In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00229-CV ___________________________ IN THE MATTER OF J.W.

On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323-118298-22

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant J.W. appeals from an order transferring him to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to complete the remainder of his determinate sentence. We affirm.

In May 2022, according to an agreement with the State, J.W. judicially confessed to committing aggravated robbery; the trial court found him delinquent and sentenced him to the agreed twenty-two-year determinate sentence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.045(a)(7) (providing that aggravated-robbery offense is eligible for determinate sentencing).

In February 2024, the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) requested by letter that the trial court transfer J.W. to TDCJ because his conduct while in TJJD custody indicated that “the welfare of the community require[d the] transfer.” See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 244.014(a); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11. After an April 17, 2024 hearing, the trial court ordered J.W. transferred to TDCJ to serve the remainder of his sentence.

J.W.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in which he asserts that after reviewing the record, he “does not believe that there are legally non-frivolous issues constituting reversible error.” Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (applying Anders procedure to juvenile proceedings).1 Counsel provided a copy of the brief and accompanying motion to withdraw to J.W., informed J.W. of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response to the Anders brief, provided J.W. with a form pro se motion to access the record, and informed J.W. of his right to file a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court should we affirm the trial court’s judgment. J.W. did not file a motion seeking access to the record or a pro se response. The State declined to file a brief but indicated in a letter that it agreed with J.W.’s counsel that J.W. “has no meritorious grounds upon which to advance an appeal in this case.”

Because J.W.’s counsel filed an Anders brief, we must independently examine the record to decide whether counsel correctly concluded that the appeal is frivolous.

See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). After carefully reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we find nothing in the record, but for the modifiable court costs discussed below, that might arguably support the appeal. Thus, we agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

In the Anders brief, counsel noted that he had not filed a motion to withdraw but would instead move to withdraw “as appellate counsel before the Supreme Court of Texas.” However, this statement appears to have been merely inadvertently included in the brief because counsel did file a separate motion to withdraw––with this court’s cause number and caption on the front page.

Regarding the court costs assessed, (1) the clerk’s record contains a bill of costs for $176, and (2) the supplemental clerk’s record contains a bill of costs for $23; these costs are for district clerk’s fees, preparation of the clerk’s records for appeal, and for certification-and-seal fees. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(a); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.17(a). But J.W.’s mother had filed an uncontested affidavit of indigence in the trial court, and the trial court found that J.W. could not afford an attorney and appointed him counsel. Nothing in the record shows that J.W. has ceased to be indigent. “For a party who files an affidavit of inability to pay costs, there are no costs to bill.” Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. 2016) (explaining that under Rule 145, the affidavit is in lieu of paying or giving security for costs and that an uncontested affidavit of inability to pay is conclusive as a matter of law). Accordingly, we delete a total of $199––all of the district cler’s, clerk’s-record, and certification- and-seal fees assessed by the trial-court clerk in this appeal—from the two bills of costs. See In re C.J., No. 02-24-00070-CV, 2024 WL 3978048, at *1–2 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. If J.W. wishes to seek further review of this case, he must either file a pro se petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court or retain an attorney to file a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. See In re D.J., No. 02-20-00386-CV, 2021 WL 2586610, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 53.2 (listing required contents of petition for review), 53.7(a) (providing that petition for review must be filed 45 days after the date of this court’s judgment or—if a timely motion for rehearing or a timely motion for en banc reconsideration is filed in this court—within 45 days of this court’s last ruling on such motions).

/s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice Delivered: May 8, 2025