Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC
Opinion
ACCEPTED 03-15-00657-CV
7774560 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/10/2015 5:14:45 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-15-00657-CV
FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS
In the Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/10/2015 5:14:45 PM for the Third Judicial District JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk at Austin, Texas
CHRIS TRAYLOR, AS EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER OF THE TEXAS HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION, et al.
Appellants, v. DIANA D., AS NEXT FRIEND OF KD, A CHILD, et al.
Appellees.
On Appeal from the 200th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas
REPLY SUPPORTING RULE 24.4 MOTION TO VACATE COUNTER-SUPERSEDEAS ORDER OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, INCREASE COUNTER-SUPERSEDEAS BOND TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
Plaintiffs misunderstand both the Commission’s argument and the relevant administrative rules. The Commission does not argue, as plaintiffs suggest, that Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1378 (2015), somehow preempts state law as a general matter. Resp. at 13 ¶ 17. The Commission’s position is, rather, that 42 U.S.C. § 1396c, as interpreted in Armstrong, preempts state-court remedies that change the amount of Medicaid rates. Mtn. at 13-17. Plaintiffs’ response ignores the actual scope of the Commission’s argument and, as a result, fails to respond to it.
Although the Commission has drawn its motion narrowly, so as to address only the remedy of a counter-supersedeas order as opposed to the merits of the underlying dispute, plaintiffs have brought that issue into this proceeding. See Resp. at 10-11. Plaintiffs misread or ignore the relevant statutes and rules. Substantively, plaintiffs’ position is that § 355.8021(a)(2)(B) requires particular reporting requirements, because the rates in this case were adopted in a “periodic rate review,” see id. (citing 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.8021(a)(2)(B)). But § 355.8021(a)(2)(B) does not apply. These rates were changed through a rate “adjustment,” not a periodic rate review.1 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 531.021(e); 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.201(d)(1)(A), (D).
The adjustment process occurs “notwithstanding” other legal requirements, including the reporting requirement of § 355.8021(a)(2)(B) for periodic review. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 531.021(e); 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.201(d). Nor is there a procedural basis for this lawsuit in El Paso Hospital District v. Tex. Health & Human Services Commission, 247 S.W.3d 709, 711, 714-15 (Tex. 2008) (“El Paso Hospital District I”). As this Court and the Supreme Court both recognized following remand, a § 2001.038 claim cannot be used to change Medicaid rates, only to challenge the underlying rules. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 400 S.W.3d 72, 81 (Tex. 2013) (“El Paso Hospital District II”) (“our prior opinion and judgment did not create a remedy for the hospitals’ past reimbursement claims”); see also Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 351 S.W.3d 460, 487 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011) aff’d 400 S.W.3d 72 (Section 2001.038’s scope is limited “solely to the extent of permitting suits against state agencies for declaratory relief concerning the validity or applicability of their rules”). And because the Commissioner’s discretion is to set rates, subject to the limitations of the Medicaid Act, there could be no ultra vires claim related to the amount of rates, and the discretion granted to proceed “notwithstanding” other legal requirements set out in § 531.021(e) precludes any ultra vires act. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2007).
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS’ RELIANCE ON POST HOC INTENT LETTERS SIGNED BY
INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS IS AN IMPROPER ATTEMPT TO BRING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE COURT VIA INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Before engaging with the substance of the counter-supersedeas issue, it is important to deal with the documents that constituted the bulk of plaintiffs’ filing: the post hoc letters signed by individual legislators and their impact on the meaning of Rider 50c. Those letters are at odds with the plain text of Rider 50 and are, as a matter of law, incompetent to change the meaning of a statute. They appear to mark an attempt to bring political pressure on this Court to avoid the necessary implications of Rider 50.
A. The Text of Rider 50 Mandates these Rate Cuts.
Rider 50, the relevant language from which is attached to the Commission’s Rule 24 motion, makes clear that the cuts are not optional. 2016-17 General Appropriations Act, 84th Leg., R.S., 2015 (Article II, Health & Human Servs. Comm’n) (“Rider 50”) (excerpts attached as appendix). Part 50a makes clear that funding has already been cut from the Medicaid portion of the budget. Rider 50a. (“Included in appropriations above in Goal B, Medicaid, is a reduction of . . . a biennial total of $373,000,000 in General Revenue Funds and $496,570,428 in Federal Funds.”) Portions of this larger cut “may” include various initiatives. Rider 50b (“This reduction shall be achieved through the implementation of the plan described under subsection d which may include any or all of the following initiatives:”).
Rider 50c is the kicker. After requiring a change in reimbursement methodology to meet industry standards, “while considering stakeholder input and access to care,” the Rider makes specific requirements regarding Medicaid therapy rates:
Out of the amount [already cut] in subsection (a), in each fiscal year at least $50,000,000 in General Revenue Funds savings should be achieved through rate reductions. . . . .
Rider 50(c). In short, plaintiffs’ entire reading of the Rider depends on the word “should,” which addresses “rate cuts” that are to be used to account for money that was already cut from the budget, according to Rider 50a.2
Given that the funds have already been cut from the budget, the word “should” is an instruction to the Commission regarding the proportion of the total cuts that are to be directed to Medicaid therapy rate reductions. The word “should” is not included in the list of words given a background meaning by the Code Construction Act, see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016, nor is there a large body of case law governing its use as opposed to the more common statutory terms “shall” and “may,” see Thomas v. Groebl, 147 Tex. 70, 78-79, 212 S.W.2d 625, 630 (1948) (“shall” can mean “may,” and vice versa). “Should” is the past tense of “shall,” and, though it is sometimes used to express “probability or expectation,” it also serves to indicate “obligation or duty.” AMER. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1994) 1612. Thus, like “shall” and “may,” the word “should” can create a mandatory standard in some contexts. See A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed. 1995) (“Oddly, should, like may . . . is sometimes used to create mandatory standards, as in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct”). Texas courts have routinely applied decrees using the word “should” as creating mandatory duties in statutes, orders, and instructions.3 It makes sense to do so in this context: Rider 50a sets out a total amount of cuts, and Rider 50c sets out instructions for how to achieve at least $100,000,000 of those cuts during the biennium. Given that the word “should” is directed at a portion of the cuts already made, nothing in the context suggests that the cuts themselves, or their amount, is either conditional or conditioned upon any particular data or analysis.
Plaintiffs have implied that the reference to “access to care” impacts the rate changes. See Resp. at 16 ¶ 21 (putting “access to care” next to the rate cuts with an ellipsis). This is misleading: Rider 50 ties access to reformation of reimbursement methodology, not to rate cuts. Rider 50(c). The rate cuts are in a separate sentence. And even if the rate cuts were subject to procedural requirement to perform an “access to care” inquiry, the reference to “access to care” necessarily invokes the Medicaid Act’s interpretation of the term, because there is no contrary definition in Texas law and because Medicaid is a Spending Clause program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A); see Motion at 7-8. Thus, the only potential legal question is whether the data supporting the adjustment pass muster under federal law—and that inquiry is in the hands of the Secretary.
B. The Post-Enactment Legislator Letters Cannot Change the
Meaning of the Legislature’s Enactment.
Plaintiffs appear to believe that the number of legislator signatures they can marshal in support of their lawsuit changes the law. But such letters are of little, or no, value in determining the meaning of a Legislative enactment. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Tex. 2000) (“[C]ourts construing statutory language should give little weight to post-enactment statements by legislators. Explanations produced, after the fact, by individual legislators are not statutory history, and can provide little guidance as to what the legislature collectively intended.”).
“The very notion of post-enactment legislative history is oxymoronic.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 470 n.46 (Tex. 2009). Like all post-enactment legislative history, the Legislator letters are of little use to the courts, because they represent the views of the Legislators, not the Legislature as a body at the time of enactment. See Ojo v. Farmers Group, 356 S.W.3d 421, 433 (Tex. 2011) (using Commissioner of Insurance report implemented pursuant to statute as evidence of Legislature’s knowledge of report’s contents). The letters attached to plaintiffs reply are the type of oxymoronic attempt to sway the outcome of a case on political grounds the Supreme Court has long decried: they “are not statutory history.” Doe, 19 S.W.3d at 352. They should not sway the Court to take an unrealistic view of the word “should,” read—as it must be—in light of the Legislature’s choice to cut far more money from the Medicaid budget and dedicate $100 million of that cut to rate cuts—as opposed to other aspects of therapy provision, which are subject to separate cuts of different amounts of money— addressed to home therapy.
II. THE REMEDY OF SUSPENDING THE OCTOBER 1 RATES IS PREEMPTED BY 42
U.S.C. § 1396C.
Plaintiffs misrepresent the Commission’s position as being that Armstrong somehow preempts state law. Resp. at 13-14 ¶ 17. In fact, the Commission’s position is that 42 U.S.C. § 1396c preempts state-court remedies that change the amount of Medicaid rates.
A. Plaintiffs Misunderstand the Commission’s Preemption
Argument.
Plaintiffs fundamentally misunderstand the Commission’s preemption argument with regard to the counter-supersedeas order. See Resp. at 9-10 ¶ 14 (asserting that State attacks underlying temporary injunction); 13 ¶ 17 (“Appellants argue that Armstrong . . . preempts any challenges of any sort”). While the State’s arguments also impact the various causes of action plaintiffs have attempted (and failed) to plead, the attack on the counter-supersedeas order is an attack on a specific remedy that changes the amount of Medicaid rates in derogation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. See Mtn. at 13-17. Implementing a contrary remedy, including a counter- supersedeas order, is “fundamental error” because it constitutes the exercise of a power denied to the courts by the federal and Texas constitutions, by taking something from the executive and federal, and giving it to the state judiciary. See Mtn. at 17-21; e.g., McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters, 157 Tex. 421, 477, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957) (per curiam).4 It is the remedy of changing the rates that is preempted in this case.
Nor does Armstrong preempt anything. The State’s position is that Armstrong’s construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1396c causes that provision to preempt contrary remedies. This necessarily follows from the conclusion that there is no separate cause of action to change Medicaid rates. Mtn. at 11-15. Plaintiffs mistakenly suggest that Justice Breyer’s view of the issue renders the remainder of Armstrong non-precedential. Resp. at 14 ¶ 18 (relying on Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Kliebert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146988 (M.D. La. Oct 29, 2015) (applying rule from rule from Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) to deem Justice Breyer’s concurrence controlling).5 This is unhelpful, because the district court got the Marks rule analysis wrong. Justice Breyer joined Part III of Armstrong—the only part of the majority opinion he did not join was Part IV—so there is no need to apply the Marks rule.6 The Commission relies on the majority opinion in Part III. See Mtn. at 5-7. In light of the Fifth Circuit’s similar conclusion regarding access-to-care claims, Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2007), it is clear that the relevant remedy when rates are at a particular level is recourse to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services.
B. Plaintiffs’ Assertion that the Remedy Remains Unpreempted Is
Based on a Misunderstanding of the Relevant Texas Law.
Plaintiffs simply misunderstand Texas law when they suggest that there is a separate, statutory right to have courts impose particular Medicaid rates in derogation of the Secretary’s arguments. See Resp. at 10-11 (asserting that there is a right to bring suit regarding Medicaid rates triggered by a claim regarding the relevant administrative rules). As explained above, plaintiffs’ argument is foreclosed by El Paso Hospital District II. To establish a separate entitlement to relief that is not preempted, plaintiffs would have to show a substantive Texas statutory requirement that imposes an additional requirement regarding the ultimate level of rates, beyond what the Medicaid Acts require.
Plaintiffs are simply wrong when they suggest that the APA impacts Medicaid rates at all. The rate making process is not subject to the APA—by statute it requires only a hearing to consider public input, not the separate range of APA formal rulemaking. Compare TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 2001.023, .024, .029, .030 (notice and comment requirements for rulemaking, including written response requirement), with 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 322.501 (containing distinct notice and hearing requirements, with no requirement to respond in writing to comments). There is no provision, as in the APA, for incorporating the public comments. If public comment suggests a need for a change, the proper remedy is to pull down the rates and start the process over.
And plaintiffs are too cute by half when they suggest that federal law is irrelevant because “[n]owhere in the pleadings, briefing, or temporary injunction is there any reference to the federal statutory Medicaid right to access to care.” Resp. at 15 ¶ 19. That is exactly the point. Under Armstrong there is no such federal right to be enforced in the courts. To recognize an implicit right to do so in Texas courts, by injunction or supersedeas order, is to disrupt the balance of power between the state and federal governments in the Spending Clause context and, as a result, to violate both constitutions. See Mtn. at 13-20.
***
The Rule 24 motion presents a remedy preemption issue; the broader preemption issues are presented in the pending appeal. The Secretary’s authority to withhold funding is the only remedy related to rate amounts. It is, therefore, preemptive. Plaintiffs point to nothing in Texas law that creates a separate procedural or substantive requirement that impacts the amount of rates: their arguments are all based on inapplicable law and rules. Because plaintiffs rely on their erroneous view of Texas law, rather than engage with the Commission’s constitutional arguments, they have provided no basis for their position. The Court should reverse and vacate the counter-supersedeas order.
III. PLAINTIFFS MISUNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
UNDER RULE 24.4 AND THE SCOPE OF ABUSE-OF-DISCRETION REVIEW.
Plaintiffs’ view of both counter-supersedeas and the bond requirements for imposing counter-supersedeas are contrary to the text of the rule. Plaintiffs’ view is that counter-supersedeas is designed to protect the party avoiding supersession. Resp. at 8-9 ¶ 13 (citing In re Board for Educator Certification, 452 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2014) for proposition that § 24.2(a)(3) is a substantive limit on the government’s ability to obtain supersedeas); Resp. at 23 ¶ 30 (improperly asserting that separate provision governing supersedeas bonds related to money judgments requires downward adjustment of counter-supersedeas bond to avoid economic harm in case involving injunctive relief). Accordingly, they argue that the evidence showing that the plaintiffs would be harmed determines the amount of the bond. Resp. at 23. That position bears no relationship to the text of Rule 24.
A. Rule 24.2(a)(3) Requires that the Bond Protect the Judgment
Creditor (in this Case the State) from the Change in the Status Quo During the Appeal.
In fact, Rule 24.2(a)(3) provides:
When the judgment is for something other than money or an interest in property, the trial court must set the amount and type of security that the judgment debtor must post. The security must adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage that the appeal might cause. But the trial court may decline to permit the judgment to be superseded if the judgment creditor posts security ordered by the trial court in an amount and type that will secure the judgment debtor against any loss or damage caused by the relief granted the judgment creditor if an appellate court determines, on final disposition, that that relief was improper.
TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). The plain text requires the bond to be set in an amount that will protect the State from the potential that it will not be able to implement Rider 50c’s cuts until after the end of the biennium: the bond must protect the judgment debtor through resolution of litigation. Thus, the operative question is whether the Commission (and by extension the State of Texas) will be protected during the appeal from any ill effects of the status quo being changed before the appeal is final. See Mtn. at 21-24.
Because plaintiffs have proffered only evidence of potential harm to themselves, there has never been any probative evidence regarding the amount necessary to protect the State of Texas. They are simply wrong to suggest that the counter-supersedeas bond should be set at a level that protects the judgment creditor—quite the opposite.
B. Plaintiffs Attempt to Obscure the Scope of the District Court’s
Injunction in an Attempt to Minimize the Importance of the Bond. Rule 24 provides that the court of appeals will not be prevented from changing the amount of the bond based on changed circumstances, merely because the issue has not been presented to the district court a second time. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(b). There has been a change: in response to the State’s motion to modify the injunction, the district court declined to provide a more specific ruling, and instead stated that the scope of the injunction would be made clear in subsequent sanctions proceedings. Supp. RR.36:17-38:10. This is, plainly, a violation of Rule 683 and a basis for vacating the temporary injunction in the underlying appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. Advocates for Patient Access, Inc., 399 S.W.3d 615, 628-29 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). But, apart from that, the district court’s confirmation of the breadth, and uncertainty, of its order impacts the potential harm to the State during appeal and, as a result, the appropriate bond to be filed.
Plaintiffs attempt stridently to direct the Court’s attention away from the district court’s views on the scope of its injunction. See Resp. at 3 n.1 (asking the Court to pretend the hearing did not happen and is not in the record). But the statements are already in the record, and they are relevant by operation of Rule 24.4(b). The district court’s statements, without doubt, vitiate plaintiffs’ argument that the counter-supersedeas should be subject to a minimal bond because it only imposes an obligation not to violate the law. See Resp. at 23-24 ¶ 31.The Commission, and Rider 50, are held hostage by the district court’s order, in the absence of a constitutional violation, and without any meaningful guidelines as to how to proceed. $500 is not a sufficient bond to protect the State of Texas from potentially losing the entirety of the $100,000,000 the Legislature already cut from the budget, if this case is not resolved and the mandate issued within the next 22 months. In short, the bond is not related to the factors that the rule says the bond should be based upon. That is a classic abuse of discretion. See Mtn. at 21-24.
Nor is it an answer to argue, as plaintiffs do, Resp. at 23 ¶ 30, that the cuts can be made up later in the biennium. Quite the contrary: to achieve the total amount of cuts, the Commission would have to cut all providers’ rates even more to make up the difference within the two year deadline for saving the $100 million. See Mtn. at 24.
C. There Is No Preservation Issue, Because this is a Challenge to the
Initial Imposition of Counter-Supersedeas.
Plaintiffs argue waiver. See Resp. at 19-20. But the preemption argument is not subject to waiver because it is jurisdictional and presents fundamental error, and the bond amount issue is not subject to waiver because of the district court’s statement on the record regarding the scope of the injunction or, in the alternative, could not be waived by an Assistant Attorney General.
Preempted acts are outside the courts’ powers. Actions outside of jurisdiction are subject to attack on appeal without regard to preservation. E.g., Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Tex. 2012); see also McCauley, 157 Tex. at 477, 304 S.W.2d at 266. The counter-supersedeas remedy is at odds with the exclusive remedy overseen by the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services. Because it was outside the judicial power entirely, it can be challenged through any appropriate mechanism—including Rule 24.4.
Plaintiffs further argue that the amount of bond cannot be challenged because there was no separate motion to change the bond in the district court and because the assistant attorney general said that the bond was reasonable. Resp. at 21-22 ¶ 28. Neither claim is dispositive, because the district court’s statements at the motion to modify have crystallized the lower court’s view of the injunction and plainly imposes two illegal requirements: (1) that § 355.8021(a)(2)(B) be applied to rate adjustments, as opposed to periodic rate reviews, see supra, introduction, and (2) that the Commission find out whether its actions violate the injunction in future sanctions proceedings, see supra, Part III.B. That broad view of the scope of injunctive relief expands the scope of the injunctive relief and the potential harm to the State of Texas. And, as explained above, harm to the State is the only relevant question in setting the counter-supersedeas bond. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3); see supra, Part III.A. Plaintiffs have never proffered an explanation of how $500 protects the State’s interests during appeal: they merely suggest that the State’s interests are somehow less than their own. There is no balancing test.
Even absent the statements at the modification hearing, there would be no waiver, because an assistant attorney general cannot waive the State’s substantive interests. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.004; see Employees Retirement Sys. v. Bass, 840 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1992, no writ) (“An admission of the attorney general cannot prejudice the rights of the State.”). This injunction imposes a limitation on Legislative policy, based on a nominal bond. Even had the assistant attorney general in question been authorized to make this admission, it would violate § 402.004 to allow this admission to stand, because it would allow the attorney general to make policy, through the courts, in derogation of statutory language. See Tex. Health Care Information Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841,848 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (citing State v. Keeton Packing Co., 487 S.W.3d 775, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Allowing this waiver to preclude a subsequent challenge to the amount of the bond would allow the Attorney General, by an affirmative statement, to bind the hands of both the Commission and the Legislature regarding implementation of the budget.
***
The relevant question regarding the bond is whether it will protect the party seeking supersedeas from damages resulting from changing the status quo. There is no evidence explaining how the bond does this, so its issuance has always been an abuse of discretion. The scope of the injunction is, at least arguably, broader following the modification hearing. It is certainly less clear. Thus, even though the assistant attorney general referred to the bond as “reasonable” in terms of plaintiffs’ evidence regarding harm to themselves, there is no evidence supporting the bond under the relevant legal inquiry, which is the potential for damage to the State during the pendency of the appeal. Because the only legally relevant inquiry is whether the bond protects the State’s interests, the bond amount must be increased to cover the entire potential loss to the State if this litigation continues through the appellate process for two or more years.
PRAYER
The Court should vacate the counter-supersedeas order or, in the alternative, order the bond amount necessary to comply with Rule 24’s requirement that the party who is denied supersedeas be made entirely whole for any harm caused by changing the status quo—$100,000,000 to cover both the amount of general revenue Rider 50(c) was intended to remove from the Medicaid program and the cost of hiring 50 new employees to comply with the injunction’s requirements.
Respectfully submitted.
KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas CHARLES E. ROY First Assistant Attorney General SCOTT A. KELLER Solicitor General /s/ Kristofer Monson KRISTOFER S. MONSON Assistant Solicitor General State Bar No. 24037129 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-2697 [email protected] COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On November 10, 2015 this document was served via File&Serve Xpress on: Ben Hathaway Kristofer S. Monson Dan Richards Office of the Attorney General Richards Rodriguez & Skeith P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) 816 Congress Avenue Austin, Texas 78701 Suite 1200 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
/s/ Kristofer S. Monson
APPENDIX
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
3RD Printing H.B. NO. 1
GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
BILL
TABLE OF CONTENTS RECAPITULATION - ALL ARTICLES ............................................................................................. ix ARTICLE I - GENERAL GOVERNMENT Arts, Commission on the....................................................................................................................... I-1 Attorney General, Office of the ............................................................................................................ I-3 Bond Review Board ............................................................................................................................ I-12 Cancer Prevention and Research Institute of Texas............................................................................ I-13 Comptroller of Public Accounts ......................................................................................................... I-16 Fiscal Programs - Comptroller of Public Accounts ............................................................................ I-22
Informational Listing of Funds Appropriated to the Comptroller for Social Security BRP ....... I-27 Emergency Communications, Commission on State .......................................................................... I-28 Emergency Services Retirement System, Texas ................................................................................. I-31 Employees Retirement System ........................................................................................................... I-32 Ethics Commission, Texas .................................................................................................................. I-36 Facilities Commission......................................................................................................................... I-38 Finance Authority, Public ................................................................................................................... I-46 Governor, Office of the ....................................................................................................................... I-51 Trusteed Programs within the Office of the Governor........................................................................ I-52 Historical Commission........................................................................................................................ I-61 Information Resources, Department of ............................................................................................... I-66 Library & Archives Commission ........................................................................................................ I-72 Pension Review Board ........................................................................................................................ I-76 Preservation Board .............................................................................................................................. I-77 Risk Management, State Office of ...................................................................................................... I-80 Secretary of State ................................................................................................................................ I-82 Veterans Commission ......................................................................................................................... I-85 Retirement and Group Insurance ..................................................................................................... ...I-89 Social Security and Benefit Replacement Pay .................................................................................... I-90 Bond Debt Service Payments.............................................................................................................. I-90 Lease Payments ................................................................................................................................... I-91 Recapitulation - Article I - General Revenue...................................................................................... I-92 Recapitulation - Article I - General Revenue - Dedicated .................................................................. I-93 Recapitulation - Article I - Federal Funds .......................................................................................... I-94 Recapitulation - Article I - Other Funds ............................................................................................. I-95 Recapitulation - Article I - All Funds ................................................................................................. I-96 ARTICLE II - HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Aging and Disability Services, Department of .................................................................................... II-1 Assistive and Rehabilitative Services, Department of ....................................................................... II-18 Family and Protective Services, Department of................................................................................. II-30 State Health Services, Department of ................................................................................................ II-47 Health and Human Services Commission .......................................................................................... II-76 Retirement and Group Insurance ..................................................................................................... II-107 Social Security and Benefit Replacement Pay ................................................................................. II-108 Bond Debt Service Payments........................................................................................................... II-108 Lease Payments ................................................................................................................................ II-109 Special Provisions Relating to All Health and Human Services Agencies ...................................... II-109 Recapitulation - Article II - General Revenue ................................................................................. II-135 Recapitulation - Article II - General Revenue - Dedicated .............................................................. II-136 Recapitulation - Article II - Federal Funds ...................................................................................... II-137 Recapitulation - Article II - Other Funds ......................................................................................... II-138 Recapitulation - Article II - All Funds ............................................................................................. II-139 ARTICLE III - EDUCATION Education Agency, Texas ................................................................................................................... III-1 Blind and Visually Impaired, School for the .................................................................................... III-21 Deaf, School for the .......................................................................................................................... III-25 Special Provisions for the School for the Blind and Visually Impaired / School for the Deaf ........................................................................................................................... III-27 Teacher Retirement System .............................................................................................................. III-28 Optional Retirement Program ........................................................................................................... III-33 Group Insurance Contributions, Higher Education Employees ........................................................ III-34 Higher Education Coordinating Board ............................................................................................. III-39 Higher Education Fund ..................................................................................................................... III-56 The University of Texas System Administration .............................................................................. III-56 Available University Fund ................................................................................................................ III-58 i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.