NUMBERS 13-17-00445-CR & 13-17-00450-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JORDAN RENARD JOSEPH, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa Appellant Jordan Renard Joseph pleaded guilty in appellate cause numbers 13- 17-00445-CR and 13-17-00450-CR to separate counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in penalty group 1 in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams, first-degree felonies. 1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112(a), (d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Appellant committed both offenses in a drug-free zone. See id. § 481.134 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.) (increasing the minimum term of confinement or imprisonment by five years). The trial court placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years. The State later filed a motion to adjudicate guilt and revoke appellant’s community supervision. After receiving appellant’s plea of true, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty and sentenced him to concurrent ten-year prison terms.

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief in both appellate causes.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal

authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel has: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant of appellant’s rights to file a pro se response, 2 review the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek discretionary review if the court of appeals concludes that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record, lacking only appellant’s signature and the date and including the mailing address for the court of appeals, with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. An adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response or a motion for pro se access to the appellate record.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no reversible error in the record. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in both appellate causes.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise

him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

LETICIA HINOJOSA Justice Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 29th day of August, 2018.