Jackson v. Vaughn
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12 later published cases cite this decision.
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- Joyce L. Jones v. Mansfield Independent School District (Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) 2025)
- Renee Yvonne Burgin v. Jimmy Wayne Burgin, Jr. (Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) 2025)
- Lelland Turner v. Hannah Morton (Tex. App. 2024)
- Joshua Nsuh v. Irine Ngumashi (Tex. App. 2024)
- In the Interest of M.G., a Child v. the State of Texas (Tex. App. 2023)
- Alvin Holt v. the State of Texas (Tex. App. 2022)
- Carl O'Neal and SOS Energy Services, LLC v. Frank Dale (Tex. App. 2021)
- Carlye Jones Miller v. Michelle Watkins (Tex. App. 2021)
- John M. Donohue v. Denise Martinez and Martha Donohue (Tex. App. 2018)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
James T. Campbell, Justice *916Appellant Reidie Jackson, a Texas prison inmate appearing pro se, brought suit under
Background
Honesto, Nall, and Guzman were members of a Montford Unit "use of force team" that in March 2011 forcibly removed Jackson from his cell when he would not vacate it. Officer Cindy Mayne
After Jackson filed suit, Vaughn and Emsoff brought a motion to dismiss under Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 14 which the trial court granted. It signed a final judgment in January 2013 and Jackson appealed. Finding Jackson sufficiently alleged section 1983 excessive force and bystander claims, we reversed and remanded the case.
Vaughn and Emsoff then moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted and the trial court rendered a *917final judgment disposing of all claims and all parties to the litigation.
Analysis
Vexatious Litigant claim of Nall, Honesto, and Guzman
By his first issue Jackson asserts the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion Honesto, Nall, and Guzman filed to declare him a vexatious litigant under Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 11.
Jackson's briefing reveals a misunderstanding of the nature of our review of the trial court's order declaring him a vexatious litigant. In his brief, Jackson points to our 2014 holding that his pleadings sufficiently alleged a section 1983 excessive force claim and a bystander claim. See
Our task this time around is different. A vexatious litigant determination requires the defendant to demonstrate there is not a reasonable probability the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant and the plaintiff, in the preceding seven-year period, commenced, prosecuted, or maintained as a pro se litigant at least five litigations, other than in small claims court, that were finally determined adversely to the plaintiff. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054 ; Leonard v. Abbott,
We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's determinations under Chapter 11. Devoll v. State,
Our Court said, in Lagaite v. Uy ,
That said, we turn to a consideration of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding there is not a reasonable probability that Jackson will prevail in his claims against Honesto, Nall and Guzman.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against "every person who," under color of state law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected," another person to a deprivation of a federally protected right.
Jackson alleges the use-of-force team applied excessive force violating the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause. The Eighth Amendment proscribes "the imposition of pain totally without penalogical (sic) justification." Evans v. Dugger,
When an inmate brings an excessive force section 1983 claim against a prison official individually, "the core judicial inquiry is ... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian,
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' " Hudson,
In order to demonstrate, then, that Jackson did not have a reasonable probability of prevailing it was for Nall, Honesto and Guzman to present evidence sufficient to permit the trial court make that finding.
Jackson's live pleadings allege another officer, Jamie Villegas, put his knee on the side of Jackson's head and bounced, stuck his fingers in Jackson's eye and punched the side of Jackson's head with a closed fist, all while Jackson was lying prone on the floor of his cell, handcuffed behind his back. They allege use-of-force team members punched Jackson's head, face, mouth and ribs, causing him great pain. His pleadings further allege that after Jackson was raised from the floor and his cuffs removed to reposition his hands, a team member grabbed Jackson's left leg or ankle and twisted it, causing him great pain and ripping the sole off his shoe. Jackson's dental plate was broken and his face began swelling. He suffered chipped or cracked teeth and blurred vision.
The defendants submitted evidence with their vexatious-litigant motion, and Jackson responded with evidence. The Montford Unit's video and audio recording of the use-of-force event also is in the record provided us. Jackson's response to the defendant's motion relied heavily on the recording.
On careful review of the recording that documents the use-of-force event and review of the other evidence presented to the trial court, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion Jackson has no reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims. We do not agree with Jackson that the recording bears out his interpretation of the events recorded. There is additional evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion. The defendants' evidence included the Montford Unit nurse's report stating that Jackson, immediately after the use-of-force event, complained of a back injury but she noted no visible injury. More significantly, the medical evidence includes the record of Jackson's sick call examination conducted at the Clements Unit four days later. The medical doctor's report, a "post Montford follow up," states Jackson had "no complaints." Jackson's response told the trial court that he showed the doctor his loosened teeth and was advised to tell the dentist. He attached a copy of a sick call visit that lead *920to a referral to the dental clinic. That record, however, is dated in August 2012, some seventeen months after the events at the Montford Unit. Jackson's medical evidence also includes a reference to his report of blurry vision; it also is dated in August 2012.
Jackson does not challenge the defendants' evidence of his initiation of the number of litigations required by § 11.054(1), or the outcomes of those cases. On the record we were provided, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declaring Jackson a vexatious litigant. Because there is no dispute he failed to post the security ordered by the court, we find no error in its dismissal of his claims against Honesto, Nall, and Guzman. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.056 (West 2017) ; Leonard,
Summary Judgment for Vaughn and Emsoff
We next consider Jackson's appellate issue challenging the dismissal of his bystander claims against Vaughn and Emsoff. As noted, the trial court disposed of Jackson's claims against those defendants on their traditional motions for summary judgment.
We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding,
As noted, Jackson complains Vaughn and Emsoff were deliberately indifferent to the conduct of the use-of-force team and therefore incurred Eighth Amendment excessive-force liability as bystanders. An officer present at the scene who fails to take reasonable measures to protect an inmate from another officer's use of excessive force may incur section 1983 liability. Hale v. Townley,
*921Jackson's contentions regarding the actions that are seen and heard on the recording are based largely on his own statements made during the events. His version of the events, then reflected in his affidavits, is replete with self-serving and conclusory statements.
Finding the trial court did not err in its grant of summary judgment to Vaughn and Emsoff, we overrule Jackson's second issue.
Dismissal of Unserved Defendants
By his third issue, Jackson argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to have defendants Mayne, Alejandro Martinez, and Villegas served with process. In December 2015, Jackson filed his "fifth amended complaint" naming Martinez, Joel Ortega, and Villegas as additional defendants. Mayne was named a defendant in an earlier petition but we assume Jackson means he never obtained service. At any rate, the record does not indicate Jackson requested or obtained service on Martinez, Ortega, and Villegas. Vaughn and Emsoff specially excepted to Jackson's fifth amended complaint arguing Jackson's claims against the three additional defendants were barred by limitations and Jackson, having previously known the identities of the three additional defendants, filed his amended pleading in bad faith. The record contains no express ruling by the trial court on the special exception but in its final judgment the *922court stated Jackson knew "the names of the remaining unserved defendants since 2012 and ... made little or no effort to effectuate service on those defendants."
In his brief argument of this issue, Jackson does not demonstrate how the trial court might have erred. Jackson does not cite authority compelling a trial court to require service of all defendants named in a lawsuit before rendering a final judgment. As to precisely what Jackson intends by his third issue we are left to guess. We therefore find the issue inadequately briefed, and waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (appellant's brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and the record); In re Estate of Valdez,
Conclusion
Having overruled each of Jackson's issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Before Jackson filed his notice of appeal, the 108th District Court of Potter County declared him to be a vexatious litigant and enjoined him from filing any new litigation pro se without the prior permission of the local administrative judge. See Office of Court Administration of the Texas Judicial System's list of vexatious litigants subject to a prefiling orders under Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code , available at http://www.txcourts.gov/judicial-data/vexatious-litigants/ (last viewed on Mar. 28, 2018); see also
Jackson named Mayne as a defendant in his lawsuit but she was apparently never served with process. He alleged she did not correctly record the use-of-force event.
See Jackson v. Vaughn, No. 07-13-00022-CV,
See
Italics added.
A conclusory statement is no evidence. See, e.g., Dolcefino v. Randolph,
The summary judgment record contains also the affidavit of Patricia Aristimuno, M.D., who became prison medical director in 2012. From her review of Jackson's medical records "from March 2011 to May 2011," she concluded Jackson "did not suffer any injury consistent with his allegations." Additionally, as we have noted Jackson's medical records do not record a contemporaneous complaint by Jackson of the injuries he now complains of.
Vaughn and Emsoff also asserted, as a ground for summary judgment, that they conclusively established their entitlement to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. We need not consider that ground. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S.,
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.