David Villegas Jr. v. State
David Villegas Jr. v. State
Opinion
NUMBER 13-19-00496-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
DAVID VILLEGAS JR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 25th District Court of Guadalupe County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Hinojosa, Perkes, and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes A jury convicted appellant David Villegas Jr. of assault involving family violence with a previous conviction, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2). The jury sentenced Villegas to nine years’ imprisonment. See id. § 12.34(a). Villegas’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
We affirm. 1 I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, Villegas’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support thereof in which she states that she has diligently reviewed the entire record and has found no non-frivolous grounds for appeal.
See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Villegas’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court in writing that counsel has: (1) notified Villegas that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Villegas with copies of both pleadings, as well as a copy of the appellate record;
and (3) informed Villegas of his rights to file a pro se response 2 and seek discretionary review if the court of appeals concludes that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.
An adequate time has passed, and Villegas has not filed a pro se response.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, Villegas’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.” (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–
80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (citations omitted))). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Villegas and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GREGORY T. PERKES Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 20th day of August, 2020.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.