In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-23-00163-CR ___________________________ DONNIE EARL PHILLIPS, JR., Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 371st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1735446

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Donnie Earl Phillips, Jr., proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal his felony conviction for driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04(a), .09(b)(2). Pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant pled guilty to that offense in exchange for the State’s offering eight years’ confinement and waiving a deadly-weapon finding and a habitual-offender allegation.1 The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with that agreement. Under the written plea admonishments that were signed by Appellant, he waived his right to appeal. Specifically, through those written plea admonishments, Appellant stated, “I give up and waive any and all rights of appeal in this case.” He also stated, “I give up and waive all pretrial motions that may have been filed in my case.” Consistent with Appellant’s plea-bargain agreement, the trial court’s certification of Appellant’s right of appeal reflects that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

After receiving a copy of Appellant’s notice of appeal, we notified Appellant that we had received the trial court’s certification stating that this is a plea-bargain case and that he had waived the right of appeal. We warned him that this appeal could be

The State proceeded on a repeat-offender allegation instead of the habitual- offender allegation, so Appellant faced a punishment range of two to twenty years’ confinement instead of twenty-five to ninety-nine years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33(a), .42(a), (d); Johns v State, No. 02-14-00233-CR, 2015 WL 1868822, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). This agreed reduction in the range of punishment qualified as a plea bargain. See Johns, 2015 WL 1868822, at *1 n.3 (citing Carender v. State, 155 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)). dismissed unless he or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. We have received no response.2 In accordance with the trial court’s certification, we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f); Hubatch v. State, No. 02-22-00153-CR, 2022 WL 4105417, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Johns, 2015 WL 1868822, at *1.

Per Curiam Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: September 28, 2023

On August 16, 2023, we received a document from Appellant titled, “Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,” which purports to challenge certain pretrial rulings and reiterates Appellant’s appeal of his conviction. It appears to be a copy of a document that Appellant had previously filed on July 11, 2023. To the extent that Appellant intended this to be a response to our notice, it does not show grounds for continuing the appeal.