NUMBER 13-21-00143-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.G. AND R.J.S. JR., CHILDREN

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Calhoun County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justices Contreras and Justices Benavides and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva Appellant K.G. appeals the trial court’s judgment involuntarily terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, A.G.G. and R.J.S. Jr. 1 We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF K.G.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that she has diligently reviewed the entire record and has concluded that the appeal “presents no

Counsel has informed this Court in writing that she has: (1) notified K.G. that she has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided K.G. with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed K.G. of her rights to file a pro se response, 2 to review the record preparatory to filing that response, and to seek review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) supplied K.G. with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). More than an adequate time has passed, and K.G. has filed neither a motion for pro se access to the record nor a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and we have found no reversible error. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). We have specifically reviewed the trial court’s findings under parts (D) and (E) of the family code § 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (holding that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code”).

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW K.G.’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant.”). However, when an Anders brief is filed in a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed counsel extends to “all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition

for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, a motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id. Counsel is permitted to withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not constitute good cause. Id. Here, counsel’s motion does not show “good cause” for withdrawal other than the fact that she has filed an Anders brief. Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied. See id. 3 IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA Justice Delivered and filed on the 26th day of August, 2021.