s{8e{?9110 Aug ?8 -1.60 Pull ATM tbsge fur, - V{lD Fn DOA 84{Xr00086s Aug 28 "1.50 Full ATM tlugc fuc - WD Frn DDA 84&)00088!

Aug 28 -1.60 Puli ATM tieage Fc€ - WD Fm DOA B.+8e000788 AugZB -2.00 Oths Benk ATM F.€ Ejti!900086f) Aut 28 -2.18 Qther Bank ATtli Fee 848900{t8€3 Aug 28 -?.00 Oths 8ar* ATM Fee B4A0CO078e Aug ?8 -5C0.00 WIDAT 8cs 2400N. $e Naoogadoches fX 84890008E8 Aug 28 -400.oo WlOAt4822North$treol Nemgdootree TX 848e00086t Aug AW 28 Alrg 30 Zg w-21.60 W/D At Bca 2zt(F N. St Nacocodocheg TX !i Vl$A Ctear $prirqs Bee*aura t taooiaoArea fX f $-r VISA Lowe'e tl 772 Nacog<ioo.he* TX i di ' i?i; 84800007s| s48870067t s4s8t t 3843 Aug 3t -7?O.00 VISA Dia Pe*ing ? 3033a24O,16 CO s{E88e1 2SB Aug 3t -0(|.00 Vl$A Dia Par|ring 2 3039424046 CO 9488821 2S2 Aug 3l "27_44 ViSA Rudy'a I ltacogdah€s TX 94888?1264 Totsl ATliyDobli c|'d w[B8rrh: +8/1?.00 Totll nrnber ot ATtllllabB Card wf$drewrts: 4g

Electron lc wlthdrawals tlrls Btatonront perlod Refcrrm nufibdr Ddt Artroui{t} Artu|tr.r *|t* Aug @ 3,930.31 VISA Peyrnont Erick O. Graham 444s140498 Aug 72 -45.oco.@ W€ t 0O4O88 8nt Frpd Graham fu * OOO13S 9485m(}849 To{rl Elcctrcnk W6rdrerrrlar .f91 3t0.31 Totrl nmb€r of Elstronic YlltMruuats: 2

Lowest dally balance Your b,u€ct daity balance ltda Etatcrnont penod wB6 $eeso.Sd on lq0urt28.200€.

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 1B From: jirt[iil:L::A: To; r;_l A.tkrr lCcajtel,..;.cpnlels.ir.cr,;]]j SubJectl FW: Transfers D!t€: Tuesday, August ?f 2006 10:36:2g AFI

:,.ia.,"tt) 1.,.;.rit lit:.),..: :);t:tj.::{: t;it,;}n}4: iht: Srrtnunl lf .lhe iran${er fttn $i:4 r:];(t iil s5,i]1rl i r',e,:i. ;r.::-t .----Onginal Mcssage---- f rorn; Graham, Fred 5snt: Monday, Au€ust 2!, 2005 4:14 pM I To: D D Allen ([email protected]) !

Subject: Transferx \"w 1," Dav;n can you pleas€ arrange for the transfer From my cornpany acc.unl xxxxx1667 $g4, r:gg 1;11",* loilov/ing account First Eank& Trust East Texas, 1009 N university Drive, Nacogdocfres TX /s96x. fioutrng number 11J1?2904 Account Number g01037g8g l-hank yc,.i rf'\ .{" / ? { I

Page 2Q ot 23 r._ TOTAL SALES/BROX€R'S coMMISSIoN ilAsEao{PFrc6 s 185, oao, oo i)AtD Fflof.,t % -- $-q, t5O. oo AC)RRO\,r,18 P'.: iSION OF CQMMISSION {LINE 7OO) AS FOLLOWS tsi_lt,f)J

:2i_:-Lt3t_ss SE T LE METJI 51-r :i!,taN,

f0 i .!. .r'g.Fls. rF t!:r MJ.ri 1fi lc Ed PoaJ !6dsr f@b^ h AL.6 Urtgrge,.r,trr ,3.@n{.r4. ie lc trll Ars,rrbl ie ?ica FaTfl,fbo stomater tesearci

?1; \ro-?,9. Mc. e..m,rm ,)' '^s!

Tl !rer4 n6!:ro r!*um br s2 , o59. OA *. 4el . R , Ot.-nr., tcl ^..t

iO!1 d*rri ,rBrqdo d#, @ '!12 Mo.a.& r.ivrr^ce

ATut\ . ; 6" .{\)4.'..1 .trg9r9qate Lccoun+-! Escrou )djustheol :i!' i rol y$ffil of .lcEi.O lE rd

.i4q Pederten Fl LLP (341 L.-d_?rl?! t Floyd LLp I t0/ Anohrt't ht to &w! itffi Numbtg Nacrigdoc,4oc .tbatraor S X-tttE Ca. t rrp, I llno$tu.bdeil.Gltu;b!r3 sfo0- oo s95,5OO.00 I r.1.19.oll!r_6i!|4y"Egr9 _- .. . $1t3lo..qo,, .... { SlSSioOO-oo )

r?Ol Feordrn!1C*3 1?o2 C[t/qMty ldslry ?)r

5Loo. oo ota Lc Home Protectiod 5320.OO 305 fedex F9e . s20. oo

\6vs €rgfully rdiow€d lhe HUD'1 Sgttlomsnt Sldmonl and to tha bost of my know!€dgo gnd b€tiet. lt is a lrm ad accurato Etalqm€nl ot a[ reoipls and disbursom€nts mado

,r^rrgbr:7;,

lelluo'l. $lemsnlStatementwhichlhavepropa€disaku€andaccurateaccountotthistransactron. .dvc Pr bPdec rs a rrue ano acculare ac thdo€ussd( the hJy)tLe ur5bursed In dccordadcc th thrs srardmenr lxa6e .Ja,e _ se{,Fnon A-aen.

W -"" g/afb, AFINING: ;5 2 6r;6re lo knoeingly maks laJso sbtsents b lh€ Unh€d States on lhis or any olher similar torm penaliles upon convrcron €n irctude a /ine and ioofls.)n !il Fo.deEil€ sae rll. 18 U S Codo Secriod tOOr and Sdio^ teto

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 14 A.'Settt(,ment Slatement

11 ent ; -l ;r.iA lle | 3 [ Conv. Unrns Number {,oao Nqrtbgr I crahan, ,I vA ; fl Conv. rr:s Frederrck Dawson ;I !redefJCk Dawson I ll tn*;' -"t A--.'= f*r -;. ", t* -.;;.;;;, ; fiems a cc weta n)ark(ttj ii o llems n)ark.(nj wer".paiij Drrrl nir(,.ra orlsrL]e ot rt^Grn^ . - . .,',Jwri ^f ciosrnq. they are shown r.ere to,;ntorr iticl,.ir iu,fi;,;;;;;;1,;;,;,:;.j;;,r:',,.';l:;:;, l NAME AND ADDUSSS OF BORFTOIV8 H: Frcderlc* Abwl|'n Gfehrm 37M Roguet, Nsegdoches, fX 75 E NAIIF ArlD ADORi:SS Oi SFrrFF Slcven lulz Nacogdoches, TX Shannon Lutz Nacogdoches, TX ; r.lltv€ANDADDRF-ssoFLINDER --W tAOg N. Univssily Dr.. f*acogdoches, TX 76961 iruof 'r'qtY Tio4*a;*A .-OCA f lrlN Nacogdaches, rx75 5 I SETIr-ilviENT AGENl: Stripling Psdersn Flayd LLp Pi-ACF OF Si:T-iLlrvlEN r 1 18 E Uospitsl St Ste 4O0, Nacogdehes TX 75961 751624274 I slrll1,i t.^l_r.lr i)ATf osi25i2006 I FtFSC,S-;,Of! DAIf ,00. tiRSSS AMOi.iNl Dl .0O. GROSS AiVIOUNT D"jF t0 SFl,.t i:F 4Oj Conl.aci Sai6 Prce I 5,.1 qs, q!{i . qq a0:a Persrral i'.rcei! i f,l .sen?r:enrs marq* l0 Lror.ajwe' I rat- rre I?3fi) s585, O0

A3.]U!iTIIE I']IS iOtr ITI'MS F'AiD AY SEL.LE[:I iN ADVAIJCT A{]JI]STMiN.iS FoFI rTFMS;..AID tsY SLLi cR iN AI]VAN{:{ 4C6 C{ylown Iues t0 {

aol aou^ry Tates lCa Asse6!frqnts

J2'J CHC)SS AVOLiNI DUE iAOM SORF{OV/FN i sr85,585 42o GFTOSS Af,4O'JN] l),J[ I() SFL,I_ER i s t8t|, o?0 0?

ZIJ' AMOUN;S PAID BY OR IN BE|JALF O': BORROWER 500. FEDUCTIONS jN AMOLrn"l DUE IO SiLLIR ',4'_'5: n .r, is?sr d rs icaats)

La Optzor Fee .1; Cr-edi t for ! Credit {or repait-s ::-- _._--_r_F i Ail_, S:MS\-S r,J;r , : V5 _NFA,-, a. 5cr. ADJJSTIVIENI S TO'T J;EI'4S U\I,AiD i-iv SI-,.I i:R I

,-,a i.riy1?,wotaxrs rr: l __)6 j_ IF_=-=: ::"J ""^' ' I JounlrBles o)/O112006 t) OE/25/2406 | s2rOSA,03 5j 1 Couniy,a@ O) /0i/20A6 5/?006 i s2 o5c 05 ^--;;;t S

f--*-

,0 jCTAi- i,ArD tsv.FOF 520 IOTAL REDU{;IIOIIS .\1i5.50J 85 SCqBOWr-nl iN AMOUNi DI.JE TC SIi,LER i a- q!T-Tt EMEAJ' ! FiJMTO BCT]AO',VE . Gaoss arrcNn,'oue 1o :ieiier lirrre 42C) j j5: 1o:l- 1/-'' Less amounl lBid bv./l'. bqrdwet lline 224\, slot,6so.05 602 !*s re,Juctions 'n ami Coe selle. {i,nc 52q) s!4i,50!.86 llASir 1flrn1tr,r, iIror BoqnowER: i 58.J,934.95 60-1 cAsfl rIIrlrovr rfirr.r HUD-1 {3-86) - R€SPA, HB 4305.2

PAGE I A. Setiti,inent Statemenl ': ,,1 '- I /t

C. NOTE;':Us tarm is hlrnished io g've yorJ a siatemenl ot actuat setllemenl cosls. Aolorrnls pard ano oy tir senieryrent aqent a,e siown nailed c o c we,e pard cutsrde ol cigsing: lbey ate show. here,o, intormalioral loot,i,loses liexrs A'i:J irF no, r.ctude(] ir !ire 1-,^,.

O NAMF: AND AODRFSS OF BORROWER: Ftcdrftc,' Otysd|n Grrhrn 3704 Raguat, Ntegdoxhes, fX TS A Stcvon Lstz Shennon Lutz Ndcogdoches, TX Necogdoches, TX I NAM,E AND ADDRESS of LIND$ffi ,o@ N. Urrivssity Or-, Necogduhca, TX 79gf,, G PCOPS|IIV 3704 R,gusl I OCAI TON Nacagdochds. fX 75 5 H. SETTI 6I/}FNT AGFNT: Stripling Ptd*nn noyd LLp E'!ACE OF SET'IIEMENT l le E, Hotpittl 3L Sto 4OO, Nscogd*he!, TX 7S$1 T iN, 75152a274 I SET;I EMENT iA;E 08/25/?ffi BESCISSION i DA"TT,

1Ca GROSS AMOTJN 4OO GROSS AMOIJNT DUF TO SELi ER l: a. n! ,c !;a'€s 5'lcl 4Cl Conlaai Sd6 Pra€ _-rj _ _ _ - l^ rt,.<a-at pirCcf, -' 51a5, i:o0 ,rc PerSoia, pope*y 1:r Se:iemA^b aia.ges ta Bf<rwer -.1I I ir.Fi r,n? 140C1 I

!DJUSTt,lFNTS I-OR iiEMS PA]{) gV SF-I Lf q IN AOVANCE

r2C CHOSS AMO|JN: L)Ui rtioM BOqqOVJEn I st85,585.0o 420 GI]OSS AMOUNT f UE IO SEiL-ER r s r 85 2O,C AMOUN]-S PAIL-] BY OR IN 8F-HALi. OF EORFIOWER 5CO. RE|IUCr{ONS rN AMOUNT DUE 1O S{:r.t.ER "l: _no,

2C: F nc,oa ocrd cr r@ ;Jae !s j $62 SBtllsnsn 6arge6tc se|€. {iire t40ci

20€ option Fee 5 roo. oo ?T Cr6d)t for repairs $2,000.oo ?aa

ADJUSiME^ITS ioq iI EMS UNPAiD gY SII i-f H Ai.T.iUSTMENTS iCR lIEflS uflpAtC) Bv SrLi f i{ i

oa/25/2006 4!Sls::aa: Iq ll

l?C la)lA) PAlij Bv.!-'aJrl sJai.650.a5 52t rOTAL REDUr..ilONS BO RqOvi I A 1NAMOUNI i]UE TO SFi TFII :1:,i r,A9r t- sf--l Li<1FN: Far-rt ,{ ROWER ;A5rr A i S: i ILLMI,NI l{,)li:Ro}rl :;LL Li i,li (1ffi g9:l rag!f!!!l! r:,140i Cjfrjss aotgunl d!,e lroni borlOwer s)85,585 0A s!lgl_! i si ss ccc oo l?2 L ess amounf eatd by/irt butove, (iiae 22J) LeEsEduciioosrnami.cueselierllrne'r2o, | 5rts,soi as i-'3 cAsli' i I I 16] Bog.iosrEn s83,934.s5 cAsrr iN'-nr;r,rr , sEri.ilr fii'ar-rl,,t firoi i :-i9,4q, i, HU0-1 (3-86) - RESPA, HB 4305.2

PAGE 1 IOI} iO'iAL SALES/EBOKER'S COMMISSION pFicq t r 85, ooa.

PAI9 f FOM PAtD I uo!\1 MSEO ON OO s9 , 25A. OO BORHOWEN,S Ji-:;.1 I ;l S r U NLTS I lJrt{1\j rvrsroN oF coMMtssloN (t.tNE 700i As FoLLows ,r, I '.: sl .625 . o0 SFT ILi:llnt:^i r si,: ii.r:tlt'l:

s9,15C Ct f_ -----**___"L 6r AoFluib r? 8d PoOl tU atdn t''6. tr _-l-'3ei-d &3 iF#.,'r!*e.h t6 qraqs. nru.m€ .6lr.n1cr i* ro

?tte f8fEl tba ftrarrcrt 'tatuetar

*l J.l6rd $erm6 r,ffilrr bf Lr6 Nrt Ot.& 52,059.OO FaC {l{ Irood ,.!u,.rrt p?.jlc,r i6. a5 rWr i&rd 6srin€ irpa !c4qr€ lnrdFcn CIt p'6rny i.{i al4 C-!.ry p'opcry lua 5 nrrd oHsa^i! muF! @

p.: tunn ate Acc^unt-ing Esclou Adj13t.mpn! i rtr sfft/mt ot .brr^a t?r tt r i!2 brg dr 4, sfr b r 103 inh [email protected] t6 Podertd, Flo LIP (3at ri05 ?affir prd.'a6n 16 axrlgl,lpg Padarta! t Floyd LLP .rt \drrytHrj 1107.@yrtub rta! ld.ineNro Naavqdochoa Abatraai & fltlq Cd,, tqc, st. Jto, oo k ngr({.df.

1?O? CirylB^tt Wq.rys r&3.$alrstre rpa

lc gec PEoloctToa s320.oa s ro. oo

Ihs hUD't Sof,lomonl Sbleftont whch I hav€ praoat€d is a lrue and dalh lhrs slaimonl *Qde @ounr o' th " "^W, X, J)' ThDCt Ftoyd ^,"-'i/r{* TARNING: I is a crims lo tnoringly mat€ tats€ slgtsfrgil9 to lho Unh€d Stalai oo tht! or sny olh€r simtlsr tm Psnan€s upoo conviqtion €n Includo a lrna aM tnposon nent Fd d.Btts s@: Iillo t6 U.S. cd€ Sdlon 10ol dnd Sglon 101o. :2 I E c= :) o O - N o $ O N

o = G 4a 3.g OG -5 O;N : :r- -=-:9p NN,: gqqo q aa a o ;;5 ooo ; a f,OClg cl O E ooQ O :) : 11 Qsc 6 O I-\e)\c6(-:1 ;;; : : c :-..u. o -o€NFtrd i6@ c.- a OO 333888333 o

OO a.d gFREEgEE? .= o c ".i1 LiOCNo-js,OO c : o o o a tr o c a . 1 r iC-i -ii--^.i-;.,--^^'^- - ;to@€o€ i lRi --i"idiDGlG;;;? E ii-: ": NNNTTTNNN' \NtrNi-itit;--;,-rNN\ ! :-:Tlocoq{a€ l:.!X- ?:Y3- "c"q;.aa;;;;;;_>bD 3.ggY-:"3f:S_+ag:_g - @ c o anaO D 3 8b5b os.'ia,;+?;::3EBB NNNTNT c

: . 5 a Eiir - :^-= i:dil=lT:iUE:;: ;:>:'::<,oo.:i-:5f- 6'r o E f o --m- mdr'- o Nd9h or€-::::::::33 o a ar)d

E SEEssFcEa=- c^ 2 c c - i = \ i.: -9'.XC ^!:f;- N c-N - ;1 6 l< F=*:=iiFtKseds <3*srr<*vgs\t: t? u 'z to =v-xc olf l* a :qNyo 3 > -1 6^- 'd: HFiFEE€EiEEg€i - x:.

IoJ l- c C- :E -AOXon I ts": I c .rc!6Y' ::aEgsEslEillI O 6 _ _ ,t _ E F l a :; *i:a '; i- i".l r>: = o '-- tv 7 ?4- iFriEEE=i:iiiE a C

. a.:-FFg!! l?-4d€d- : e J == =: (! ci?oa44e1ooeci -+-a*-Fts-c o -o -_.=oloX 7e-*!zr'odoz€d06azdo.= -*- i:=;:f;;=:ff==- cl rl RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 19 'iE '- \J f,s t\ 8Fg \ -**. f;e \\i\6? o 5 oq, 3 cc EE f E.]: Su o OQ ol E .oo <)d 99P !p- .=;.!6 ro{, coco o oo 0000 aQ. N rc CL o O. o oo, OTJ OI {,J !-o BEfrE 4 <tc)6Ooo q 888 ;;x c F. rQd<)60 60doo(5 dciridi nl vi uiui@ F(J qUQ U 6< a u 2z o o o;Z d(J IU tu o oF (Jo ! {b I J L) E o Od 0 A = o9 E€ EE oo BE8EEE88E .o f, 9qq i k;8 48. do- Eeng'g.fiE.E.e 40c)NOdO60 PEao -'oo{ E u 9;i'q E; E! c U !9.9F F- g G F c) * ,tr^ a Ir 6 q AAA q99 (olo Nfl NNN NNNdNNfldN qq9q9q!qqq 6 r: g !l .: gF>R e D N rrr F-r rxr s. D TFNThNTNT s- D}S NF rhr &- co- 66@ rrrrhNrtsr €6A66cO.O@O ra E **gR e-k; s.s.'s qg qqs €r+trlqsrq.<q+ o ^a trl-d ACEO I s-33R -z 9€@rNr c o oo?g r rNr rrrFNcd&€m t'ifigccc ? 9?? >c= YYYYYYYYY v,<XP666 o :fldaNOo Y o:'T-i om ?

G ?fi :36$E"F5s*" -:*:--S*- €OO sNoq6@rcoo ddddidddd hs E EZ E> 5G .9 o Ro xo ooooPQ^Q ,q E 2 c ee oo 8888EHFEU OC)OOHYHYq tsr ppppxi-';K'> N l4 Nts c A-q;r dx NXYO: >6 : A :g n; For tol dO ::::iitii 9.q99fi;3Hft N 0 € F I EK :: R E ER R* .9ii on EHgHggHEi o ro F ad d ! tr e s.? ;E ; R :-i EH€ H5E PsP r (J rr N:IT::RS1 Nrrlt\-lAY t (faox><:<g:t- G g :- := :X E q 9d6 :.H FBF oo R9*;;i;5Xi5 ,9 E F Nt) sq 538::::31 oo c -6 E := 3 > E 6> E o F aro{ E -:- &=> 3 F=s {E5o E >: e o * s;; > :;. q ;2: h=; z zz. Tzzzzzzz- E o c o 0 (J 4 F Fq oo:e E:t 999399998 : t oiF-FF!

J :J': d JJ c go N oU ododb F FI-FFFFFF€ 3 <4 E5? o, ad odoE.Uo{06o5"6"t? f fE s e*-H dPc rsffreScS = :i ,E Stnrnmmwr {)r Acsrrsr ao787 ll,,rl,lrlrl'l',,ll,,tl,lr,,l,llr,lt,l,,llr,l,tflrrl FBEOERPK D GRAHAM ?ro ELM $'r N A{)OriDoc H Es TX 79965-2 848

Your llonay Market lnysstrnenf $fatemcnt August eg, 20O8 to $rptanrbcr It, lgOS Aeoouft t numbir 7001 1 iteSeB

Your account surnmary Beglnning balence @ Csll on Augrret 25, 2O0€ $186,07O.t1 rr13) 8118'3400 l-learing lmpaitsd ffDD 214 58S4r55) Plua &nolsita lntarpet s406.24 Vlclt d,r rub altr www.oomerka.csn Lss*wlthdrawab Yltltc io ut Electmnic iEFTj wifndrawule €e5,070.a1 COMERICABANK - p.o.Box850282 bd;wi*'d;#; $4,OOO.0O DALLAS, TX 7526$'?82 Feea and eevhr chargos -$1o.oo Entsng balanco on gtptcmbcr 27,2{lOG $157,396.24 @ The Gomerkm Vis Gilt Card b the perlec{ gift tot evefyarle and ersry omaslrn - blrthdaya.

Swnmary ol intercgt youle earncd holHays, graduathrn. w€ddkrgts and more. Pick . lnlereel paid io you this statem€nl psriod $,106*?4 up your Vba Gitl Card todqy al any Soamrba r Annual percenlage yiold eamsd thls slat€manl parlad: g-55% locallon or prrcheee or{in€ al trrrn€ric&.€orrr. r Tctal inlsrsst Fid to you this year: 93,935.48 Sorn€ rsstridio&s appry.

I@ Thank you lor belng a Comsr*x dlEtofi*r. Wo valua tha lrud andoonfrdene€ that yvu wtfrntJ€ ta ptaca ift us.

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 19a TRANSFERS FROM SAVINGSFUNDS IRANSF[RR[D TROM SAVINGS ACCOUNT 7CO].142996 REPORT -]

F tiNDS TRANSFFR To co A BANK A/c 7aort4297a INVENTORY SUPPORT 4.3 REPORT 3 I].A.TL DETAILS AMOUNT BANK REF{ 30-Mar^06 WEB TRANSFTR FROM AC 7001142996 800 00 w888807324 17'Apr'-06 WiB IRANSFER FROM AC7OOTL42996 8.500,00 w888800292 26-Apr'06 WtB TRANSFER FROM AC7OAN42996 6,0c0.00 w888807604 7-i u n-06 WE B TRANSFER FROM AC7OOL1.4299' 8,000 00 w888808096 7-Juq-OBWt3 TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,C00 00 w888807612 n-06 WtB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 7-l u 2,C00.00 w888801374 6-lul 06 W[B TRANSTTR FROM AC 7001142996 3,500 00 w888804059 13-J u l-C6 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888806871 24-)ui-46 \#LB TRANSFFR FROM AC 70C1142996 r",s00.00 wB88808548 10"Aug"0i; Wt8 TR,qNSFFR FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888801800 -iRANSFER 21-Aug-06 WEB iROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888802796 29-Aug 06 w[B iRANSrt_R FROM AC 7001142996 3,000 00 ow50023399 5'Sep-06 WTB TRANsFER FROM AC 7001142996 3,000.00 ow50073167 1,1"Se p-06 W[B TRANSFTR FROM.qC 7001142996 3,000.00 ow50079976 21-Sep-06 WE3 TRANSFi_R FROM AC 7001142995 12,000.00 ow50062130 20-Dec-06 WEB TR.ANSFIR FROM AC 7OO].142996 6,000.00 0w50082172 Pre House purchase 62,300"00 1-Mar'07 WTB IRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 6,000.00 ow50001709 2B-Mar-07 WEB TRANSFIR FROful AC 70C1142996 1,000.00 ows0009599 3-Apr.07 V/EB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 s,000.0c cw500356lE 0-J u l-07 wt 8 TRANSFIR IROM AC 7001142996 5,000.00 ows0082796 30-Aug-07 WEB ] R,AI]SFER FRCM AC 7C01142996 5,000 00 ow5005 2155 10-Scp-C7 WT B TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 s,000 00 olv50038 12 1 7-i'Sep-47 wts rRANS[ER FROM 4C7441,142996 7,500.00 cw50063723 u/tB TRANSTTR FROM AC 7001142995 2,750.00 ow50026027 30-Oct 07 WIB TRANSFFR AC 7001142996 7,000 00 ows0039801 30-Nov 07 WtB IRANSFtR ':ROM FROM AC 7OO1].42996 6,000.00 ow50087670 14'Dec-0 7 WiB TRANSFTR FROM AC 7001142996 3,000.00 cw50049096 24-Dec-Al WEB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 3,O00.00 cw504447247 Jan-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 6,500.00 o 8w50002 52 9 2-Jan O8 V\lEB TRAI.JSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,000.00 cw50006201 30-i an'08 WEB TRANSFER FRCM AC 7001142996 5,000.00 ow50076060 d - [ eb-08 WTB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 ow50037633 - 1 i.. ^;-Li3 WEB TRANSFER FROI,/4 AC 7001142996 3,000.c0 ow5001,0336 l, N'i;rr iil WL3 TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 6,000.00 ow50094999 1C-Mar-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001T42996 3,C00 00 ow5c0581"54 2a-Mar-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,000 00 ow50076107 I -Apr ud \ /tB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 5,O00.00 ow50075748 1-4 Apr-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7OO]-142996 1,400,00 ow50029213 18-Apr'08 W[B TRANSFTR i'ROM AC 7001142995 1,OO0 00 ow50014828 :ompletion of house Purchase 92,150.00 28-Apr WTB TRANSFIR ;ROM AC 7CO1I-42996 1,000 001w50064000 6'tu1dy WEB TRANS| FR FROM AC 700114299fi 6C0.C0 ow500374s3 3-fv1ay WEB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 200.00 ow5002782 2 27-May WEB TRANSFER FROlvi AC 7001142996 300.00 ow50092365 2f -Mav V/[B TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 300.00 o\ll5c056130

Total 156,850.00 march 06-may 08

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\lr4y Documents\drvorce hard drive\divorce 3 rourt infomatrr RESpONDENT'S PURCHASE\cOMIRICA ac7AAIL42970 HOUSE PURCHAS xIsx EXHIBIT 20 Fill tE-.frl rrr' IIII Frrst Btni< 1009 N. Universqty Drive O-'TL dg rrust ffi Nn*gOoches, TX7596I (936) ssss100 .ir ' ) ' :riL : i) !;(:'6 Y !r'r:1.r; ', '

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RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 21 PnYr"ielti-C llgse First Bank &T?ust ffi 1009 N. UniversitY Drive Nacogdoches, TX 75961 tDEs) sse-sloo .<ir, trr'. {r -1, ' ,r ; l; I 1rli..'i,.' .14 r t: .il l! ,:t . l,t^ . i, j 11; .' a'r

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H 131?55 NOTICE OF CONFIDEN'I.IALITY RIGHTS: IF YOU ARE A NATURAL PERSON, YOU MAY REMO\,'E OR STRIKE AI\{Y OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING IIiTORIUATION o FROM ANY INSTRUMENT TIIAT TRANSFERS AN I}iTERESI'IN REAL PROPERTY F.

BEI'ORE lr IS FILED FoR RECORD rN Ttrn puBLIC RECORDS: youR socrAl R SECURITY NUMBER OR YOUR DRII'ER'S LICENSE NiU]VIBER.

WARRANTY DEED WITII VE\-DOR'S LIIN l*t Dccember IU 2008 <7 Grantor: ROBERT tv{ll,LER and wifu, ARDAN MILLER 7 Crantor's Mriling Address (including county): 10 P:rk St., Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County, TX 7596 I t-t Grantee: FRL,DERjCK D. CR\HAM t-_l l_t Grantee's FIailing Address (including county); 3704 Raguet St., Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches Couag. T}-j5965 Consideration: TEN AND Noi 100 Doi.r.ARS 1s 10.00) ancl orhervaruabre consideration, ancl a nore of evcn date rhat is in the principal alnourr of IrORTy-FOUR THotJiAND and Noi 100 DOLLARS (s44,000.00) and is execured by cranree, payabre to rhe order of FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST TEXAS, -ihe n.te is secured ty a vendor,s lien relained in tavor of FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST TFXAS in rhis dee<i and by a deed of trust of everr date from Grantee to JoE c. DENlvtAN. Iil, Trustqe- Properfy (including improvcmcnrs) :

All that certain lot or parccl of land in the ciry of Nacogd.ches, Nacogdoches County, Texas, and being Lor No. 2 of rhe Rcplat of Lot X-C, Ciiy nloci.

OZ, a-s shown on Plat recorded in voiume 9, page 25 of thc plat Records uiNo"ogdo.,h"..

Counly. Texas Exceptions to Conveyance and Warrantv: Easernenls, nghts-of-way, and prescriptive rights, whether of rccord or not; all presently rcccrded rest-nctions, resen'ations, covenants, conditions, zoning ordinances' oil and gas leases, rights oi'development, mrneral severances, and other rnstruments, other thar liens and conveyanc€sj that alfect the propertyi rights of adjoining owneis in .ny walrs and ibnccs situated on a cornrnon bounciary; an-v discrepancies, conflicts, or shortages in area or boundary lines; any encroaclirnents or o'erlapping ofimprovernents; any contiitions that would be revczrleci by physical a inspeclion and surv'ey ofrhe properry.

Ad valorem t$ies ibr the ycar 2008 have been prorated and paid between crBxtor and Grante€' and Granlee assumes palment oi tares for the year 2009 and subsequcnr years_

Reservations from Conveyance and \4,arrann,: NONE Grantor" tor the consideration ancl subject to the resenatrons Fonr and exceptions to T

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 33 131?55 crnveya.nce aod lvarranty, glants, sells, axd conveys to Crantee the property. together with ail lutd rf F. singuiar the rights and appurtenances thereto in a:ry wise belonging, to have and hold it to Cranree.

R Crantee's heirs, executors, administrators, succcssors, or a*ssigns fbrever, Grantor hereby binds Crantor and Grantor's heirs, execulors. adminisrators. and successors to warrant and forever def'end t-,1

all and singular the property to Grantee a"rd Crantee's heirs, executors, administrators, $uccessors, f:

and assigns, against every person whomsoever larvfully clainiing or to claim the same or any pafl -7 thercof, cxcept a.s to the reservations fron: and exceptions to warranty.

'fhe vendor's lien against and superior title to the propeny are retained until each note l_r described is fully paid aocording to irs lerms, at which timc this deed shall becorne absolute. r.:!

\Mhen the context requires, singular nours and pronorlns include tire plural. t:, {t !'IRST IIANK & TRUST EAST TEXAS, at the instance and request of the Crantec hcrein, r:l havirrg advanced and paid in cash to the Grantor herein that portion of the purchase pnce of t-hc herein dcscribed propeqv as is evidenced by the hereinabove described note of544.000.00, rire vcndor's lien together with superior title to said propeny is herein retained for lhe benefit of FIRS I BANK & TRUST EAST TEXAS, and the same are herebyTRANSF'ERRED and ASSIGNID unto the said FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST TEXAS.

RPQERT MILLER Q,o&-^, ARDAN MII,I,ER NUU, THE STATE OF-|EXAS COLN'IY OF NACOCDOCi IES l/ llris instrumenl wa-s acknow'ledgcd befbrc mc on the I (1 day of Deccmber, 2008, hy Robcrt and wil'e, Ardan Millcr.

NOTARY PIJBLIC, STATE OF TEXAS

Fi lad fo. Rerofd i | : Ho':oidoches Counte 0o: Der l9r.DoE ot 03t51P Aso Reiord in9 0ocu'6f'Tii6er: Aroun'" lC.0P Re,:eip+, Nsrber - 6958?

9s' (qrcl [,ii1cco. (ountc'.]*k r - &l

REAL EIITATE LIEN NOTE lt ,).te: Dec.trnber-{b ,2008 Makor: FREDSR]CRD. GRAITAM Mrker's Mriling Address :

3704 Raguet St,, Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County,'fX 7J965 Payee: FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST'I'EXAS Placc for Pryment (lncluding counfy): P.O. Box 631 I I I, Nacogdochcs, Nacogdoches County, 1'X 75963 PrinciprlAmount: $44,000.00 Annual Interest Rate on Unprid Prbclpd frorn Drte: sx PERCENT (6.00p/o) A-unual lEterert Relc oa Matured, Unpaid Amountr: All past due principd and interest shall bear interest from mdurity until paid at on inrerest rate per annum whictr, from day to day, shall bc cqual m the lcsscr o{'eilher: (ri) the greatest rate pamittedby lheiaws otTexas or heUnhodStates applicablottr this loan or (b) an intcrest rate of cighteen pcrcent (18%) p€r annum.

'Ierrne of Prynent {priacipal rad inlcrert); (l) Principal aad interott are payable in mouthly installmcnts of EIGHT HUNDltl,D FIFTYand60/100DOLLARS(3850.60)ormoreeach,onorbeforethe_!f; "dayofcvcrymo:rth, bcghning JANUARY IS?" .2009 rnd continuing regr:iarly until *re principal and interest have been paid. lnterest wirl be calculated on the unpdd principal to &e date of each paymeilt. Payncnts wili bc creditcd first to the accrucrl interest and then to rorluctjon of princrpal . (2) Ali principai aod inlacst not sooner paid shall be duc und payable DECEMtsllR _."i , zor. li'thc Payer has not received tbc fuI1 amount of any monthly paymsnt by thc end of 15 calendar days afler the &te it is due, Maker will pay a latc charge to Payee. The auuint.pf 0* ch:tge will be 5% of Maker's overdue paym.ent of prilcipal and rntcrcst. Makor will pay this latc charge promptly but only oncc on each iate palTlfi!.

Security for Paymenl: 'l hrs note is seured bya vador's lien aad superior title rctained in deed datedDECEMtsER J6--.

2008, executcd by ROBERT MILLER and wife, ARDAN MILLER to FREDEzuCK D. GRAHA*M. aad is additionally securetl by a deed of trust of evsr drte from Makers to JOE C. DEIiM.A.N, Trustee, covering thc following reai prope4y: All that ccrtain lot or parcel of land in the City ol Nacogdochcs, Nacogdochcs County, Texas, and beiag L,ot No. 2 of the Replat of Lor 25-L, Ciry Biock r57, as shown on Plar recordcd in Volurne 9, Pagc 25 of the Plat Rec<lnls of Narxrgdochcs Couoty, Texas

k - \i1 ui

RESPONDEN; EXHIBIT 26 I lf Maksr docs not dcfault under thie note or any iruuument se&uring the same, and if all accrued intcrast bereon be paid, Maker shsll havc the rigbt to prepsy, 8t any time prior to rnaturity, alloranypartofihcptincipalofthisnotewithoutpouatty. Anysuchprcpaymcntslullbcapplicd to the priocipal inslalhnenr lest maturing in thc inversc order of mrtltrity, and without rcducing thc amount nr delayrngthc timc frr galment r.rf tbe rcmuininginstalhnents ruqund hereundet.

Maker pronises to pay to th€ order of Payee at the placc for payrnent and uccoaiing to thc terms of payment the principal amount plus intcrest st th€ rates slated above. All unpaid aroorurts shall be due by the 6nal schedulcd paymmt datc.

If Maker dehult$ in ftc paym€ot of this notc orin thc performancoof any obligation in any irstrument securing or collatcral to it, ard the dcfasll continues after Payco givcs Mater notice of thc defbult and tlre time within which it must bc curect as may be raluircd by law or by wri8en sgteemert, then Payec may dcclare the unpoid principal balance and earned intcrcst on this notc trrnerlirtdy duc. Mtrk$ md codhr rurd.-y, vrrdcnsu,:cod grrrc?rrtrn v'aTrE bll dcrtr2ords r:or prymsm, pflrs€ntEtions for paymont, noticos of intention to occelcrate msturity, noticss of ac+cleration of rnaturity, proteats, aod notices ofprotcst, io tbe extent pcnnittat by law' Maker also promises to pay rcaso.rable attorney's tbes and oourt and othcr costs if this note rs ir tt o hande of tr, atorncy {o colhct qr rnfolcc t}e r/otr. ThrF€ *1nr,**s 'wrlf hmr ;,nrrrusr 1A.atd from tbe date of advanc€ at thc dnnual lntcrest Rate on Msilr€d Unpaid Amounts. Maker will pay bnder thcse cxperrses and interest on demand at the Piace tbr Paymcnt. Th€s€ expmses and intcrest will ba,omc part of the dcbt evidrrnced by thc notc and will be socunxl by aay secrrrity for payrnent.

hr'&r$L $r. ih.c deb", cvidrtngtd by th,i$ t.e^s thsli !(y, q[tptd t]',t, rrrfi[irnruf' tmr nri 04 nonusurious intcrest thatmay be contractod for, taksq roserve{ chargd or rccoived under law; any inte,rest in cxcess of that maximum amount shall bc crcdited on the principal of thc debt or, if that has bpen paid rafurtdcd. On any accalororjo$ or r€quirod or prrnitted ropayment *ny such excoss shall be cancclled automaticslly as oftlre accoleration or repayment or, ifalready paid, credired on tlr:e pnr.ci.pef of tte dnlv. cr, it the 1r ecr.lal o{ rbo dnhv, ha* hnrn laill" rs{r$/i€A. This prc'-nshn ov€rrideg other provisioos in this sod all other instruments concerning the debt.

Eacb Maker ie responsible lbr all obligarioru r€ercsent€d by this note.

When the cotuext requir€s, singular nouns uti pronoun$ includc the plural.

r{) | _&r,&" FREDERICK q. CRAHAM _ NOTICE OT' CONFIDENTIALITY RIGHTS: IF YOT-I ARE A |IATURAL PERSON, YO[,' IUAY REMO1T OR STRIKI' AI{Y OR AI,L OF THE TIOLLOWLT'{G IN}ORMATTON }.'RO]II A]\iY INSTRUMEN-I'TTIAT TR.LIIiSFERS AN I}ITEREST IN RRAL PROPERTY BEFORT) I'r ls fll,ED FOR REcoRD IX TITE PUBLIC R-ECORDS; YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY }iUMBER OR YOUR DRIVNR'S LIC!:NSE NUMNITIL pEEp orrTRlgT 131256 Executed on the ciate of the acknowledgment below bu! havlng an Effectlve Date Deccnrb ., I fu. zoot o fi' Grnntor: fREDgl{ICK D. CI{AHAI!'1, singic rlan R (;raotor'i if{aiting Adrlress {including count}): 3704 Raguet St.. Nacogda'chas, llacogdoches Counly, T;{ 75965 r:l 'lrustee: IOE C. DtsNM:\N, III a-;, Trustee'r llaillng Address (including county): P.0.8ox 810, Diboll, Angdina Counfy,'lX 75941 Beneficiary: FIRST BANK & TRUST EAS'f TEXAS l_.1 Ben efi ciary's l\lailln g Address (incl uding county)l t-l P.O. Box 6ll II l, Nacogdoches. Nacogdochas Courtty, TX 75963 fJ 4> Notc: ]. l)aie: Oecemter-ffi-, zoof Anrount: forty-Four llsg-saud urd Noi i00 Dollars 1$44,0{}t}.Qti) \{ake..: Fro<icrick D. Craham Payee: F-irst Bar* &'fru"^t East'fcxzrs Final Mafurity Datc: f)eccmbsr* l-Q*,Zatl Terms of Paymentr AccordiDg to tern']s prcvided in lhe noie.

Properrl (including Bny improvsnenis): All tlat cerlain lot or parcel of land in the City of Nacogdoches, Nacogdochcs Ccrunly, Texas, ancj bcingl-ct No. 2 of thu Replat of I4',25-C, City Block 67, as shown on Plat reccrded ia \tolurne 9, Page 25 of $e Plat Rcconis of Naoogd<lcires County, Tc.ras Prlor Lien (s) iincluding rccordin g in formation ) :

NONE For va.lue ieceived and to secure palrqent of the no1e. Granlor convelr the propcrt-v to l'rusto€ ill trust. Glant<ir warrants ald agrees to dcibnd tire title to thc property. IfGrantorperfoons *s cieei of r'us'l sha" havc :';J:: ilTil1,:ff:il1":,ffi ;:::11tr :: i:Jila "' "ry -cfry]gllQblsaiall

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 27 Ctaltor agtecs trl: l. keep the Propaly in gootl repair and condition; I 5 1 ?51: 2, pay all taxes and assessrnentg on thc lropot'ry'befote deLinquency; l. defeod ritle to tho Propaly subjcct to the Otbef Excepdoru !o Conveya.nca arrl 0 Warrar:l.y urrd prescn-c lhe lien's priorit-v as it is establishcd in rhis deed of trust; c,. mainiain all insuranc€ covsr&ges wirh respectto the flrcperry, revcnues gcneratd by F' rhc Propcrt-v, and operalions o11 tlc Propef,ty that Lrndet reasonably requires (*Required lnsura::cc R Coveragcs''), issued by insurers ard written on policy forns acceptable to [.endcr, and deliver ovidence ofthc Recpired insvrance Covsrages in a form acccptablero Lendcr at lea.st tcn days befure thc expiftJlion ofthe Required Insrvance Covcrages; r:r 5. obey a1l laws, ordinarrces, and resu-ictiv€ c{,vsnants applicable to thc Propr:tty 6. keep anyburldilgs occupied as requrredby the Requircd lnsurnnce Ccveruges; ? f. ifthc iie1l ofthis deed oftrust is nct a filsl lien, pay of oause to 3e paid 8ll prior i'ien ntltes and abirie by or cause to be atrided by all prior lieo instr.tmenls; an<l I 8. notify l.endcr ofany changc oiadd:rss IJeneficigry"s Ri,gltts 1. lleueficiary may appoint in writixg a substitute or successor kuste e, succ€eding io all righls BrLl rcsponsibilitics of Trustec. r:l 2. If thc procee& of &e noie arc used lo pey sny debt secwed by pricr liens, Beneticiary r:l rs submgated to all of thc nghls and liens o f the holders of anv debt so paid, l. Beneficialy may apply eoy proc€ods rcccrved under the insurancc policy nther [t- r:r rcrluce the noie or to rcpair or rcplace darrrageJ rtr destrcryed iinproveanenLs covered bv the policl.

4. if Cra:'itor fails to pcrforrn aly of L3rantols obligations, heneliciary maY pc'rfbrnl thosc obligations and bc reimbursed by Grantor oo dernand at tbe plac€ wl:crc thc note is psyable fbr arry sums so paid. including artonrey's fces, plus interest ou tliose suns ftonr the dates of payment dt thc rat€ ststcd in the note tbr nraturcd, unPaid amounts. T'hc surn to be reimbursed shall bc iecured hy this r'leeC of-tru",.

5. ll Gra.ntcr dei'aulLs 0n the note or fuiis to palbrm any of Gra.nior's obligations or if c1e{bult occrus on a prior lien note or other inslrumsnt, and thc default continues aftcr Beneficiary glvcs Gra-.rtor notice of rhc dcfault and the time rvithin whioh i1 must be curcd, as may bc rcquircd by law or b-v *"icen agrecmenq ther'^ Bcnclieiary n:ay: a. doclare the ucpaid prilcrpal baiance and eunred interesl on lhe note immediartely Cue; b. requesl Trustcc io forecicse this lien, in which case Bencficiary or Bencfieiar-v's agent shall give noticc oi (hs fereclt'sure sale as providcd by ttre 1-exas Prcrpaty Code as then amerded: and c. purcirase rhc propcrry at any foreciosurc sale by otTffing tie higlest bid and lrgn huve tbc bid cre{iited on the notc. -ilrr&e"aDuiet Ifrcquested by Beneilciary to lorecicse this lien,'['rustec shall: I. cidrer pcrsoneily or" by agcnt givc nr".tr ce of forcclosure sale as requirtd by the 'J ex a-s Pro[.'erty Oode as then arnended: 2. scll and ctuvcy all or part of the prcpe(y to the highest biddsr tbr cash widr a gencral warranty bicding Crantor, subjccl to prior licns and to r>lhcr cxceptions 10 conve,vnnce *nd warrailtf, urd 3. iicnr ilrtj proreeds of tb.e:.ole, pay, in tiris urdvr; a. exlens€s o f iirreclOsure, rnciud hg a commisSiOn tO TruStee cf 5% Of tlrC bid; b. 1o Bcnciiciary, tlie full amo'unt of prurcipui, intcrest, etk)mcv's ltes, and o'Jra oliargcs due and unpaiti; c. sny all)ounts required b)'law to bc palii beforc payment to Cruntor; arrd d. to Crsnlor, anv ba'lancre. $cnEr'a-l Provisions l. Ii'Lny of thc propcily is sold undcr this ded oltrust, Cranior 5h3l] irrrngdisl6b sun€ndcr posscssion to the purchascr. If Cranlor t'ails to do so, Grantor shall bccorncl$r;lS#a I suffemncr of t-he purchaser, subject to an 8cliotr fc'r forcible detaincr.

2. Recitals in arry'I'nrstee's deed convcying the properfy will bc presumed to bc truc, (] 3. Procecding uadcr rhis dccd of trust, 6liag suit for forcclosure, or pursuing any othcr rrrnedy will not cottslirule an clection of rernedics. |.- 4. This lien shali remain supcdor to licns later crcated even if the lime of paynxxit of tr all or part ofthe rrote .is extendcd or part ofthe properry is released' 5. If any portion of the note cennot be lawfully secured by this dced of trust, payrnents shali be applied first to d:schargc that portion.

6. Grzurtor assigrs to Bcneficiary all sruls payable to or received by Crarrtor from r-r condcmnatios of sll or part of the pmpqty, tom private salc in lisu of cpndcrnnation, anci frorn 2 damages caused by public works qr consrmction on or ncar thc property. After deducting aly {? cxpenses i:rcured ilcluding artornels fces, Bvneficiary mayreleane aly rernaining sufils to Gmntor or apply such sums to r€duce tlre note. Bcneii<;ir:.ry shall not be iiable for fsilurs lo collect cr to r:xercise diligcnce in coliccting any such sutirs.

7. Grantor assigns to Btneficiary absolutcly not oniy as colialeral, all present asd future rent and other incomc and receipts frolrr tho propsrty. LeBsEs urt not assigtred. Grantor warrants the volidiry and vnlbr<rability of the assignmerrt, Crsntor sray as Ilcneficiaqls licsnsce collcct rwrt and other income and receipls as long as Grantcr is not in delault rmder the note or Liris deed of ttust. o Crantor will apply alt rem aod other incone and recerpts lo payinent of thc note and pcrfo:mzuce r:l o{'this deed of trirst, but if -,hc rcnt and other income and rcotipts excc.cil t}e anrount due ulder thc Dote aild deed of trust, Grantor may rctain the excess, ll Crantor defaults in paymeflt oitle notc or r:l peribrmance of this dsed of tnrst, Beneficiary may terminate Crantor's i!censc to coliect and Lhen as c} Granlot'g sgent may reot *r9 properf)- if it is vscant ond c.oiloct all rcnt and c{.her incorne zurd reccipts. Beneficiary nci&cr has nor rissumcs a"ry obiigatiols as lcssor or lantllord wit]r rcspcr,t tu &ny occupant of the properfy, Beneicrary may exercise lJeneliciary's rig!:ts and remetlics u:rder lhis paragraph without taking possession of the propfffy. Benellciary shall apply all rent and n(hcr rncome nnd reccipts collected under this paregraph first to expenses incurred in erer;ising Bcnciiciary's righrs and rcrnedies and then to Crantor's obligations undsr thc note and this dccd of trusr rn the order dctcmlined by Bcncficiaq,, Beneficiarf is not required to sct undcr this paragrap)r, and autrng undcr this paragraph docs not waive any ol Benc.Liciar-v's ot}ter rigbts or rfin€dles. lf Grantor becomes a volunlary cr involuntary bankn:pt, Ileneficisry's filing a pr:oof of clairn in Sankruptcy wii.l b€ tafltamo'.tnt ti] the appointrnent of a rccclver undcr 'fcxas law.

8. lnterest on tbe dcbt secured by this rleed of tn:st sball not exceed thc nraxirnum arilouot of nonusurious intcrsst thai may bc contrsote{ tbr, taker4 rescrv'ed, charged, or receive<i un<lcr law; any rrterast in excess cf that maximurn arnounl shall be credited on t!.e principal. of the debror,ifthathasbeenpaid,refunded. Onanyacceleradonorrequirsdorp€rmiltedprepayrxent, any .zuch excess shail be oancelod autonratically as ofthc tcceleration or prepeymsnt or. ifolrcady paid, creditcti on thc principa! ol'the debt or,'if lhe principal of the debthas been paid, refunded.

This provision overrides othcr provisions in thjs a--rd ali othcr instruments concvrning the debt.

9. When the contcxl re quires, singular nouns a:d pronouns include the plural.

I 0, f'he term "nole" includes sll sums src':;ed by tbis doed of trusr.

II. Thjs deed of trusr shall bild, inwc to the benetit o1. ard be exe-rcised hy succesxrn ir: inLeresl of all paltes.

12. If Crantor and Maka'irre nol the slr:']e person the tenn "Crantor" slrail irrclrrde \,{aktr.

13. Cra.ntor represents that this <ieed of trusr and the ncrre are given ftrr the foilor.ving purp()ses.

The dcbt clidenccd by lhe nt:tc is in part payment of the puruhose price of the prcpcrty; tie debt is securod Lry this deed of trust ald by a vendor's iien orr the propedy, which i.s cxprcssly rctsrncd in a decd of even date given by fi.OBER-f lvllLLER and wife, ARDAN MILLER to FREDERICK D. GRAHAM. This deed oftn:st does not rvaive the r.endofs lien, and thc two l.icns ard thc rights s€ated by 0tis irstmmenr shall be cumulativc. Beneiiciary may eiect to forecio-se under cilher ol the lierrs without waivlng the olirer or may forcclosc under both. Ttre cieed is ,\ i.ncorporeted into this deod of"lrust. til I 14. Bcneficicry may remcdy auy de{'aulf wiftout wai!.iDg it and may waive any drfuuv$ ivithout *,aivirng an-v prior or subscqucnt delarrlt. \ i,5. lf Crantoltranstbrs any pari cf the propely wirhcut Ileneficiat's pn<r wriuen qonssnl, Bcneficiary may dcclarc thc deht recured by this dced ofrnrst imrncdiatciy payafle-- In that svenr Bcneiiciary rvili noti$ Crantor that the debt is paSable: ii it is not puid wilhin thiri&16fi after notice to Crantor, Beneficiary trray wrthout futhet noticc or dcmand 1o Crar:tor rnvoke any rgmedigri protjdcrl rn rhis ins(umcnt for default, Dxcc'pllons to this provision ftri declaring dre noic tl due6;:salcortrarufcrarelimteCtothcfcllorvilg: (a)crcaticnofslienoroncurnbrance sultordinttc P to .Jris dced of trust; (b) crealion of a purcbasamcncy seclrity interesi fbr houseltc:lti appiianccs; (c1 ranstbr by <levisc, desccnt, or opcration of law on tire rieaih of a jo'inl tenanl; (d) 15ant o{'a lea.schold R 1alerest ofthrce ycars or less without an optioir to purchasc; and (c) a tanst'er from onc spouse to thc other, 16. This conveyancc is also madc in trug', to sccure itnd gnforcc the pa)"rnent of all othcr l-l inriebtcCnesses of tjrc M aker of sai d notc to Berrcticiary prei-cntly cxisting or which rn af in attl mrnner r)r mealts hereai:ef bc incurrec by thc Makei and el"idcn0€d tn any malnrr whaEoevrr, either ?. by notes, adva-nccs, overdrafts, bo<-rkkccping cnrries or any ot-irc me'Jtod or uteans, it being cxpressly c? agrcal and underslood that any and all sums now orved to sr he rsriter advaaced by sard Ileneficia:-v ro the Makq sbdl be payable at FIRST Bz\NK ANfi TRUS-i' EASI'I'EXAS in Nacogdocbcs 7 Ccunty, 1-cxas, and shali beer inla'cst as may be provided rn such rtotes or olhcr criidcnces of i:rdebtedness given by the Maker to saii Beneficisryi and this ir:strument is tlso executeri for thc pupose ot sccuring rnd enforcing the paymsnt of ary renewal ar:d extcnsion of any note or of any pan of !"tlc said indebte{ness of the Msker, and ilcluding any lurtler loans and advanccments mace by said Beneficiary to the rnaksrs oisajd note under rhe provisions hereof The 1'act of regrryncnt tr of ail iridebte<incss oltiic Makcr to said Elcncficiary shall not terninat€ this mongagc unless thc sa:re be so relcased by said Bcneficiary at the requcsl of the Maker; bur otherwise it shall rcmain in Il full force and oilcct to sccure all furure sdvances ald indebtedlcsscs, rcgardless o1'any additional It secrrrity that rnay be taksr Bs lo any pasl or future indebtedness, and shall bc ulall-cctcd by any tenewals, exteilsions or Dar-tia1 releases hcreunder

REPUEUC OF SNOAPORE ) FREDIR ;RAHAM

.^ OTY OF SU{GAIORE IMBAsSY OF THE ttATIs Of lrt ^. ,,li.ll[B' >d:rta:rtt:Lnia AXERICA) E0elgtA 8SlaEf).FXSq'NlT&r} s$Aif ts3 ofi jdldsn,i€r! lia r ia-Te re sa Lopez Bclbrc rr.c,rbr*uxdaurynefisnkbify, e NutaridL l)r [.icer of thc i,'nited Starcs ot Arnerica residcnt in Singa;rorc, duly comrnissionevi and qualificd, ol this day pa-sonaily npocareC FREDERICK D. Cl{A}lAMr k*{}*9-re{ffi or proven to rn€ 10 be the person who* nunc i: suhscribed lo tic foregolrg iasr.:$rurrt and ackrowlcdgcd to me lliat l''e cxecuted the same ior rhc purpos€s and consrccrajon therein cxpresscd.

Civo: undermy hand aod seai of ofice tlris 5tjr day of Decenbe r 2008

lide:=--,\_"13t-i""i 9tjic,er . -,ofrleUnire<i .l' ! State.s of Amenca '' :\ liled foc Record lF: f{ccosdoch€5 Counte 0n;0er t9r2009 ot C3151P As '1 Re:ord ns Dorulin-f*frii5er: 131?56 ltrourt ?8.0Q t 6.rrrpt Nurter 08529 & Pv ' uf ) Cofol lil5on' counb CterPqf 0.* 14'i2l'"r:'- i 50'uur i36.',Z2+ 622'1,4+ \i'2? 'j'1,rrLr'. i16-24-2rl I l u-t l;redenck (hahzur l0{)9 N Liniversity Dr Nacogdoches. TX 7596

Atln: FrederickGrahanr: Subject. Acct Nbr: 7617734 Borrtrwer(s): Frederick Graham

DeaLr Fredcrick Graham: I-he arrount needed to fully satisry the above loar on.- 06-17-29!l--- is .l4.ll().98 *, The following table describes the payoffamount in detail.

N.,ts- Tnf erFql 580.6C Nol,e Balaace ,051"61 1',1 I t.ate charqe Balance jg2 ."7'1 l- I I I I I

L__ 14, 120 . 98 0.00

Vcry truly yours.

-:.r'tr'. iJanz ,i t.ust- i--a:i: TSris -*;. --- irtt. Ti$e; ild-:g-:!i.J iii:11;5] Ie ii e. tu$l,f f ; o8.i 1,l,i I t.ti i 5et " C: i6il rrr tS: tlll l*r{.lllj ;Rilllt.: ,la"ll .'it) tiJ.l:{i.?Fj

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 29 z o al -o J o ip v) ro - zuJ (u E U) E F-X .E z! r! Z.; x 1J 7 EV r 6< o c Ei o cr (Ji! (J :-: <; o c Ei ar!?;z3a ;€ <+e VL ZQ 9- ",') .li or c, tn t= s 6 ss e o co o-

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OE q N oeq LJL LJ u fn ci (\ \O -/qJ5.< <f N \i' vl- <l N rNN : (oi o Fl N l.'.| rl !c ol o = Z.

6S c]5 CiP ;go J(J UOJ -F f .=o LJ o qrl cl .d' o N (J :r $-E tE3 F{ o N Ot O o P -;

L gl = co o e'o z ETg. 'E s g CJ

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RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 3B-A (\ <l r\ FI i:i, FI tf :r;, : fr) d (f TF ea € !0 k a) at <-} i\ tai

"!* U & i.{ F a {l'1 -tl dd il <f

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RESPONDENT'S EXHIBTT 38-b rt!

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RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-c c.l Y cl ro g $i' t{l eF , q N !r. I 1 ...l g srl B 6 € c .',- a E -- d.{ € t

7. ;r{ a - w dj Etr cc ttt n-

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RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-d C O= rn - [: iti ,lt- ,E: Y-n c'' @ I l€ rf n- Ni I ln aJ- !* c {_t (t{ (R l;.' I x{ Ft'. i I I i \E; -1\; I \ 4 it ",i 1 Sl- r.{ I I

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RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 3B-e - ca : :f co 5l :- rf IF E ili g .{ I

t €I .i3 ts C.l c/l fr N Sr t H oo F

g - lr ;L ?

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s -l z o o 6 r€a t) c{ a oc s& LN c\- fft cr.

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g{ r{

t= g,H., >t EX ll

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G o -t ,n rH :E IL :i ll ,F T

,r RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-g /-- \* -F C!= zut va.l a- $= O; ?-s ? s l.\I- gl ili € E q \-l tr C '.; cd

I :

It \Id sl- a --t,, h € vl (a) I

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HtrE= sq(i f! a rl I&3 I ,i 'aig -\) s o s RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38,h ,1re-uso-tg3s i_ '.+-_.-l:--:-:-.*'-..

ji Fnfocnrcx o- cfiaHln lnEDrntct o. cnrr{lc r 187 r!.ilaxrE7 lrD0GGr6. n r:rs *glul ii &ff** .*:'!l 'r ir, ,I tar $,iilryi'":.j ,6

i i ':ltlll l80tt! l18lr.5EtOll?tSt .I i Eranch0 Oate0F04-2010 Acoount00103374g Amount 108.07 Sorisl I 183 TR I 131 22S04 InsuD 0 EmptD 0 DbCr D franCoOe Branch0 Dtt606-03-2010 Account5OrO3374g Anount75.00 gcrirt 1t07 TR tr3jt28o4 Dis{r&utionCode 21 TransmitAccount0 Soqusnccg0l?g6g526 O ..lnrtt0 EmpiO - 0 otb, O Trancode 0 O TrancmitTR 113122804 FxceptionCode0 piyNopay DietributionCods 21 Tran3rntiAccount O Squrndfr I SzSeeqo CgrrtclcdAccount 0 Tnan*mitTR 113124804 ExtxptionCoda O p"VUopaV CorcdodAccount 0

r;l ll t I 160r,r: t l85rr50 toll?[5|.

8r.o€h0 D.te 0$.05-2010 Account SOlO33Z4g Amount56.52 Brsncfi 0 oat! 0&11-a0io Accounr so10g3745 A;"t 3000--.00 Scnd 1185 TR 11312ZA(X InetlD 0 EmptD 0 DbCr O TnnCode 0 0 TB tr0101Og IngtlD 0 Emptp DbtributlonCode 2'l TrangrnitAccount0 Sbqrrsnca g0t26&+72n Ea/ial Ot|trblltigncodc 1 Dtcr'C rrendojJiO: TrsnsmitAccount 0' Soq{r€ncc l+OSSStSeO Tr€trrflrtTR 113122e0,4 ExceptionCodo 0 payNopey TranrrnitTR 0 ExcsptionCodo 0 payNopa] CorreaeOacmunt ?vFbdAccount 0 O

I I I tt rre:r on&r.r FfiBEmCr rL ,r6ffi:t,tIr'|:t Hl{r--Fr.^re tdp }ry'trr * .F5;o" s t*c. t+w+ea h+ eAtr,.ttYr FUE . _ wr* 6 Ea _

IggIgSH ieii&-'ri'F ,,j!^; ffi| 1 I @I ll^ I r: laoqr: t loqrSo tgtt?L 5r - a _-_=.&&e_ r{J,r0060o t?5oo/ Eonctr 0 Dsb Fl&.?0i0 Account SO103374f Arnount 175 Eranch 0 Dat. 05.05.2010 Account 501033745 Arnount 4i.00 0t s6nrl 1189 rR i 13122904 rnsttD 0 ErnprD o Drcr o rrancode Ssr6i 1184 TR 113122804 tnsrlD0 EmptD0 ObCrD TrFncod60 0 D8ffiutionCode 21 TruNmrtAccount 0 Siqrrancc eOr3{ S6E6 Drctrbstioncodc 2J TrenemitAccount0 Seqtnncr g0i2ggTl0o TranernitTR 1131246&t Excaptioncod. O payXopay TnrnernrlTR 113122804 ExcaptinnCodcO pryHopay ConcddAccount 0 Co.rodedAccouni 0

[$so.cs Finr Brnk &Trurt l* stutrnGrt6, .lll : l80rrr: t lglt 50 tO 31?\9 ll | | ?gol.ri I tg0r 50 I0tl ?\ s t: I Brardr 0 DatsH1-?010 Accounl 5010&3745 Arnount 190.0O Brench 0 Dais 06-2$2010 Acrour( 50i03374i Arnount tO0,0.00 S€risl 1188 TR 1 131228&4 InrUD 0 ErnplD 0 DbCr D TranGode 0 S..i.t 119O TR l t3tZZAO/r Inr$D 0 ErrplD 0 Db0 D f"crCorfc OiatbdbnCodc 21 TrgnmriAount 0 Sqrnnce 9O132OS6E2 Di*hlbutiooCodc ?1 T*rsrnitAccourx 0 Siqirf,€ g0f g50S610 O TroarynitfR 113122804 Excapboncodc0 payxopey TrrnunitTR 1131228&t E'erptonCodc 0 p'fli{JpL- Cor€dsdAcc.ount 0 Cono*dAcslntO - RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 38-i DUPLICATE TAX RECEIPI \A(. ()(IDO(:HF,S (,FN'] R^I- ,^,PPR DiST I lb w H(.);cPIt'At- Sl" \.4c( )(;fx-)( -iJ l-..q. .t x j Jqr; I q l6,,5 bij" J 4+7

This is a rcceipt. I)o not pay.

fJ* ner ID: R 18218 -f {IRNER 1r4,.\RIORIE l.{NE.

8OI I,,AI;RE],I,,C,NE \At ocl)ocHEs. IX 75964_65 Ii

Par;e{ ld/{)rrnerSec 28016 / l Atrsr/Subd jv CIAI{TIIR Sliltr N ,{ccDunr Nr)rrlhcr: I ll- I i1)-:6ti0-0 ll{tO{) Blocl i.or l-t)t:2 Ac rcs (lat ('r,dr /.1 { )rvncr lntcr:sr I oix) i-egais t- I' l2 CARTER Pri'D Address 80 I l_At,rRF.t. LN PnrpCrrviS1./Zip NA(:.)Gt)O(.ili:S.IX-7596.t l-il'i: LrSl'A I i; Llon:r.sierd L i,ilc l car Jurisdiction l'nr Tsr Post Rr te Tsr -l'otnl Vrlur Codr DistltrnlOther Amounl lhlr l'{)sted :109 :lA[ txiDOC]t lF.s c.r,){ iN"iY 0 4_i4100 s3+.6 90 t, 5i01 9l s0 00 !10"!97 t)l,lq,'2()i() 2r)09 \AC(-)CD(,\CltFS isD v&() l. t7f)0cfl $l9.6 90 sjjT P 07 s0 00 slil ,17 ll09 :\./\t.( )(iu(-X.ll.ltiS 1SD t&S 0 200000 $39.690 P $?9 18 50 00 $?9 l3 '.ta)q CIT\',(lt- t\A( a)c{)()cHi:s 0 550000 54.6 C0 s P !.)00.I ir Si) 0{) !;-100.lta) 20ag i.*, tn,ri. s!122.22 50 t)u 5822 t2 Parrel Totrls: t8l2 2.. SC 00 5822 2-l Dl'l Ycrrillonth: lfl I 0i) I paymeni Ref Totrls: s822.22 s0.00 $822-:2 (llcrk: n:ra PTid lt.v: i.RLDERICK D GRAHAM Pavmcnt-type: Checl Prr ment Ref No: l:)2!,/

Crand Totals: 582 2.21 s0.00 s822.r2 a| [^ 1y '.- I - ,'-l

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-a DUPLICATE TAX RUCEIPT :i,{L.f)CI)OCI{I: S (., LIJTRAL APPR D]S1' I t., w itosPIT.\l- s-i \,,\(l()C;l)()Ct l I i,S. ]-X 7-_s 96 1

't-i 6- J60-.14:l l

This is a receipt. Do not pav. ()tl'69r lp, R I8218 iI ]RNER VlAR.IORIE JANE .30] LAURT'"L LANI, N.4('0GDOC}rF_S,'fx 7_(96.1_65 I l i'arcel id,'{)rmrr Str-l 18024 i I At-.st,'Subdiv CAR'THl \u[: N Ac,roirnl )lurnbcr l8- j ii)---q600-0l1o0r) ftiock Lrrt a,)\!Ier ltitercst i 0l 12 -\crcs Lat Code AI L O)1t L.egals: l,l l2 C,\RTLR l'rrp .;1i1,1,.r, tiO I L.\tjp.EL LN i ;,',,p ( ih,;sr,7.p NACOC;DOC,I.rirS.t x_75e64 I IFL ESTATE ill)mestead Codd: I] 'frr p()!t Yerr .furirriiction IllKate 'l 'l i'rlue (ode ar Drs,'Pen,'Othrr otel Amounr Dsrr posted iril C' i!A( r.lUDO(. itES ISD \t&O I I70000 $i9,6.16 A S 168.-s,1 S0 Oil $1685.1 0l l,i2fill lrll0 N,\COCiIX)L'I{LS ISD I&S 0.200000 519.690 A S i9.{rE r.lil 50 s.19 6E 2r)10 \Ac(.)Gix.)Cili:s (-oi,)i]'y t 4-j410{j 5-]4,6q0 A s5: 49 $0 0{l s.s2 49 tiJlo /.-il Y OF NA(:OCjI)O(.HES 0.561167 s54,690 A s 15-5 70 sft 0{) s is-5 ?0 f,O10 Yerr 't otsls 5J 6 .10 1 $0 1r0 s4la 40 Ps rr:cl Tota ls: 5416.40 s0 0() s4t640 I)['l Ytgr'rtl(]nth; l.)l l{il f 'l.otels: I'a.v-mcnt Re s+t6..r0 s0.fr0 141 6..10 (.lerk: Grace Paid By: I)E\A TI,RNER Payment.Iype: Check l'rymcnt Ref \o: II l2

Crpnd Totrls: S'l l6.JlJ St)-00 s,r t6.J0

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-b Page I rf I DUPLICATE TAX RECEIPT N.Aalo(iDOC}iES CiiNTR;\t. AppR DIST ]I6WftOSPITALST \ACOGD()c-rtrs, "i-x 7.596 I t)36-56A-1.147

This is B receipt. Do not pay.

f)wner ID; R 18218 Ti,rI{NNR MAi{JOIiII: IA\J: 801 l.AtjRiir. t-ANI \ACI)CDOCI IES. t'X ?i964-65 l3

Parcel kl/l.iwner Sert: l8(il6 , AbstiSuhdrv CAIt'itR \[rt.

A,iccun'Number N l8-llfr,-s6!lrJ-0ll(){}(l Block ( )\vner Inlcre\t l_or Acre ! ( ill ( odc rr. l | 0()A Lcgals LT l2 CARTER i'rop Addrcss. 80 1 i,Al_ REL L\ I'rip Cilv,Sti Zrp NACr.i(tDCICHLS.TX_7_596.1 LIFF ESTATE [Jrrnrestead L'odc : l:i Ycar ,lurisdiction rnx Rrlr It: Posi -ln r Stut Code r D i r./l'c ni {) th c r f0lrl Amount Drtc postod :OIO NACO(iDOCIi€S ['OITNTY 0 "134100 $1t,690 P $.s2'18 !r E7 .16i1 t j 06 01t2i)i :U1(r CIIY OF NAC(XjD(}('HF,S {} 56q..i61 i s54.6gc P sr55 69 !t3.1,-\ $ l?g i)4 l0l0 \^1CO(iD0Cffirs iSD M&O I I 70t)00 s19.690 r) $l6E 5{ sl.s.j8 ll91 r0li.| \A{-O(lD(_)C'HI-tS jSD t&S t) t00000 sj9,69i) P $.19.70 5s 96 5.1_5 65 loio r;.-r :f"i"i. 5.r ti'r t s62 ,16 $ f7t 8t Pr rcel Totr ls: 54i6 4l $62.,t6 s.178 8r DPI l'e*r;)lonlh: 2(.tl j06 prvmen( Ref l.otals: S{ I 6.,t I 5 62.16 s478.87 {llcrk: mes;hclJc I Paid By: Dt:\A TLiRNijit Pa,!mrnt Tvpe: {.-heck l'almcot R{f loi tili)

Gre nd Trilals: 5{16.{l \6:.,16 td? tt.8r

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-c [.19..19t,\ DIJPLICATE TAX RECf II'T \A( (_i{;iXX'llF.S { fNlRAL AppR I)tS'I ": t.' w iti)sPIl ,Ai_ s-r \AC.-)CD{JL litS f X 7i:)6 I 9I6-<61-'i- 1..i,1r'

This is s receipt. Do not pay, On'ncr IIJ: R t8318 'l l,lRNl:R \4AR.l0RlF ir\Nt: 8tl LAI.jRI-.l.l.ANF NA( O(in()clJLS. t'X 75961-65 t I

Seq. i'arce! ld/()wncr 28()25 | i AbstiSubdrv CAR If:R \u t1t N Ae corrnr \umber I 8- I l0-,:h0ii-1t12(100 Block Lor LOT I2 (,)!1r1er lnlerest.

4.ci es C at (lodr: z\ i I 000 l-egalsr LT 12 C'ARI ER Ilrrrp Address 801 l."Ai.JRf i. LN Prup Crr.v,'Stlzip NAC(X;IX)CHLS.TX-?-5964 LIFE I:S'f:\TI; lilimcs(ead (.odc frv I rar .lurisdiction L\ Ratr .',-: I'o.ct 'flx 'I-otrl Amounr ! ttuc (lodc DistPen 0ther l)ltt Poite(t ).(:l I NAilax y 'l).)Cl'.lL-,S Cu'r}:t () 134$A 514,690 s75.16 s0 00 575.,16 0i,ll:il12 ]i)] i )iA(.](X;JXX]}.ILS ISD V&O L I7(l0tr0 s_r9.6t0 \{} 00 s2l2 t3 2(11 I f.'ff\' a)F N.{L-a)(ji)(x i:lFs .) 569000 s,\,{,690 s15566 50 01j .iiii NA(:(t(itx)( ltEs r!t) I&s !. )l {,b 0100(100 S.19.690 5.19 ir) Stl r'0 sl, i0 l0l l Year Totrls t5f):) 00 50. iio s5{J1.00 P$rrfl 'l 0tsls: $50i 00 50 00 55('3 00 l)Pl I eariUonrh: l0l2f)l paymcnr Rtf I otrls: ss0J.00 s0.00 s50J.00 ( lerk: rncschellc I l'rid fly: FRLI)LTRICK D (iRAHA\{ Palment I ype: (lheck Pa1'.ment Rcf No: I lS I

Grrnd Torcls: :is0J.00 5-S03.00

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-d DUPLICATT, TAX RECEIPT ?'l,r.f |,1.;1rtn,t tt:S C tlJl RAl,. ,.\ppR DIST : l5 t!' t"10st)lT,\1. st' i!.{(-O.;l)OC l lirS, TX j i96 l q3 6,-( 1r !)- j ".1.1I

This is a receipt. Do not pav.

Owner ID: R 18218 iirftr;P-Y1 \1n RJQftlii JANF.

8()l l.r\l RI-L t-ANlr l"l:\( (-xil)O(.lJrS. I X 75()(i4-r.5 l l

i'ai'ce) Iditlqnei Set: }Jit:6 , I .t,bst-rSubdiv CAR'l irR 'iil tt r\dcc{rni Nutlber I li- I I l-iit)i)-it Bicrcl I 2(;0tt l.or I OT l2 ,\ercs , .rl ( \i l)'^nrr lnlfrcrl I rli){) {)Ll( i cg:ls i- i' I I C,\1{ l Llt l)n)p.1,jdr.ss 8{)i 1..\tiR[1.1]., j)rop Cjt;'/S1.ZtI \.1( ()(;D{,X. if ES.l X-;<e6.r i.lFI: l:S i':\ II f'lr)ntcstc,id ( )(j ( li 1'trr ,lurrsdictiun far Rrtr T*r Post 'I sr !'a lue {..ode Dis/J'eni0thtr TOarl Anlr)unt D*tt Posted :0i: N,\t(.)(ii){.)Ci trr_c IsD I&S r).20f)i)(r0 s19.69(l 5.19 69 :i0 0i g:tr) ()9 {rl,'l lr.loll 2Lrl2 \,\CO(iD.x_FtEs lsD \,1&() I. I 7()000 5i9.6q0 $tl: r 9 50 0(l $2t2 l9 20t: a tf t ofj N,\(,(xiDt)( 1il,S i).5621x)0 5 54.ti9(l sr5i6ft s0 {)0 5| i 3.6ri l(rl: \,.\(..O(iDrJC HI:S Cot.rVfv (r Ji.l100 53.{. ()9a) $7::l.t Sil {10 5t5 3-l ztrt7 t cr. t:otet, .5:Ofr .qq S0 Orj si00 E9 I'arcrl'l oralst 55r)r) Ii9 i50{) fi9 liPl ) car/tlnnth: l{,1 j1)l l,aJ,mcnt Rcf Tolals; 5500.tt9 50.{r0 s500.E9 { lerk: rncschcllcnr l'$id B]': l)l:\,\ N.'! ltiRNl,R l'41me nt I -v pe : L hrck P8]'mrrl Ref No: ILr()l

(;rand Totats: 5 500.Ii9

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 39-e i:l4i)rl) l{:6(tA\ l'agc i lrt l N o € a F & a N z F & € m @ z* a O Pqr E =m o :: F c E g xt. E > : c 6-2 t :' (/t F ;a D z z 2 2 m z h r z z z z zr z z z z z iri z z z 8H A x z z ftz z r-z 2 z z 2 z z z I o z 2 { f z 2 z { q I I z -z r z -z zn F tt z rz -z z. z { q* 3X ts l g I i i o i r 4 i i i i I { I j q I I n i F .pX; g; F z o o o o o t z 2 z z t z z z z z z z 2 z z z z z z z 2 z z z z 3() q> P o -dz 2 o r v v F r r n 6 g !

2,ns - > ! ! ! f,F l'oG 5o ;> 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 s 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 O'<r E G I a z{ z+ z 1 1 {z I J m zi zI z z z 2 z z z z i { i { I 1 4 I zI { zi z q 4 z 2{ 2 3 8<m2 I o t i Zr g v)r 3' F p 3 33 ts_ i.

I x o -I X I 6 2 2? c): I:I F F o o 6 o G' t t 5 X x I I b b 6 b o i5 E d b b b h i5 b b 8 TJ 8 b o E F F I 6 6 IA F 6 ; I$ dsffi# 5" i: Yti.i t t"',\ nfr r&it, ffi$.,-ti i,i: ir$):;'f @F o zl 7( o o z vlG z. o o O { { { { I { a { { { o :il { a") a ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! n J F € € € €@ @ s o a s ! ! ! ,! ! ! ni il o @ @ F € D 6 @ 6 F E 6 & g5 ?=i gi Ti t= @ .9 tl E= h m n ba b6 m z-4 *i Hl ft ic aa D! OE 3 Sl O6 o9 lo e ftl ftl f. o g3E =i sg !5 3g 14Y z z z 7 2 z z z zl z z z xl eE xo o6 <3 tiaa T;I rtoii li : bl i: z z zl z Itz @l >l 3 d=: 3P d; :5 :E lftt 1> ;t *€ 3P i > v\ t i i I F I vt. vl { OY ;lfrt Im >I oB s.x qt g.x e.x o5 Af a 5l d Yl OY ls. x I { ^l {I !4 n I r Ift - I 1 t{ I i ?; le 31, 1> 1> 1> -! 3 3 3 3 3 d 3 ot sg 3H "5 0l6t 5g m PI ;i EI 3 I

F ni 3; BE h; ;ro ;' ni, I# 1F t z z { { - t z z z { n a =l z z fi EI 1 +2 -;9 ;E t4 J dl z{ z !l z z m 3 <! sf, sn Oar E'6 g6 SH 2, ct.t o^ I ;l I i oO o: Oo 6l oO 6a 6Z oG o ol ^= !O h ll 1l ;'E ;t = r) *i 3! dn z-- (1; Io o -o n to Ear t! H! E! -o -ot t n n <l s de zm z o o =6 do iio ^o 5U R 6l <o iiq o, -l a6 o ^a ;d ml m z ZI z r] 6l EI E'; nl, pl 69 n -l =l at m ; o f o l -l o ol 6l ml - g{ om -i ft { -t r -t 6l f o B f o J o ol 6I , o o z d= 3 m I d c cl I =l RI zl ol = o 6- o ol I z €= o- {l 2 rl : 4 I E.l 3 t €l 6- € 6-l rl iT !l >l ! > tl >l I I ;l 5 =l = 9l I

I 9tr o= ilet nl 3 m z <t 3l nl zl <t 3l 6l 2l I o, pl ol ;rl D X1 oi 6 pt !l ol ol ol ol I I t-{ 0, dt I ol ol f,l ;1 I ql ;rl fl o r o. @l {l ol <l ql AI ol ot ol rl ol ol ol I - frl dl E il hl hl I

I T I JI rl DI ll 5l o.l -l I

2 I I

d

x L

RESPONDENT'$ EXHIBIT 41 IE Pe z € a s o tt gm = E n { xxxHxxxxxH z I' '@z; u->!t P o i z € I 4666555U8o t t zlr1l 3 € 3 D v o@@!o6baaiJ* L 6a! gi F { {F r 1 2 x m 7 d o= pt so zd gR ||"-i t; uYE F 6l ;- v :< lF o <r p !A Ic -1 g h z c v x r) (.)

6U 3a fs J z I I iv az i { { ! n P a ! J i lv(: ;ml o u > o i z j I a n I

I &i 8< i 9 oI 6 z z i 2= -{o E, r 3Z I c! d .> - 3 (r3 e 3 o 6 5 N 6' t{ -5 8J".o,999-6-s-o zI 2i !{ { o E$EggEggS o n): (rn z - { lf T€ ?3 d 3 T (t o fr n o ilqe qaa {o o c rod sfi 1 ah'v o r x 6 i66 z;: x7 n :5! E 7 va I E9.s -{ F, t'o IF9E t { hJJ o --t :l b{ x /e l!B= t5 lo -o <{ o d C = m gEg I c! ix x g9 z -l :. 38 dt; z do (,0 o g €8 l7 Es= BT: 2 ! .iO !l O f I Dos HI 3 <ce 3i rE= t a 4 diZa 4 g;; x; €.

HJ o I f n 6ii(' trf - F1 FEfi I zGI oo { F=E 6 E 7= oo € ta z, o d5. o o 3 FSE 3 m t7 o e a)o F z EiF F !frd F q 'T F o o z to lHe z f, r = a 2 ca a n o fEE € 3 o l r H8; F o =6i; R t4ai> E Iz ;3* 5€ou J 2 F ;as oz 6 d zI , FEE 3 F (o TTE aof; F' 3 o>z t , o (1 EE c, II a! :r!tq8 s parricr income

loconrg source le&' I Checrcn ti{J'i ptRSior{ pAyAEtt AT THf IST OF EVtRy MO,rH r*To r't.tionrr wesffrrnFtlr bink A/c r.0084681 FROM THT 5TART OF ,4PRII t4:rn'hly sour!e Chryion letter dated 28th February 2014 2Or4

Net Year pension !

5W6 ended Taratlon receiyed splil as April Annual D€ducted to be Monthly net per UX ilg:r:$i't' 2At4 Pension at Source sbared pension divorce 4,465 27.31 1 2,275.99 13655.7 M! Tontl'!t/ sha.e In,,i.frng p"riis r I J7.97 i.4Eti ffi t.6.813 1.6-i 12015 t

,dr per Maf wire 5r.€ 1855.1jt 1..63120157 cop! rn Ste erpenses estimates .rrm uf, Io tw ! *hich has no !or! cod€ only rculing 1{mber 50 pound5 rterling multiphed )y dollere exahrngc Gte .rE!rr r!rt |,r,r'rr8y !lvtil8 t4 I rsm5 MCho!t air cCndition,hE. Csn not ranage tii5 iummer due to 96r health ;as h6ting not used jurt tor heatrng wate.

OL ,,ty water and Earbage coll(tion 5{ )r'operfy laxes currentlV detinou€nt s0c ry to <eep yard wsl rea5onable monthly total 100 :s- v4rMr lure ror ryPc5 UX free irJr/e but ontv gO daw ths requrcd to see Ul dodor to replcnish med5 r€qurres trip back to En8land ro !e a cGtor coet a{ flight ir ts and iax€s 5270 . Alturn.tive MUld be to 6nsult with US dctor and pay monthly lor medi€tion . Assum€ u5 docto. rculd be mde qpeiliive than a 3 msth return to the Ul average rcnthly @5t do not cxpet daughtcrs !o pay tor flight'.

'hooe bill ertimated to be "e,oPJ e+vr|*5 ru.reuy qcuusya acl! colfee hNee cofte€ per 6onth {Otc no !udderlrnk usge lor Intdnet I0y !yr'trlt osrY trm Hdston ri9rs but t.ip5 to and rirpon relir€nt q Rugbv fri.nd l.ish to rrovtde at i average @st ol515d dch Ey { fuel and timc) .

d ratron to 512 Xr dav 35C ougdngs L574 nffie fiom pensoh 1856 !vrr er,\rr 6e{i6 rErurrE prupcrr \d^5 ,atl rntoa,r&s and copinB withilt Ai. :ondfllbning fc:n save rAor( fe.h S/lX, )er moth )9) ofine proped laxs and no air winter ru66ea @i ravt but wdld not /rse thinling about returninS to aland and live on wclfare

RESPONOENT'S EXHIBIT 9 c:\D*um€nts and settinSi\Adminisu€tor\Mv DocumentJ\divoJce ha(d drive\divorce 3 ourt intomation\t-tvtNG fxpfNsE5\tncome 50urce .rlsr Page 1 I04 Norlii'fempic Drive Dtb'oll. 'l-X 759"1 l ffi#ffi*-* tn c o m in g wi iTowc Jor?ieo,r Frederrck Graham ACCOUN'I'#: -".2070 1009 N University Dr Nacogdoches TX 75961

DATE: A5nSt2O14 AMOUNT: i,856 27 GFX REF #: 2C141350003200 IMAD #: 2014051581Q8021c017926 oMAD#: ze140515L1LFB47ccc00070sislc,20FT0:l Additionat payment details are shown bejlow: SENDER FINANCIAL |NST|TUTION Name: CtTtBANK NyC ABA: 021000083 OR|GINATING PARTY (ORC) Name: BR|DGET GRAHAM Address.. 3.1 MALEA WAy.

GEORGE GREEN.

BUCKS SL3 6RN BENEFICIARY PARTY (BNF) Name: FREDERTCK GRAHAM Acct#: -*2A7A jddress." BENEFICTARY'S FtN. |NST. (BBK) Name: A8A: REFERENCE FOR BENEFICIARY {RFB): oRtctNATOR TO BENEFICtARy tNFo (oBt): BANK TO BANK INFORMATION (BBIi:

For questions regarding wires, prease calr 1-935-s2g-1041 or 1-936-829-1051 .

Alf other questions can be directed to 1-936-g29 4721 ar tolr free at 1_g8g_608_7787.

This rnessaqc ts ltor ihe sale.u)e.a{ tne intended recip,tent, Bfld may ccnlatr) confidantar ancr pivrdged ;nfam)a!!at..

Ai}y tJqaatbcnzetj ':::i;r:;,'".2:::T;;":r{;':o::t:"iseprahibted 1r vou are not the intencted ecipte,i, ptease co,;tai! the sender tty phone or rax anil

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 1O Olr tei /rCN175 1/Ci1ViA954445

llr FD Grahilnt '.)4 AzaleaV'iay (ier:rge (ir rerr SlotrEl"r [J€.irksl)tre SI J 6RN rl,l,l,,h.rl.rrll,rrh,r,rrll,l,,rhl

2t:t Fr:t:ruar.1 ?)i4 K'.f," fi4rt tn:En v Chevron

Chevron UK Pension Plan (The plan) Dear l,4r (jr.rh;ni T hank vOU f or vour rer_leli ef )qurry I cA:t r:onlttm thal your Pension,c'ntnrencernent Lurnp suni IPCLS) cf f 177.242.42 was ycrrr penston (-oillflenced on 1 Febn.raiy 20i)g p<-)id $,ilerl Please sce the lable belcv; for cjelarls r:t your :tnnual pensiori pavrytenis Dale Gross Pension Tax Deducied i)t lii)4i?C0c) f|t!t.:\27 7I L1?,7t1 4t) oitc4!'2a1i) i28.548 2..1 1.1.4..3 8il OClA4l20-i 1 f28.808 1 3 tl4.46ir,t0 riai0li2a1i) t29 831 50 ,.4.47') 10 a6:A4l2t':ll, t-30,934 41 |4 565 rl0 if lher€ -; an,/thrnq €_.1:,e ycll o lrxe tc kncw, please rJ€l tit iouclt (wilh your referenr:e ,,/,,e 1c netnat) a|ril lt be rrapily lo heip Yorrrs srncerely l:or ano r:n hchalf of ihe TriJslei? of lhe Cfte../rorr i-rK frensr0l f:'l:}t

lleltrl,ne (i()n1?rcr No 0i100 5E5 82/- ior +'i4 BfjO 585 824 fronr overse€tsl salls answereri N4orr.j:ty to FricaV g 00arn 5 L)0prn E:lr:irl :lddrriss: chevrorr pensions(@.tonconsult nrj (_:{) rjK !i/ c b s I e,r1,ra?. u h e,i I c a LJ f( pe n Sr o n c o. u k i

Address lor written aorr€spoitden..je Clrevrrlrr iJK F)ajr-lsron Pl?ln AON Hewrll SL;annlne D';rsron PC 8ox 1!lfr HUcr.ler.-il rel0 -ti4 lr-L)

b-:\ a..r' t,i.w:l l.;:ir r.:,i la,a!rthi,rls.;d nr,.i ,.rC.ri;)t,r,i f,y lirc i:,r)ilr,.ia,, (.),)r,rin.t1 AL,lf,,,,rt, RESPONDENT'S i fJ I l,,tr iler{t Lrrrrrt-c Rtt!rstllfq.t rf Ei\rjl?rd itij r:r?aaj jLl EXHIBIT 5 -- s .r... 1,a,.., .,t ".t..r.,.:.f.?.\tl_, .....11 Chevron Our rof: AON 1 751/CHV/A9S444S

Mr FD Grahanr Azalea Way George Green Slough Berkshire SL3 6RN EOPY H July 201 3 Ch€vron UK Pension ptan (The ptan) Dear Mr Graham Please find encrosed the intormation as requested in your recent pnone cail

oate ot Leaving I 30 Novembsr 2001

l--- l Start Date of Pension 1 February 2008 I t_I ype or Pensron I Occupational Final Salary r---*--'-^ I

j Current Annual payment I [31,476.24 (gross] -l .

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- _l More information can be found on the chevron pension website. prease find detairs berow.

The website link is wwrg.chevronukpension.co. uk To ensure confidentiality the first time you visit the website, you will be required personal information so that we can verrfy your ldentny. to enrol by entering There are fr.ee steps io ilr,s process: Step1Beginbyse|ecting.Enro|.andenleringyourqIlandtkI er siep 3 Th' !"':?ilsi:e u'riil requesi icu chocse a ij.rss;'.t!"i fc: ac:essing j,a!r bsn3fils visits lt can be a mix of letters and numbers and must be at least slx characters c:.r s-,t!se..ent lono_

RESPONDENT'; EXHIBIT 6 )ri g i irrj: a, r,,t, rri rrr. _i .r;r.1.,ii 'r '.. 'rl.'r:1.r- '. .,,i J,'- I.,1.,...i. I r,;l GEN 1t 10513) Y t . w t$l *in$1 i:1g. trs $,r:rren t&ri&aoctxlr .-:r,r( 't 'J IS l ir"ov rrfrv*rm rfiniLJ|ai{|j4nbi|t rfrttr;{.r/dq.eetji.{I} ,;g q,t)dJ$r,r: ''r.f: *l* ''&{#hi'r'r:, ffi$r x.e 'r***g*,, !ka***ax lr* Suu*o *r* [,u*ror.;tr61pma*.:f&i, ,,,ro.p * 's@ *r tn.

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a RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 7 q14rn14 P€fisiqurs lis) ()f, rhi* !"\ -, yt).t \\il t$r t") r..t yt:ilt r:isr rd !srci(x) lv)ysr,[$ rtur ./ftr can !rc(v ;n{, rirgrl a, c!.!py rJt y&a frll:($irg. '!icl -, I r:tryqFtr'tGrr thrr rkqrl;wrr S.slr;s'l l.r:I:..r. -- Avrilf;!: Paysliyr' 01 ,qrv 21014 p Yry tqrlp

Pnnt If you have tax queries please telephone Please vtstt.the "uv out"itr;'p"g" o^ iniu ,*[rt"-i" " 0300 200 3300 maxe to your address; and ln additioo you .aly lhrl,Ses or wrlt€ to ruy vtstt the .Get lrt Touch', page to lnforftr tne CfreJ-, UK Pcflsion ptan administretlon'team of any -' HM Rev€nue & Customs b,anldbuitdhg soclery account oetails. eneriailve-tv "pAiiud Jou Regian House jl",gr'evron uK pension ptan aorninisiriitin James Street ::l team:ont1{ on 0800 5BS82d.

Llverpooi Please..lso visli the.,,t{y prniton" page on tl.}ls L75 ll"tw website ro see the yarlous elementj that make ,,p yor..uii*ni pAYE Ref: 4281C1070A ?ll"lL9l. '1f a{|Tl!:. .

t-- Ir.* ftsylllp $$d*t$ons $38 r.70 llY_sl f, 38 ii.70 "t{-^-*-*----- €27,311.0s 1]l82,3t4.77 y€arto I lCurrent Thls P€nslon Ii P€dd oar.

II pEilsroN -'I i _-.: NE.r .:.: : :'---.- *---- - i:lgures shown here should be P.y Date O1/A4/20!4 Tsx Code/Trx 944L uSed for Period lllmb€r ! 2 8.nl$ your tdx.etum if you receive tll Numbof YS3295S7C M€mb€Bhlp t{o. 49 54445 oile Memb€rs Ham l4r FL\ Graham Chevron UX pension plan

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 8 [email protected] ir.a.crt'cfcrur"dgers,mrrcnbers&alFlap6d etim_aspx 'U1 Nacogdoches County GarolWilson Nacogdoches County Clerk Nacogdoches, Texas 75961 iffi $ilt$tffi ff ffi fi fit fi$ffi ililtfi ililtliliitilt I til 2Cl2 0a-JJg31l Instrument Number: 2012-g913 Recorded On: September 26,2e12 Recording Parties; TURNER DENA MARTE Billable pages: ,t TO GRAHAM FREDERICK DAWSON Number of Pages: 2 Comment: NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS i Parites Isled above are for Clerrs refere^ce cr v " Examined and Chargad as Follows: -i Recordrng 's cc Total Recordi.gi IR ^n

I*i*I'tT**,r DO NOT REMOVE, THIS PAGE IS PART OF THE INSTRUMEP; *T*****il A1y prcv srcn hefe - wh ch restricts the sale, Rentai or use cr r^e desc.,!--d REAL pftopERTv 3ecaLlse ol co;or or race is inyai d and une:fcrceaole u.der {eceral lar.r File lnformation: Record and Return To: Dccurnent Nun-ber 2C'1 2-89.3 Rece,pl Number 92 96 .7 JEREI"4Y.,^/ILLIS Reccrded Daie,,Time Septernber' 2A12 12:55 30p 26 209 HUGHES Book-VotlPg BK-OPR VL 33C9 PG-155 NACOGDOCHES TX 7595J User / Slatiori J A{ien - Cashie;' Stafion 0i

I berrby ccrlifi' thrt this instrument wrs filcd on rhe date rod tirue strrnped beron rnd wrs duly rccorded in {be Officirl Public Records iu Nacogdoches Countv, Tenr 3r*t, *;t *l Crrol Wilson )i r c ogdoch cs Cou n r.'* Clcrk RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 54 Lan,gr: Q[1.!!_!] tix_tl[lL\ S-TA'rt, OF TEXAS COLTNTY OF ;\AC.OGDOCHES \orlcE IS l{EREBl'ctv}r.N ihat Canse No. c1228635, sryied ln The Marrer of .}.he Maniagc ol'Dcna l!1ailt''l'urncrantJ Frcdcrick Dawson cirahanr, was cornnlc,rrccd in thc 'll0'' 'ludicial i')istrict L'.url tii Niicogciticlic5 (i..r:t1,.'lcxas tirr seprcrrrS*.2r.l()12.,rrd is nrirv pclrdrrrg irr sue lr e iiun. -lhe action invol'cs thc tirie anc seeks to establish a lien rntc'rest or notice of cncumbra'cc against reai propertv situated in Nacogdoches counti,.'l-exas arrd rjescribcd as fbllows: Ail that cenain lol or parcel of land in rhc cit,v of n-g(olcoctres. Nacodoches Co*nrr., "l-exas. fl] *i:g9.!il: !'r.'liinrc )1] :f l|: *,:ir*t oiLor piai Rcc,,ra.. ?i-e. a;t/lrf;k ai, on prar recorded i' I)agc 25 .1'rhc ".',r,o,un Xr.,ga,,ff;d(:;,;;,1,.,1."*,.,.

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.lcrcim) Sl '*'illis Hughes Strer-t Naciigdoches. T'X 7.596 I (9i6),i69-79,{4 A( K N0tr/l.l:I X ili4 I:.N't si.A'l i.ol:iIrX,\S cou\ rY oF NAC'O0DOCt-l[S B!-f ORF. i\'lE. ihe undersigned Notary Public. on this day personally appearecl Jerenry S. \\:ilrs. knoun Io me to be thc person rvhose nante is subscribed'ro the lbregoing instrument and acknt'rw'ledged io rne that tlie same ira.s bcen exccuteC for the puryroses and consideration therein ex prcssed.

(ii\'f :N untlet'nrv hirnr.{ arrd seal ololllcc {lris ScJrtentlrcl l.i, f1) 12 -_ Noiarl f'ubiic. in arrd lirr sutc 0t' {'r'xas Nacogdoches County CarolWilson Nacogdoches County Cterk Nacogdoches, Texas 75961 {[ tfi til itNfftffi f# tfilt{ffi $fi 7l 2t I:t rrr'):Jt{,| t ffi til ff f nstrument Number: ZA12-gg14 AS Recorded On: gspfgrnber 26,2e12 Recording PaTlies: TURNER DENA IVIARIE Billable pages: To GRAHAM FREDERIcK DAwSoN Number of pagesl !

Comment: NOTICE OF LtS PENDENS i Pari€s listed above are fcr Clerrs reler.ence oniv ) ." Examined * and ChargeO as foitors: iecc.c,n-o JC UL Total Recofding 0C

ttli*iAtr'** DO NOT REMOVE, THIS PAGE IS PART OF THE tNSTRUME1,1I *******il Any Drovis cn he'ern whrct ies:ricts rhe sare Rertal or use of ihe descrbed REAL pRopERTy becruse of co.or or race ,s rrvaiici tnd Jng61616g3ble lncer federai layi File lnformation: Record and Return To: Docunent Number 2012-8914 Recerpt Numcer 3Z/Y/ JEREMY WILLlS Recorded DatelTne, September 26.2012 12 03p 209 HUGHES Eook-Vcl/Pg BK.OPR VL.38O9 PG.l57 NACOGDOCHES TX 75961 User I Siat on J Allen - CaStier Statron 01

I herebl'ccrlif thrl thir iostrument was lilcd on tbe dste nnd time stamped heron rnd wru du\ rrcordcd iu the Official Public RrEords in Nrcogdocbcs Ctiunty, Trras &*L h',t* CrrolWiboo Nrcogdoches Counn Clerlr RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 55 NOTTCE OF LIS PENr)ENf STATE OI'TEXAS COLI\TY OT NACOGT,OCHES \OTICE IS HERIBY GIVfTN that cause No. C122863i, styled In The N,latter rif The llarriage of Dena lvlarie Tumer and Fredcrick Drwson Graham" was corn nrcnccd in the 410.Judicial District court of Nacogdoches countl'. fcxas on Seprember ll. i012, ancl is now pcndilru irr such crrun 'l he action itrv'olves the titlc and secks to estublish a licn intercst or polrce ol'e'cumbrancc against real propci-tr sitLrated in Nacogdoches County.'l'crl* and dcscribcd as lirll,ws: All that t'enain lot or p^arcelol'land in thc citl'.of Nac-trgdr>e he.s. Nacodochcs a'u being and ciou6t;.. I'exas. l,ol N0. uctl,g r,t)r r\(). z2 oI rjf ttte ltcplat rll the Kcptat ol'Lgt 2_\-Ll. (.it),tllock l.ot 2-s-L:. (.itr,[]lock 67- aS as ShOwn rr* l)lat shrrw,n Otr i^ *r-.rr,r,,,r in r)r,rr r.ei{:)rclerj v.lLrnrc 9. I'}agc 2-5 o1'rhe r'rai Rcc'rtis, Nacirgcr,,c'r,;r-g6l;;i.l..rr.. f{ sr(;NrD thir$eL&.zotz

JFremy'S. 'v\rillis Hughes Slreer Nacogdoches. TX 75961 (936) 56e-7e4J AC'KNOWLEDONIF,NI S]-,\TE OF'I'EXAS CO{ AiT}, OF NACOCI)OC}JES llLt;C)Rlr fufl-. drr: uirdercigncd Notar,r, lrul-rlic- on thi.s da; personall-v- appearcd \\'illis. knorvn to rne lo bc thc pcri,rn Jerenry S. whosc-narrre is subscribcd to thc fbrcrroirrg instrumcnt lrici acknon'ledged ttr me titat lhe sarne has trr:cn cxccutctJ lbr thc purpos{Js and con.sirlcratitirr therein cxprcsscd.

(;lVl..N trnder mv irand an<l scal <>f'olllcc tfris I Lban. {gfeenent Setween: Datod: 22d June 20,13

Frederick D. Graham purclpot oftherb$owingprop€rty in the city of Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches county, Texrx and belng-Lotlsc, cnvblock 6?, as shsqm on Plat recorded in volume 9, paae 25 of the {ecords of Nacogdoches courqr, Texss-

L€xdipe pat' leine Robert a-nd Mccatty, (JJC citizms) residing atflalficre,-Ellingtorr,Erja4,T,aploq$t$een Buckinghamshirc, Si,6 iigA gngla1j t - - - , The puqrose of the loan to enable lvk Frederick Grahan to repay the outstanding PlVment tn full due tq First Bag& and Trust p.aqt Texas. ThE paymenr in-fufr, ytl fsutt the relinquisbmerit in &e lien curently held by First Bard<and.Trust of East Texas and the tien bding p€s*d to Robert and Kathleen Mccatty.

The amount of loan willle $r5,000 principle. Repayable back to rhe lender within two years; 22on June 2015; or u/benth pt"p""rt is sold whjch ever is the sooner.

Sufg* *m E of lO,gedpat t+*rra&A; oace nmney has be€n paid to "5, FirstBank and Trust East Texss.

Tholoan is dgpendeat on Fg legally,exccuted transfer of the pmperry lien and registered ar the Nacogodoches Cou$y Court

Duly signed by:

Frederick D. Craham: DateA nn I t- l-Z t^* lL, I lc

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 31