ACCEPTED 03-15-00008-CV 7476585 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/21/2015 2:05:15 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK

FILED IN No. 03-15-00008-CV 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/26/2015 11:20:15 AM IN THE COURT OF APPEALS JEFFREY D. KYLE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Clerk

PAUL D. SIMMONS APPELLANT V. TERESAA. SIMMONS APPELLEE

oN ÀPPEAL FIìOM ',l't{F' 1 19 r'rr JUDI(),,\L DIS'|RICT COURI OF .I'OM GIì]ìI]N COUN'I'Y,1'LìXAS cAUSLì NO. It-1 3-0232-ir

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Gar:re tt Clarl<son Fliglcy sBN 2404ó074 l-aw Officc of Garrctt C. Fliglcy, Pl,I-C \7. 12'ì' Strcet Austin, 'I'exas 78701 (512) s14-1940 lìax No. (512) 391-0028 G [email protected]\'law. com Iìobctt ll. l,uther sllN 12704000 Law Officcs of lìol¡crt 11, Luthcr, P.C.

1800 Iùo (ltandc Àustin, -I'exas 78701 (512)477 -2323 I'ax (512)478-1824 r:bluther@lutl'rlaw. con-r Attorneys on Appeal For Appellee No. 03-15-00008-CV IN TI-IE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PI\UL D. SIMMONS APPELI.ANT V. TERESAA. SIMMONS APPELLEE

ON APPEAI, IIIIOM TFIL- 1 1 9'II I J UDICIA]- DIS'TRIC']' CO UIL| OII ,fOM G IìI]I]N COUN'I'Y,'[ìXAS cÂusE NO. 1l-1 3-0232-[i

BRIEF OFAPPELLEE

I'O'11'I-Ì l IONOI{,,\BI.,Ij COU1ì I' OF Al .c' ^PPIr -Appclle c 'le rcsa .4. Simmons respectfully fìle s this Ilrie f.

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Pursuant to lì.ule 38,1(a) of the 'I'EXAS IìULES OF,APPII,LL,À'IB ì)RO()ÌDUlìlì, thc followìng infonnation is supplied to this Ilonorable Court.

Parties: 'l'rial Petìtioner ar-rd Appellee ......,...'I'crcsa À. Sìmmons 'l'dal lìcspondcnt and Appellant........ ....,.....,,.........Paul I). Simmons Counsel: Appellce Counsel for 'I'etesa A. Sirnrnons......... Iìobcrt B. I-utl'rer I,AW OFIìICES OII IIOBIìlLI1]. I,[JT]-ìÌìII. i].C.

1800 llio (ìranclc Austin,'I'exas 78701 (ì arrctt Clarl<sorl Ì Iigìey l,aw (Jfficc of (ìartctt C. I-iìglcy, PLLC 508 \7, 12'r' Str:co: -Àustiu,'I'cx¿s 78701 'l'rial Counsel for 'I'etcsa Â. Simmons......................... I(irk I-Iawl<ins Àtlorntl¡ at ] aw West I3eaur:cgar<ì, Suitc 303 San Angclo,'I'cxas 76903 ftial Counscl for: lìespondctrt/ Âppellant on Àppeal Paul I). S1mmons..................,,,...,,.,Melvin G r:ay Gary & Iìrigman, Pl-l-C \X/. College Àve.

San -A.ngckr, Tcxas 76903 'I'dal Court...... .. .. .. ... .'I-lie Honorable Ben Woodward 19'r'Judicial I)istrict Court 'I'on-r Green Couuty, I'exas OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR ORÁLARGUMENT Appcllec belìeves the request for oral ârgument should bc dcnied, because the facts and lcgal argumer-rts are adecluatcly presentcd ìn thc bdefs and rccord, ¿nd the dccisional proccss would not be significant\' aidcd by oral argumcnt.

DESIGNATION OF REFERENCES Record Re ferences The Cled<'s lìecotd includcs all of thc relevant pleadings and ordcrs {ìled with thc tlial court and cletk. 'Ì'hc Clctk's lìecords contairls one volumc. Iìeferenccs in this ,{ppellee 's Btie f to the Cle rk's lìecord are by volurre and pagc numbcr, indicated as "CIì 1t-." 'l'he lìeporter's lìecord lncludes thc transcript of thc bench tr:ial held onJúy 22, 201.4. 'l'he lì.eportcr's lìccord contâins thr:ee volumes. lìcfcrcnces to the lìeportcr's Iìecord are by volume and page nurnbeL, ir-rdicated as "lì1ì _:_." 'l'he llepottcr's lìccord also includcs all of the pâf tics' cxhibits submitted to thc tl:ìal court and aclmittcd rnto evidcnce during the bcncl'r trial. Copics of all such exhíbits al:e included in Volumc 3 of thc lì.eportcr's lìecor:d, lìcfctcnce 1o thc par:tics' exhil¡its are indrcated as "Iìlì 3:IrX# " or: "lìIì 3:1ìX# lìcfetences to the triâl couÍt's Irìndìngs of Iìact atc indìcatccl as "IìIr#_ lìe ferer-rces to the trial court's Coflclusions of Law ale indicated as "CL# lìe fcrcnce s to Appellant's llrief atc indicatecl as ""411:_," Party References Paul l). Stmmons, Âpltellant, shall bc tcfcrred to as eitbcr "Appellant" or "Paul" hercin. 'I'cr:esa A. Simnons, Apltellee, shall be refelred to as "Appcllee" ot "'I'ercsa." INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page

....5, 13 CoruþnterAssocs., Int'lu.A/tai, Inc.,91BS.\7.2c1 453,456(Tcx. 1996)...................8 l)tratt u. Garcia,224 S W.3d 309,31,3 ('liex.App.,ì11 Paso 2005, no per,).,..........,.......4 Coode u. .lhoakfe |t,943 S.\ø.2d 441 ,446 (I'ex. 1997) .....,..................,..,6 ITaas u. George,71 S.\7.3d 904,912 (l-ex. App, - fcxarkana 2002,no pet).. ,. . .,...... .......,...,.....................,9 LIal u. Shell Oil Co.,986 S \7.2d 772,777 (1'cx. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied)..,.. ...............,..,..,..........8 I'lECl Expl. Co. u. Nee/,982 S.W.2cl BB1, 886 (I"cx. 1998).,... .,.., . .....8 In re T.J.L.,97 S.!7.3d 251 ,265 (I'cx.r\pp.-I{ouston [14th Dist I 2002, ûo pcr.) ............4 In the Alariaga of Reinauer,946 S.Sø.2d 853, B(r0 (I'ex. App. *Arrlarillo 1.997,1':tet. cleniccl) ....................6 I{PMG Peat Mawii;k u. I-Iarrison Coanfl IJoas. t*ur. Corp., S.\X/.2d 746,749('1ex. 1999)............... .......................7 Lid.e u. Ude,116 S.W.3d 141 ,1,51 (I'ex.Âpp.-Bl Pasr¡ 2003, no pcr.),.,.........................5 I-nuu. ['1etn1,221 S.\X/.3c1 609,61,4 (I'ex. 2007),...,.. ...............,,.,.,............6 Oliur u. Rogut',976 S,W.2d 792, 802 (llcx. App - Flouston [1" Disll 1998, pct. dcnied).........,,. ....,....,...,.....8 Statutes Page \ 9 003(b), fex. Iramì1y Code (Vernon's 2015)............, ..................3

S 9.01 1,'I'ex. Family Code (y'ernon's 201 5).......,....,,.,.. ...... ........ ..9 STATEMBNT OF THE CASE Appellce accepts -{ppellant's Staternent of thc Case.

REPLY TO ISSUE PRESENTED -I'he Reply to Issue No. 1: trìal court properly exercìsed its discrction by enforcing an award of letitement funds to 'l'ercsa and denying Paul's statutc oI lim.itations defense bcc¿use 'I'eresa brought the cnforce mcnt act.ion wtthin two 1rs¿1s of hcr discovering his breach of fi cluciary rcsponsibility.

No. 03-15-00008-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD JUDICIAI DISTRICT

PAUL D. SIMMONS APPELLANT V. TERESAA. SIMMONS APPELLBE

ON APPEA]- I]IìOM'J]I II- 1 1 91T I JUDICIAI, DIS'IIìIC'| COUITI' OF TOM GIìEEN COUNT'Y, ]]IXAS C^USI:ì NO. B-13-0232-Ir

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

'l'OTHE I-IONOIL\BLL, COUIìT OF APPLrÂI.S: 1'ìl,lìfis^ À. SIMMONS (hcreaftcr dcsignatcd ";\ppellec" or: ^PPELLII,E "'Icresa") respectfully sul¡mrts this I'rer Appellec's Iìjcf and would ash this court to affìrm tl-re fìnal orclcr cntrtled 'Judgrnent" sigîed oû September 15,201,4,, b)'the Honolal¡le Bcn Woodward, ptesidìng jr-rdge of the 119'r' Juclicial I)istrict Court of ',[-om Green County, 'I'cxas.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 'l-cresa would add the followng to Paul's Staten'rcnt of Facts þ\R:6]: -Ieresa Âled a Iretitìon for' Iinforcement of Order, ("Petiuon for llnforccmcr-rt"), seeking to enfotce the Divorce Dccrec, on Âpril 3,201.4. (Clì 1:35-37; Irl#10)(;\R:Appcndix 2).

Teres¿ âsserted in 1'ret enforcernent pleading that she became âware of tl-re retirement paymelrt in I¡te 201.2 oteatly 2013. (C1ì1:36). Paul asserted various affìrmatìvc defenses to 'l'eresa's cnfotcerrrent action, including but lrot limited to, the statute of [nritations. (Clt 1 :25-26;IrF#9) (ÂÌì:r\ppendix 2), -I-etesa met Paul to talk to I'rin-r one tirnc aftet their clivorcc. (l\1124:20-24). ,,\t that meeting she mentionecl something to hrm w}rìle at an evening dinnct, and he handccl her a (lonoco knife saying "Hete, you've -- you'vc - you've eamecl part of this." (l{lì 25:10-12) 'fcrcsa tenindccl hil¡ about hcr pctccntage ¿ward of letiremelrtì, aûd he sâicl

"I hnow, I know, I l<now. I won't forget". (Iìlì 25:13-15).

'lclcsa tcstifiecl that she fìrst leamecl about Paul cashing in his tctirerrent from her -I'crcsa daughter: when sl-re told that Paul "tooh iris money out of Colroco and paid his home ofl" (Rlì 21:2-B).

'I'he ttial coutt found that "fl'cresa] le¿med of this rctil:cment distribution sonretimc after ,August 2012 whe¡ her daughter told hcr that l)efendar-rt was mad at a

loan cornpuy and paid thern with procceds frorn a rctilcment distribution." (Clì 52; lìIr#7). The trial court futthcr concludcd that "'I'he earlicst ['I'elcsal lcarncd a]¡out the retiremellt distribuuon to lPauÌJ w¿s after r\r-rgust 2012." (Cl\ 53; CJ,#z). Paul clid nor dispute uot was there any evidencc adduccd tl-rat disputed 'I'etcsa's testimoÍìy.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Teresa btought hcr cuforcer¡er1t âction agairst Paul within two years the date her clairn accrued against Paul, tl'rc d¿tc sl're teccived noticc tlìat hc had cashcd in I'ris Conoco retitetnent, failed to give l-rer a share of tl're tetiLement, and brcachcd I'ris fiduciary duty.

'I'crcsa asserted in her cnforcemelrt pctìuor-r shc did not fincl out Paul hacl cashcd

tn his tetiretnent until Âugust 2012, t.c., tl-rat she discovcre d he r injury in August of 2012. 'I'I-Le trial court, l¡ased on undispute d facts, found that 'fcrcsa first found out Paul h¿d receivcd a tetitemellt distribution ir-r August of 2012. 'I'l're trial court futther made the lcgal conclusion thât tl-ìc cârlicst the Plaintiff ['lietcsa] leatnccl about the rctìrcment distr:íbution to l)cfcnc{ant [Par-rll was altcl Âugust 20 [2.

'Il-re trìal court ímpliedly founcl that cashing out rhe redrement fund was inhcrent\' undiscoverablc, and t,hat 'l'cresa had exercised tcasonal¡lc cliligcncc. As sucl-r, thc trial cour:t propcdy cotrcludccl drat the discovery rule tolled tl-rc appìicable two-1rs¿¡ statute of Lir¡itations found ûr 'I'cx. Iìarn. Coclc $ 9.003(b). 'lhe trìal cour:t proPedy enfotcecl the lrtovisicxr of the divorcc decrce ìn tegatds to thc division of Paul's rctitetrent bel1cfìts.

ARGUMENT REPLY TO ISSUE PRESENTED: The tial court properly exercised its discretion by enforcing an award of retirement funds to Teresa and denying Paul's statute of limitations defense because Teresa brought the enforcement action within two years of her discovering his breach of fiduciary responsibility.

Standatd of Revíew A trial coutt's ruling or-r â post-divoÍce motion fot enforcement of a divorcc dectee is tcviewed under an aì¡use-o f-discretion stanclatd. See Iø re T.J.I-.,97 S.\(/.3d 257,265 (fex.;\pp.-Flouston [14t1'r Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (abusc of díscrcrion statrdard applicd in lcviewing ordct ctrfotciug payment of chilcl's l-realthcate expcnse s ancl unínsured me dical cxper-rse s). In cleter:mining wl'rethel thc ttial court abused its discretiolr, thcrc al:c two clucstiol'ìs: (1) did the tlial coutt have suffìcrcnt tnformadon upon which to exercisc its disctetion; ancl (2) díd thc trial couÍt eÍr irr its application of disclction? Duran u. Garcia,

2245.W.3d309,31.3 (Tex.App.-Iil Paso 2005, no pet.).

llìth respcct to thc fìrst clucslion, the tr:¿ditron¿l suffìcicncy stanclarcls apply. .lotelo u. Conqahs, 170 S,W.3d 783,787 (l'ex.Âpp.-lìl Paso 2005, 1ro pet.). An appellant may cl'rallcnge thc trìal court's ûndings offact fot lcgal and factual suffìcicncy ofthc evidence.

Sofe/0, 170 S.W,3d at 787. -A. legal sufficìcncy <¡r "no evidence" challengc will be sust¿ined if t1'rc party suffcring thc ach.er;sc decision at trial shows: (1) the cornplctc absencc of a

vital fact; (2) thc cor-rtt is l¡ancd by tules of law or evidence frorn giving weight to the ouly evidence offcted to pÍove â vital fact; (3) the cvidcnce offerecl to prove a vital fact ís no mote than a scintilla; or (4) tl-re evidence establishcs conclusìvely the opposítc of thc vital fact, Cìb,0f Keileril. ll/ils0n,1.68 S.\7.3d 802,810 (T'cx. 2005), Wrcn concluctin¡¡a legal sufficierrcy revicw, evidcncc is r,rcwed ir-r the ligl-rt most favorable to thc judgmcnt, creditìng favorable evidencc if a teasonable fact fìndcr coulcl, and distegarcìing colrtraÐ/ evidence unless a rcason¿blc lact fìndcr could not. id. at 822.'I'l-¡e fìnal tcst for legal sufficieucy must alwa¡rs bc whcther the evidcncc at tÍiâl would cnablc le¿rson¿ble and fair- n'úrrdcd peoplc to lcach the verclict uude t teview. id. ln a factual suffìciency review, al1 of the er,'rdence is considcrcd, both tl-re evidencc whicl-r ter-rds to provc thc cxistcnce of a vital fact, as well as eviclcncc whrcl'r tcnds t<r

dìsprove its existcr.rcc. So/.e/0,1,70 S.W.3d at 787. A findirg should bc ser âside only if it is so coutlaq' to the ovcÍwhclming wei¡¡ht of thc cr,rdcncc as to bc clcarly wrong and manifestly unjust. .fcr Cain u. Baitt,709 S.W.2d 17 5, 1,7 6 (I'ex. 1986).

Oncc it is detcrmincd drat sufficient evicìencc exists, the court must consiclel wl-rctlrcr the ttial couft mâcle a re asonablc clecision. L'ide u. Licle , 1 16 S.W.3ct L47 , 151 (T'ex.Àpp.-lÌl Paso 2003, 11o pet.), In other wolds, rhc court lrrust determitlc that the ruling was netther arbitrary 11or unrcasonal¡Ie. id. Under thc sccolrd inquiry, thc test is not whcthet, in the opinion of tl-re lcvicwrng court, the facts prcscltt an a1t1tr-oprintc case fol: tlrc trìal coutt's action. Sotelo,1,70 S.W.3d ¿t 787-88, llathcr:, the issuc is whether the trial cr¡utt actccl witìrout tefete:uce to any guiding rules ol: prìnciplcs sucl'r drat its ruling wls âÍbitrâly ot ullreasonable. See Lul u. IJenry,221 S.\7.3d 609,614 ('I'cx. 2007); Goode u.

Shonkfeh,943 S.\ø.2d 441,446 (I'cx. 1997). l\n abuse of clisctetiorr is shown if thc trial couÍt drew an iucottect conclusion of law b1' misappllnng the law to the fâcts or: if thc conttolling firrdings of fact do 11ot supllol:t a correct lcÉìal theory sufûcicnt to support tl'ìe judgmcnt. lote/.o, 170 S.W,3c1 at 788.

The Discover|, Rule Avoids Limitations as a Bat to Tercsa's Claim Âl¡sent a l¡asis to defer the lunning of the clock for purposes <¡f statutes of limitation, lìmitations generally bcgin to tun when the wrongful act causes an injuq,.

Childs u. Hattl.recker, / 974 ,î.V/.2¿ )/, i6 (lex. / 998). It this casc, -fercsa was ìnjured when Paul dicì uot comply wìth the tcms of thc divorce clecree. 'l'he parties' clivorcc dccrcc tcquirecl Paul to tcrnit to 'felcsa "[a] portron of I'Iusband's retjt:ement, pensìon, thrift, proÂt sharing ancì othct crnlrloyce bcllcfits âccluircd drtougìr llusband's crnplolnlcnt wrth Oonoco, to bc paid if, as, and when reccived by I*Iusbancl. (Cll 1;14,111ì

3:PX#5;FIr#5;FF#1)(z\ppendices 2-3). 'I'cLesa's injury occurred when Paul widrdr:ew all of tl're funcls from thc letirernent account and upon doing so thcn failed to irnrnediatcly ternit 'I'e tesa's por:tio11 to het. .1¿¿ In the Mariage of Reinaan',94ó S.W.2d 853, 860 (I'ex. App. -,,\rnarillo 1.997, pet. denied).

It is'I'eresa's tnain conteution tirat the discovcry rulc applies to avoid application of Pauì's limitatious defcnsc to l¡at her claim against hir¡ for failutc to pay hct awatdcd redtcment funds. 'fhc discovery tule is the lcgal pr:inciple whicìr, whcn applicablc, ptovides that lirnitations Lun ftorn the date thc plaintiff discovers or should havc discoveled, in the exctcisc of rcasonable care and diligence, the Íìature of tl're injury. lYilli¡ a. Mauerick, 760 S.W.2d 642,644 (I'cx. 19BB).

\Xhcthcr thc discovery rulc ap¡rlics in the fitst instancc depelrds ilr part upon whether thc injury is inherently undiscoveral¡le; meaning, depcndìng or tlle injury, thc iujury is unlikely to be discovcrcd witl'rin tl're legislative\' prescribed limited per;iod cvcn when tlre claimant has exetctscd cluc cliligence. I{/agner ù Brown, Lld. u. LIonyood, 58

S.W3d 732 (I'ex. 2001). \X4rcn it applics, thc discovery tule defers accrual of ^t734-35 â cause of action until tl-rc plainuff knew ol, cxer:cìsìng tcâso1râble diligencc, shoulcl havc knowtr of tlrc wtcxrgfully causcd injury." I(PMG Peat Ì¡Laruick u.I:l arri¡on Connþ I7ont. .Fin.

Cor.p.,9B8 S.W.2d 746, 749(l'ex. 1999). Nor.rethelcss, tl.rc cliscovery rule is a Limíted cxcelltìon to the statutc of linritaúons and applies oûl)¡ "v/hcn the n¿turc of tl're plaintiffs injury is l¡oth inhetently undiscovctable alrd objectively vcrifìablc." ILonyood,5B S.W.3d

^t734.

After decicling whet}rer thc dìscovery rulcs applìes, the ncxt issuc for the coutt to decicle becomcs "When did 'Ì'eresa learn that Paul had not rernittecl retiternent funds orvecl to lrer?" .1¿¿ Cl:i/d.ç,974 S.W.2d at 37. Aftcr applicâtion of the discovety rule, resolving whcn'I'ercsa had actual oÍ constructive knowlcdge of Paul's failur:c to rernit the tetitemcnt funds to her sl-rould rcsolve thc issuc whcthct the trial couît pÍopcdy refused to time bar 'l'etesa's claim.

Pau|'s Dectsion to .Not Pay Teresa, a Breaclt of Fiduciary Duty, fs "fnherently Undiscoverable" i\n injury is "inl-rcrcndy undrscoverable" if it is, by natulc, unhhcly to be discovctcd wrthin the ptesctibcd lirnit¿tions pctiod despite thc plaintiffs diligence .

She// Oi/ Co. u. Ror,356 S.W.3d 924,930 (l"ex. 2001); IY/agner a. Bron,n, Ltd., u. Honuood,

58 S.W.3d 732,734-35 (Iex. 2001); ContpaterAtncl, Int'/ u. Alrd| Iilî.,918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tcx. 1996). \X/hcthet an injury is inl-rerently undiscoveral¡le is dctermincd categorically - that is, by exarnining whether the palticular rypc of rnjury clairnccl ìs gcnetal dìscovcrablc through the cxctcise of reasonablc diligcncc, IJECI Expl. Co. u.

Nee/, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (l'cx. 1998). 'l'he plaintiff must demonstrate only rhat it wa,q diffìcult to discover the ìnjnty, the plaintìff dc)cs not neecl to l)rovc that it was impossiblc. See S.I/. u. R. l/.,933 S.W.2cl 1 (fcx. 1996), An injuty is "objecuvcly vetifiable" if the rnjury's cxisrcnce and thc defendant's wrongful act cânûot be disputed and tl-re facts on which hability is assertcd are dcnronstr¿ted by ditect physical cvidcnce. IJal u. She /l Oi/ Co.,986 S.\ø.2d 172,771 ('I'ex. App. - Cotpus Chdsu 1999, pet. denìecì). 'I-his might best be demor.rstrared by example. An injury resulting from a brcach of conttact is objectìvely vcr:ifìable by k;olring at the clefcndant's contract wìth a thírd pany. Sae Oliuer u. Rogers,976 S.W.2d '792,802 (I'cx. ,,\pp. * Iloustor.r [1" Dist,] 1998, pet. dcnrcd), \(/hcteas, sexual abuse by a parcnt would not be objecuvcly vcriÂable because there is no scicntific colrsensus or how to gaugc thc üue or falsity of recovered rnernc¡ries upotr which tl-re clairn wonld be based. -1¿¿ .r.V.,933 S.W.2d at 18.

'I'hc first part oI tl're inquiry is whetl-rer 'fcresa's injury is inl-rerendy urrdiscoveral¡le. 'l-etcsa did not teceìve paymcnt of rctircment funds sl're was awarded, aud she did not rcceive thetn because Paul teceived tl-rern fìrst and did 11ot pây thcn'ì to I'rer, but paicl bílls instc¿d. (1ìlì 1:52; lîÌì#3,4). \71'ren Paul teceived the rctircment lunds awarded to 'I'eresa, a ficluciary obligatiol'ì in favor of 'I'eresa rvas creatcd, a

collsttuctlvc trust was pìaced on those fuuds for the bcnefit of 'l'eresa, and Paul owed a ûduciary lcsponsibility to pay tl-re funds to'I'eresa. Sec. 9.011,'I'ex. lìarnily Cocle (Veruon's 2015). Paul l¡rcachcd his fiduciary rcsponsibiLiry to'I'etesa by not paying the tctitenent fi-urds he l'reld to 'I'eresa.

'l'hankful\' 'l'cxas casclaw is clcar: that injurics atisurg fi:om a bl:each of a

fiducialy duty are considercd inhetentll' undiscovcrable 5.V.,933 S.W.2d at B;

ConþnlerA.r.roc.r, 918 S,W.2d tt 456; Tlaat u. George,71 S.\)í.3d 904,912 (I'ex. App. - 'I'exatkana 2002, no pet.). Gener:al\', a party who ìs ov¡ed a fìclucìar:y cluty ìs relieved

of tesponsibilit.y of clilìgent incluiry into the fiduciar:y's conduct as long as thc rclauonslrip exists. ,1. Z, 933 S.W.2cl at 8; 'fre ail u. Tre ni/, 311 S.W.3cl 11,4, 123 (I'ex. App. - Ileaumont 2010, no pct.). FIowcver, oûce ficluciary misconduct becomes apparent, it cannot bc ignorecl, r:egalcllcss of the natutc of the rclatìon ship. ConpuÍer zl¡socs.,91B S.W.2d at 45ó. 'I'hcrc can bc no othel conclusion but that 'l'ercs¿ has rnet hct first butdcn of demonstrating tl'rat hcr injuty, suffering from a breacl-r of hduciar'y dr-rty, is thc qpe of lljury that is "inhegrt\' undisc<¡verablc".

Teresa's Iniury is Obiectively Verifrable Jlvrdence at trial was unclisputecì tl'rat Paul lcceived the rctircmcnt funds ar-rd

spent thc cntire arnount r:cccived to pay bílls. (Clì:52, llfffi,4). (ll1ì2:5, L 9-24). 'I'he injury can be quantrÊcd and determiucd wrtl-r cettainty, as opposed to otheÍ injurics which can be disputcd and cannot bc dcmonstrated by dir:cct physrcal evidelrce.

Iìxarnples of the latter al:c claims ptovecl by ân cxpcrt opiniorl based on rcpressed or tecovelcd rnernories which are trot suffìcient to objectivcly verify ân injury; there was no scicntiûc collscnsus on how to gaugc truth or falsity of tcc<;vcrcd rncrnorìcs. J.lZ, S.\?.2d at 18. 'I'etesa's injury being "objectìvcly vcrifiable", the sccond prong of the te st I'ras been mct, and the cliscor.cС rule applics to dclay application of thc statutc of limitatjons to Paul's bteach of fìducìary duty.

Ewdence lVas Sufficient Teresa Exerc.ísed Due DiIlgence and Filed Claim Within Two Yeats of Nottce 'I'hc evrdcnce adduceci at triâl rcgarding discovcry of thc injury and cfforts to discovcl tl're injury was tlle tcslimolry of 'I'eresa, who tcstìfìed as follows: a Ohay, Now, when did you fìtst learn that your: husband had casl'red in his tetitetnent witl-r Conoco?

l0 A, I lcarned, uhm, whcn rny daughtcr, gosh, uhfiì, vzas - just happcncd rncnúon t<¡ when shc was tallang to me that he I'rad gotten aggravatcd ât d1e ilrsural-ìce compâlly oï somethû1g for going up or-ì their pticcs and he just paìd his horne ofl FIc rooh his moncy out of Conoco ancl paid his hr¡rnc o ff. a Okay. r\nd thât would Ìrave bcen I'row long ago?

Uhûr lln tl-rirrking that was somewhere n 2012. ^. a Okay.

Norv, let me tell you, I dcx-r't cliscuss witlr hrm with rny kìcìs bccause I dolr't ^ my kids to be dr:ug lrto any krncl of snrff like that. u/ant a Okay. But she just happcncd to trention that?

A. Yeah.

a And then at tlìat point in time you st^rted - what did you t1-y to clo then. ,\. I started colrtactillg diffctent, uhm, attomeys. I thought at the tirnc that he was living in New Mcxrco, ar-rd so I contactccl a1l attorûc)¡ in Nerv Mcxico and spol<c with lrim. Ilut hc wasn't living in New Nlcxico, he l-racì -, hc was thcn lìr'ìng - a I'lere?

A. - herc. So then I contactcd you. a And clid he cver tcll you that hc had câsl'ìed i1r hìs retitcmcnt with thcrn? r\. ,{bsolutcly not. (ì Did you know al¡out tl-rc banhnrptcl' we just found out about?

I rnay havc hcard about it slrce t1-ren, uhrn., fiom one of the kicls. I did not get ^. âlìy notice of auy bankr:uptrcy, no. a Okay. Âr-rd âfe )¡ou askng thc Coutt to award 1'6¡ thc monc;' that I're woulcl owc you fol your sl'rare of his rctiremcot?

ll l\ Ycs, and attorney's fccs ancl costs. (lì1ì 2: p. 21.,L 2 to p.22, 1.9).

a Âud 1'6¡ fcel tl-rat you'rc elrdded to â portion of his retiremcnt?

I absolutcly do. ^. a Á.nd you didn't know that he was gctring â rctiremenr bcncfit unúl your daughter told you? .{. 'I'hat's correct. I I havc scen hirn to talk to hirn onc time sincc wc wcre - divorced. I tl-rrr-rl<, ancl that was a few yeats beforc l-re retlrcd when thc lads wcre both in towr. Jesse was in town atrd the l<ids wantcd us to mect for dinner, tl're four of us, ancl I fìnal\' agt:ecd to it.

a We , accordir-rg to Pagc 4 of your decrce, which i¡ you kncw rvas back 1.981 , that a tetitement wâs âccruing ât the tìme accorcling to y6¡1 own decrec, -- A. Yeah.

a - dicl you not?

A. Yes, I did. a Well, then w}ry did you wait another 25 years or so to mahc a claim?

Iìecause, uhm, 1he clivorcc dcctee orclercd that when hc retilcd I woulcl tcccivc ^. perceutage. When wc lrret for dinncr that timc in Ol<lahor¡¿ (ìity, I rnentioncd that solncttú1rÉÌ to him actually that very cvening. I Ie l-rancìcd mc a (lonoco knife ancl l-re said "Ilerc, you've )¡ou'vc you've eamcd part of this." And I said. "Don't forget - - ¿bout tl-rat peÍccrltâfle of ¡r¡¡s¡ retiremel1t." FIc said, "I know, I know, I know. I won'l: forget." And agrecd that he owed it to me. So I - what woulcl you l-rave rnc do? (lìlì 2: p. 24,1.20 to p. 25, 1. 16).

t2 'fl're evidence from'I-ctesa Sitnmons \À/âs that she dìscoverecl Paul had not paicl her tlre retrremcnt when she w¿s put o11 lrotice by 1-rer claughte r t¡ 2012. 'I-eresa fìled a pet.ition to enfotcc the divorcc dcctee on April 3, 2014. (Clì 2:52)(Iìf1 #10).

'l'etesa also testìfied that shc had asl<ed Paul to not forget about the tetirement

awarded to 1rer, alrd he stated "I won't forget." Importantly, the rccord in this case teflects that Paul nevel testifìcd tl-rat'I'cresa's âccoullt of the convcrsation between 'I'etesa and Paul never occurred, nol did Paul offet any eviclcnce that het recounting ofthe cxcl'rangc was inaccutate. It is thereforc uncontrovcrtcd that'l'crcsa inquircd of Paul about the relirer¡ent ¿ward and that Paul tgreecl to be responsiblc fot it.

A finclel of fact cannot "ignote undisputcd tcstin-rony that is clcal, positìve, direct, otherwrse credible, frcc from contradictiolrs and ìnconsistencies, and could l.ravc bcen rcaclily controvetted." Ci4t o.f IQ/hr u. l.(/il¡on, 1,68 S.\7.3d 802, B1 1 (I'cx.

200s).

Under thc facts of this casc, when Paul t:ccerved dre reútetrcnt funcls cluc 'I'etesa, I-rc owed her: a fìcluciary respotisibility to safekeep the funds and pay I'rer what was owed. The undisputed testimony is that'I'eresa ashed of Paul, and Paul agrccd, tcr be r;esponsible fot thc tctitemellt duc'fetesa undet the clivolce decree. Paul had sole conttol over the decision to withdr:aw funds fton-r his Conoco accoullt, and he agreed witl'r 'I'ctcsa's Íequcst to be respousiì¡lc for the payrncllt when he madc the clecision.

Nothíng in thc recorcl would rnal<c thc request by'l-clesa oï thc acceptancc of thc responsibility by Paul untcasonablc. Iikewise, rotl'ìing in thc r:e cold would rnakc 'l-cres¿'s teliance on Paul to delivel thc payrnent unreasonable, especially considcring

Paul undisputcd acce¡rtance of that responsibiLity. Mor:c important\', it ìs arguable that Tcrcsa wâs not recluìred tc¡ ask of Paul about tl're retirer¡ent becausc he held her funds in a constructive ttust, and hc owed a fidr.rciary responsibilìty to'fcresa to pay her.

It is'I'cresa's contention tl'rat Paul r,rolated his fìduciary responsibiliry to'I'cresa wheu hc teceived the retitement funcls and did not pay her. It is'Icrcs¿'s further contefltiolr that her requcst to Paul honesdy rnadc ancl undisputcdly accepted by Paul to rnal<e thc rctirerner-rt paymclrt satisfìes an)¡ ÍcqrÌircment of re¿sonable diligcrrce for applicatrou of the discovcry rtrle ir-r this c¿se. 'I'l'rere was no cviclcncc in the recor:d to Put T'eresa on notice that she sllould not re\¡ o11 Pâul's âcccptalrcc of her rcquest to be lcspoÍrsible for the ttaûsfet uûtil'I'cresa hcard from hcr daughtcr regardiûg Paul's possiblc use of tctircmcnt fuûcìs, and Tcrcsa filecl suit within two ycars of tirat notrcc.

Based on the uncìisputecl, clear, ¡rositive ancl direct tcstimon¡, of 'Jieresa, which could have been readily coutrovertcd by Paul,'lercsa exercised tcasonablc cliligcnce by leasonably re\ii11g nu Paul to transfct the funds, a r:csponsibiLity requested of him ancl accepted by l'rirn without rescrvâlioû. Undel thc facts of this casc, the trial court clid uot abuse its discrct-iolr by fìndng that thc claim by'I'eresa for the rctrremcnt funds did not accrue undl sl'rc was givcn notice by hcr daughter that Paul wâs 1-ìot going to t4 fulfill l-ris agr:eed-upon rcsponsibility tro trânsfer the retiremcnt funcls to'l'eresa whcn he tcceived thcm.

Paul's argument to thìs Court: is that'I'etcsa could h¿ve had a QDIIO si¡yred, or she coulcl havc contacrcd Conoco, ol she could I'rave callecl Ì)aul again ancl again on some undetetmiued tcgr-rlat basis to dctetmrlre his retucmcnt status, whcthct he hacl reclucsted a letìtcment alrroulrt ir-r some fonn from Conoco, and whetl'rer hc had actually reccived funds from Conoco. It is 'I'ere sa's position that wl-rìle any onc of a nurnbet of possibilities exist to cxercisc dìligcnce, the fiduciary duty owcd to'l'eresa by Paul, coupled with 'I'cresa's requcst of Paul to rake rcspor-rsibility for the retiremcnt transfer, and Paul's unhiûdcred and voluntary acceptallce of that rcqucst to, suppoÍts 'I'etesa's position tl-r¿t is was Par-rl's cluq, to disck¡sc the injuty. fiurdrcr, hcr rcliance on Paul to malçc thc r:clircrncnt pâymcnt was rcasonal¡lc. Às sucl'r, to thc cxtent r:cc¡uircd by any rneasure, -feresa cxctcisecì thc "leasonabìc dilìgcncc" l:ccluitcd of her towalds discovety of an "inhcrently undiscovelable" rnjury sufficient to allow appJicatìor-r of the discovery r:u1e to delay irnposrtìon of thc statute c¡f limitations in tl'rìs case .

CONCLUSION AND PRA\'ER 'Ihc ttial court propctly fcrund tl-rat'I'cr:cs¿ filcd hct clairn agaínst Paul witl'rin two yeal's of the datc she hnew ot sl-rould havc l<nown of hcr injury. '1'1-re ttial court ptoPerty tefused to bar'I'ercsa's clairn agair-rst Paul fol rctitcmcnt fur-rd s hc failcd tcr

delivcr to l'rer. 'I'cresa prays that thìs Court deny Paul's tcquested relicf.

WH lllìE IrOÌìF,, Plì.li,MIS BS CO NSIDElììjl), Âpp ellcc'l-cres ¿ À. Sirnmon s

that this Court affinn thc ttìal cor-rrt's judgrnent, and deuy all telief r:eclucstcd by Appellant, lìespcctfully subrnitted, Gartett Clarl<son Fliglcy sIlN 24046074 l,aw Office of Garrett C. I-Iigley, Pl,l-C \(/. 12'r' Street Àustin,'I'cxas 78701 (512) 514-1940 Iìax N<¡. (512) 391-0028 G at ett@higleyfarnilylaw. com

Àncl ]-,\W OFIìIC]I'S OF Itoltlit{f 11. LU'rFlIitì, P.c, 800 lììo (lranclc Strcct -Austin,'fexas 78701 (s12) 477-2323 Iìax (512) 478-1,824 By, /S/ lìol¡ert ll. l,uthcr lìobctt lJ. J-uther sIlN 12704000 Ilbluthet(@lu tl.rlaw. cor¡ .Attorncys for: l\ppellce, -I'crcsa Â. Simmons CER'TIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE In accordance with lìule s 9.4(e) and (I) of the'IïXAS I{ULES OIr ,ÀPPll'l-LA'I"L, PÌìOCEDUlìlì, the undctsiglrccl attorney of record certìfìcs that tl're Ilne f of Appellee contains 14-point typeface for: the body of thc bricf, 121oint $pefacc fol fo<¡tnotes in the l¡r'ief and contains 3873 words, excluding thosc words identified as not being countcd rn lìulc a.4(Ð(1) ancl was prcparcd on S(/ordPerfect version X6.

/S/ llobett 11. Luthcr Iìol¡clt Il. Lutl'rer CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I ccrtify that a truc copy of tl-rc abovcwas scrved on Âpcl1ant, by and thr:ougl-r his attorucl's of tecord, Melviu (ìray a¡d lìlcd l3rigrna¡ via cservicc at sgteen@grayandbri¡¡man.com, in accordancc wlth tl-re 'I'exas Rulcs of Civil Proccdure and tlre'I'exas lìulcs of Âppellatc Procedurc on October 21,2015.

/S/ ltobctt 11,l,uthcr: I{obcrt Il. Lutl-ret

T7