Saul Marquez Garza v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-20-00321-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

SAUL MARQUEZ GARZA, Appellant, v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 24th District Court of Calhoun County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

Appellant Saul Marquez Garza appeals a judgment revoking his probation for assault on a public servant, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1). The trial court sentenced Garza to ten years’ imprisonment. See id. § 12.34. Garza’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, Garza’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Garza’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Garza’s counsel also informed this Court in writing that he (1) notified Garza that counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Garza with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed Garza of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing a response, and to seek discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals if this Court finds that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Garza with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record with instructions to sign and file the motion with the court of appeals within ten days by mailing it to the address provided. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. Garza has been provided access to the appellate record. However, an adequate time has passed, and Garza has not filed a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the entire record, and we have found nothing that would support a finding of reversible error. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, Garza’s counsel asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Garza and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

GINA M. BENAVIDES Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the

24th day of June, 2021.