In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-24-00204-CR

JOE PEREZ MARTINEZ, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the Hall District Court 100th County, Texas Trial Court No. 3905, Honorable Dale Rabe, Jr., Presiding September 18, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Pending before this Court is a motion to withdraw supported by a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California.1 Pursuant to a plea of guilty, Appellant, Joe Perez Martinez, was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for five years for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, enhanced by a prior felony.2 Less than two

In support of her motion to withdraw, counsel certifies she has conducted a conscientious examination of the record, and in her opinion, it reflects no potentially plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling authorities, the record supports that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated she has complied with the requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to Appellant, (2) notifying him of the right to file a pro se response if he desired to do so, and (3) informing him of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.4 By letter, this Court granted Appellant an opportunity to

ANALYSIS

Appellant’s pleas of true alone support the trial court’s order. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The original charge against Appellant, a second degree felony, was enhanced to punishment for a first degree felony. The forty-year sentence is within the statutory range. Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d).

When we have an Anders brief by counsel and a pro se response by an appellant, we have two choices. We may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that we have reviewed the record and find no reversible error; Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744), or we may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief issues. Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27 (citing Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

We too have independently examined the record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues which might support this appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;

ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33.

Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511. We have found no such issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After reviewing the record, counsel’s brief, and Appellant’s pro se response, we agree there is no plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

Alex Yarbrough Justice Do not publish.