NUMBERS 13-16-00191-CR & 13-16-00192-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG JOHN GIBBS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 176th District Court of Harris County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez In appellate cause numbers 13-16-00191-CR and 13-16-192-CR, appellant John Gibbs pleaded guilty to two separate counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.). The trial court sentenced Gibbs to twenty-five years’ confinement in both causes, which will run concurrently. Gibbs’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, Gibbs’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed with this Court in both causes a motion to withdraw and a brief stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Gibbs’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Gibbs’s counsel has also informed this Court that Gibbs has been (1) notified that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed of his rights to file a pro se response, review the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek discretionary review if we

conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20, Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and Gibbs has not filed a pro se response.2 II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal.3 See id. at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in each cause.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, Gibbs’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Gibbs and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

/s/ Rogelio Valdez ROGELIO VALDEZ Chief Justice Do Not Publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 3rd day of August, 2017.