Texas Court of Appeals, 15th District, 2025

In re Synergy Global Outsourcing, LLC v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 15th District · Decided February 3, 2025

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00002-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 2/3/2025 3:38 PM No. 15-25-00002-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS In the Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS for the Fifteenth District of Texas 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk In re Synergy Global Outsourcing, LLC, Relator.

Original proceeding arising from the First Business Court Division, Dallas County No. 24-BC01B-0007 Hon. Bill Whitehill, Presiding

Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus

David S. Coale Lynn Pinker Hurst & State Bar No. 00787255 Schwegmann, LLP [email protected] 2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2700 Michael K. Hurst Dallas, Texas 75201-7919 State Bar No. 10316310 Telephone: (214) 981-3800 [email protected] Facsimile: (214) 981-3839 Gregory A. Brassﬁeld Attorneys for Relator State Bar No. 240799900 gbrassﬁ[email protected] Daniela Vera Holmes State Bar No. 24124113 [email protected] Leo Park State Bar No. 24122983 [email protected] Table of Contents Table of Contents ......................................................................................... 2 Introduction ................................................................................................. 3 Reply Argument ........................................................................................... 3 1. The text does not prevent jurisdiction and Relator’s case eﬀectuates the legislature’s intent .................................... 3 2. Rules of statutory construction prevent Defendants’ interpretation ........................................................................... 4 3. The procedural nature of H.B. 19 § 8, read consistently with other statutes, permits inclusion of this case in the business court .......................................................................... 5 4. Defendants’ citation to administrative material and commentary do not illuminate the Legislature’s intent. .......... 6 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 7 Certiﬁcate of Service.................................................................................... 9 Certiﬁcate of Compliance ............................................................................ 9

Introduction The business court abused its discretion by misconstruing H.B. 19 § and remanding this case to the 191st District Court, which permanently deprived Relator of its right to litigate in the forum best suited to adjudicate these claims. Accordingly, mandamus relief is appropriate and in similar situations, the Texas Supreme Court has held as much by issuing writs of mandamus. This Court should issue the writ compelling the business court to adjudicate Relator’s case.

Reply Argument In reply to the arguments of the real parties in interest, Relator makes the following four points.

1. The text does not prevent jurisdiction and Relator’s case eﬀectuates the legislature’s intent Nothing in H.B. 19 Section 8 excludes this case from the business court’s jurisdiction. 1 Indeed the plain reading of the text is silent as to cases commenced before September 1, 2024. The Court should not interpret this silence as a prohibition of jurisdiction.

“The primary objective in construing any statute is to determine and give eﬀect to the Legislature’s intent.” Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. 2004). Interpreting H.B. 19 to permit removal of cases ﬁled before

Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 380, § 8 (“The changes in law made by this Act apply to civil actions commenced on or after September 1, 2024.”).

September 1, 2024—such as this one—is consistent with its text, 2 and the act’s express purposes of relieving back logged district court dockets and funneling complex business disputes to be resolved by the business court. 3 Relator’s case—a business case with internal governance disputes, the complexity of which has languished in the district court for over 5 years—is exactly the kind of case the Legislature intended the business court to resolve.

2. Rules of statutory construction prevent Defendants’ interpretation Defendants insist that Section 8 prohibits the business court from exercising jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Legislature. 4 However its reading of Section 8 is contrary to the Texas Supreme Court’s instruction that “[a] court may not judicially amend a statute by adding words that are not contained in the language of the statute.” 5 Defendants’ 6 position implies the addition of “only” to Section 8, where the Legislature did not include it. D civil actions commenced before September 1, 2024.

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25A.006(d) (“A party to an action ﬁled in a district court or county court at law that is within the jurisdiction of the business court may remove the action to the business court.”) (emphasis added).

See House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 19, 88th Leg., R.S. (2023) (discussing the need to “streamline resolutions of business disputes” and relieve backlogged district court dockets).

See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25A.004(c) (conferring business court jurisdiction).

Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 543 (Tex. 2021).

Resp. 13 (“Synergy renders Section 8 meaningless.”).

3. The procedural nature of H.B. 19 § 8, read consistently with other statutes, permits inclusion of this case in the business court The Court should reject Defendants’ interpretation because it turns decades of legislative acts on their head. The Legislature consistently and deliberately uses the word “only”, when it intends an act to be eﬀective only prospectively. 7 Tellingly, the Legislature did not do so here.

Defendants’ and the business court’s theory is contrary to the Court’s instruction that “every word excluded from a statute must . . . be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose”. 8 And, if accepted, would render portions of many other legislative acts superﬂuous. 9 Further, the Court should not hold that the absence of the word “only” is meaningless, because it is contrary to the canon that presumes the entirety of a statute is intended to have eﬀect. 10 Furthermore, there is no dispute that Chapter 25A’s rule regarding removal that Relator invokes is procedural. And the “well settled” 11 and See Pet. 16-18 (citing acts from 1999 to 2021 applying changes in law “only” to conduct occurring on or after the act’s eﬀective date); see also, Act of May 17, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 763, § 2 (codiﬁed at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 52.007) (“The change in law made by this Act applies only to a civil action commenced on or after the eﬀective date of this Act. A civil action commenced before the eﬀective date of this Act is governed by the law in eﬀect immediately before the eﬀective date of this Act, and that law is continued in eﬀect for that purpose.” (emphasis added)); Act of May 12, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 148, § 6, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 683, 684 (using “only” three times to reﬂect only prospective application of the “changes in law”).

Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).

See infra n. 13.

See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021(2).

Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. Work, 62 S.W.2d 490, 490 (Tex. 1933) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). “general rule is that a new remedial or procedural statute applies to both pending and future actions.” 12 Of course the Legislature knew this and selected its words deliberately. This shows that this procedural law does not apply only “to civil actions commenced on or after September 1, 2024” 13 and therefore can apply to this case commenced before that date.

4. Defendants’ citation to administrative material and commentary do not illuminate the Legislature’s intent.

Defendants cite a non-binding memo from the Texas Oﬃce of Court Administration and third-party attorney commentary. 14 But secondary materials should not be consulted for statutory interpretation, particularly when, as here, there is no ambiguity to resolve. 15 In any event, none of these secondary materials illuminate the Legislature’s intent. “Our objective in construing a statute is to give eﬀect to the Legislature’s intent, which requires us to ﬁrst look to the statute’s plain language.” 16

Att’y Gen. of Tex. v. Redding, 60 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); see Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)) (“Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has held that a new statute conferring or ousting jurisdiction applies to existing suits.”).

Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 380, § 8.

See Resp. 15-18.

See Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018) (“When a statute is not ambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate to use extrinsic aids to construe the unambiguous statutory language.”); see also Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 473 ( J. Willett, concurring) (“Even in rare cases where we mine secondary sources to help clarify ambiguity, judges, while not limited to the text, should always be limited by the text.” (emphasis in original)).

Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015).

Conclusion For the reasons stated in Relator’s Petition and this Reply, Relator asks this court to ﬁnd that the business court abused its discretion by declining to exercise its jurisdiction and remanding this case to the Dallas County District Court; and issue a writ of mandamus directing the business court to vacate its remand order; and grant all other relief to which Relator may be justly entitled that is consistent with the above dispositions.

Respectfully submitted, /s/ David S. Coale David S. Coale State Bar No. 00787255 [email protected] Michael K. Hurst State Bar No. 10316310 [email protected] Gregory A. Brassﬁeld State Bar No. 240799900 gbrassﬁ[email protected] Daniela Vera Holmes State Bar No. 24124113 [email protected] Leo Park State Bar No. 24122983 [email protected] Lynn Pinker Hurst & Schwegmann, LLP 2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2700 Dallas, Texas 75201 (214) 981-3800 Telephone (214) 981-3839 Facsimile Attorneys for Relator

Certiﬁcate of Service The undersigned hereby certiﬁes that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on all counsel of record via eFile Texas on February 3, 2025.

/s/ David S. Coale David S. Coale Certiﬁcate of Compliance

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), this brief complies with Rule 9.4 because the total number of all words in this document is 1,452. /s/ David S. Coale David S. Coale

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

David Coale on behalf of David Coale Bar No. 787255 [email protected] Envelope ID: 96922223 Filing Code Description: Other Document Filing Description: Reply in Support of Petition for Mandamus Status as of 2/3/2025 3:59 PM CST Associated Case Party: Synergy Global Outsourcing, LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ronni Bracken [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT David S.Coale [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Michael K.Hurst [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Kay Ridenour [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Beverly Congdon [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Tonia Ashworth [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Greg Brassfield [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Leo Park [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Gina Flores [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Daniela Vera Holmes [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Maria Gonzalez [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT

Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Barry Barnett 1778700 [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Ophelia Camina 3681500 [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Bill Whitehill [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT Ravi Bhalla [email protected] 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Hinduja Global Solutions, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.