Mellissa Marie Benavides v. the State of Texas
Mellissa Marie Benavides v. the State of Texas
Opinion
NUMBER 13-21-00032-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
MELLISSA MARIE BENAVIDES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria Appellant Mellissa Marie Benavides 1 appeals from a judgment revoking her community supervision and adjudicating her guilty of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group one in an amount greater than or equal to four grams but less
I. ANDERS BRIEF In his brief, appellant’s counsel states that he has diligently reviewed the entire record and has found no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court in writing that he has sent appellant a letter in compliance with Kelly, specifically stating that he: (1) notified appellant that he has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant of her right to file a pro se
response, 2 review the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek discretionary review if the court of appeals concludes that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record, lacking only appellant’s signature and the date and including the mailing address for the court of appeals, with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. An adequate amount of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also
In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.” (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779– (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (citations omitted))). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise her of her right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the 12th day of August, 2021.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.