COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

§ EL PESCADOR CHURCH, INC., No. 08-18-00029-CV § Appellant, Appeal from § v. 384th District Court § HECTOR P. FERRERO, of El Paso County, Texas ROSA FERRERO, ANTONIO NUNEZ, § AND DIEGO SANCHEZ, (TC # 2015DCV0484) § Appellees.

§ ORDER On its own motion, the Court issues the following order requesting supplemental letter briefs from the parties.

El Pescador Church, Inc. filed suit asserting DTPA claims against Antonio Nunez, breach of fiduciary duty claims against Hector Ferrero, as well as fraud and conversion claims against all the defendants. Hector Ferrero is identified as the church’s pastor, Rosa Ferrero as his assistant, and Antonio Nunez as an individual who may have provided services to the church. The pleadings do not describe Diego Sanchez’s role. The church now appeals the trial court’s orders that granted Antonio Nunez’s Plea to the Jurisdiction (asserting lack of consumer status) and his No Evidence and Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment. It has also appealed the trial court’s order sustaining Hector Ferrero, Rosa Ferrero, and Diego Sanchez’s No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.

None of the parties raised below or in their principle briefs the question of ecclesiastical abstention. See e.g. Masterson v. Diocese of N.W. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Tex. 2013); C.L.

Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 405 (Tex. 2007). If applicable, however, ecclesiastical abstention raises subject matter jurisdictional concerns that this Court would be obliged to address sua sponte. See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 103 (Tex. 2012) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by agreement, can be raised at any time, and must be considered by a court sua sponte.”). The parties are therefore ordered to address the following question: To what extent, if any, does the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine affect each of the specific claims that El Pescador Church, Inc. has raised below. Appellees are ordered to address the issue first by filing a letter brief within twenty days of this order. Appellant is then ordered to respond with a letter brief twenty days after the last Appellee has filed their letter brief.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 26TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2019.

PER CURIAM Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez and Palafox, JJ.