Hunter Gladney v. the State of Texas

NUMBERS 13-24-00535-CR, 13-24-00536-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

HUNTER GLADNEY, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 148TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva On May 22, 2017, appellant Hunter Gladney pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in trial court cause number 16FC-0294E. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 29.03. On the same day, appellant pleaded guilty to robbery, a second-degree felony, in trial court cause number 17FC-0838E. 2 See id. § 29.02. In both causes, the trial court placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a term of eight years each, and later extended the duration of appellant’s community supervision by two years. On September 9, 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision and to adjudicate his guilt in 16FC-0294E, alleging that appellant violated twelve conditions of his community supervision. On the same day, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision and to adjudicate his guilt in 17FC- 0838E, alleging that appellant violated eighteen conditions of his community supervision.

Appellant pleaded true to each and every violation alleged in the State’s motion to revoke in both causes. As to each cause, the trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and imposed six years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s orders revoking his community supervision and adjudicating him guilty in both causes. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response, and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09. In both cases, appellant neither filed a timely motion seeking pro se access to the appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so.

Appellant did not file a pro se response in either case.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.

IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 24th day of April, 2025.