Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2020

Gordon Ray Dunn v. State

Gordon Ray Dunn v. State
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided January 30, 2020

Gordon Ray Dunn v. State

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-19-00334-CR ___________________________ GORDON RAY DUNN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1555835D

Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Birdwell, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Gordon Ray Dunn attempts to appeal his conviction for felony driving while intoxicated. Because Dunn pleaded guilty under a plea-bargain agreement, which the trial court followed, and because the trial court certified Dunn had no right to appeal, we dismiss.

Under a plea-bargain agreement with the State, Dunn pleaded guilty to felony driving while intoxicated, true to a deadly-weapon allegation, and true to a habitual- offender enhancement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(d), 49.04(a), 49.09. The trial court found Dunn guilty of the offense and found the deadly-weapon and habitual-offender allegations true. Following the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Dunn to twenty-five years’ confinement. Dunn filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court certified that he had pleaded guilty under a plea-bargain agreement with no right to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). We notified Dunn of the certification and warned that we would dismiss the appeal unless we received a response showing grounds to continue it. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. We received no response.

The right to appeal a conviction arising from a plea-bargain agreement is limited to matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled upon before trial or to cases in which the appellant has obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court’s certification in this case does not show that Dunn was granted permission to appeal, nor does the record indicate that Dunn intends to challenge a ruling on a written motion filed and ruled on before he pleaded guilty. Thus, we dismiss Dunn’s appeal in accordance with the trial court’s certification. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f).

/s/ Lee Gabriel Lee Gabriel Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: January 30, 2020

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