NUMBER 13-15-00436-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG MARK STUYVESANT, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 28th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides A Nueces County jury convicted appellant Mark Stuyvesant of burglary of a habitation, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 30.02 (West, Westlaw thorugh 2015 R.S.). On November 4, 2015, the trial court sentenced Stuyvesant to four years’ imprisonment with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division. At the time of his conviction for burglary of a habitation, Stuyvesant was on deferred probation for two separate cause numbers (trial court cause numbers 12-CR- 3777-A and 12-CR-3014-A).1 As a result of his burglary of a habitation conviction, the State filed two motions to revoke Stuyvesant’s probation for cause numbers 12-377-A and 12-3014-A. At the revocation hearing, Stuyvesant pleaded true to all of the State’s grounds for revocation, except for the allegation that he had committed burglary of a habitation. The trial court took judicial notice of Stuyvesant’s conviction, found the burglary allegation to be true, and revoked Stuyvesant’s probation and adjudicated Stuyvesant’s guilt in cause number 12-CR-377-A and 12-CR-3014-A. The trial court sentenced Stuyvesant to four years’ imprisonment with all three convictions running concurrently, with credit for time served.

Stuyvesant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, Stuyvesant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief

need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State and Kelly v. State, Stuyvesant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Stuyvesant’s appellate counsel also notified this Court that he: (1) notified Stuyvesant that he has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Stuyvesant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed Stuyvesant of his rights to file a pro se response, review the record preparatory to filing that response,2 and seek discretionary review if we concluded that the appeal is frivolous; (4) provided Stuyvesant with a pro se motion for access to the appellate record; and (5) informed Stuyvesant that the pro se response, if any, should identify for the Court those issues which he believes the Court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510, n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. A reasonable amount of time has passed, and Stuyvesant has not filed a pro se brief.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). A court of appeals has two options when an Anders brief and a subsequent pro se response are filed. After reviewing the entire record, it may: (1) determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it finds no reversible error; or (2) determine that there are arguable grounds for appeal and remand the case to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If the court finds arguable grounds for appeal, it may not review those grounds until after new counsel has briefed those issues on appeal. Id. We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See id. at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no reversible error in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, Stuyvesant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffrey v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Stuyvesant and advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex Parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

GINA M. BENAVIDES, Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed the 29th day of December, 2016.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.