Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2025

Keiara Bovell v. Pathways Asset Management, Inc.

Keiara Bovell v. Pathways Asset Management, Inc.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided January 30, 2025

Keiara Bovell v. Pathways Asset Management, Inc.

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00779-CV

Keiara Bovell, Appellant v. Pathways Asset Management, Inc., Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. C-1-CV-24-005140, THE HONORABLE ERIC SHEPPERD, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Keiara Bovell filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s November 13, 2024 “decision.” The “decision” that appellant seeks to appeal is the “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Keiara Bovell” that the trial court signed on November 13, 2024. Upon initial review, the Clerk of this Court sent the parties a letter informing them that this Court appears to lack jurisdiction over the appeal because the order that Bovell seeks to appeal does not appear to be a final and appealable judgment, and our jurisdiction is limited to appeals in which there exists a final or appealable judgment or order.

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.012; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that appeal generally may only be taken from final judgment that disposes of all pending parties and claims in record unless statute provides for interlocutory appeal).

The Clerk requested a response on or before January 16, 2025, informing this Court of any basis that exists for jurisdiction. To date, no response has been filed.

In this case, the trial court’s November 13, 2024 “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Keiara Bovell” grants appellee Pathways Asset Management, Inc.’s motion for default judgment against Bovell, but the order expressly states that it is not disposing of appellee’s damages claims for rent owed and reasonable attorneys’ fees. An order granting default judgment that does not resolve all claims of all parties is not an appealable interlocutory order. See Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998) (“Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction.”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (allowing interlocutory appeal from certain orders).

There are a few ways for a trial court’s order to become a final judgment without a trial. See Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. 2024). A trial court’s order is final if it (1) actually disposes of all remaining parties and claims then before the court (regardless of whether it includes unequivocal finality language), or (2) includes unequivocal finality language that expressly disposes of all claims and parties. Id. (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (concluding default judgment that did not purport to dispose of all parties and all claims, did not actually dispose of punitive-damages claim, and lacked unequivocal finality language was not final and appealable judgment); McNally v. Guevara, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“Because the judgment does not appear final on its face, and because it did not dispose of the defendants’ claim for attorney fees, it was not an appealable judgment.”).

In addition, “[a]s a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final.” Sealy Emergency Room, 685 S.W.3d at 820 (quoting Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2001)). None of those circumstances are present here, and accordingly, the default judgment is not yet final and appealable. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s interlocutory orders merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing that judgment.”).

For the reasons explained above, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

__________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: January 30, 2025

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.