Texas Court of Appeals, 15th District, 2025

In re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas

In re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas
Texas Court of Appeals, 15th District · Decided June 23, 2025
In re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00109-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/23/2025 5:08 PM NO. __-__-______-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/23/2025 5:08:40 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk IN RE STORABLE, INC.; REDNOVA LABS, INC. (D/B/A STOREDGE); SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC; EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC; BADER CO.; AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP Relators.

Relating to Trial Court Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 In the Third Division of the Texas Business Court SWORN MANDAMUS RECORD

Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 [email protected] Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 [email protected] GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP West 6th Street Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 T: (512) 320-7200 F: (512) 320-7210 COUNSEL FOR RELATORS INDEX TO SWORN MANDAMUS RECORD Exhibit Description Date Pages 1 Docket Sheet N/A 008-046 Plaintiff’s Verified Second Amended 01/28/2025 Petition and Application for A Temporary 2 047-083 Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Reporter’s Record Volume 4 of 7 Volumes 02/13/2025 3 from Appeal No. 15-25-00020-CV 084-092 (excerpt) Reporter’s Record Volume 5 of 7 Volumes 02/14/2025 4 from Appeal No. 15-25-00020-CV 093-102 (excerpt) 5 Notice of Appeal 02/25/2025 103-107 Agreed Protective Order and Temporary 02/27/2025 6 108-119 Sealing Order Storable’s Motion to Modify Protective 04/04/2025 7 Order/ Require Disclosure and Request for 120-135 Expedited Consideration Exhibits A-J of Storable’s Motion to Modify 04/04/2025 8 Protective Order/ Require Disclosure and 136-181 Request for Expedited Consideration Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Modify 04/11/2025 9 182-224 Protective Order and Require Disclosure Order Denying Motion to Modify 04/15/2025 10 225-227 Protective Order Defendants’ Objections and Responses to 04/21/2025 11 Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services, 228-245 LLC’s First Merits Request for Production

-2- Defendants’ Amended Answer, Affirmative 05/05/2025 Defenses, Response in Opposition to 12 246-276 Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Injunction, and Counterclaims Lockelaw PLLC’s Letter to the Court 05/16/2025 277-280 Supplement to Plaintiff’s Verified Second 05/22/2025 Amended Petition and Application for a 14 281-284 Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Arnold & Porter’s Response Letter to 05/23/2025 15 285-289 Lockelaw PLLC’s Letter to the Court Discovery Order [referred to as the 05/28/2025 Production Order in the petition for writ of 290-295 mandamus] Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary 06/02/2025 Judgment on SafeLease’s Attempted 296-326 Monopolization Claim Declaration of Katherine Ginzburg 06/02/2025 Treistman in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 327-694 SafeLease’s Attempted Monopolization Claim Storable’s Emergency Motion for a Partial 06/06/2025 Stay of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered 695-704 Production Deadline Storable’s Motion for Reconsideration of 06/06/2025 the Court’s April 15, 2025 Order Denying 705-793 Modification of the Protective Order Storable’s Motion for Partial 06/09/2025 Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 21 794-862 Discovery Order (including declaration and exhibit to declaration)

-3- Notices of Written Submission and 06/10/2025 22 863-864 Briefing Schedules Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ 06/12/2025 Motion for Partial Stay of Production 865-960 Deadline Storable’s Reply in Support of Emergency 06/12/2025 Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, 961-966 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline Order Partially Granting Emergency Stay 06/12/2025 25 967-968 and Additional Relief Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for 06/16/2025 Reconsideration of Order Denying 969-985 Modification of Protective Order Storable’s Motion for Extension of Stay and 06/17/2025 27 986-996 Reply Deadline Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Partial 06/19/2025 Reconsideration of May 28, 2025 997-1042 Discovery Order Notice of Submission 06/20/2025 1043-1045 Storable’s Reply in Support of its Motion 06/23/2025 for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 1046-1070 2025 Discovery Order Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for 06/23/2025 31 1071-1075 Extension of Stay Orders on Motions for Reconsideration; 06/23/2025 32 1076-1079 Other Relief

-4- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served on counsel of record by using the Court’s CM/ECF system on the 23rd day of June 2025, addressed as follows:

STONE HILTON PLLC Judd E. Stone II State Bar No. 2407670 [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton State Bar No. 24087727 Congress Ave., Austin, Texas 78701 T: (737) 465-7248 YETTER COLEMAN LLP R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] Shannon N. Smith State Bar No. 24110378 [email protected] Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 T: (713) 632-8000 COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY

-5- I also certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served by email on Respondent on the 23rd day of June 2025, addressed as follows:

Honorable Melissa Andrews Third Division of the Texas Business Court Herman Marion Sweatt Courthouse Courtroom 421 1000 Guadalupe St. Austin, Texas 78701 [email protected]

/s/ Dale Wainwright Dale Wainwright

-6- re:SearchTX - SafeLease Insurance Services LLC vs. Storable, Inc.,RedNova Labs, Inc.,SiteLink So... https://research.txcourts.gov/CourtRecordsSearch/#!/casePrintView/7c3dd6b992cc448397adba060c...

https://research.txcourts.gov/CourtRecordsSearch/ViewCasePrint/7c3dd6b992cc448397adba060cc864e6 008 Case Information SafeLease Insurance Services LLC vs. Storable, Inc.,RedNova Labs, Inc.,SiteLink Software, LLC,Easy Storage Solutions, LLC,Bader Co.,Property First Group, LP 25-BC03A-0001 Location Business Court 3a Case Category Civil - Other Civil Case Type Tortious Interference Case Filed Date 1/29/2025 Judge Andrews, Melissa Davis Case Status Open (Active)

Parties □7 Type Name Nickname/Alias Attorneys Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC Adam Locke, Alexander Dvorscak, Christopher Hilton, Julia Risley, Luke Schamel, Mr Judd Stone, II, Mr R. Paul Yetter, Shannon Smith, Susanna Allen Appellant Storable, Inc. Andrew Bergman, John Holler, Justice Dale Wainwright, Lakshmi Kumar, Mikaila Skaroff, Mr Neil Kenton Alexander, JR, Ms Elizabeth Eoff, Ms Jonna Summers, Ms Katherine G.

Treistman, Ray Torgerson Appellant RedNova Labs, Inc. Andrew Bergman, John Holler, Justice Dale Wainwright, Lakshmi Kumar, Mikaila Skaroff, Mr Neil Kenton Alexander, JR, Ms Elizabeth Eoff, Ms Jonna Summers, Ms Katherine G.

Treistman, Ray Torgerson Appellant SiteLink Software, LLC Andrew Bergman, John Holler, Justice Dale Wainwright, Lakshmi Kumar, Mikaila Skaroff, Mr Neil Kenton Alexander, JR, Ms Elizabeth Eoff, Ms Jonna Summers, Ms Katherine G.

Treistman, Ray Torgerson Appellant Easy Storage Solutions, LLC Andrew Bergman, John Holler, Justice Dale Wainwright, Lakshmi Kumar, Mikaila Skaroff, Mr Neil Kenton Alexander, JR, Ms Elizabeth Eoff, Ms Jonna Summers, Ms Katherine G.

Treistman, Ray Torgerson Appellant Bader Co. Andrew Bergman, John Holler, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justin Bernstein, Lakshmi Kumar, Mikaila Skaroff, Mr Neil Kenton Alexander, JR, Ms Elizabeth Eoff, Ms Jonna Summers, Ms Katherine G. Treistman, Ray Torgerson Appellant Property First Group, LP Andrew Bergman, John Holler, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justin Bernstein, Lakshmi Kumar, Mikaila Skaroff, Mr Neil Kenton Alexander, JR, Ms Elizabeth Eoff, Ms Jonna Summers, Ms Katherine G. Treistman, Ray Torgerson

Hearings □

Date/Time Hearing Type Judge Location Result 2/11/2025 09:00 AM Temporary Injunction Hearing Andrews, Melissa Davis Heman Marion Sweatt Held Courthouse - Hearing Room

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Date/Time Hearing Type Judge Location Result 009 2/13/2025 09:00 AM Temporary Injunction Hearing Andrews, Melissa Davis Heman Marion Sweatt Held Courthouse - Hearing Room 2/14/2025 09:00 AM Temporary Injunction Hearing Andrews, Melissa Davis Heman Marion Sweatt Held Courthouse - Hearing Room 2/18/2025 02:00 PM Temporary Injunction Hearing Andrews, Melissa Davis Virtual/Video Hearing Held 3/13/2025 09:00 AM Scheduling Conference Andrews, Melissa Davis Virtual/Video Hearing Held 4/10/2025 10:00 AM Other Hearing Andrews, Melissa Davis Virtual/Video Hearing 6/2/2025 10:00 AM Other Hearing Andrews, Melissa Davis Virtual/Video Hearing Held 7/1/2025 09:00 AM Motion for Summary Andrews, Melissa Davis Heman Marion Sweatt Judgment Courthouse - Hearing Room 6/12/2026 09:00 AM Pre-Trial Conference Andrews, Melissa Davis 6/23/2026 09:00 AM Pre-Trial Hearing Andrews, Melissa Davis 6/30/2026 09:00 AM Bench Trial Andrews, Melissa Davis Heman Marion Sweatt Courthouse - Hearing Room

Events D

Date Event Type Comments Documents 1/29/2025 Filing Case Information Sheet Business Court Case Information Sheet.pdf 1/29/2025 Filing Transfer (County Use Exhibit A - Appendix & Exhibit A - Appendix & Travis County Records.pdf Only) Travis County Records 1/29/2025 Filing Notice of Removal to Notice of Removal To Notice of Removal To Business Court.pdf Business Court Business Court 1/29/2025 Filing New Cases Filed (OCA) No Documents © 1/30/2025 Filing Application Plaintiff's Emergency Plaintiff's Emergency Application For Temporary Restraining Application For Order, Temporary Injunction, and In The.pdf Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and In The Alternative, Motion For Recondsideration 1/30/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Temporary Proposed Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Restraining Order and Hearing For Temporary Injunction.pdf Order Setting Hearing For Temporary Injunction 1/30/2025 Filing Appearance of Counsel Notice of Appearance.pdf 1/30/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing - TRO Notice of Hearing - TRO.pdf 1/30/2025 Filing Objection Defendants' Objection to Defs' Obj to Removal and Request for Hearing.pdf, Ex. A - Removal and Request for Email Ruling.pdf Hearing 1/30/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Temporary Proposed Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Restraining Order and Hearing for Temporary Injunction.pdf Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Injunction 1/31/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Order Denying Proposed Order Denying Application for Emg TRO.pdf, Plaintiff's Emergency Transmittal Letter to Business Court and Proposed Order Application for Temporary Attached.pdf Restraining Order 1/31/2025 Filing Objection Defendants' Objections to Defendants' Objections to January 30 Proposed Order.pdf Plaintiff's January 30 Proposed Order 1/31/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing.pdf 1/31/2025 Filing Order Order Denying Order Denying Application for Temporary Restraining Application for Temporary Order.pdf Restraining Order

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 010 1/31/2025 Filing Motions - All Other Defendants' Motion to Motion to Remand.pdf, Proposed Order Granting Motion To Remand Remand.pdf 1/31/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing on Notice of Hearing on Motion to Remand.pdf Motion to Remand 2/3/2025 Filing Letter from Attorney Court Welcome Letter Welcome Letter.pdf 2/3/2025 Filing Certificate of Court Appointment of Deputy Appointment of Deputy Court Reporter and Statement.pdf Reporter Official Court Reporter and Statement 2/4/2025 Filing Motions - All Other Plaintiff's Emergency Plaintiff's Emergency Motion For Expedited Discovery & Entry Motion for Expedited of Discovery Control Plan.pdf Discovery and Entry of Discovery Control Plan 2/4/2025 Filing Order Order Setting Briefing Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Hearing on Motion to Schedule and Hearing Remand.pdf 2/4/2025 Filing Notice of Court Notice of Court Order.pdf Proceeding 2/4/2025 Filing Order Expedited Discovery Expedited Discovery Order.pdf Order 2/7/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Order Denying Proposed Order Denying Motion to Remand.pdf Motion to Remand 2/7/2025 Filing Answer/Response Plaintiff's Opposition to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Remand.pdf Defendants' Motion to Remand 2/10/2025 Filing Witness List Plaintiff's Witness List Plaintiff's Witness List for TI Hearing (Incl Expert Discl) - REDACTED.pdf 2/10/2025 Filing Brief Plaintiff's Hearing Brief Plaintiff's Hearing Brief on Texas Antitrust Law.pdf On Texas Antitrust Law 2/10/2025 Filing Answer/Response Defendants' Reply Defendants' Reply Supporting Motion to Remand.pdf Supporting Motion to Remand 2/10/2025 Filing Brief Plaintiff's Hearing Brief on Plaintiff's Hearing Brief on Reconsideration.pdf Reconsideration 2/10/2025 Filing Answer/Response Plaintiff's Original Answer Plaintiff's Answer and Special Exceptions to Defendants' and Special Exceptions to Counterclaims.pdf Defendants' Counterclaims 2/10/2025 Filing Letter from Attorney Plaintiff's Discovery Letter Plaintiff's Discovery Letter.pdf 2/10/2025 Filing Opinion Order & Opinion Denying Order & Opinion Denying Defendants' Motion to Remand.pdf Motion to Remand 2/10/2025 Filing Notice of Court Notice of Court Order.pdf Proceeding 2/10/2025 Filing Letter from Attorney Response to Discovery Ex. A - 2025-02-07 Plaintiff's Response to Def..pdf, Ex. B - Letter to Court 2025-01-12 Plaintiff's Objections to D.pdf, Response to Discovery Letter.pdf 2/11/2025 Hearing Temporary Injunction - - Hearing 2/11/2025 Filing Letter from Attorney Plaintiff's Discovery Plaintiff's Discovery Response Letter.pdf Response Letter 2/13/2025 Hearing Temporary Injunction - - Hearing 2/13/2025 Filing Certificate of Court Appointment of Deputy Appointment of Court Reporter Form.pdf Reporter Official Court Reporter and Statement 2/14/2025 Hearing Temporary Injunction - - Hearing 2/14/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing - TI Closing Arguments.pdf

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 011 2/18/2025 Filing Brief Defendants' Bench Brief Defendants' Bench Brief on the Court's Authority.pdf on the Court's Authority to Compel Parties to Enter into Contract, Set Price Terms, and Permit Free- Riding 2/18/2025 Filing Brief Requested Bench Brief Requested Bench Brief.pdf 2/18/2025 Filing Brief Plaintiff's Post-Hearing Plaintiff's Post-Hearig Breif.pdf Brief on Legal Issues 2/18/2025 Filing Motions - All Other Motion to Exclude or Motion to Exclude or Disregard Opinions of Dr. Williams On Disregard Opinions of Dr. The Ground That They Are Unreliable & Con.pdf Williams on the Ground that they are Unreliable and Constitute No Evidence 2/18/2025 Filing Protective Order API Access Proposed TI Proposed TI Order.pdf Order 2/18/2025 Filing Protective Order AU Access Proposed TI Proposed TI Order.pdf Order 2/18/2025 Filing Protective Order Order Denying Plaintiff's Proposed Order Denying Plaintiff's Application.pdf Application for Temporary Injunction 2/18/2025 Hearing Temporary Injunction - - Hearing 2/19/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Order Granting Propopsed Order Granting Temporary Injunction.pdf Temporary Injunction 2/19/2025 Filing ISCOI Order Granting Order Granting Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Temporary Injunction Injunction.pdf 2/20/2025 Filing Bond Cash Bond Cash Bond Form.pdf 2/20/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Agreed 2025-02-20 Agreed Protective Order_Business Court.pdf Protective Order 2/21/2025 Service Writ - - 2/21/2025 Filing Writ of Injunction Storable, Inc. Writ of Temporary Injunction.pdf 2/21/2025 Filing Letter from Attorney Letter to Court Regarding Letter to Ct re Bond.pdf Bond 2/21/2025 Filing Motions - All Other Objections to temporary 2025-02-21 Objections to temporary injunction order and injunction order and motion to reconsider.pdf motion to reconsider 2/21/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Motion To Reconsider.pdf Defendants' Motion To Exclude and Reconsider 2/24/2025 Filing Answer/Response Plaintiff's Response to Plaintiff's Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider TI Order.pdf, Proposed Motion to Reconsider TI Order Denying Mot. to Reconsider TI Order.pdf Order with Proposed Order attached 2/25/2025 Filing Notice Defs Notice of 2025-02-25 Notice of Submission.pdf Submission 2/25/2025 Filing Notice of Appeal Defendants' Notice of 2025-02-25 Notice of Appeal.pdf Appeal 2/25/2025 Filing Request Request for Reporter's 2025-02-25 Request for Reporter's Record D. Goree.pdf Record - D. Goree 2/25/2025 Filing Request Request for Reporter's 2025-02-25 Request for Reporter's Record K. Kidd.pdf Record - K.Kidd 2/25/2025 Filing Request Defs' Request for Clerk's 2025-02-25 Request for Clerk's Record.pdf Records 2/26/2025 Filing Request Request for Reporter's 2025-02-26 Request for Reporter's Record L. Schnoor.pdf Record L. Schnoor 2/27/2025 Filing Correspondence - From 15th Court of Correspondence From 15th Court of Appeals.pdf Received Appeals

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 012 2/27/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing - Notice of Hearing - Sealing.pdf Sealing Motion 2/27/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Notice of Scheduling Notice of Scheduling Conference.pdf Conference 2/27/2025 Filing Order Agreed Protective Order Agreed Protective Order and Temporary Sealing Order.pdf & Temporary Sealing Order 2/27/2025 Filing Request Request for Reporter's Request for Reporter's Record J. Simon.pdf Record J. Simon 2/27/2025 Filing Notice of Court e Service Reciept Notice of Court Proceeding.pdf Proceeding 2/28/2025 Filing Correspondence - Sent Invoice - Cost of Invoice.pdf Preparation of Clerk's Record 2/28/2025 Filing Letter from Attorney Payment for Clerk's Clerk's Record Invoice.pdf Record $1003.00 3/3/2025 Filing Request Designation of Reporter's Designation of Reporter's Records.pdf Records 3/4/2025 Filing Correspondence - From 15th Court of Correspondence - Received.pdf Received Appeals re: Court Reporter's Extension 3/5/2025 Filing Ody - Motion - Dismiss Plaintiff's Corporate Plaintiff's Corporate Disclosure Statement.pdf Disclosure Statement 3/5/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Scheduling 2025.03.05 - Proposed Sch. Order (Final).pdf Order 3/5/2025 Filing Ody - Motion - Dismiss Defendants' Corporate Defendants' Corporate Disclosure Statement.pdf Disclosure Statement 3/6/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Amended Notice of Amended Notice of Hearing Sealing.pdf Hearing - Sealing Motion 3/6/2025 Filing Notice of Court EService Receipt Notice of Court Proceeding.pdf Proceeding 3/7/2025 Filing Appearance of Counsel Notice of Attorney Notice of Appearance by Katherine G. Treistman and Andrew Appearance by Katherine D. Bergman.pdf G. Treistman and Andrew D. Bergman for Defendants Storable, Inc., RedNova Labs, Inc. d/b/a StorEDGE, Sitelink Software, LLC, Easy Storage Solutions, LLC, Bader Co., and Property First Group, LP 3/7/2025 Filing Order Amended Temporary Amended Temporary Sealing Order.pdf Sealing Order 3/7/2025 Filing Answer/Response Supplement to Plaintiff's 2025-03-07 25-BC03A-0001 Plaintiff's Supp. Resp. to Mtn to Response to Objections Reconsider TI Order.pdf, Exhibit A - 2025.02.27 - Storable to Injunction and Motion Defends Platform Integrity.pdf to Reconsider 3/10/2025 Filing Correspondence - From 15th Court of Letter From 15th Court of Appeals re: Clerk's Record Filed.pdf Received Appeals re: Clerk's Record Filed 3/10/2025 Filing Notice of Court Receipt Eserve Temp Eserve Temp Sealing Order.pdf Proceeding Sealing Order 3/10/2025 Filing Answer/Response Storables Reply Reply supporting objections to temporary injunction order and Supporting Objections to motion to reconsider.pdf Temporary Injunction Order, Motion to Rule On Exclusion of Opinions of Dr. Williams, and Motion to Reconsider Based on Objections and Exclusion 3/11/2025 Filing Order Order on Post-TI Motions Order on Post-TI Motions.pdf

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 013 3/11/2025 Filing ISCOI Amended Order Granting Amended Order Granting Temporary Injunction.pdf Temporary Injunction 3/11/2025 Filing Notice of Court Eserve Receipt of Order Notice of Court Proceeding.pdf Proceeding on Post TI Motions 3/11/2025 Filing Notice of Court Eserve Receipt for Notice of Court Proceeding.pdf Proceeding Amended TI Order 3/11/2025 Filing Motion Defendant's Motion for Defendant's Motion for Clarification.pdf Clarification 3/12/2025 Filing Protective Order Defendant's Motion for Proposed Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Clarification Clarification.pdf 3/12/2025 Filing Notice Notice of Hearing By Notice of Hearing By Submission on Motion for Submission on Motion for Clarification.pdf Clarification 3/12/2025 Filing Notice Notice of Submission - Notice of Submission - Motion for Clarification.pdf Motion for Clarification 3/13/2025 Hearing Scheduling Conference - - 3/13/2025 Filing Notice of Court Eserve Receipt of Notice Notice of Court Proceeding- Eserve Notice of Submission.pdf Proceeding of Written Submissions 3/13/2025 Filing Notice Amended Notice of Amended Notice of Submission.pdf Submission 3/13/2025 Filing Notice of Court Eserve Amended Notice Notice of Court Proceeding-Eserve Amended Notice of Proceeding of Submission Submission.pdf 3/14/2025 Filing Special/Other Scheduling Order Scheduling Order.pdf 3/14/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed ESI Protocol 2025-03-14 Proposed ESI Protocol Order.pdf Order 3/19/2025 Filing Answer/Response Plaintiff's Response to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Clarify TI Order.pdf Motion for Clarification 3/19/2025 Filing Motion Plaintiff's Motion to Plaintiff's Motion to Release and Substitute Bond.pdf, Release Cash Bond and Proposed Order Releasing and Substituting Bond.pdf Substitute with Surety Bond 3/19/2025 Filing Bond SafeLease Surety Bond Surety Bond - SafeLease.pdf 3/20/2025 Filing Notice Notice of Written Notice of Submission - Motion to Release.pdf Submission - Motion to Release 3/24/2025 Filing Answer/Response Storable's Reply in Storable's Reply in Support of Motion for Clarification.pdf Support of Motion for Claification 3/24/2025 Filing Order Order on Motion for Order on Motion for Clarification.pdf Clarification 3/24/2025 Filing Appearance of Counsel Notice of Appearance of Notice of Appearance of Adam T. Locke for Plaintiff SafeLease Adam T. Locke for Insurance Services LLC.pdf Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC 3/25/2025 Filing Answer/Response Storable's Response in Storable's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Opposition to Plaintiff's Release Cash Bond.pdf Motion to Release Cash Bond and Substitute with Surety Bond 3/25/2025 Filing Letter from Attorney Letter re Protective Order Letter re Protective Order & Sealed Records + Ex. A.pdf & Sealed Records + Ex. A 3/25/2025 Filing Exhibit List Receipt of Exhibits Receipt of Exhibits.pdf 3/25/2025 Filing Motions - All Other Plaintiff's Unopposed 2025-03-25 Motion for Perm Seal (final).pdf, 2025-03-25 Motion for Permanent Proposed Order Perm. Seal.pdf Sealing Order 3/26/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Permanent Proposed Permanent Sealing Order.pdf Sealing Order

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 014 3/26/2025 Filing Notice of Hearing Public Notice of Hearing 2025-03-26 Public Notice Hearing on Perm Seal.pdf on Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Permanent Sealing Order 3/26/2025 Filing Protective Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion Proposed Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Release Cash to Release Cash Bond Bond and Substitute with Surety Bond.pdf and Substitute with Surety Bond 3/26/2025 Filing Motion Defendants' Rule 76A Defendants' Rule 76A Motion to Seal Court Reco.pdf, Motion to Seal Court Proposed Order.pdf Records 3/26/2025 Filing Notice of Appeal Amended Notice of Amended Notice of Appeal by Storable.pdf Appeal by Storable 3/26/2025 Filing Notice Notice of Rule 76A Notice of Rule 76A Motion to Seal Court Record.pdf Motion to Seal Court Records 3/27/2025 Filing Request Defendant's Request for Defendant's Request for Preparation of First Supplemental Preparation of First Clerk's Record.pdf Supplemental Clerk's Record 3/27/2025 Filing Return of Service Verified Public Notice of Verified Public Notice Hearing on Perm Seal.pdf Hearing 3/27/2025 Filing Service Return Officer's Return of Officer's Return of Service of Notice of Rule.pdf Service of Notice of Rule 76A Motion to Seal Court Records 3/27/2025 Filing Notice 2025-03-27 Verified 2025-03-27 Verified Public Notice Hearing on Perm Seal.pdf Public Notice of Hearing (Mtn to Seal) 3/27/2025 Filing Answer/Response Plaintiff's Reply in Plaintiff's Reply in Support of its Motion to Release Cash Bond Support of its Motion to and Sub with Surety Bond.pdf Release Cash Bond and Sub with Surety Bond 3/28/2025 Filing Motion Storable's Unopposed Proposed Order Granting Storable's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply.pdf, Storable's Sur-Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Sur-Reply Motion to Release Cash Bond.pdf, Storable's Unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply.pdf 3/28/2025 Filing Correspondence - Payment for Invoice - Supplemental Clerks Record.pdf Received Supplemental Clerk's Record $181.00 3/28/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Storable's Motion for Leave to File Unopposed Motion for Sur-Reply.pdf Leave to File a Sur-Reply 3/31/2025 Filing Correspondence - From 15th Court of Notice From 15th Court of Appeals - Supplemental Clerk's Received Appeals - Supplemental Record Filed.pdf Clerk's Record Filed 3/31/2025 Filing Order Denying Motion to Order Denying Motion to Substitute Bond.pdf Substitute Bond 4/3/2025 Filing Motion Mikaila Skaroff's Mikaila Skaroff's Unopposed Motion for Pro Hac Vice Unopposed Motion for Admission.pdf, Proposed Order Granting Unopposed Motion of Pro Hac Vice Admission Mikaila Skaroff to Appear Pro Hac Vice.pdf and Proposed Order 4/3/2025 Filing Motion Motion of Katherine G. Motion of Katherine G. Treistman Requesting Admission of Treistman Requesting Mikaila Skaroff to Appear Pro Hac Vice.pdf Admission of Mikaila Skaroff to Appear Pro Hac Vice 4/3/2025 Filing Order Order Granting Motion to Order Granting Skaroff PHV Motion.pdf Appear Pro Hac Vice- Signed

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 015 4/3/2025 Filing Answer/Response Response in Opposition 2025.04.03 Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to to Defendants' Motion to Seal_Redacted.pdf, 2025-04-03 Proposed Order Partially Seal Denying Sealing.pdf 4/4/2025 Filing Protective Order Proposed Order Partially Proposed Order Partially Denying Sealing.pdf Denying Sealing 4/4/2025 Filing MODIFY Storable's Motion to 2025-04-04 Proposed Order Granting Storable's Motion to Modify Protective Order - Modify Protective Order.pdf, EX A - Excerpt of Feb. 11, 2025 Require Disclosure and TI Transcript.pdf, EX B - Excerpt of Jan. 16, 2025 TI Request for Expedited Hearing.pdf, EX C - SafeLease Press Release re Adam Locke Consideration (Jul. 20, 2022).pdf, EX D - Agreed Protective Order and Temporary Sealing Order (Feb. 27, 2025).pdf, EX E - 2025-04-04 A. Bergman Declaration (Signed).pdf, EX F - 2025-03-25 - K. Treistman Letter to P. Yetter.pdf, EX G - A.

Locke Letter to K. Treistman (Mar. 26, 2025).pdf, EX H - A.

Locke Email to K. Treistman (Mar. 28, 2025)_Redacted.pdf, EX I - 2025-03-31 - K. Treistman Letter to A. Locke.pdf, EX J - A. Locke Letter to K. Treistman (Apr. 2, 2025).pdf, Storable's Motion to Modify Protective Order.pdf 4/7/2025 Filing PO Granting Storable's Granting Storable's Motion to Modify Protective Order Require Motion to Modify Disclosure and Request for Expedited C.pdf Protective Order Require Disclosure and Request for Expedited Consideration 4/7/2025 Filing NOT Notice of Written 2025-04-07 Notice of Written Submission on Storable's Motion Submission on Storable's to Modify Protective Order.pdf Motion to Modify Protective Order - Require Disclosure and Request for Expedited Consideration 4/7/2025 Filing NOT Court's Notice of Court's Notice of Submission - Motion to Modify with Briefing Submission - Motion to Deadlines.pdf Modify 4/7/2025 Filing M Plaintiff's Unopposed Plaintiff's Unopposed Revised Motion to Release Cash Bond Revised Motion to and Substitute with Surety Bond.pdf, Proposed Order Release Cash Bond and Releasing and Substituting Bond.pdf Substitute with Surety Bond 4/7/2025 Filing ORD Order Granting Motion to Order Granting Motion to Release Cash Bond.pdf Release Cash Bond and Substitute with Surety Bond 4/7/2025 Filing BOND Temporary Injunction 2025.04.03 - Bond.pdf Bond 4/9/2025 Filing ACR Storable's First Ex. B Revised.pdf, Ex. C Slipsheet.pdf, Ex. D Slipsheet.pdf, Supplement to Its Rule Ex. E Slipsheet.pdf, Ex. F Slipsheet.pdf, Ex. G Declaration of 76A Motion to Seal Court Neil Verma.pdf, Proposed Permanent Sealing Order.pdf, Records Storable's First Supplement to Its Rule 76A Motion to Seal Court Records.pdf 4/10/2025 Hearing Other Hearing - - 4/11/2025 Filing ACR Plaintiff's Response to 2025-04-11 Proposed Order Denying Motion to Modify PO.pdf, Motion to Modify Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Modify Protective Order and Protective Order and Require Disclosure.pdf Require Disclosure 4/11/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Denying Proposed Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Modify the Defendants' Motion to Protective Order and to Require Disclosure.pdf Modify the Protective Order and to Require Disclosure 4/14/2025 Filing ORD Permanent Sealing Permanent Sealing Order-Signed.pdf Order-Signed

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 016 4/14/2025 Filing ACR Storable's Reply in Exhibit K.pdf, Exhibit L - Excerpt of P's Second Merits Support of Its Motion to RFPs.pdf, Second Proposed Order Granting Storable's Motion Modify Protective Order to Modify PO (Apr. 14, 2025).pdf, Storable's Reply in Support and to Require Disclosure of Its Motion to Modify Protective Order and to Require Disclosure.pdf 4/15/2025 Filing ORD Order Denying Motion to Order Denying Motion to Modify Protective Order.pdf Modify Protective Order 4/21/2025 Filing REQ Plaintiff's Request to Plaintiff's Request to Supplement Clerk's Record.pdf Supplement Clerk's Record 4/23/2025 Filing REQ Corrected Request to Corrected Request to Supplement Reporter's Record.pdf Supplement Reporter's Record 5/5/2025 Filing AMEND Defendants' Amended Defendants' Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Answer, Affirmative Response in Opposition.pdf Defenses, Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Injunction, and Counterclaims 5/9/2025 Filing MOTAO Defendants' Unopposed Defendants' Unopposed Rule 76a Motion to Seal Portions of Rule 76a Motion to Seal Apr. 10 Transcript.pdf, Ex. A - List of Transcript Excerpts.pdf, Portions of Apr. 10 Ex. B (Temp. Seal COVER SHEET ONLY).pdf, Ex. C - NV Transcript Declaration.pdf, Ex. D - Copy of StorEDGE TOS.pdf, Proposed Permanent Sealing Order.pdf 5/12/2025 Filing VL Vacation Letter for Ms. Vacation Letter for Ms. Treistman.pdf Treistman 5/12/2025 Filing M Plaintiff's Motion for Plaintiff's Motion for Access to Sealed Reporter's Record.pdf, Access to Sealed Proposed order granting access to record.pdf Reporter's Record and Proposed Order 5/14/2025 Filing ORD Order Granting Motion for Order Granting Motion for Access.pdf Access 5/16/2025 Filing LTR Letter Summarizing Letter Summarizing Discovery Dispute Under Local Rule Discovery Dispute Under 4(d).pdf Local Rule 4(d) 5/20/2025 Filing RETS Public Notice of Hearing Return of Service Public Notice of Hearing on Defendants' on Defendants' Unopposed Rule 76a Motion to Seal.pdf Unopposed Rule 76a Motion to Seal 5/22/2025 Filing AMEND Supplement to Plaintiff's Supplement to Plaintiff's Verified Second Amended Petition Verified Second Amended and Application for TRO, TI and PI.pdf Petition and Application for TRO, TI and PI 5/23/2025 Filing ACR Storable's Response to Storable's Response to SafeLease's Discovery Dispute Letter SafeLease's Discovery (May 23, 2025).pdf Dispute Letter 5/28/2025 Filing CORR-R Correspondence Letter Correspondence From 15th Court of Appeals.pdf from 15th Court of Appeals 5/28/2025 Filing ORD Discovery Order Discovery Order.pdf 5/29/2025 Filing NOT Plaintiff's Notice to Plaintiff's Notice to Defendants of Subpoena to EQT.pdf Defendants of Subpoena to EQT 5/29/2025 Filing NOT Plaintiff's Notice to Plaintiff's Notice to Defendants of Subpoena to Cove Hill.pdf Defendants of Subpoena to Cove Hill 5/29/2025 Filing MOTAO Motion of Katherine G. Motion of Katherine G. Treistman Requesting Admission of Treistman Requesting John Holler to Appear Pro Hac Vice.pdf Admission of John Holler to Appear Pro Hac Vice

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 017 5/29/2025 Filing MOTAO John Holler's Unopposed John Holler's Unopposed Motion for Pro Hac Vice Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission.pdf, Proposed Order Granting Unopposed Motion of Admission John Holler to Appear Pro Hac Vice.pdf 5/29/2025 Filing RETS Re: Notice of Intent To Return of Service of Notice of Intent To Seek Production of Seek Production of Documents From Non-Party Subpoena on EQT.pdf Documents From Non- Party Subpoena on EQT IX GP LLC 5/30/2025 Filing RETS Re: Notice of Intent To Re: Notice of Intent To Seek Production of Documents From Seek Production of Non-Party Subpoena to Cove Hill Partners L.pdf Documents From Non- Party Subpoena to Cove Hill Partners L.P. 5/30/2025 Filing AOC Notice of Appearance Notice of Appearance Julia Risley.pdf Julia Risley 6/2/2025 Hearing Other Hearing - - 6/2/2025 Filing ORD Sealing Order Permanent Sealing Order.pdf 6/2/2025 Filing ORD Order Granting John Order Granting John Holler's Unopposed Motion to Appear Pro Holler's Unopposed Hac Vice.pdf Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice 6/2/2025 Filing ATCH Part 2 of 2 of Declaration Part 2 of 2 of Declaration of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman in of Katherine Ginzburg Support of Defendants' Motion for Part.pdf Treistman in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 6/2/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Defendants Motion for Partial Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on SafeLeases Attempted Monop.pdf Partial Summary Judgment on SafeLeases Attempted Monopolization Claim 6/2/2025 Filing M Defendants' Motion for Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Partial Summary SafeLease's Attempted Monopolization Claim.pdf, Part 1 of 2 Judgment on SafeLease's of Declaration of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman in Support.pdf Attempted Monopolization Claim 6/5/2025 Filing NOH Notice of Hearing - Notice of Hearing - Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.pdf Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 6/6/2025 Filing M Storable's Unopposed Storable's Unopposed Motion for a Temporary Sealing Motion for a Temporary Order.pdf Sealing Order 6/6/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Storable's Unopposed Motion for a Storable's Unopposed Temporary Sealing Order.pdf Motion for a Temporary Sealing Order 6/6/2025 Filing M Storable's Emergency Storable's Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, Motion for a Partial Stay 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadlin.pdf of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline 6/6/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Defendants' Emergency Motion for a Storable's Emergency Partial Stay.pdf Motion for a Partial Stay 6/6/2025 Filing M Storable's Motion for Storable's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's April 15, Reconsideration of the 2025 Order Denying Modification of th.pdf Court's April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 018 6/6/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Storable's Motion for Storable's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's April 15, 2025 Order.pdf Reconsideration of the Court's April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order 6/9/2025 Filing ORD Order Granting Order Granting Temporary Sealing Motion.pdf Temporary Sealing Motion 6/9/2025 Filing M Storable's Motion for Storable's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, Partial Reconsideration of 2025 Discovery Order.pdf the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order 6/9/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Storable's Motion for Partial Storable's Motion for Reconsideration.pdf Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order 6/10/2025 Filing OTH RETURN OF SERVICE P336508_001.pdf 6/10/2025 Filing NOT Notice of Written Notice of Written Submission and Briefing Deadlines.pdf Submission and Briefing Deadlines 6/10/2025 Filing CLRKREC Second Supplemental 2nd Supplemental Clerk's Record.pdf Clerk's Record 6/11/2025 Filing CORR-R From 15th Court of Correspondence - Received.pdf Appeals 6/11/2025 Filing RETS Return of Service for Return of Service for Subpoena, exhibit a, B, witness fee for Subpoena, exhibit a, B, Cove Hill Partners L.P.pdf witness fee for Cove Hill Partners L.P 6/11/2025 Filing CORR-R From 15th Court of Correspondence - Received From 15th Court of Appeals.pdf Appeals 6/12/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Denying 2025-06-12 Proposed Order Denying Motion to Stay.pdf Motion to Stay 6/12/2025 Filing ACR SafeLease Opposition to 2025.06.12 - SafeLease Response to Motion to Stay Defendants' Motion for Discovery Order -.pdf partial stay of Production deadline 6/12/2025 Filing ORD Order Partially granting Order Partially granting Emergency Saty and additional Emergency Saty and Relief.pdf additional Relief 6/12/2025 Filing ACR Storables Reply in Defs' Reply re Stay Motion DRAFT(254344243.1).pdf Support of Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline 6/16/2025 Filing ACR SafeLease Response to SafeLease Response to Motion to Reconsider April 15 Motion to Reconsider Order.pdf April 15 Order 6/16/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Denying 2025-06-16 Proposed Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Modification of PO.pdf Order Denying Modification of PO 6/17/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Granting Proposed Order Granting Storable's Motion for Extension.pdf Defendants' Motion for Extension of Stay and MSJ Reply Deadline 6/17/2025 Filing M Defendants' Motion for Defendants' Motion for Extension of Stay and MSJ Reply Extension of Stay and Deadline.pdf MSJ Reply Deadline

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Date Event Type Comments Documents 019 6/18/2025 Filing ORD Order Granting in Part Order Granting in Part Motion for Extension.pdf Motion for Extension 6/19/2025 Filing ACR Storable's Reply in Storable's Reply in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration of Support of its Motion for the Court's April 15, 2025 Order.pdf Reconsideration of the Court's April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order 6/19/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Denying 2025-06-19 Proposed Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Motion to Reconsider Discovery Order.pdf Discovery Order 6/19/2025 Filing ACR SafeLease Response to SafeLease Response to Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Motion for Partial May 28 Order.pdf Reconsideration of May Order 6/20/2025 Filing NOT Notice of Submission - Notice of Submission - Motion for Extension of Stay.pdf Motion for Extension of Stay 6/23/2025 Filing ACR Storable's Reply in 2025-06-23 Defs' Reply re MFR of Discovery Order.pdf Support of its Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order 6/23/2025 Filing PO Proposed Order Denying 2025-06-23 Proposed Order Denying Motion for Extension of Motion for Extension of Stay.pdf Stay 6/23/2025 Filing ACR Plaintiff's Response to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Extension of Stay.pdf Motion for Extension of Stay 6/23/2025 Filing OTH Order on Motions to Order on Motions to Reconsider.pdf Reconsider 7/1/2025 Hearing Motion for Summary - - Judgment 6/12/2026 Hearing Pre-Trial Conference - - 6/23/2026 Hearing Pre-Trial Hearing - - 6/30/2026 Hearing Bench Trial - -

© 2025 Tyler Technologies, Inc. | All Rights Reserved Version: 2025.2.92.1249 • ••= EMPOWERED BY •:•••• TYLER TECHNOLOGIES

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047 10:59 PM 1/28/2025 Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County No. D-1-GN-24-010233 D-1-GN-24-010233 Victoria Benavides SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC (“SafeLease”) files this Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction against defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc.; SiteLink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP.

NATURE OF THE CASE 1. This action is necessary to prevent a monopoly software provider from using its market power to cripple a low-price competitor in this State in a related market for insurance.

2. Founded and based in this County since 2021, plaintiff SafeLease is a startup that offers low-cost insurance plans through self-storage facilities to protect people who store goods at those facilities. SafeLease’s plans cover tenants at facilities in Texas and elsewhere throughout the United States. Most self-storage companies rely on third-party vendors like SafeLease for these products. With better prices and service, SafeLease has seen steady growth and an enthusiastic response from customers.

3. To administer its policies, SafeLease is required to access the facility management software systems of self-storage facility operator partners. Operators rely on facility management software to run virtually all aspects of their day-to-day operations. Operators give their advance permission to SafeLease to secure access to their software systems and agree to provide, through these software systems, the information SafeLease needs to administer policies.

4. Defendants are affiliated companies that also offer products and services to the self- storage industry, including facility management software. In fact, with products marketed as storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions, defendants have a dominant role in the market for facility management software. Their market share in the relevant market likely exceeds 75%.

Given the central role of these systems to operations of self-storage facilities, defendants’ power over mission-critical software provides them with considerable control and influence across the self-storage industry.

5. Relatedly, defendants offer insurance plans that compete directly with products and services of SafeLease. Defendants aggressively have grown their share of the tenant insurance market through acquisitions of industry leaders. Despite defendants’ efforts to consolidate the tenant insurance market, SafeLease has made considerable inroads, winning customers from defendants with its competitive products. Witnessing SafeLease’s potential and rapid rise, Storable has made overtures to buy SafeLease for years and as recently as late 2024.

6. On December 17, 2024, defendants abruptly went on the attack. They blocked SafeLease’s “authorized user” access to defendants’ storEDGE system, a widely used facility management software, for which customers specifically designate SafeLease as an authorized user.

In so doing, defendants cut off SafeLease’s ability to access critical data to properly service its tenant insurance plans and administer policies for customers covering thousands of storage units.

This action was both sudden and unprompted, as SafeLease has been an authorized user to access customer accounts for years with defendants’ full knowledge.

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7. Notably, these impacted customers are joint customers, as they use defendants’ storEDGE system as well as SafeLease’s insurance products. In January 2025, over 44,000 self- storage units were scheduled to commence or renew coverage under SafeLease insurance plans.

Countless more units would incur claims on existing plans that need to be serviced. SafeLease would be unable to properly service the several thousands of these new or renewed customers and claims on storEDGE systems without access to its customers’ storEDGE systems.

8. Making matters worse, defendants began taking steps to cut off SafeLease’s access to other facility management software products, SiteLink and Easy Storage Solutions. This would impact hundreds of thousands of additional tenants. These actions are unwarranted, threaten the viability of SafeLease’s business, interfere with current and future contracts with customers, and put innocent self-storage operators and tenants at imminent risk of substantial and needless harm.

9. In short, defendants were using dominance in one market (facility management software) to get power over another market (tenant insurance). Their actions were calculated to cripple SafeLease and force customers to switch to defendants’ higher-cost, competing insurance products. This was blatant monopoly leveraging, not legitimate competition.

10. To protect its customers and business, SafeLease filed suit on December 30, 2024, requesting a temporary restraining order, as well as temporary and permanent injunctions, to prevent irreparable harm from defendants’ conduct. The Court granted SafeLease’s request for a temporary restraining order on December 31. Defendants restored SafeLease’s access to their facility management software less than an hour after the TRO became effective. The Court then denied defendants’ request to dissolve the TRO and extended the TRO through January 21, 2025.

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11. For the three weeks the TRO was effective, SafeLease again was able to service the parties’ mutual customers without interruption. However, on January 21, 2025, the day the TRO expired, the Court denied SafeLease’s request for a temporary injunction.

12. Defendants wasted no time in resuming and amplifying their attack. In just hours, they cut off SafeLease’s access not only to storEDGE but also SiteLink and Easy Storage Solutions. The scope of the blocking is massive and exceeds even what SafeLease feared prior to entry of the TRO. Defendants have singled out and targeted SafeLease. Its access has been completely severed, and its customers have no way to grant SafeLease access to the customers’ own critical data in the software. As a result, SafeLease is unable to fully and timely service its customers that use defendants’ facility management software products. This affects over 275,000 tenants at facilities with SafeLease insurance coverage.

13. These new attacks are proof positive of defendants’ anticompetitive scheme to cut off a competitor and to avoid competition on the merits for tenant insurance, ensure higher insurance prices, and eliminate or buy out the only discount insurance competitor in the industry.

Unless restrained, defendants will cause substantial, irreparable harm to self-storage operators and tenants in this State and to SafeLease, which has no choice but to seek injunctive relief from the Court.

DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 14. SafeLease intends that this case be conducted under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plain in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4.

PARTIES 15. Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC is a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business in this County at 800 Brazos Street, Suite 320, Austin, Texas

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78701. It provides insurance plans to protect tenants and operators of independent self-storage facilities.

16. Defendant Storable, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in this County at 11000 N. Mopac Expressway, #300, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a supplier of products and services to the self-storage industry and the corporate parent, directly or indirectly, of the other defendants.

17. Defendant RedNova Labs, Inc. is a Texas foreign for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in this County at 10900 Research Blvd., Suite 160C, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 18. Defendant SiteLink Software, LLC is a North Carolina limited liability company with its principal place of business in this County at 10900 Research Blvd., Suite 160C, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 19. Defendant Easy Storage Solutions, LLC is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of business in this County at 10900 Research Blvd., Suite 160C, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 20. Defendant Bader Co. is an Indiana corporation with a principal place of business in Indiana. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 21. Defendant Property First Group, LP is a Pennsylvania limited partnership with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 22. Defendants RedNova, SiteLink, Easy Storage Solutions, Bader, and Property First are commonly and centrally owned and controlled by Storable, Inc., their parent company. Their

-5- activities are coordinated together by or with Storable, Inc. As such, defendants are a single business enterprise controlled by Storable, Inc., from Austin, Texas.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 23. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court pursuant to the Texas Constitution, Art. 5, Sec. 8 and TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.21 and § 15.26. Defendants do substantial business in this County and State.

24. This case could not be filed in and is not removable to federal court. There is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, and no federal claim is raised in this petition. See Am. Airlines, Inc. vs. Sabre Inc., 694 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2013).

RELEVANT BACKGROUND A. Self-Storage Industry 25. There are an estimated 52,301 self-storage facilities in the U.S. See SpareFoot, U.S. Self-Storage Indus. Stats. (Oct. 10, 2024), https://www.sparefoot.com/blog/self-storage-industry- statistics/. The industry is largely made up of operators that own/run facilities that lease storage space to businesses and individuals on a temporary basis, usually month-to-month. The industry is valued at $44.3 billion, and it is anticipated to reach nearly $50 billion by 2029. Id. According to the Self Storage Association, 11.1% of U.S. households currently rent a self-storage unit—some 14.6 million households. See The Self-Storage Almanac 2024, Sec. 1, https://digital.modernstorage media.com/almanac/self-storage-almanac-2024db/.

26. Self-storage is big business in Texas. This State has the most self-storage facilities of any state in the country. In 2023, there were 5,564 total storage facilities in Texas, representing more than 10% of all facilities in the nation. Id. (Table 1.4). The amount of rentable self-storage

-6- space in Texas is 256 million square feet. This is one of the highest square feet of rentable space per capita, at 8.70, compared to a national average of 6.32. Id. (Table 1.3).

27. Some self-storage space in the U.S. is owned by large public companies. Four of these companies are real estate investment trusts: Extra Space, Public Storage, CubeSmart, and National Storage Affiliates Trust. The fifth is U-Haul, also a public company. Together, these companies operate 22.5% of self-storage facilities, representing 37.6% of self-storage space by rentable square footage. Id. at Sec. 2. Most or all of these companies have their own insurance programs and proprietary management software.

28. Most self-storage facilities and square footage are owned and operated by small- and medium-sized businesses or individuals. These independent owners represent 77.5% of self- storage facilities and 62.4% of all rentable square feet. Id. Many of these businesses are mom-and- pop shops. Id. (Chart 2.1). Independent facility owners rely on third-party vendors for their facility management software and tenant insurance plans.

i. Facility Management Software 29. Independent self-storage facilities rely on third-party software to run the day-to- day operations of their businesses. Facility owners subscribe to facility management software, sometimes referred to as FMS, which allows them to track and manage their storage units. This software facilitates core services, such as tracking tenant data, allowing for billings, managing communications, generating financial reports, and servicing tenant insurance policies.

30. Facility management software is an essential tool for owners and their vendors. It is common in the industry for owners to permit vendors to access their facility management software to provide the vendor’s services. These services range from onsite management to remote financial services. For example, owners routinely authorize facility management software access

-7- for an on-site manager (who may run front-of-house) and for access control systems (which operate gate codes). It is also essential for vendors that offer remote or administrative services. For example, an owner may authorize a third-party call center to access its facility management software to follow sales leads or address customer inquiries. Similarly, owners may authorize a bill collection agency to access their facility management software to collect payment data and follow up on delinquent payments. This software is designed to facilitate many services in one place for owner management.

31. Defendants are the largest supplier of facility management software systems to independent self-storage facilities. They offer three such systems: storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions. Defendants rolled up the companies that offered these systems under common ownership from 2018-20. See SpareFoot, Tech Firms Combine Under Storable Brand Name To Serve Self-Storage Indus. (Apr. 29, 2024), https://www.sparefoot.com/blog/tech-firms-combine- storable-brand-name-serve-self-storage-industry/; Inside Self Storage, Storable Acquires Self- Storage Software Provider Easy Storage Solutions (June 5, 2020), https://www.insideselfstorage. com/software/storable-acquires-self-storage-software-provider-easy-storage-solutions.

32. According to industry statistics, defendants control some 75% of the U.S. market for facility management software systems for independent self-storage facilities.

33. According to defendants, “more than half of every single storage facility in the United States” uses their facility management software. 2023 State of the Self-Storage Indus., https://www.storable.com/resources/learn/unpacked-webinar-2023-state-of-the-self-storage- industry/. The numbers are even starker considering that the only storage facilities that use third- party facility management software are independent facilities. Some 40,500 facilities in the U.S. are independent self-storage facilities. See The Self-Storage Almanac 2024, Sec. 2 (independent

-8- owners represent 77.5% of self-storage facilities). And nearly 32,000 self-storage facilities used defendants’ facility management software systems as of 2023. See 2023 State of the Self-Storage Indus., supra. Today, defendants advertise that 36,000 self-storage facilities “are currently managed with Storable software.” Storable, About Us, https://www.storable.com/about-us/.

34. SafeLease does not offer facility management software. Rather, its independent self-storage customers rely on their facility management software to facilitate the administration of SafeLease’s tenant insurance plans. Each of these customers expressly authorizes SafeLease to be one of its third-party vendors, to access its facility management software with administrative user credentials, and to use its systems to offer tenant insurance plans. Customers also agree to provide the information SafeLease needs to administer policies through access to their facility management software.

B. Tenant Insurance Plans 35. SafeLease basically offers two types of related insurance products for its independent self-storage customers: tenant insurance and tenant protection.

36. Tenant insurance is produced directly to the tenant by the facility. In most states, the facility operates under a limited lines license, where SafeLease is the designated responsible licensed producer—that is, the overseer for the program. The tenant is directly insured for stored goods, rather than having recourse to the owner-operator of the storage facility.

37. Tenant protection involves the placement of a contractual liability insurance policy with the storage facility owner-operator. The policy covers risk to tenant stored goods on the rental agreement. Under SafeLease’s program, rental agreements are amended so that the standard exculpatory clause (where owners/operators disclaim liability for tenant stored goods) is pared back, and the facility owner-operator instead has limited liability for certain types of loss.

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38. These products are marketed largely as substitutes. Some facility owner-operators prefer conventional tenant insurance, while others choose tenant protection. The coverage levels and cost for the product borne by the tenant and the revenue that can be earned by the facility owner-operator for distribution are comparable.

39. Defendants directly compete with SafeLease on both insurance product lines.

40. In addition to rolling up facility management software system vendors, defendants also acquired various insurance producers and books of business. These include Property First Group LP (StorSmart) and Bader Co. See Inside Self-Storage, Storable Adds Self-Storage Ins. Providers Bader, Storsmart to Stable of Cos. (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.insideselfstorage.com/in -surance/storable-adds-self-storage-insurance-providers-bader-storsmart-to-stable-of-companies.

Defendants also acquired a large book of insurance business from Sage Insurance in 2021.

41. In short, defendants provide tenant insurance at independent facilities. In addition, they offer an unlicensed, insurance-like “protection plan” program to independent facilities through Easy Storage Solutions facility management software. In total, defendants together control the single largest share of the market for tenant insurance and tenant protection (“tenant insurance”) at independent self-storage facilities.

42. The parties compete in the market for tenant insurance at independent self-storage facilities.

C. SafeLease Access to Customer Accounts 43. SafeLease opened for business in mid-2021 and has grown steadily. It now covers 2576 facilities, representing about 322,000 units with active SafeLease-acquired coverage.

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44. SafeLease currently administers insurance policies/plans through customer facility management software systems. Access to this software is critical to enable SafeLease to effectively administer its customers’ insurance protection and to protect facility owners/operators and tenants.

45. To administer these policies, SafeLease must access facility management software that its self-storage customers use. Given defendants’ dominance in the facility management software market, the vast majority of customer plans that SafeLease administers must be managed through defendants’ software systems. Over 275,000 tenants at nearly 2000 facilities must be administered through defendants’ facility management software: a. storEdge: 83,992 plans (683 facilities) b. SiteLink: 147,233 plans (734 facilities) c. Easy Storage Solutions: 44,681 plans (514 facilities) 46. The remaining policies are administered through third-party facility management software offered by companies other than the defendants, such as Self Storage Manager, Cubby, and WebSelfStorage.

47. Since 2021, for defendants’ storEDGE and SiteLink systems, SafeLease has accessed its customers’ accounts as a designated “Authorized User” on the systems after its customers granted SafeLease such access in accordance with its contracts with those customers.

StorEDGE and SiteLink permit a customer to designate “as many” Authorized Users to access its accounts “as you wish,” according to the terms of service for their facility management software.

a. Sitelink Terms of Use, https://www.storable.com/privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ (“4.2. Authorized Users. You may designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement.”); and b. storEDGE Terms of Service, https://www.storable.com/privacy/storedge- terms-of-service/ (“4.2. Authorized Users. You may designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement.”).

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48. Likewise, SafeLease’s access to defendants’ Easy Storage Solutions (which is a more basic software than storEDGE or SiteLink) only occurs when access is given by defendants at the request of a customer. Access is “locked” otherwise. Easy Storage Solutions customers then must create an Authorized User account for SafeLease. Defendants knew SafeLease was accessing the facility management software on behalf of customers and provided access for it to do so.

49. In SafeLease’s customer contracts, storage facilities are obligated to give SafeLease access to their facility management software for it to administer the relevant insurance policies.

The data within the facility management software—for example, information about a particular facility, its tenants, and its operations—belongs to SafeLease’s customers (not to defendants).

SafeLease’s customers grant SafeLease permission to access this information kept on their facility management software by logging in with a username and password, exactly as the facility owners would log in to access the same information. This is how SafeLease has accessed its customers’ facility management software.

50. The information SafeLease can access is controlled by its facility customers.

SafeLease only accesses the information that is necessary to carry out its insurance functions. It does not access sensitive information that is irrelevant to SafeLease providing its contractual insurance services. SafeLease never has access to tenant credit card information. SafeLease uses secure, independently audited, SOC-2 certified processes when accessing and storing customer data.

51. Storable has known for years that SafeLease is an Authorized User to administer its customer insurance policies. In general, SafeLease can access facility management software to administer coverage policies by a direct connection to the software through an application programming interface (API) or as an Authorized User through the graphical user interface (GUI).

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In 2021, just months after SafeLease opened, it reached out to defendants regarding API access for SiteLink. Defendants declined, saying they are “not planning to add additional providers.” As a result, SafeLease moved forward as an Authorized User and successfully has operated that way ever since.

52. As an Authorized User, SafeLease efficiently can collect targeted data every day or few days from a customer’s facility management software that it needs to administer policies.

SafeLease accesses the least data necessary and only the data that its customers allow, even gathering information more efficiently than if a user were manually operating the software.

SafeLease’s access to facility management software has not intensified in nature or scope across time. In fact, since 2021, SafeLease has further tailored its operations to make its access of facility management software even more narrow and efficient. Until this case was filed, defendants never claimed that SafeLease’s practices harmed defendants’ facility management software and never demanded that SafeLease stop or change its Authorized User access.

53. SafeLease’s ability to access the facility management software as an Authorized User has been beneficial to defendants. For example, SafeLease products are low-cost options that defendants admit are popular with and beneficial to facility operators and their tenants. Operators want to use SafeLease products, so having a facility management software that is compatible with SafeLease products enhances defendants’ software, making it more valuable to facility management software customers and increasing its marketability. Conversely, cutting off SafeLease’s access to facility management software hurts defendants’ own customers, who are left at risk of disruption and uninsured loss.

D. Defendants’ Actions Towards SafeLease 54. Since SafeLease’s founding, defendants have expressed interest in acquiring its insurance business. Storable’s CEO sees SafeLease’s business as “interesting” and “compelling.”

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He believes SafeLease can “help our customers” increase tenant enrollment in insurance coverage, which “benefits” self-storage operators, their tenants, and insurance providers, which can “grow the business.” SafeLease repeatedly has declined defendants’ overtures.

55. In March 2022, less than a year after SafeLease’s founding, defendants inquired about buying SafeLease. The next year, following discussions in May 2023, the parties entered into a term sheet regarding a potential long-term partnership. The parties ultimately could not agree on terms and agreed to pause negotiations in March 2024. In September 2024, defendants again expressed general interest in acquiring SafeLease.

56. Defendants’ tactics then changed after acquisition talks broke down in October. On October 15, 2024, SafeLease got a cryptic email from defendants noting upcoming “security measures” on the facility management software, including “stricter policies around user roles, access authorization, and ensuring only authorized personnel can access Storable systems.” This raised possible concerns that defendants might limit SafeLease access to the facility management software—access that its shared customers long had authorized and that SafeLease successfully had used without issue for many years.

57. In this message and the surrounding communications, defendants made no specific complaint about any specific SafeLease practice—referring only to nebulous “security” issues but never telling SafeLease that defendants believed it was causing or responsible for any such issues.

They could not and did not explain any harm from SafeLease’s continued operation as an Authorized User in the same manner as it had done for years.

58. In response, SafeLease asked about an interim agreement with defendants to “avoid disruptions to the services and agreements with [their] shared customers.” SafeLease sought a call as soon as possible, including technical resources, so that it could understand the planned “security

-14- changes” and take appropriate measures. In addition, SafeLease proposed as a potential solution an agreement to access defendants’ API—access that they had denied years earlier.

59. Defendants responded with egregious terms to access the system via an API. They proposed a penalty price of $1.00 per unit per month, far greater than the market price for such access. Moreover, they would charge SafeLease an even higher price for units that had been served by defendants if the customer chose to switch to SafeLease for its insurance products. In that case, SafeLease would have to pay $1.50 for API access—50% more—whenever it out-competed defendants for business. The terms were confiscatory, exclusionary, anticompetitive, and another example of defendants flexing their monopoly power.

60. Indeed, defendants’ demanded price was so high that it would drive SafeLease out of business. Defendants knew this since they offer similar insurance plans and are well aware of the economics. For example, the most common protection plans typically cost a tenant $12/month for $2000 of coverage. The facility will keep most of that $12, as it has the relationship with the tenant, and a coverage provider like SafeLease will get $2-3/plan per month, which also must cover the cost of the insurance itself, which is not less than $2/plan per month. So, charging $1 to $1.50 per unit for API access would consume 50% or more of SafeLease’s gross profit, which would not leave enough to cover insurance premiums.

61. In short, API access was no option at all on defendants’ monopolistic terms, which were designed as merely another way to drive a low-cost competitor out of the market to the detriment of consumers and the industry.

62. Defendants then took their next step. On November 4, 2024, SafeLease noticed issues logging into storEDGE. Its engineers found that SafeLease IP addresses had been blocked

-15- from logging into storEDGE. On November 6, 2024, SiteLink similarly blocked SafeLease IP addresses, although SafeLease was able to re-establish its authorized access.

63. On December 4, 2024, there was another wave. Defendants blocked the IP address for the SafeLease office from accessing storEDGE and SiteLink facility management software.

This cut off SafeLease’s access to customer accounts and was a direct interference with servicing its policies. Again, SafeLease was able to engineer a solution to restore access.

64. At the same time, defendants’ buyout overtures continued. On December 9, 2024, they again expressed interest in acquiring SafeLease, warning that additional “security” measures soon would be implemented.

65. On December 17, 2024, defendants took a dramatic step. They blacklisted SafeLease from storEDGE. In addition to blocking the SafeLease office IP address, defendants deactivated storEDGE users with @safelease.com emails even though they were customer- designated as Authorized Users. There was no technical workaround. As a result, SafeLease could not access storEDGE on behalf of customers. It lost the ability to service 84,062 insurance plans for storage facilities that use storEDGE facility management software. This caused, and if left unchecked was set to cause more, serious harms, including gaps in coverage and delays in adjudication of claims for SafeLease and defendants’ shared customers.

66. SafeLease filed this petition and request for temporary and permanent injunctive relief on December 30, 2025, to prevent irreparable harm that would commence January 1, 2025.

SafeLease was due to issue thousands of contracted-for new and renewed policies to its customers, a process that it could not do without accessing its customers’ facility management software.

67. The Court acted swiftly and granted SafeLease’s requested temporary restraining order on December 31. Defendants’ actions in the hours that followed showed that the status quo

-16- imposed no burden at all on them. Indeed, less than an hour after the TRO became effective, defendants restored SafeLease’s access as a customer-designated Authorized User on storEDGE.

68. Defendants moved to dissolve the TRO on January 2, 2025. In turn, SafeLease moved for expedited discovery and to extend the TRO to allow for this discovery. On January 9, the Court denied the motion to dissolve, extended the TRO to January 21, and granted targeted discovery in advance of a temporary injunction hearing, which was set for January 16.

69. While the TRO was in effect prior to the temporary injunction hearing, SafeLease got to work. It was able again to service the parties’ mutual customers by: a. sending notices to self-storage facilities with tenants transferring into SafeLease insurance coverage; b. confirming coverage for 33,000+ units switching to SafeLease coverage for facilities using defendants’ facility management software; c. helping facilities meet insurance requirements by confirming tenants have valid homeowner policies linked to their accounts or are enrolled in SafeLease; d. collecting reports to bill facilities for premiums that must be paid to insurance carriers to maintain necessary coverage; and e. securing facility data to advance adjustor files to pay pending claims.

70. On January 16, 2025, the parties participated in an evidentiary hearing on the request for a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo through trial.

71. The Court denied the request for a temporary injunction on January 21, the day the TRO dissolved by its extended terms.

72. Defendants wasted no time in resuming their anticompetitive attacks. The next day, January 22, defendants reinstated their block on SafeLease access to storEDGE. Then they went further to cut off SafeLease from the other two facility management software products, SiteLink and Easy Storage Solutions.

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73. The impact of defendants’ attacks has increased dramatically. SafeLease cannot access its customers’ data in the facility management software, despite express user authorization from those same mutual customers. The number of units, tenants, and facilities that defendants are preventing SafeLease from servicing properly and timely under their existing contracts has tripled.

There are over 275,000 tenants at nearly 2000 facilities who SafeLease no longer can provide the insurance services that they and the facilities have contracted for.

74. Defendants have not merely disabled SafeLease’s Authorized User accounts. They also have fully disabled SafeLease from having access by any means to any of defendants’ facility management software systems. Their excuse for cutting off access is alleged “security” concerns posed by SafeLease’s using automated log-in to its customers’ software to access its customer data (as customers have authorized and contracted for). Defendants have said that manually logging in would resolve those concerns. But they now will not allow even that means of access, that is, access that is identical to how any facility owner would access its own facility management software.

75. This newly restricted means of access for SafeLease is no different from how other contractors, consultants, or third parties with which facility owners do business access customers’ facility management software. For example, a certified public accountant who a facility owner has designated as an Authorized User to provide accounting or tax services also accesses the customer software via username and password manually. That access is allowed for third parties who don’t compete with defendants, but defendants have denied the same access to its competitor SafeLease.

76. Defendants took further steps to target SafeLease and eliminate competition. They disabled all SiteLink accounts where SafeLease had been using the system’s legacy custom third- party insurance module to provide insurance to facility customers. Disabling SafeLease’s accounts

-18- that used this custom insurance module has no legitimate purpose. It simply singles out SafeLease to block access for a competitor and to interfere with its contracts with customers.

77. This custom insurance module is a means of access long approved by defendants and used by other insurance vendors. The module was created by defendants specifically to enable facility owners to use an insurance provider that does not have API access to SiteLink. Facility owners pay defendants $10 per facility/month to use this custom insurance module, and SafeLease reimburses the customers. So, when and whether a facility owner is using a third-party insurance provider via this module is known to and long allowed by defendants.

78. Using this custom module poses none of the alleged security issues that defendants claim justify cutting SafeLease’s access. Indeed, this custom module is defendants’ own creation.

79. To SafeLease’s knowledge, defendants did not block access to this custom module for any other insurance provider. Cutting off SafeLease from even this method of accessing data and servicing customers further shows that defendants are targeting SafeLease, and their in-court excuses for removing SafeLease’s access are pretextual.

80. Since defendants cut off access again only days ago, the parties’ mutual customers have expressed confusion and concern about how it will impact them and their tenants. Reactions from customers have ranged from anxiety to frustration to anger, including the following: a. “Help me understand where our account stands as of today; 1. Are our tenants covered and how long will they be covered? 2. How do we continue coverage? 3. Will the payments by our tenants no longer be accessed by SafeLease? . . . I am just scratching the surface with questions, by my greatest concern is to make sure that our tenant protection doesn’t lapse during this struggle.”

b. “We utilize SiteLink at our facility and currently pay $10 per month for the ability to use SafeLease. We are concerned about the potential disruption of service and insurance coverage for our tenants.”

c. “I see that SafeLease has been deleted as a user in my corporate account. . . . Should I add you back as an authorized user? They deleted without

-19- mentioning anything to me. . . . Also, if a tenant moves in now, will they even have access to coverage?”

d. “I want safe lease to immediately have access to manage my tenant protection. . . . I have been with easy storage solutions way before storable purchased them. I have been a loyal customer since 2012 and demand the right to choose my tenant protection for the best options for my tenants.” (email sent to defendants) e. “Sounds like you already don’t have access to our system. What issues is this going to cause us until you regain access?”

f. “Safelease was removed from each of my locations. They are my tenant protection company. . . . I’m going to be adding them back in today so that I can go over my numbers as I do monthly with them. Please, can you make sure Storable does not remove someone I have given permission to.” (email sent to defendants) g. “Could you please clarify if Storable’s actions have also impacted the data transfer and service for SiteLink users who pay for SafeLease access? Are you still receiving our information, or has this been interrupted as well?”

h. “Team Storable, Please immediately restore access to all authorized users. SafeLease must have full access.” (email sent to defendants) i. “Have you guys looked into any legal recourse? My opinion is that Storable is doing some potentially illegal stuff throughout (not a lawyer).”

j. “This seems like it is breaking some sort of law and at a minimum a terrible way to do business.”

k. “We have also experienced the anticompetitive activities of Storable.

When we attempted to access our own data, they demanded an outrageous toll fee for the access.”

l. “Not surprised that Storable would pull such a dirty trick. Can’t expect much better from them.”

Common to the customer reactions to defendants’ actions are concerns about disruption of service, increased risks, and loss of protection for them and their tenants.

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81. By contrast, as SafeLease was cut off from accessing these facility management software systems, defendants’ insurance products offered through Bader and StorSmart remained integrated in the software.

82. Defendants’ actions have been greatly damaging to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry. As a result, SafeLease cannot operate its business as it has done for years with defendants’ knowledge, consistent with its terms, and with customer authorization and agreement.

E. Relevant Markets 83. The relevant primary product market is for tenant insurance at independent self- storage facilities. SafeLease and defendants, as well as firms such as Xercor, Deans & Homer, Insurance Office of America, and MiniCo Insurance Agency, compete in this market.

84. Because of the fragmented nature of self-storage facility ownership and the fact that large public companies offer their own insurance plans, this tenant insurance is offered only at independent self-storage facilities. Consumers at these facilities can turn to either tenant protection or tenant insurance products. These products are substitutable in that a consumer reasonably could turn from one product to the other in response to a price increase to satisfy their insurance needs.

85. Market share in this market can be measured based on the number of facilities using a tenant insurance product. Defendants are collectively the largest provider in this market.

86. The relevant secondary product market is for facility management software.

Defendants dominate this market. Other competitors are Self Storage Management, Cubby, and WebSelfStorage.

87. Because of the fragmented nature of self-storage facility ownership and the fact that large public companies use their own proprietary management software, these facility management software products are offered only to independent self-storage facilities.

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88. Market share can be measured based on the number of facilities that use facility management software. Defendants control over 75% of this market within the United States.

89. Defendants have a monopoly in this secondary market. They are leveraging their market power to harm and control competition in the primary market, for tenant insurance at independent self-storage facilities, and to acquire monopoly power.

a. Geographic Market 90. The relevant geographic market for both product markets is the United States.

91. For tenant insurance, the parties and others operate throughout the nation.

Consumers in Texas looking to purchase tenant insurance reasonably can turn to any such product offered by a provider if it is licensed to provide insurance in this State.

92. For facility management software systems, defendants and its competitors operate throughout the nation. Consumers looking to purchase such software for their independent self- storage facilities may turn to any competitor in the country to provide this product.

F. Defendants’ Anticompetitive Conduct and Effects 93. Defendants have engaged in an anticompetitive scheme to monopolize the market for tenant insurance and drive a low-cost competitor out of business. They are leveraging their monopoly power in the facility management software market to try to monopolize the connected market for tenant insurance. Facility management software is vital to the market they are attempting to monopolize, and defendants have a monopoly of that software market. Their actions are an attempt to exploit that connection to the detriment of consumers and competition.

94. So, armed with this unique power in an adjacent market, defendants are engaging in prohibited predatory conduct by refusing to deal with SafeLease by cutting off SafeLease’s access to their facility management software systems. This shuts out SafeLease from the tenant

-22- insurance market, excluding or foreclosing competition and harming consumers including with higher prices. SafeLease is precluded from accessing more than 75% of the market, so defendants will be able to scoop up the customers that SafeLease no longer can compete for.

95. Defendants cut off SafeLease after years of allowing what it now prohibits. This long-known and consented-to access was voluntary and to defendants’ benefit, as it made their facility management software product more enticing to consumers, some of whom would not have chosen it if SafeLease were not allowed access, severely limiting their tenant insurance options.

And defendants cut off SafeLease’s access without warning or valid business justification. As is clear from defendants’ conduct, their motive is to achieve anticompetitive ends.

96. Defendants are familiar with SafeLease and how it does business, including that it has Authorized User access to defendants’ facility management software granted by their shared customers. Defendants have expressed interest in partnering with or buying SafeLease. As recently as just weeks ago, they proposed acquiring SafeLease. It was only after talks broke down that they sought to drive SafeLease out of the market and remove a low-cost competitor. They retaliated by cutting off SafeLease and making a confiscatory “offer” for API access that was no offer at all and was, instead, another way to try to destroy a competitor to reduce competition, to the detriment of consumers. The timing shows that defendants’ “justifications” for their conduct are pretextual.

97. Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct escalated after suit was filed. In December, SafeLease successfully competed for a new customer that uses defendants’ SiteLink as its facility management software. That customer had used defendant Bader as its tenant insurance provider, until SafeLease out-competed Bader for this customer’s business. On December 31, 2024, the same day the Court granted the TRO, defendant Bader tried to scare the customer into switching back to Bader’s insurance coverage by informing the customer that defendants were going to block

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SafeLease from accessing SiteLink, just as they had done with storEDGE. Confused and concerned, the customer alerted SafeLease, who assured the customer that a TRO was in place.

98. Although the TRO was in place, defendants’ threat to remove access proved too much for this customer. He determined that the risk of SiteLink severing ties with SafeLease posed a significant operational challenge and financial risk to the customer, which he could not bear, so he chose to cancel his planned contract with SafeLease.

99. This recent conduct is further proof of defendants’ plans to monopolize the tenant insurance market not by competing on the merits but by removing competition through leveraging their monopoly in the facility management software market and interfering with SafeLease’s prospective business with these customers.

100. With defendants’ monopoly power, their scheme to drive out competitors in the related tenant insurance market has a dangerous probability of success. Defendants know how vital facility management software is to independent self-storage facilities. Having captured more than 75% of the market for this software, while allowing SafeLease and others to access the software for years, defendants are able to leverage that monopoly and customer reliance on the software to drive out as many competitors in the tenant insurance market as it can by refusing to deal with them, or by allowing them to use defendants’ software products only on the condition that the competitors promise not to compete for defendants’ customers and pay a penalty if they do. This will, in turn, drive customers to their only practical option at that point: buying higher-cost tenant insurance from defendants.

101. This anticompetitive scheme is an attempt to monopolize the market for tenant insurance. It will harm competition and consumers, remove low-cost competitors like SafeLease, and drive-up costs and reduce options.

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G. Damages and Continuing Injury 102. Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct is causing irreparable harm to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry.

103. On December 17, 2024, defendants cut off SafeLease accounts from accessing the storEDGE facility management software, revoking the Authorized User status granted to SafeLease by storage facility customers. The only thing that stopped this anticompetitive scheme and prevented further harm to SafeLease, consumers, and competition was the TRO. But when the TRO expired, defendants escalated their attacks by cutting off SafeLease from accessing all their facility management software systems. Without access, SafeLease cannot service insurance policies for tenants with units in facilities that use those systems. Practically, this means that SafeLease’s customers will experience delays in adjudication of their insurance claims and risky gaps in coverage while SafeLease is unable to renew or issue new policies it has or would have contracted with customers to issue.

104. This risk and these gaps cannot be filled by these mutual customers. They cannot legally intake or adjust tenant insurance claims, which is something that only a licensed insurance agent like SafeLease can do. This disruption and interference with customer-authorized access to customer data on its customers’ software has wholly impaired SafeLease’s ability to service more than 275,000 tenants and thousands of customer facilities. This harms not only SafeLease but also innocent customers and their tenants.

105. Defendants’ actions have jeopardized SafeLease’s entire business, which is worth over $100 million. It has and will continue to harm and cause loss to SafeLease’s goodwill, clientele, and operations. Defendants’ actions also put at risk the insurance coverage that customers secured through SafeLease, which exceeds $600 million.

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106. Defendants’ unjustified and anticompetitive actions are calculated to and do destroy competition by excluding a low-cost competitor from competing in the market to the detriment of competition and consumers. This harm will be outsized in Texas which has more storage units than any other state and in which the parties are based and conduct their business.

H. Status Quo Poses No Harm to Defendants 107. SafeLease accessed defendants’ facility management software as an Authorized User with defendants’ consent for over three years until they abruptly cut off access in December.

Defendants’ actions after the TRO was entered show that returning to the status quo imposes no burden at all on them. Indeed, in less than an hour after the TRO became effective, defendants restored SafeLease’s access as a customer-designated Authorized User of storEDGE.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the Texas Antitrust Act, Section B 108. SafeLease incorporates the material fact allegations from the preceding paragraphs.

109. Through anticompetitive conduct, defendants intend to secure dominant market power and a monopoly in the market for tenant insurance at independent self-storage facilities.

They leveraged their monopoly of the facility management software market to lessen or destroy competition in the tenant insurance market by cutting off SafeLease from accessing storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions facility management software on behalf of and for the benefit of customers. This refusal to deal is contrary to defendants’ prior voluntary practice of allowing such access for years, which benefited defendants, and it will harm defendants’ own customers.

110. This refusal to deal is intended to remove a discount competitor from the market to help defendants gain market share and solidify a second monopoly in the market for tenant insurance. Their monopoly of the facility management software market gives them a unique ability

-26- to exclude or foreclose competition in the market for tenant insurance by excluding competitors in that market, like SafeLease, from facility management software.

111. Defendants are exercising this unique anticompetitive ability here by excluding SafeLease from their facility management software systems after years of knowing use. Given this unique power to exclude or foreclose competition in the vast majority of the market, made possible by leveraging a monopoly of facility management software, defendants’ scheme has a dangerously high probability of success.

112. This conduct is an attempted monopolization in violation of TEX. BUS. & COMM.

CODE § 15.05(b). This unlawful conduct has been willful and flagrant.

113. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful conduct, SafeLease has been injured in its business and property, including by being foreclosed from competing in the market for tenant insurance.

114. These injuries to SafeLease and the public are injuries to the competitive process and are the type of injuries that the antitrust laws are intended to prohibit. They constitute antitrust injuries in Texas.

115. SafeLease did and will suffer irreparable injury and loss of business and property, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, unless the Court enjoins defendants’ continuing and imminent violations.

116. SafeLease has been forced to retain attorneys to protect its rights and to prosecute this claim. Under TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 15.21, it is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees and costs spent in this matter.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Tortious Interference with Existing Contracts 117. SafeLease incorporates the material fact allegations from the preceding paragraphs.

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118. SafeLease has a contract with each of its customers that use defendants’ facility management software. These contracts are commonly titled “Storage Partner Agreements.” They require the customers to provide SafeLease with access to their facility management software and their data that they keep on these software systems for the sole purpose of providing the parties’ contractually agreed insurance services.

119. SafeLease’s contracts with its customers are valid contracts. Defendants are not parties to these contracts.

120. Defendants are willfully and intentionally interfering with SafeLease’s contracts with its customers. Defendants know that SafeLease provides insurance services to their mutual customers. Defendants know that such services are under contracts between SafeLease and the customers. Defendants know that these services require SafeLease to access and use customer data that is stored on the facility management software systems. Defendants know that SafeLease’s customers grant it access to their facility management software as an Authorized User.

121. Defendants intentionally cut off SafeLease’s access to their facility management software. Defendants are preventing the parties’ mutual customers from providing SafeLease the access that the customers want and are obligated to provide. Defendants know or reasonably should know that blocking access interferes with the customers’ ability to perform under their contracts, including by preventing customers from being able to give SafeLease the agreed, desired, and necessary access to their facility management software systems and data.

122. Defendants cut off SafeLease’s access in order to interfere with performance of these obligations, and it was substantially certain that the consequences of cutting off access would be to interfere with performance of these obligations.

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123. Defendants’ interference with SafeLease’s customer contracts proximately caused SafeLease harm and loss to its business, business operations, goodwill, and clientele. It threatens to destroy SafeLease’s entire business. This harm and loss are continuing, increase with every day, and given their nature are not easily or readily quantifiably.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations 124. SafeLease incorporates the material fact allegations from the preceding paragraphs.

125. Defendants have willfully and intentionally interfered with SafeLease’s ability to compete in the market for tenant insurance. They have removed SafeLease’s ability to service customers that use defendants’ facility management software systems, which comprise over 75% of the market.

126. Defendants’ leveraging of their monopoly in the facility management software market to cut off SafeLease from thousands of customers in the tenant insurance market makes it nearly impossible for SafeLease to compete for new business, as customers now are effectively unreachable to SafeLease. Defendants are telling SafeLease’s prospective customers that they plan to and now have cut off SafeLease’s access, for the purpose of interfering with SafeLease’s attempts to enter contracts to provide services to the potential customers.

127. Defendants’ software is so vital to customers that their threat of stopping SafeLease access already has lost SafeLease customers, including a customer who cancelled his contract with SafeLease when he learned that SiteLink was planning to remove SafeLease’s access.

128. Defendants’ threats to remove SafeLease’s access and then actual removal of that access have caused customers to cancel or back out of agreements with SafeLease, thus injuring it. These injuries are the direct result and intent of defendants’ anticompetitive acts to leverage their monopoly power to interfere with SafeLease’s prospective business relations.

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129. Defendants’ interference with SafeLease’s prospective business with customers has proximately caused SafeLease harm and loss to its business, business operations, goodwill, and clientele. It threatens to destroy SafeLease’s entire business. This harm and loss are continuing, increase with every day and with every prospective customer with which defendants interfere, and given their nature are not easily or readily quantifiably.

SERVICE ON ATTORNEY GENERAL 130. SafeLease has mailed a copy of this amended petition to the Attorney General of Texas, in compliance with TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §15.21(c).

VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION 131. SafeLease has requested that the Court issue a TRO and temporary injunction against defendants to prevent probable imminent and irreparable harm to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry. The Court issued the requested TRO on December 31, 2024 and extended it to January 21, 2025. In the interim, it held a temporary injunction hearing on January 16. The Court denied the requested temporary injunction via email notice from its clerk on January 21.

GROUNDS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 132. Temporary injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo prior to a trial on the merits. The last actual, peaceable, non-contested status preceding the pending controversy is SafeLease’s accessing defendants’ facility management software systems so that it may service the parties’ shared customers, which SafeLease did for years with defendants’ knowledge until they cut off access. See In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004) (status quo is “the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy”) (cite omitted).

133. Defendants’ cutting off access to this critical software did and will cause irreparable harm to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry. Without access SafeLease will be unable to

-30- run its business and administer insurance services for its customers. Temporarily enjoining defendants imposes no or minimal burden on them and also will allow SafeLease to service these mutual customers as it had done with defendants’ knowledge and consent for years.

134. SafeLease pleads valid causes of action and has shown a probable right to relief. It has furnished evidence that defendants’ actions and threatened imminent actions are an illegal monopolization attempt of the market for tenant insurance, using an anticompetitive scheme and predatory or exclusory means. Given defendants’ monopoly power and ability to leverage it to exclude or foreclose competition, they have a dangerous probability of succeeding. Defendants’ actions also improperly interfere with SafeLease’s current and prospective customer contracts.

135. Federal antitrust case law, which the Texas Antitrust Act follows, supports the state law claim raised here. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (“If Kodak [a monopolist] adopted its . . . policies [refusing to deal] as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it will have violated §2.”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (monopolist liable for refusing to deal with competitor where parties had prior voluntary course of dealing that was ended without justification); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (finding monopolization where defendants used monopoly power in one market to acquire monopoly control of other markets); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Monopoly leveraging occurs when a firm uses its market power in one market to gain market share in another market other than by competitive means.”), vacated on other grounds, 540 U.S. 1147 (2004).

136. SafeLease also has shown probable imminent and irreparable injuries prior to a trial on the merits. Accessing defendants’ software is its only means of servicing customers that use the

-31- software. Without access, it cannot address claims made by tenants, correctly bill its customers, or commence new or renew insurance policies that it has contracted with tenants to provide.

137. The impact of this disruption is wholly or largely immeasurable to SafeLease and the tenants that it helps insure. It did and will cause immediate and irreparable harm to SafeLease’s business and customers by preventing SafeLease from, among other things, renewing or issuing new policies, notifying tenants of changes in coverage, adjusting or adjudicating insurance claims, or billing facilities accurately. This harm from loss of access critically impairs SafeLease’s business and its ability to service thousands of customers, is ongoing, and is irreparable because it places its entire business at risk, making much or all of the current harm to SafeLease’s business impossible to measure in damages.

138. As such, the Court issued a TRO enjoining defendants before the application for temporary injunction was heard: a. Defendants should be ordered to restore SafeLease’s status as an Authorized User on the storEDGE or any other facility management software for customer accounts that grant SafeLease such authorization.

b. Defendants should be ordered to take no action to remove or otherwise restrict SafeLease’s access to its storEDGE, SiteLink, or Easy Storage Solutions facility management software systems as an Authorized User for customer accounts that grant SafeLease such authorization.

139. SafeLease posted a bond to make the TRO effective. A minimal bond was required and warranted because the TRO simply restored the way that the parties have operated for years.

As a result, the risk of irreparable harm to defendants was nil.

140. SafeLease further requested that the Court temporarily enjoin Storable from these same acts until the trial of this case and that, after trial, the Court permanently enjoin Storable upon entry of final judgment.

141. On January 21, 2025, the Court denied the temporary injunction request.

-32-

PRAYER SafeLease respectfully seeks a TRO, temporary injunction, and permanent injunction that enjoins defendants and their officers, agents, servants, and employees from performing the anticompetitive and tortious acts described above, and a judgment for SafeLease and against defendants for reasonable and necessary attorney fees, costs of court, pre- and post-judgment interest, and all other relief to which SafeLease may be entitled.

Dated: January 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Paul Yetter R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] Shannon N. Smith State Bar No. 24110378 [email protected] YETTER COLEMAN LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 632-8000 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

-33-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record via the Court e-filing service and/or by email, on January 28, 2025.

_/s/ Shannon N. Smith_______ Shannon N. Smith

-34-

VERIFICATION

My name is StcYcn Stein. My date of birth is November 18, 1994. I am the Chief E:xccutiw Officer of plaintiff Sa fr Lease and have been since its inception . My business address is ~00 Brazos Street. Suite 320. Austin. Texas 7870 I. I declare ur1<.ler penalty of perjury that the material facts alleged in this Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Temporary Injunction. and Permanent Injunction, except for paragraphs 80 and 97-98 (as to which another SafeLease employee is verifying), are true and correct based on my personal knowledge or, as indicated, on reliable referenced information sources.

Executed in Travis County , Texas on this 28th day of January, 2025 .

~;i

-35-

VERIFICATION

My name is Nathaniel Kinet. My date of birth is Occcmbcr 12. I986. f am Chief Revenue Officer of plaintiff Safclcasc and han~ been an employee of SafcLcase since May 2021 . My business address is 800 Brazos Street. Suite J20. Austin. Texas 7870 I . J declare under penalty of pc1:iury that the material facts alleged in paragraphs 80 and 97- 98 of this Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction. and Pennanent Injunction are true and cotTect based on my personal knowledge.

Executed in Travis County. Texas on this 28th day of January, 2025.

-36- Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 96716932 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION Status as of 1/29/2025 11:08 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Neil KentonAlexander [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Jacqueline Chin [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Ruth Tucker [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Stephanie Jennings [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Austin Brumbaugh 24121929 [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 1/28/2025 10:59:33 PM SENT 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD FILED IN 2 VOLUME 4 OF 7 VOLUMES 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BCO3A-261J&f)25 3:37 :13 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE 4 APPELLATE CASE NO. 15-25-OOO2O-CV Clerk SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC TEXAS BUSINESS COURT 7 Plaintiff, v. 9 DIVISION 3A STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 12 Defendants.

15 HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION 16 AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 19 On the 13th day of February, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in person in Austin, Travis County, Texas. 23 Proceedings reported by stenographic machine shorthand.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 2

1 A P P E A RA NC E S APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: 3 YETTER COLEMAN, LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 4 Houston, Texas 77002-6125 (713) 632-8000 HON. R. PAUL YETTER 6 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] 7 HON. SUSANNA R. ALLEN State Bar No. 24126616 STONE HILTON, LLP 9 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002-6125 10 (713) 632-8000 11 HON. CHRISTOPHER HILTON State Bar No. 24087727 12 [email protected] APPEARING FOR THE DEFENDANTS: PORTER HEDGES, LLP 15 1000 Main Street, Floor 36 Houston, Texas 77002-6341 16 (713) 226-6650 17 HON. RAY T. TORGERSON State Bar No. 24003067 18 [email protected] 19 HON. NEIL KENTON ALEXANDER State Bar No. 00996600 20 [email protected] 21 HON. LIZA EOFF State Bar No. 24095062 22 [email protected] Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 3

2 A P P E A RA NC E S 3 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP West 6th Street, Suite 2050 4 Austin, Texas 78701 5 HON. DALE WAINWRIGHT State Bar No. 00000049 6 (512) 320-7226 [email protected] 7 [email protected] 8 HON. JUSTIN LEWIS BERNSTEIN State Bar No. 24105462 9 (617) 512-5191 [email protected] ALSO PRESENT: 12 Chuck Gordon Rick Verma 13 Lakshmi Kumar Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 4

1 VOLUME 4 OF 7 2 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX 3 (February 13, 2025) TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING PAGE VOL Case called/appearances 6 4 Housekeeping matters 6 4 Motion to compel by Ms. Allen 6 4 Response by Ms. Eoff 7 4 Adjournment 262 4 Certificate of Court Reporter 263 4 12 CHRONOLOGICAL WITNESS INDEX WITNESSES: D X RD RX VOL 14 NATE KINET 10 23 86 99 4 15 JULIETTE CAMINADE 103 163 208 215 4 16 JULIETTE CAMINADE 217 4 17 JOHN MANES 221 242 262 4 19 ALPHABETICAL WITNESS INDEX WITNESSES: D X RD RX VOL 21 CAMINADE, JULIETTE 103 163 208 215 4 22 CAMINADE, JULIETTE 217 4 23 KINET, NATE 10 23 86 99 4 24 MANES, JOHN 221 242 262 4 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 5

1 INDEX OF EXHIBITS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS: NO. DESCRIPTION OFFERED RECEIVED VOL 185 Storable website page - About Us 198 4 197 List of customer cancelations 12 12 4 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS: NO. DESCRIPTION OFFERED RECEIVED VOL 352 Storable software integration page 140 140 4 357 Monopoly share analysis 136 4 359 Email from Stephen Skinner 52 52 4 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 08981

1 A. You could add up the amounts that those customers have been invoiced for as long as they have worked with us, yes.

4 Q. So, of those 10 or 12 customers, we could know, moving forward, how much to expect revenue Safe Lease would not be recognizing because of this cancellation; true?

7 A. If you are looking exclusively of the 12 that have so far canceled.

9 Q. Right. You would agree with that proposition though.

10 This 1s a knowable calculation, true?

11 A. For the knowable 12 customers, yes.

12 Q. Okay. I just want to be clear. To date, you have actually not had a problem with an insurance policy lapsing after January 21st; true?

15 A. I don't know.

16 Q. Certainly no data of that has been produced ,n this case; right? 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. Okay. And as you sit here today, to your knowledge, since January 21st, has a single claim been denied or unpaid as a result of being blocked from the Storable platforms? 22 A. Again, I don't know. I don't oversee claims.

23 Q. And do you know if any of that information has been produced in this case?

25 A. Again, I don't know.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 09082

1 THE COURT: This is a good time 2 MR. TORGERSON: I'm almost done.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 Q. (BY MR. TORGERSON) You understand that those customers that terminated you, those 12 customers, there are other options for them in the market; right?

7 A. Sure.

8 Q. All right. And you know that there are other FMS providers out there, right?

10 A. I do, yes.

11 Q. And you agree with me that ,n some instances Safelease has been recommending that their customers consider Cubby as a replacement FMS provider, true?

14 A. That is true.

15 Q. All right.

16 A. In the same way that Storable recommends their customers go to one of their insurance companies. I don't see it being any different.

19 Q. Okay. Let's look at DX-348. Safelease has a head-of-talent job posting, right?

21 A. We do, yes.

22 Q. Does this report to you?

23 A. Does not.

24 Q. You are familiar with this posting?

25 A. I'm familiar with the role. I wouldn't say that I'm Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 09183

1 very familiar with this posting. I didn't write it. It's not, again, something that rolls up to me. So 3 Q. Let's look at the last sentence of the first paragraph, Mr. Kinet. It says: We're three years old, profitable, and intent on building the best insurance provider in storage.

7 Do you see that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "Profitable," you know what that means.

10 A. I think there is a lot of different ways to define "prof i tab l e . " 12 Q. Profitable means you make more money than you lose, doesn't it?

14 A. I think in the simplest terms, yes.

15 Q. And in the simplest terms, you would agree with me that right now Safelease is not profitable?

17 A. I would agree with that.

18 Q. You understand that for no year of its existence has Safelease realized a net profit.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So, this statement that Safelease is profitable, ,n simplest terms, that is quite false; isn't it?

23 A. Again, I didn't write this. I can't speak to why it was written or what the meaning behind it was.

25 Q. Just to be clear -- Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 092263

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS: COUNTY OF AUSTIN: 3 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 4 I, DONNA A. GOREE, Official Court Reporter 1n and for the Texas Business Court, Division 3A of Austin County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included ,n this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-entitled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were stenographically reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

16 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 11th day of March, 2025.

1s1 Donna Goree DONNA A. GOREE, CSR, RPR, CRR 20 Official Court Reporter Texas Business Courts 21 Austin County, Texas 3721 Carmen Avenue 22 Rancho Viejo, Texas 78575 (979) 533-0422 23 Certificate No. 3909 Expiration Date: 07/31/2025 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD FILED IN 2 VOLUME 5 OF 7 VOLUMES 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BCO3A-261J&f)25 3:37 :13 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE 4 APPELLATE CASE NO. 15-25-OOO2O-CV Clerk SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC TEXAS BUSINESS COURT 7 Plaintiff, v. 9 DIVISION 3A STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 12 Defendants.

15 HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION 16 AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 19 On the 14th day of February, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in person in Austin, Travis County, Texas.

23 Proceedings reported by stenographic machine shorthand.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 2

1 A P P E A RA NC E S APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 3 YETTER COLEMAN, LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 4 Houston, Texas 77002-6125 (713) 632-8000 HON. R. PAUL YETTER 6 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] HON. SUSANNA R. ALLEN 8 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] STONE HILTON, LLP 10 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002-6125 11 (713) 632-8000 12 HON. CHRISTOPHER HILTON State Bar No. 24087727 13 [email protected] APPEARING FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 16 PORTER HEDGES, LLP 1000 Main Street, Floor 36 17 Houston, Texas 77002-6341 (713) 226-6650 HON. RAY T. TORGERSON 19 State Bar No. 24003067 [email protected] HON. NEIL KENTON ALEXANDER 21 State Bar No. 00996600 [email protected] HON. LIZA EOFF 23 State Bar No. 24095062 [email protected] Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 3

1 A P P E A RA NC E S GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 320-7226 HON. DALE WAINWRIGHT 5 State Bar No. 00000049 [email protected] 6 [email protected] 7 HON. JUSTIN LEWIS BERNSTEIN State Bar No. 24105462 8 (617) 512-5191 [email protected] Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 4

1 VOLUME 5 OF 7 2 ***INDEX*** 3 (February 14, 2025) 4 PAGE VOL Case called/ appearances 7 5 Adjournment 286 5 Certificate of Court Reporter 287 5 8 CHRONOLOGICAL WITNESSES INDEX WITNESSES: D X RD RX VOL 10 STEVEN STEIN 12 58/131 135 5 11 CHARLES GORDON 138 169 222 222 5 12 DAN FRITCHER 233 248 5 13 DANIEL STEINBROOK 265 284 286 5 15 ALPHABETICAL WITNESS INDEX WITNESSES: D X RD RX VOL 17 FRITCHER, DAN 233 248 5 18 GORDON, CHARLES 138 169 222 222 5 19 STEIN, STEVEN 12 131 135 5 20 STEIN, STEVEN 58 5 21 STEINBROOK, DANIEL 265 284 286 5 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 5

1 VOLUME 5 OF 7 2 EXHIBIT INDEX 3 PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS NO. DESCRIPTION OFFERED RECEIVED VOL 178 ESS incident log 253 253 5 185 Wayback Machine 10 10 5 198 (Demonstrative) Safelease dashboard 21 5 206 (Demonstrative) 13 5 207 Storable letter to customer 11 11 5 208 Courtney to Storable email 1-28-25 11 11 5 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 6

1 VOLUME 5 OF 7 2 EXHIBIT INDEX 3 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS NO. DESCRIPTION OFFERED RECEIVED VOL 361 Email 2-6-25 Sudlow to Safelease 137 137 5 362 Excel spreadsheet 137 234 5 362 ESS database entry 234 5 363 Email 1-28-25 O'Risky to Safelease 137 137 5 364 Email 2-10-25 McAdams to Safelease 11 11 5 364 Email 2-10-25 McAdams to Safelease 137 5 365 Self Storage Association doc 137 5 366 Storable timeline 141 141 5 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 09927

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Where is Safelease's home state as it relates to insurance?

4 A. Texas.

5 Q. And who is bigger in the tenant coverage market, Safelease or Storable?

7 A. Storable.

8 Q. Storable's counsel at the prior hearing asked you about some marketing materials where Safelease says: It's the largest tenant protection and tenant insurance provider in the self-storage industry.

12 Can you explain to me how that's the case if Storable is a larger player in this market?

14 A. Safelease is one of the few producers that offers both of those products under one flag. Storable is a collection of different companies. Some of those companies only offer protection. Some only offer insurance.

18 Q. So, is it -- when it comes to Storable overall, is it fair to say that they are significantly larger than Safelease in the tenant insurance market?

21 A. They are.

22 Q. They just may not have one entity that offers both products?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Do you consider Safelease a discount provider? Is Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 10028

1 that the term that you have heard?

2 A. It's not regularly used. I don't think it would be a mischaracterization. Occasionally, one deals on price. But I would like to think it's a combination of reasons why someone would work with us. Of course, price is always important in the insurance world.

7 Q. Do you agree that Safelease offers highly competitive prices?

9 A. We do, yes.

10 Q. And the term "discount provider," is that, in fact, a term that Storable has called Safelease in its papers in this litigation?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. About how many of your customers use the Storable product as their FMS?

16 A. I think it's now 1,800 facilities.

17 Q. Do you know about what percentage of your customers use a Storable FMS?

19 A. It's approximately 70 percent.

20 Q. 70 percent?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Do you, Safelease, ever access the customer's Facility Management Software without their permission?

24 A. Never. We wouldn't be able to. The customer has to create the credentials.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 10129

1 MS. ALLEN: I would like to just very quickly pull up Plaintiff's Exhibit 70, which is "outside, counsel eyes only."

4 Please don't. Okay. Apologies. Thank you.

5 You can republish the document.

6 Q. (BY MS. ALLEN) Is this an example of a contract between Safelease and a facility customer that includes that authorization?

9 A. Yeah, this is the first page.

10 Q. Let's go to Page 2 in the program. Is this an example a customer can send for you to access their Facility Management Software as an authorized user?

13 A. It is, yes.

14 Q. And it also authorizes you to access the customer's data?

16 A. It does, yes.

17 Q. For every customer, do you have a consent like this?

18 A. We do.

19 Q. Whose data ,s stored on the FMS?

20 A. It's only the customer's data, and they are authorizing just for the purposes of facilitating the insurance program.

23 Q. It's the facility's data?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And does even Storable acknowledge that?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 102287

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS: TEXAS BUSINESS COURTS: 4 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 5 I, DONNA A. GOREE, Official Court Reporter 1n and for the Texas Business Courts, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-entitled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were stenographically reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

16 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 12th day of March, 2025.

1s1 Donna Goree DONNA A. GOREE, CSR, RPR, CRR 20 Official Court Reporter Texas Business Courts 21 3721 Carmen Avenue Rancho Viejo, Texas 78575 22 (979) 533-0422 [email protected] 23 Texas Certification No. 3909 Expiration Date: 07/31/2025 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of Texas 2/25/2025 1:00 PM 103 Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS LLC § Plaintiff, § § § THIRD DIVISION v. § § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, § INC., (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP.

§ Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

NOTICE OF APPEAL Pursuant to Rules 25.1 and 28.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively “Storable” or “Defendants”) hereby file this Notice of Appeal.

Defendants desire to appeal to the Fifteenth Court of Appeals, which has exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Texas Government Code Sections 22.220(d)(3) and 25A.007 because this is an appeal from an order of a business court. Defendants appeal the Order Granting Temporary Injunction signed February 19, 2025 in the above- styled case, and all adverse rulings and failures to rule related to the Order Granting Temporary Injunction, including, but not limited to, rulings made during hearings and the February 10, 2025 Opinion and Order denying Defendants’ motion to remand.

This is an accelerated appeal because it is an appeal of an interlocutory order. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a). In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(d)(6), Defendants confirm that this appeal is not a parental termination or child protection case, or an appeal from an order certifying a child to stand trial as an adult.

Respectfully submitted, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP By: /s/ Dale Wainwright______ Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 [email protected] Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 [email protected] West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 T: (512) 320-7200 F: (512) 320-7210 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served to all attorneys of record, in compliance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 25.1(e) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, on February 25, 2025.

/s/ Dale Wainwright Dale Wainwright

-3- Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Sylvia Dominguez on behalf of Dale Wainwright Bar No. 49 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97769294 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Defendants' Notice of Appeal Status as of 2/25/2025 1:51 PM CST Associated Case Party: SafeLease Insurance Services LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Courtney Smith [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT

Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Justin Bernstein [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Neil KentonAlexander [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Sylvia Dominguez on behalf of Dale Wainwright Bar No. 49 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97769294 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Defendants' Notice of Appeal Status as of 2/25/2025 1:51 PM CST Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT Liza Eoff [email protected] 2/25/2025 1:00:29 PM SENT FILED IN BUSINESS COURT 108 OF TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 2/27/2025 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § Defendants. § AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER & TEMPORARY SEALING ORDER The Court enters the following Agreed Protective Order and Temporary Sealing Order (the Agreed Protective Order or Protective Order) as agreed to by the parties, except that the Court has deleted paragraph 24 and modified paragraph 20 to comply with Rule 76a and grant a temporary sealing order.

In order to expedite the flow of discovery material, facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality, adequately protect material entitled to be kept confidential, and ensure that protection is afforded only to material so entitled, entry of this Agreed Protective Order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6 is merited. This Protective Order applies to materials produced in advance of the Temporary Injunction hearing and functions as the operative Protective Order for this matter until such time as this Order is amended or replaced.

It is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information and Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information produced or exchanged by the parties in the course of this litigation, including information produced by third parties/non-parties, shall be used solely for the purpose of preparation, trial, and appeal of this litigation and for no other purpose whatsoever, and shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms hereof.

2. “Confidential Information” as used herein means any information of any type, kind, or character which is designated as “Confidential” by any of the supplying or receiving parties, including third parties/non-parties supplying said information, whether it be a document, information contained in a document, discovery materials, information or testimony revealed during a deposition, or otherwise.

3. “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information” as used herein means any information that is “Confidential” as described herein and additionally may not be disclosed to anyone except the Qualified Persons described in Paragraph 6, infra. “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information” includes trade secrets or other non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information. More specifically, an “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” designation means that the materials so denoted may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or a subsequent Order by this Court.

4. In designating information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” a party or third party/non-party supplying information will make such designation only as to that information that it in good faith believes contains “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information. Information or material which is available to the public, including industry materials, advertising materials, and the like shall not be classified as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.”

5. “Qualified Persons” as used herein for “Confidential Information” means: (a) Attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees and/or agents of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the information be shown for purposes of this litigation; (b) Actual or potential independent experts or consultants (and their administrative or clerical staff) engaged in connection with this litigation (which shall not include the current employees, officers, members, or agents of the parties or affiliates of the parties) who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (c) The parties and their respective in-house counsel, paralegals, legal staff or experts; (d) The Court and its staff, including court reporters; (e) Vendors engaged by the parties or the parties’ respective counsel, including independent copy services, printers, or illustrators, and court reporters for the purpose of this litigation who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (f) The authors and original recipients of the documents or information unless any such person no longer has a right to access or possess any such documents or information by virtue of a change in employment, position, or other circumstance; (g) The designated corporate representative for the party that produced the documents or information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only”; or (h) By agreement of the parties, or if this Court so elects, any other person designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all the parties and hearing.

6. For “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information,” “Qualified Persons” includes (a), (b), and (d) - (h), above.

7. Documents produced in this action may be designated by any party or parties or by any third party and/or non-party producing said documents as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information by marking each page of the document(s) with the word(s) “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.” However, for documents produced in electronic native form, such as Excel spreadsheets, the designation may be affixed to the drive, disk, or other medium on which the documents or materials are produced or in the file names without marking each page of the documents or materials “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.”

8. In lieu of marking the original of a document, if the original is not produced, the designating party may mark the copies that are produced or exchanged.

9. Information disclosed at (a) the deposition of a party or one of its present or former officers, directors, employees, agents or independent experts retained by counsel for the purpose of this litigation, or (b) the deposition of a third party (which information pertains to a party) may be designated by any party, including a third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed, as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information by indicating on the record at the deposition that the testimony is “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” and is subject to the provisions of this Order.

10. Any party or third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed may also designate said information disclosed at such deposition as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by notifying all of the parties, in writing within 30 days of receipt of the transcript, of the specific pages and lines of the transcript which should be treated as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” thereafter. Each party shall attach a copy of such written notice or notices to the face of the transcript and each copy thereof in his possession, custody or control. All deposition transcripts shall be treated as “Confidential” for a period of 30 days after the receipt of the transcript, apart from any portions designated on the record as “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” which portions shall be treated as Attorneys’ Eyes Only.

11. To the extent possible, the court reporter shall segregate into separate transcripts information designated as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” with blank, consecutively numbered pages being provided in a non-designated main transcript. The separate transcript containing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information shall have page numbers that correspond to the blank pages in the main transcript.

12. “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information shall not be disclosed or made available by the receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons as delineated above. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Protective Order restricts the ability of a party and/or third party/non-party to review, disclose, or disseminate its own documents or information as it sees fit.

13. Documents produced prior to entry of this Protective Order may be retroactively designated “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by notice in writing of the designated class of each document by Bates number within 30 days of the entry of this Protective Order.

Documents unintentionally produced without designation as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” may be retroactively designated in the same manner and shall be treated appropriately from the date written notice of the designation is provided to the receiving party. The burden shall be on the party claiming confidentiality to prove the confidential nature of the documents.

14. Documents to be inspected shall be treated as “Confidential” during inspection. At the time of copying for the receiving parties, such inspected documents shall be marked or stamped prominently “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by the producing party.

15. If a receiving party learns of any unauthorized disclosure of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” the party shall immediately upon learning of such disclosure inform the producing party of all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure and shall make all reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure by each unauthorized person who received such information.

16. Nothing herein shall prevent disclosure beyond the terms of this Protective Order if each party or third party/non-party designating the information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” consents in writing to such disclosure or if the Court orders such disclosure.

Nor shall anything herein prevent any counsel of record from utilizing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information in the examination or cross-examination of any person who is indicated on the document as being an author, source or recipient of the “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information, or if counsel has a reasonable belief that such person was an author, source or recipient of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information irrespective of which party or third party/non-party produced such information.

17. A party shall not be obligated to challenge the propriety of a designation as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” at the time made, and a failure to do so shall not preclude a subsequent challenge thereto. In the event that any party to this litigation disagrees at any stage of these proceedings with the designation by the designating party of any information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” or the designation of any person as a

Qualified Person, the parties shall first try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an informal basis, such as production of redacted copies. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the objecting party may invoke this Protective Order by objecting in writing to the party or third party/non-party who has designated the document or information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” or designated any person as a Qualified Person. The designating party shall be required to move the Court for an order preserving the designated status of such information or person within 30 business days of receipt of the written objection. The disputed information shall remain “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” unless and until the Court orders otherwise. Failure to move for an order shall constitute a termination of the restricted status of such item unless the parties otherwise agree. The party or third party/non-party objecting to disclosure bears the burden of proof to establish the confidentiality of the document.

18. The parties may, by stipulation, provide for exceptions to this Protective Order, and any party may seek an order of this Court modifying this Protective Order.

19. Nothing shall be regarded as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information if it is information that either: (a) is in the public domain at the time of disclosure supported by appropriate evidence; or (b) becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the other party, as supported by appropriate evidence.

20. The following provisions govern the treatment of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information used in connection with Court filings or proceedings: (a) Temporary Sealing Order. There have been hearings in this case in connection with plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and temporary injunction

(TI). The Court has determined that the criteria of Rule 76a(5) is satisfied and hereby GRANTS a temporary sealing order covering (1) the exhibits that are designated as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” and (2) the transcripts of those proceedings. This temporary sealing order will remain in effect until March 24, 2025. (b) Sealing Motion, Notice, and Hearing. At 1 p.m. on March 20, 2025, the Court will hold a hearing on whether to permanently seal the materials covered by the temporary sealing order in subsection (a), above. At least 14 days before the hearing, the parties, either jointly or individually, must (1) file a motion to seal any portions of the material covered by the temporary sealing order that should not be made public upon expiration of the temporary sealing order; and (2) comply with the notice requirements of Rule 76a(3). The motion(s) must identify the specific portions of the hearing transcript(s) to be sealed by page and line. The Court will not seal the entire transcript(s). The exhibits to be sealed must be identified by exhibit numbers.

Any documents or transcripts previously provided to the Court need not be provided again, but any transcripts or exhibits that a party seeks to seal that were not previously provided to the Court should be provided to the Court in the same manner as the hearing exhibits for the TI hearing and served on the other parties subject to this Agreed Protective Order. (c) Future hearings. For future hearings at which the parties expect to disclose “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information or documents containing such information, the parties may move for a temporary sealing order under Rule 76a(5) before the hearing. Any material at issue in the motion that has not previously been provided to the Court should be provided to the Court for in camera inspection but not filed in the case. If granted, the temporary sealing order will remain in place for 30 days after the hearing and may be extended for good cause. The parties may move for permanent sealing by obtaining a hearing date from the Court and complying with Rule 76a and the procedures in subsection (b), above, relating to the motion and notice. For any part of the hearing record that contains “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information that has been sealed under a prior sealing order, the motion to seal need only identify the portion of the record (by page and line or exhibit number) to be sealed and the applicable sealing order. (d) Filings. To the extent documents containing or revealing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information are filed in this Court after the date of this order, the parties shall undertake the following procedures: 1. The filing party must redact any material that would disclose “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information from the Court filing and simultaneously serve an unredacted version on the other parties subject to this Protective Order.

2. The redacted filing must identify the redacted material by Bates Number, page and line, or as specifically as possible.

3. The parties have five days after such filing to move to temporarily or permanently seal the designated information. If no motion to seal is timely filed, the filing party will file the unredacted version of the document with the Court. If a motion to seal is timely filed, the filing party will wait until the Court rules on the motion to seal, then file the unredacted version of the document under seal or not under seal, as dictated by the Court’s ruling.

4. The foregoing notwithstanding, if the parties agree that any or all of the redacted material is not needed for the resolution of the matter, that material may remain redacted, will not become part of the Court’s record, and will not be considered by, relied on, or before the Court.

(e) - Trial. - - The use of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information at trial will be addressed in the pretrial order and/or at the pretrial conference.

(f) The parties understand that material provided to the Court for in camera inspection but not filed in the case will not be part of the record unless further action is taken.

(g) The parties understand that material filed in the case under a temporary sealing order may become part of the public record if a permanent sealing order is denied.

21. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the Court, all proceedings involving or relating to “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents or information shall be subject to the provisions of this Protective Order.

22. After the conclusion of this litigation and any appeal thereof, any “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents and all copies or reproductions of such documents produced by a party or third party/non-party in the possession of any of the “Qualified Persons” shall be returned to the producing party or third party/non-party within 60 days of receipt of a timely written request by said producing party or third party/non-party, except as this Court may otherwise order or to the extent such information was used as evidence at the trial. As far as the provisions of any protective orders entered in this action restrict the communication and use of the documents produced thereunder, such orders shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this litigation, except (a) that there shall be no restriction on documents that are used as exhibits in open court, and (b) that a party may seek the written permission of the producing party or order of the Court with respect to dissolution or modification of such protective orders. Alternatively, at the conclusion of this litigation, in lieu of the actual physical return of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents, counsel for each party may provide a certification certifying that (1) all experts and any other person(s) receiving “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents have been instructed to delete or destroy all documents; and (2) all “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents in the possession of counsel have been deleted or destroyed.

23. Any party designating any person as a “Qualified Person” shall have the duty to reasonably ensure that such person observes the terms of this Protective Order.

Signed this 27th day of February, 2025.

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge Presiding

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, § INC. (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EXHIBIT A AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY TERMS OF PROTECTIVE ORDER My name is, , my date of birth is , and my address is, . I have read and am familiar with the terms of the Protective Order concerning the records and testimony produced by the respective parties in this case, and I agree to abide by all terms of said Protective Order and not to reveal or otherwise communicate any of the information disclosed to me pursuant thereto to anyone except in accordance with the terms of said Protective Order. I agree not to make any use of that information or materials other than for the purpose of this litigation.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in County, State of Date: E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of Texas 4/4/2025 8:29 PM 120 Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ______________________________________________________________________________ Storable’s Motion to Modify Protective Order/Require Disclosure and Request for Expedited Consideration ______________________________________________________________________________ Pursuant to the February 27, 2025 Protective Order, and the Court’s inherent authority under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants Storable, Inc., RedNova Labs, Inc., SiteLink Software, LLC, Easy Storage Solutions, LLC, Bader Co., and Property First Group, LP (“Storable” or “Defendants”) respectfully move the Court on an expedited basis for an order requiring Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC (“SafeLease”) to disclose information necessary to investigate potential unauthorized access to Storable’s “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” (“OCEO”) Documents—information which SafeLease is refusing to provide. Storable further moves the Court for an order modifying the Protective Order (“PO”) to exclude attorney Adam Locke (“Locke”) from accessing Storable’s OCEO documents going forward. Given the nature of the relief requested, Storable respectfully requests the Court’s expedited consideration and would show as follows: Summary of the Argument During the Court’s hearing on the temporary injunction, one of Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Yetter, represented in open court that SafeLease’s “outside general counsel is Adam Locke” and that “when we get into outside/counsel only, we will ask him to be excused.” TI Hr’g Tr. (Feb.

11, 2025) at 95:12–16, Exhibit A (emphasis added). SafeLease is now attempting to insert Locke—its general counsel, who is also its former chief operating officer, and a witness in this case—as an outside counsel of record with full access to Storable’s OCEO documents. When the parties entered into an Agreed Protective Order, which the Court issued on February 27, 2025, both Storable and the Court understood that SafeLease was excluding Locke from OCEO materials. Just a few weeks later, however, on March 24, 2025, Locke entered an appearance in this case and has admitted to reviewing Storable’s OCEO documents as early as the very next day, March 25, 2025, and is continuing to access and review such documents.

Now, despite Storable’s multiple requests, SafeLease refuses to provide basic information—e.g., what OCEO documents Locke reviewed and when—for Storable to determine whether there was unauthorized access to its OCEO documents. SafeLease is required to provide this information under the PO, and the Court should order it to do so.

Storable further requests that the Court modify the PO to expressly exclude Locke from reviewing Storable’s OCEO documents going forward consistent with SafeLease’s conduct, and Storable’s understanding at the time of the PO, prior to Locke’s attempted hat change. Had Storable known that Locke planned to appear in the case and access OCEO materials, Storable would not have agreed to the PO in its current form. Whether strategic or unintentional, Locke’s March 24 appearance, weeks after the PO was entered, deprived Storable of the opportunity to advocate for provisions in the PO necessary to protect its OCEO documents.

Because of the issues raised in this motion, Storable respectfully requests that the Court consider the motion on an expedited basis. Storable requested that SafeLease temporarily pause Locke’s access to OCEO documents to avoid a need for expedited relief, yet SafeLease refused.

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Relevant Background I. Adam Locke Locke is SafeLease’s current outside General Counsel. At the February 11, 2025 hearing on Plaintiffs’ Temporary Injunction Motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Yetter, represented to the Court that SafeLease’s “outside general counsel is Adam Locke” and that “when we get into outside/counsel only, we will ask him to be excused.” TI Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 11, 2025) at 95:12–16, Exh. A. Plaintiff’s counsel similarly represented at the January 16, 2025 hearing on Plaintiff’s TI motion before the District Court that Locke was one of SafeLease’s “client representatives” and that “he is the outside General Counsel.” TI Hr’g Tr. (Jan. 16, 2025) at 35:21–25, Exhibit B.

Locke was repeatedly excused during the course of the TI hearing in this Court when OCEO materials were being introduced or discussed.

Locke is also SafeLease’s former Chief Operating Officer, a position he held during the relevant time period for purposes of this case and therefore is likely a potential witness in this case.

See Press Release: SafeLease Hires Adam Locke as Chief Operating Officer (Jul. 20, 2022), https://www.safelease.com/resources/safelease-hires-adam-locke-as-chief-operating-officer, Exhibit C.

II. The Agreed Protective Order As of the Court’s February 11 hearing, the Parties had been operating under a Rule 11 Agreement permitting one another to designate produced documents as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.” However, on February 20, 2025, the Parties submitted a Proposed Agreed Protective Order to formalize those protections. See [Proposed] Agreed PO (Feb. 20, 2025). On February 27, 2025, this Court entered the PO in the form submitted by the Parties with slight modifications. See PO, Exhibit D. At the time the Parties agreed to the Proposed Agreed PO and when the Court entered the PO, both Defendants and the Court understood, pursuant to Plaintiff’s

-3- counsel’s representations, that Locke was SafeLease’s general counsel and not permitted to view documents marked by Defendants as OCEO.

The PO provides that “Documents produced in this action may be designated by any party . . . as ‘Confidential’ or ‘Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only’ information by marking each page of the document(s) with the words ‘Confidential’ or ‘Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.’” Id. § 7. The PO “applies to materials produced in advance of the Temporary Injunction hearing” and granted a temporary sealing order for all exhibits to those hearings marked “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” which the Court determined to meet the standards for temporary sealing under Rule 76a(5). Id. § 20(a). Both Plaintiff and Defendants have marked several documents produced as OCEO, including several exhibits to the TI hearings.

Under the PO, documents designated OCEO “may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or a subsequent Order by this Court.” Id. § 3. The PO specifies the limited individuals who may view OCEO documents, including only: counsel of record for the Parties and their staff; experts or consultants for the Parties in this litigation and their staff; the Court and its staff; vendors engaged by the Parties’ counsel; authors and recipients of any particular document (subject to restrictions); a party’s corporate representative (but only as to documents designated as OCEO by such party); and other materials as may be agreed by the Parties or ordered by the Court. Id. §§ 5(a)–(b) & (d)–(h), 6.

III. Locke Appears as Counsel of Record and Admits to Having Reviewed An OCEO Document the Next Day On March 24, 2025 Locke filed a notice of appearance in this matter. See Notice of Appearance of Counsel (Mar. 24, 2025). The following day, counsel for the Parties participated in a meet-and-confer regarding the Parties’ motions to seal, which was conducted by teleconference. Locke attended this meeting and other counsel for SafeLease represented that

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Locke is a “member of SafeLease’s outside counsel team.” Declaration of Defendants’ Counsel, A. Bergman, Exhibit E. During the meeting, Locke stated that he reviewed one of the TI hearing exhibits that Defendants marked OCEO as an example of a document he did not believe should be sealed, and he explained his reasoning based on the contents of the document. Id. At the end of the meeting, counsel for Defendants stated, for the record, that Defendants do not accept Plaintiff’s characterization of Locke as “outside counsel” for SafeLease, to which Locke responded “we’ll raise it with the Court.” Id. IV. Locke Refuses to Stop Accessing Storable’s OCEO Documents and to Provide a List of Which Storable OCEO Documents He Reviewed and When.

Later on March 25, 2025, and shortly after Locke’s admission that he reviewed an OCEO document, counsel for Defendants sent a letter to lead counsel for Plaintiff, P. Yetter, formally demanding that Locke cease and desist from viewing documents marked by Defendants as OCEO.

See K. Treistman Letter to P. Yetter (Mar. 25, 2025), Exhibit F. The letter requested (1) counsel’s confirmation that Locke would immediately and permanently cease and desist from reviewing OCEO documents unless and until any such OCEO designation is properly challenged and removed by the Court; and (2) a list of all documents marked OCEO by Defendants that Locke has reviewed. Id. The letter also requested a Rule 11 agreement to memorialize Plaintiff’s agreement that Locke will cease and desist from the improper conduct. See id. On March 26, 2025, Locke sent a response letter in which he insists that he is “outside counsel” and entitled to access Storable’s OCEO documents. See A. Locke Letter to K. Treistman (Mar. 26, 2025), Exhibit G. Locke’s response did not state whether he would provide the requested list of documents, nor whether he would agree to stop looking at Storable’s OCEO documents going forward.

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On March 28, counsel for Storable conferred with Locke by telephone and email and asked once again that he stop viewing Storable’s OCEO documents, and that, in the alternative he stop doing so temporarily while the parties resolve this issue in order to avoid the need to go to the Court on an expedited basis. Locke again insisted that he is SafeLease’s outside counsel and should have full access to Storable’s OCEO documents. See A. Locke Email to K. Treistman (Mar. 28, 2025), Exhibit H. His response did not address the proposed temporary pause. See id. On March 31, undersigned counsel sent Locke another letter asking him to confirm his refusal to stop accessing Storable’s OCEO documents and to provide the list of which OCEO documents he has reviewed and when. See K. Treistman Letter to A. Locke (Mar. 31, 2025), Exhibit I. The March 31 letter also proposed an alternative solution—namely that if Locke would agree to stop accessing Storable’s OCEO documents across the board, Storable would consider de-designations of certain OCEO documents if one of SafeLease’s outside law firms, Yetter Coleman or Stone Hilton, determines that Locke’s review of such documents is necessary for SafeLease to pursue its case. Id. at 2.

In a response letter on April 2, 2025, Locke confirmed his refusal to stop accessing Storable’s OCEO’s documents, but again refused to provide a response to the requested list of Storable’s OCEO documents that he reviewed and when he reviewed them. See A. Locke Letter to K. Treistman (Apr. 2, 2025), Exhibit J. Locke did, however, reject Storable’s proposal to discuss de-designations of particular OCEO documents that SafeLease’s outside law firms may need Locke to review. Id. at 3.

In yet another attempt to reach a resolution without the Court’s intervention, on April 3, Storable’s counsel conferred in writing asking SafeLease to confirm its refusal to provide the list

-6- of documents (which it failed to provide despite two requests). As of this filing, SafeLease has not responded to this final request.

Legal Standard The PO’s paragraph 15 provides that “[i]f a receiving party learns of any unauthorized disclosure of [OCEO], the party shall immediately upon learning of such disclosure inform the producing party of all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure . . . .” PO § 15, Exh. D. As with any order, Court has “all powers necessary” to enforce the PO. T EX. GOV. CODE § 21.001(a).

Those powers include aiding “the exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction,” facilitating “the administration of justice,” and preserving “the independence and independence and integrity of the judicial system.” Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Products, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 718 (Tex. 2020).

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure also allow courts to issue any protective orders regarding discovery “in the interest of justice.” T EX. R. CIV. P. § 192.6(b).

Argument and Authorities The Court should require SafeLease to disclose which of Storable’s OCEO documents Locke reviewed and when he reviewed them. The Court should also modify the PO to exclude Locke from viewing Storable’s OCEO documents going forward.

I. SafeLease Must Provide Facts Relevant to Determine Whether There Was Any Unauthorized Disclosure of Storable’s OCEO Documents.

The Court should order SafeLease to disclose which of Storable’ OCEO documents Locke reviewed and when he reviewed them. Under the PO, SafeLease is required to promptly disclose “all pertinent facts” relating to any unauthorized disclosure of OCEO documents. PO § 15, Exh.

D. The record shows that there has been at least some—if not a significant amount—of unauthorized disclosure of Storable’s OCEO documents. See Exhs. E, H, J.

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A. If Locke Was Not Permitted to View OCEO Documents, then Storable is Entitled to Know Which Documents He Reviewed First, and as an initial matter, it is not clear at all that an “outside general counsel” such as Locke is truly an “outside counsel” within the letter or spirit of the PO’s OCEO provisions. If he is not, then it is essential for SafeLease to disclose all Storable OCEO documents that Locke has viewed so that Storable and the Court can determine the extent of protected OCEO information that was compromised.

Under the PO, counsel permitted to view OCEO documents include “[a]ttorneys of record for the parties in this litigation . . . to whom it is necessary that the information be shown for purposes of this litigation.” PO §§ 5(a), 6 (emphasis added), Exh. D. OCEO materials, however, “may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party . . . .” Id. § 3 (emphasis added). SafeLease has already affirmed in open court that Locke is a “client representative[,]” TI Hr’g Tr. (Jan. 16, 2025) at 35:21–25, Exh. B, and expressly took the position that he needed to be excused from discussion and review of OCEO materials that were before the Court. TI Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 11, 2025) at 95:12–16, Exh. A.

Locke cannot erase, or attempt to somehow explain, these judicial admissions as to his role simply by filing a notice of appearance. If a party’s general counsel could do this, then it would render the PO’s OCEO restrictions a nullity. In any event, SafeLease has litigated this case for months before Locke’s March 24 notice of appearance—including prosecuting a TI motion before two different courts involving multiple days of hearings—so it is unclear why SafeLease’s general counsel now suddenly qualifies as attorney “to whom it is necessary that [OCEO] information be shown for purposes of this litigation.” PO §§ 5(a), 6 (emphasis added), Exh. D.

-8-

To the extent Locke does not qualify to review Storable’s OCEO documents under the PO, SafeLease is required under section 15 to provide Storable with, at minimum, a list of the OCEO documents Locke reviewed, and all other “pertinent facts relating to such disclosure[.]” Id. § 15.1 B. Even if Locke Might Qualify to Review OCEO Materials—Storable is Still Entitled to Know Which Documents he Reviewed and When.

Even if Locke’s March 24, 2025 notice of appearance could transform him from a client “representative” (required to be excluded from OCEO materials), into an “outside counsel” with full access to those materials under the PO (which is not clear at all), Storable is plainly entitled to know which of its OCEO materials Locke reviewed and, most importantly, when (or, at minimum, whether the review occurred before or after his appearance). See id. § 15. At bare minimum, counsel must file an appearance in the case to be an “attorney of record” who may view OCEO materials under the PO. Id. §§ 5(a), 6 (emphasis added).

There can be no realistic dispute that Locke’s review, if any, of Storable’s OCEO documents before his March 24 notice of appearance would have been improper. Given that Locke filed his notice of appearance at 6:26 PM on March 24, 2025—yet was discussing a Storable OCEO document that he reviewed at the parties’ 2:00 PM meet-and-confer the very next day (see Exh. E), it is possible, if not likely, that Locke was accessing and viewing Storable’s OCEO documents before his March 24, 6:26 PM notice of appearance. At minimum, there is enough indicia of unauthorized disclosure to trigger SafeLease’s requirement to provide Storable with the pertinent facts—including which OCEO documents Locke reviewed and when—pursuant to section 15 of the PO.

Storable respectfully reserves it right to move for an order to show cause or other relief for any violations of the PO.

It does not do so at this time simply because it was necessary to seek the more limited relief in this motion on an expedited basis—namely to (1) get the information needed to investigate any unauthorized disclosure of its OCEO information in the first instance and (2) to seek modification of the PO going forward. If the Court determines on its own that an order to show cause is warranted, Storable respectfully requests that it be permitted to provide its position in the ordinary course and consistent with the Court’s procedures.

-9-

II. The Court Should Modify PO Section 3 to Expressly Exclude Locke from Viewing Storable’s OCEO Information.

When the PO was entered on February 27, 2025, everyone—the Court, Storable, and SafeLease’s lead counsel, Mr. Yetter—understood that Locke was a “client representative” of SafeLease who had to be excluded from viewing OCEO materials. See Exh. A, Exh. B. Regardless of whether the PO as written permits Locke to change hats simply by filing a notice of appearance, going forward, the Court should modify section 3 of the PO as follows to reflect the Parties’ and the Court’s understanding at the time it was entered: 3. . . . More specifically, an “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” designation means that the materials so denoted may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or a subsequent Order by this Court. For the avoidance of doubt, materials containing an “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” designation produced by Defendants may not be disclosed to attorney Adam Locke, who is Plaintiff’s outside general counsel, except by agreement or a subsequent Order of this Court.

Modifying the PO in this manner is “in the interests of justice” for several reasons.

First, the PO was an agreed protective order which the parties negotiated and which the Court entered (with slight modifications not relevant here). At the time of the Parties’ agreement, Storable did not know that Locke planned to appear in the case as counsel of record and obtain access to OCEO documents. Neither Locke nor SafeLease ever disclosed this intention before the PO was entered, and indeed, Locke did not actually file his appearance until almost a month after the PO was entered. Instead, SafeLease made exactly the opposite representation regarding Locke’s role at the hearings before this Court and the District Court. See Exh. A, Exh. B. Neither a party’s good faith agreement to a protective order, nor a Court’s approval of such an order, should ever be procured on a bait-and-switch basis as SafeLease has done here—and least of all where the agreement at issue concerns a party’s confidential and competitively sensitive materials produced with the expectation that the opposing party’s client representatives, like Locke, would

-10- not see them. The Court should ensure that the PO’s provisions fairly reflect the Parties’ and the Court’s mutual understanding as to who could review OCEO documents at the time the order was entered.

Second, even putting aside settled expectations at the time the PO was entered, Locke is objectively a client representative of SafeLease who should not in fairness be permitted to view Storable’s OCEO documents going forward. Locke’s correspondences regarding this matter admit that he is SafeLease’s “outside general counsel”—a role in which he provides SafeLease with “general legal advice” that SafeLease relies on. Exh. G at 2–3. This role is different from an outside counsel retained for this litigation. SafeLease is a direct competitor of Storable, and Storable’s OCEO materials include competitively sensitive information. See PO § 3, Exh. D (OCEO documents include “trade secrets or other non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information”). Storable’s right to the confidentiality and propriety of such information under the PO is violated if individuals like Locke, who are involved in SafeLease’s general business operations or discussions, are privy to OCEO documents.

Finally, SafeLease will not be prejudiced if Locke were to be excluded from viewing Storable’s OCEO materials. This is not a situation in which a business litigant with limited means cannot afford more than one lawyer to serve as its general counsel and its outside litigation counsel.

Rather, independent of Locke, SafeLease has hired two entirely capable outside law firms, Yetter Coleman and Stone Hilton, that were ably handling this case for months before Locke filed his March 24 notice of appearance. If Locke is excluded from OCEO materials, SafeLease will still have several qualified and experienced outside counsel with access to these documents. Further, Storable remains willing to consider de-designating certain OCEO documents if SafeLease’s outside law firms determine that Locke needs to review them (see Exh. I at 2), and even if the

-11- parties cannot agree on de-designations, the PO has a procedure for challenging OCEO designations. See PO § 17, Exh. D.

III. The Grounds for the Relief Sought in this Motion Call for Expedited Consideration In this case between competitors, the PO’s OCEO provisions apply to the Parties’ highly sensitive trade secret, financial, and other proprietary information. See id. § 3. Accordingly, under the PO, Storable has a right to be “immediately” informed of “all pertinent facts” relating to any unauthorized disclosure of its OCEO information. Id. § 15. Similarly, wrongful disclosure of trade secret information, even under a protective order, constitutes irreparable harm. See In re Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding) (emphasis added). SafeLease has refused to provide the requested information, and Locke has refused to stop viewing Storable’s OCEO documents—either in general or even temporarily to avoid the need Court intervention.

Conclusion Accordingly, Storable respectfully requests that the Court expedite its consideration of this Motion and require SafeLease to disclose which of Storable’s OCEO documents Locke viewed and when; modify the February 27, 2025 PO to exclude Locke from viewing OCEO materials going forward; and grant any other relief to which Storable may justly be entitled.

Respectfully submitted April 4, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected]

-12-

Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) Colorado Bar No. 60688 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 1144 Fifteenth St, Suite 3100 Denver, Colorado 80202 Tel.: (303) 863–1000 Fax: (303) 863–2301 [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

-13-

Certificate of Conference The Parties conferred multiple times via email, telephone calls, and letters exchanged from March 25, 2025 through April 3, 2025 regarding the relief requested in this Motion. Counsel for Plaintiff indicated that it would not discontinue Mr. Locke’s access to OCEO materials. Counsel for Plaintiff failed to response to repeated requests for the disclosure of information requested in this Motion. On April 3, 2025, counsel for Defendants attempted one final time to confer with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding Plaintiff’s position on the relief requested in this Motion. As of this filing on April 4, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel has not responded. Due to the exigent nature of the underlying dispute, Defendants have proceeded to file this Motion, despite the lack of response.

Based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s statements in the parties’ meet-and-confer discussions, it is my understanding that Plaintiff is opposed to the relief requested in this Motion. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 3,783 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on April 4, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

-14- Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 99322069 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Storable's Motion to Modify Protective Order - Require Disclosure and Request for Expedited Consideration Status as of 4/7/2025 9:37 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 99322069 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Storable's Motion to Modify Protective Order - Require Disclosure and Request for Expedited Consideration Status as of 4/7/2025 9:37 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 4/4/2025 8:29:07 PM SENT

EXHIBIT A

137 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD 2 VOLUME 3 OF 13 VOLUMES CAUSE NO. 15-25-00020-CV 4 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 5 Sitting at Austin, Texas STORABLE, INC.; REDNOVA LABS, INC. (D/B/A STOREDGE); SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC; EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC; BADER CO.; AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP 9 V. 10 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC -------------------------------------------------------- 12 REPORTER'S RECORD 13 FEBRUARY 11, 2025 -------------------------------------------------------- On the 11th day of February, 2025, the hearing on Discovery Motions and a Temporary Injunction came on to be heard in the above-entitled and -numbered cause; and the following proceedings were had before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in Austin, Travis County, Texas: 19 Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype machine; Reporter's Record produced by computer-assisted transcription.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 138 95

1 THE COURT: Thank you very much.

2 If the plaintiff would like to go forward with their first witness.

4 MR. YETTER: Yes. Our first witness is Dr. Williams, as I said earlier; and our colleague, Mr. Schamel, will present his examination.

7 MR. TORGERSON: We would like to invoke the rule as to fact witnesses, and I would like time to rearrange with my co-counsel.

10 THE COURT: Okay.

11 MR. YETTER: I neglected to introduce our CEO, who is our corporate representative. That is Mr. Stein, Steven Stein; and the outside general counsel is Adam Locke, L-O-C-K-E. He is not a witness; but when we get into outside/counsel only, we will ask both of them to be excused. But they're not subject to the rule because one is a lawyer and one is our corporate representative. Thank you.

19 MR. SCHAMEL: Good morning, Your Honor.

20 SafeLease calls Dr. Williams.

21 (Whereupon, the witness was sworn) 22 MR. SCHAMEL: May it please the court.

23 THE COURT: Please proceed.

24 MR. SCHAMEL: Before I get started, we prepared a PowerPoint slide. May I approach and give

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 139 327

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF HARRIS

4 I, Kimberly Kidd, Deputy Court Reporter in and for the Business Court of Texas, Third Division, Travis County, Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted, tendered in an offer of proof or offered into evidence.

17 I further certify that the total cost for te preparation of this Reporter's Record is $2,837.65 and was paid by Defendant.

20 WITNESS my hand this the 12th day of March, 2025.

/s/Kimberly Kidd 23 Kimberly Kidd, Texas CSR No. 2437 Expiration Date: 8/31/26 24 Deputy Court Reporter 1104 Londonderry Avenue 25 Friendswood, Texas 77546 [email protected]

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected]

EXHIBIT B

1 REPORTER'S RECORD CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, )IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LLC, ) 4 Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) )TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS ) (D/B/A storEDGE), SITELINK ) SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE ) SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND) PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, ) Defendants. )345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ________________________________________________________ TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING ________________________________________________________ 17 On the 16th day of January, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be held in the above-titled and numbered cause before the Honorable Jessica Mangrum, Judge Presiding, held in Austin, Travis County, Texas.

21 Proceedings reported in computerized machine shorthand by a Texas Certified Shorthand Reporter, Certification Number 7076.

1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 THURSDAY, JANUARY 16, 2025 3 (9:07 a.m.)

4 THE COURT: All right. Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the 200th District Court. We are here this morning in Cause No. GN-24-010233, SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC versus Storable, Inc., et al.

8 If we could start off with introductions, just let me know you're here and who you're representing.

11 APPEARANCES 12 MR. YETTER: Yes, good morning, Your Honor. Paul Yetter for the Plaintiff, and with me are my colleagues: Susanna Allen, who is with me -- 15 MS. ALLEN: Good morning.

16 THE COURT: Good morning.

17 MR. YETTER: -- at Counsel table. Luke Schamel will be here. Shannon Smith is behind me and my colleague Alyssa Smith and Bronson Parker is our courtroom graphics person.

21 And, Your Honor, our client representatives in the back: Steven Stein; he is -- will be a witness, and he is also the chief executive of the Plaintiff, and the outside General Counsel is Adam Locke, who is next to him.

1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE STATE OF TEXAS ) COUNTY OF TRAVIS ) 5 I, Janis Simon, Official Court Reporter in and for the 200th District Court of Travis, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were reported by me.

14 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

17 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND this 30th day of January, 2025.

19 /s/ Janis Simon 20 Janis Simon, CSR Texas CSR 7076 21 Expires: 07/31/2026 Official Court Reporter 22 200th District Court Travis County, Texas 23 P.O. Box 1748 Austin, Texas 78767 24 Telephone: (512) 854-9325

EXHIBIT C

01231245ÿ7289 ÿ 

Experienced leader will focus on operational efficiencies, risk management, and ongoing compliance to accelerate company growth • Locke has a strong track record of driving efficiencies and managing complex processes at law firms and early-stage companies • His experience as an outside general counsel and corporate attorney brings a new perspective to the Safelease leadership team and positions the company to effectively manage risk AUSTIN,July 20,2022 - SafeLease, the leader in self-storage tenant protection, is pleased to announce the appointment of Adam Locke as the company's Chief Operating Officer. Locke will focus on ensuring the company's strategic business objectives are met by increasing operational capabilities and driving efficiencies across all functional departments.

Locke worked with Safe Lease as an outside advisor prior to joining the company as its COO. During that time, he gained expert knowledge of SafeLease's products, market positioning, and the value the company delivers to its customers.

"SafeLease is excited to bring Adam on board to spearhead new operational initiatives," says Steven Stein, Founder and CEO at SafeLease. "His deep regulatory acumen and

8111  1     !      "#   710 01231245ÿ7289 ÿ  cross-functional strengths complement our fast-growing product, sales, and marketing functions."

"SafeLease is well-positioned to redefine risk management solutions for the commercial real estate industry," says Locke. ''The space SafeLease is innovating in is ripe for disruption. With such a talented team and tremendous market opportunity, I was thrilled to join. I look forward to working with my new colleagues to ensure the company reaches its full potential."

Prior to joining SafeLease, Locke owned and ran a boutique law firm where he was outside general counsel to tech startups, commercial real estate firms, and investment managers. Locke also owned and operated an advisory firm focused on legal assets. He has advised on transactions totaling over $200 million.

Locke began his career as a litigator and advisor at corporate law firms and clerked for a federal appellate judge. He earned a law degree from Yale.

Click here to read the press release on Cision PR Newswire.

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EXHIBIT D

FILED IN BUSINESS COURT 149 OF TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 2/27/2025 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § Defendants. § AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER & TEMPORARY SEALING ORDER The Court enters the following Agreed Protective Order and Temporary Sealing Order (the Agreed Protective Order or Protective Order) as agreed to by the parties, except that the Court has deleted paragraph 24 and modified paragraph 20 to comply with Rule 76a and grant a temporary sealing order.

In order to expedite the flow of discovery material, facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality, adequately protect material entitled to be kept confidential, and ensure that protection is afforded only to material so entitled, entry of this Agreed Protective Order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6 is merited. This Protective Order applies to materials produced in advance of the Temporary Injunction hearing and functions as the operative Protective Order for this matter until such time as this Order is amended or replaced.

It is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information and Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information produced or exchanged by the parties in the course of this litigation, including information produced by third parties/non-parties, shall be used solely for the purpose of preparation, trial, and appeal of this litigation and for no other purpose whatsoever, and shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms hereof.

2. “Confidential Information” as used herein means any information of any type, kind, or character which is designated as “Confidential” by any of the supplying or receiving parties, including third parties/non-parties supplying said information, whether it be a document, information contained in a document, discovery materials, information or testimony revealed during a deposition, or otherwise.

3. “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information” as used herein means any information that is “Confidential” as described herein and additionally may not be disclosed to anyone except the Qualified Persons described in Paragraph 6, infra. “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information” includes trade secrets or other non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information. More specifically, an “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” designation means that the materials so denoted may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or a subsequent Order by this Court.

4. In designating information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” a party or third party/non-party supplying information will make such designation only as to that information that it in good faith believes contains “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information. Information or material which is available to the public, including industry materials, advertising materials, and the like shall not be classified as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.”

5. “Qualified Persons” as used herein for “Confidential Information” means: (a) Attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees and/or agents of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the information be shown for purposes of this litigation; (b) Actual or potential independent experts or consultants (and their administrative or clerical staff) engaged in connection with this litigation (which shall not include the current employees, officers, members, or agents of the parties or affiliates of the parties) who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (c) The parties and their respective in-house counsel, paralegals, legal staff or experts; (d) The Court and its staff, including court reporters; (e) Vendors engaged by the parties or the parties’ respective counsel, including independent copy services, printers, or illustrators, and court reporters for the purpose of this litigation who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (f) The authors and original recipients of the documents or information unless any such person no longer has a right to access or possess any such documents or information by virtue of a change in employment, position, or other circumstance; (g) The designated corporate representative for the party that produced the documents or information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only”; or (h) By agreement of the parties, or if this Court so elects, any other person designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all the parties and hearing.

6. For “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information,” “Qualified Persons” includes (a), (b), and (d) - (h), above.

7. Documents produced in this action may be designated by any party or parties or by any third party and/or non-party producing said documents as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information by marking each page of the document(s) with the word(s) “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.” However, for documents produced in electronic native form, such as Excel spreadsheets, the designation may be affixed to the drive, disk, or other medium on which the documents or materials are produced or in the file names without marking each page of the documents or materials “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.”

8. In lieu of marking the original of a document, if the original is not produced, the designating party may mark the copies that are produced or exchanged.

9. Information disclosed at (a) the deposition of a party or one of its present or former officers, directors, employees, agents or independent experts retained by counsel for the purpose of this litigation, or (b) the deposition of a third party (which information pertains to a party) may be designated by any party, including a third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed, as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information by indicating on the record at the deposition that the testimony is “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” and is subject to the provisions of this Order.

10. Any party or third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed may also designate said information disclosed at such deposition as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by notifying all of the parties, in writing within 30 days of receipt of the transcript, of the specific pages and lines of the transcript which should be treated as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” thereafter. Each party shall attach a copy of such written notice or notices to the face of the transcript and each copy thereof in his possession, custody or control. All deposition transcripts shall be treated as “Confidential” for a period of 30 days after the receipt of the transcript, apart from any portions designated on the record as “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” which portions shall be treated as Attorneys’ Eyes Only.

11. To the extent possible, the court reporter shall segregate into separate transcripts information designated as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” with blank, consecutively numbered pages being provided in a non-designated main transcript. The separate transcript containing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information shall have page numbers that correspond to the blank pages in the main transcript.

12. “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information shall not be disclosed or made available by the receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons as delineated above. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Protective Order restricts the ability of a party and/or third party/non-party to review, disclose, or disseminate its own documents or information as it sees fit.

13. Documents produced prior to entry of this Protective Order may be retroactively designated “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by notice in writing of the designated class of each document by Bates number within 30 days of the entry of this Protective Order.

Documents unintentionally produced without designation as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” may be retroactively designated in the same manner and shall be treated appropriately from the date written notice of the designation is provided to the receiving party. The burden shall be on the party claiming confidentiality to prove the confidential nature of the documents.

14. Documents to be inspected shall be treated as “Confidential” during inspection. At the time of copying for the receiving parties, such inspected documents shall be marked or stamped prominently “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by the producing party.

15. If a receiving party learns of any unauthorized disclosure of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” the party shall immediately upon learning of such disclosure inform the producing party of all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure and shall make all reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure by each unauthorized person who received such information.

16. Nothing herein shall prevent disclosure beyond the terms of this Protective Order if each party or third party/non-party designating the information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” consents in writing to such disclosure or if the Court orders such disclosure.

Nor shall anything herein prevent any counsel of record from utilizing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information in the examination or cross-examination of any person who is indicated on the document as being an author, source or recipient of the “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information, or if counsel has a reasonable belief that such person was an author, source or recipient of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information irrespective of which party or third party/non-party produced such information.

17. A party shall not be obligated to challenge the propriety of a designation as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” at the time made, and a failure to do so shall not preclude a subsequent challenge thereto. In the event that any party to this litigation disagrees at any stage of these proceedings with the designation by the designating party of any information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” or the designation of any person as a

Qualified Person, the parties shall first try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an informal basis, such as production of redacted copies. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the objecting party may invoke this Protective Order by objecting in writing to the party or third party/non-party who has designated the document or information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” or designated any person as a Qualified Person. The designating party shall be required to move the Court for an order preserving the designated status of such information or person within 30 business days of receipt of the written objection. The disputed information shall remain “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” unless and until the Court orders otherwise. Failure to move for an order shall constitute a termination of the restricted status of such item unless the parties otherwise agree. The party or third party/non-party objecting to disclosure bears the burden of proof to establish the confidentiality of the document.

18. The parties may, by stipulation, provide for exceptions to this Protective Order, and any party may seek an order of this Court modifying this Protective Order.

19. Nothing shall be regarded as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information if it is information that either: (a) is in the public domain at the time of disclosure supported by appropriate evidence; or (b) becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the other party, as supported by appropriate evidence.

20. The following provisions govern the treatment of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information used in connection with Court filings or proceedings: (a) Temporary Sealing Order. There have been hearings in this case in connection with plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and temporary injunction

(TI). The Court has determined that the criteria of Rule 76a(5) is satisfied and hereby GRANTS a temporary sealing order covering (1) the exhibits that are designated as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” and (2) the transcripts of those proceedings. This temporary sealing order will remain in effect until March 24, 2025. (b) Sealing Motion, Notice, and Hearing. At 1 p.m. on March 20, 2025, the Court will hold a hearing on whether to permanently seal the materials covered by the temporary sealing order in subsection (a), above. At least 14 days before the hearing, the parties, either jointly or individually, must (1) file a motion to seal any portions of the material covered by the temporary sealing order that should not be made public upon expiration of the temporary sealing order; and (2) comply with the notice requirements of Rule 76a(3). The motion(s) must identify the specific portions of the hearing transcript(s) to be sealed by page and line. The Court will not seal the entire transcript(s). The exhibits to be sealed must be identified by exhibit numbers.

Any documents or transcripts previously provided to the Court need not be provided again, but any transcripts or exhibits that a party seeks to seal that were not previously provided to the Court should be provided to the Court in the same manner as the hearing exhibits for the TI hearing and served on the other parties subject to this Agreed Protective Order. (c) Future hearings. For future hearings at which the parties expect to disclose “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information or documents containing such information, the parties may move for a temporary sealing order under Rule 76a(5) before the hearing. Any material at issue in the motion that has not previously been provided to the Court should be provided to the Court for in camera inspection but not filed in the case. If granted, the temporary sealing order will remain in place for 30 days after the hearing and may be extended for good cause. The parties may move for permanent sealing by obtaining a hearing date from the Court and complying with Rule 76a and the procedures in subsection (b), above, relating to the motion and notice. For any part of the hearing record that contains “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information that has been sealed under a prior sealing order, the motion to seal need only identify the portion of the record (by page and line or exhibit number) to be sealed and the applicable sealing order. (d) Filings. To the extent documents containing or revealing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information are filed in this Court after the date of this order, the parties shall undertake the following procedures: 1. The filing party must redact any material that would disclose “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information from the Court filing and simultaneously serve an unredacted version on the other parties subject to this Protective Order.

2. The redacted filing must identify the redacted material by Bates Number, page and line, or as specifically as possible.

3. The parties have five days after such filing to move to temporarily or permanently seal the designated information. If no motion to seal is timely filed, the filing party will file the unredacted version of the document with the Court. If a motion to seal is timely filed, the filing party will wait until the Court rules on the motion to seal, then file the unredacted version of the document under seal or not under seal, as dictated by the Court’s ruling.

4. The foregoing notwithstanding, if the parties agree that any or all of the redacted material is not needed for the resolution of the matter, that material may remain redacted, will not become part of the Court’s record, and will not be considered by, relied on, or before the Court.

(e) - Trial. - - The use of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information at trial will be addressed in the pretrial order and/or at the pretrial conference.

(f) The parties understand that material provided to the Court for in camera inspection but not filed in the case will not be part of the record unless further action is taken.

(g) The parties understand that material filed in the case under a temporary sealing order may become part of the public record if a permanent sealing order is denied.

21. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the Court, all proceedings involving or relating to “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents or information shall be subject to the provisions of this Protective Order.

22. After the conclusion of this litigation and any appeal thereof, any “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents and all copies or reproductions of such documents produced by a party or third party/non-party in the possession of any of the “Qualified Persons” shall be returned to the producing party or third party/non-party within 60 days of receipt of a timely written request by said producing party or third party/non-party, except as this Court may otherwise order or to the extent such information was used as evidence at the trial. As far as the provisions of any protective orders entered in this action restrict the communication and use of the documents produced thereunder, such orders shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this litigation, except (a) that there shall be no restriction on documents that are used as exhibits in open court, and (b) that a party may seek the written permission of the producing party or order of the Court with respect to dissolution or modification of such protective orders. Alternatively, at the conclusion of this litigation, in lieu of the actual physical return of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents, counsel for each party may provide a certification certifying that (1) all experts and any other person(s) receiving “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents have been instructed to delete or destroy all documents; and (2) all “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents in the possession of counsel have been deleted or destroyed.

23. Any party designating any person as a “Qualified Person” shall have the duty to reasonably ensure that such person observes the terms of this Protective Order.

Signed this 27th day of February, 2025.

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge Presiding

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, § INC. (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EXHIBIT A AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY TERMS OF PROTECTIVE ORDER My name is, , my date of birth is , and my address is, . I have read and am familiar with the terms of the Protective Order concerning the records and testimony produced by the respective parties in this case, and I agree to abide by all terms of said Protective Order and not to reveal or otherwise communicate any of the information disclosed to me pursuant thereto to anyone except in accordance with the terms of said Protective Order. I agree not to make any use of that information or materials other than for the purpose of this litigation.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in County, State of Date:

EXHIBIT E

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ______________________________________________________________________________ Declaration of Andrew D. Bergman ______________________________________________________________________________ I, Andrew David Bergman, hereby declare as follows: 1. I am over the age of 18, of sound mind, and competent to make this declaration.

2. I am an attorney licensed in Texas. My State Bar number is 24101507. I am employed by the law firm Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, and my office address is 700 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000, Houston, Texas 77002.

3. I am one of the attorneys representing Defendants Storable, Inc., RedNova Labs, Inc., SiteLink Software, LLC, Easy Storage Solutions, LLC, Bader Co., and Property First Group, LP (collectively “Defendants”) in the above-styled case.

4. I attended a meet-and-confer meeting with counsel for both Defendants and Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Service, LLC (“Plaintiff”) on March 25, 2025 at approximately 2:00 pm CT. Counsel for Plaintiff requested the meeting to confer regarding the parties’ then- forthcoming motions to seal exhibits and transcripts from the temporary injunction hearings pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a.

5. The March 25 meet-and-confer was conducted via teleconference (e.g. , Teams).

The attendees present for Defendants included Ms. Elizabeth Eoff and myself. The attendees present for Plaintiff included Ms. Susanna Allen, Ms. Shannon Smith, and Mr. Adam Locke.

6. At the beginning of the meeting, one of the attorneys present for Plaintiff other than Mr. Locke introduced Mr. Locke as a " member of SafeLease's outside counsel team ."

7. During the meeting, Mr. Locke gave an example of an exhibit to the TI hearing that Defendants had marked as "Outside Counsel 's Eyes Only," and which Defendants had designated for potential sealing, but that he (Mr. Locke) believed should not be sealed. Mr. Locke explained his reasons why the document should not be sealed. I do not recall whether Mr. Locke specified the exact document, and his discussion of the document was not specific enough that it could be readily identified, however, he clearly stated that the document was marked by Defendants as "Outside Counsel 's Eyes Only."

8. Near the end of the meeting, I stated that Defendants "do not accept [Plaintiffs] characterization of Mr. Locke as 'outside counsel. "' In response, Mr. Locke stated that "we ' ll raise it with the Court."

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this o/-r~ day of A~e IL- , 2025.

EXHIBIT F

Arnold&Porter Katherine Ginzburg Treistman +1 713.576.2433 Direct [email protected]

March 25, 2025

VIA E-MAIL R. Paul Yetter YETTER COLEMAN LLP Main St., Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 [email protected] Re: SafeLease Ins. Servs., LLC v. Storable, Inc., et al., Cause No. 35-BC03A- 0001 (Tex. Bus. Ct. 3d Div.) Paul: I understand that Mr. Locke joined the meet-and-confer with counsel for the Parties today. On that call, other counsel for SafeLease attempted to hold out Mr. Locke as “a member of SafeLease’s outside counsel team.” During the call, Mr. Locke affirmatively stated that he had reviewed a document marked by Defendants as “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” (“OCEO”).

Mr. Locke is not outside counsel for SafeLease, and he is not permitted to view any documents that Defendants have marked OCEO pursuant to the Court’s February 27, 2025 Agreed Protective Order. You know this because you represented to the Court at the TI hearing on February 11, 2025 that SafeLease’s “outside general counsel is Adam Locke” and that “when we get into outside/counsel only, we will ask [him] to be excused.” Feb.

11, 2025 Tr. at 95:13–16. Moreover, it is my understanding that he is the former Chief Operating Officer, as well as potentially a witness in the case given his involvement during that time frame in that role. Given the above roles, merely the filing a notice of appearance on March 24, 2025 does not transform him into outside counsel.

This letter is a formal demand that Mr. Locke immediately cease and desist from reviewing any and all documents that Defendants have marked OCEO. Within hours of your receipt of this letter, please do the following: (1) Confirm Mr. Locke will immediately desist from viewing any documents that Defendants have marked OCEO;

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP I 700 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 | Houston, TX 77002-2755 | www.arnoldporter.com Arnold&Porter Paul Yetter March 25, 2025 Page 2 (2) Provide a list of any and all documents marked OCEO by Defendants that Mr. Locke has reviewed; and (3) Confirm by your countersignature below SafeLease’s agreement, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11, that Mr. Locke will permanently cease and desist from reviewing any document marked by Defendants as OCEO, unless and until such designation is removed in accordance with the Court’s February 27, 2025 Agreed Protective Order or other order of the Court.

Absent your agreement to the above, we’ll move for protection with the Court.

Thanks in advance.

Respectfully yours,

Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Attorney for Defendants

AGREED AND ACCEPTED BY:

___________________________ R. Paul Yetter Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT G LDCKELAW 2617 Bissonnet, Ste. 503, Houston, Texas 77005 Tel: 713-832-0242 • Fax: 713-565-4709 Attorney Adam Locke Direct: 713-832-0243 • [email protected]

March 26, 2025 Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002-2755 Via email: [email protected] Re: SafeLease Ins. Servs., LLC v. Storable, Inc., et al., Cause No. 35-BC03A- 0001 (Tex. Bus. Ct. 3d Div.) Dear Katherine: I received a copy of the cease and desist letter you sent yesterday to my co-counsel, Paul Yetter, which demanded action of me and my law firm within 24 hours. The letter, which suggests that I may violate a Court order, reflects a serious misunderstanding of my outside counsel relationship with SafeLease, of my law firm serving dozens of clients, of my ongoing role in the litigation prior to your appearance, and of my own professional ethics, which I believe you know well. I will respond to your letter in some detail in the hope of avoiding another needless dispute in this important litigation.

1. I Have Honored and Will Continue to Honor the Agreed Protective Order.

First and foremost, I’m writing to assure your clients that my appearing as an attorney of record for SafeLease in this matter will not compromise the protections in the Agreed Protective Order. Please be assured that I will faithfully abide by all obligations the Court has imposed on counsel of record relating to materials defendants have designated as Outside Counsel Eyes Only (“OCO”). I have read the Agreed Protective Order, and I acknowledge that my access to OCO materials comes with strict limitations — all of which I will honor. In particular, your clients can rest assured that I will honor the following obligations: • I will use OCO materials only to prepare for, try, and appeal this matter. • I will not use OCO materials to advise SafeLease on business or legal matters. • I will not disclose OCO materials to SafeLease employees, agents, or affiliates.

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 169 March 26, 2025 Page 2 • I will disclose OCO materials, and offer advice based on it, only as permitted by the Protective Order.

I understand that the above obligations are just some of the limitations on my conduct pursuant to the Protective Order. For example, I recognize that accessing OCO materials in this litigation may limit my participation in business dealings or negotiations between the parties if they implicate OCO information. Accordingly, I will ensure that I am walled off from dealings or negotiations between the parties where, for example, my participation or advice may give or appear to give SafeLease an unfair advantage because of knowledge of OCO materials.

In short, I fully understand and take seriously the limitations in the Protective Order. I will protect your clients’ non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information that is designated as OCO. And I will adhere strictly to the limits imposed on me as an attorney of record for SafeLease. These are commitments that I share with all other counsel of record in this case.

2. I Am Outside Counsel for SafeLease and Have Been Since July 2023.

As you know, from our 20-minute phone call on March 7, 2025, which you initiated and I welcomed, I am outside counsel for SafeLease. On that call, you asked if I was “in house” at SafeLease. I replied that I was not. I explained that I had been outside counsel for SafeLease since July 2023, that like many litigators at private firms, I provided general legal advice to my longtime client (which I have represented since 2021), and that through my law firm Lockelaw PLLC, I represent dozens of clients — of which SafeLease was just one.

Following my explanation, you responded that you “got it” and understood I was — like many lawyers in private practice — representing a longtime client in an array of matters, as its de facto “outside general counsel.” To my surprise, your letter suggests you now don’t understand my role. If so, please allow me to further explain my role and history with SafeLease.

I launched my firm in 2020, during the height of the pandemic, with a handful of clients who helped me keep the lights on. SafeLease was not one of them. I did not begin representing SafeLease until 2021. After a year of working with SafeLease, I was invited to join the company as Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel. I accepted this invitation, but even while employed by SafeLease, with SafeLease’s permission, I maintained my firm and a limited roster of loyal clients. By 2023, demand for my services had grown, and I felt a strong pull back to private practice. By June, SafeLease’s CEO, Steven Stein, and I had come to a mutual decision where I would continue to represent SafeLease as outside counsel but would no longer have any in-house role or relationship with SafeLease. My decision had real consequences: as part of my departure and transition, I forfeited a significant amount of company stock and benefits. I did so in order to build an independent firm and serve a broader range of clients as outside counsel.

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 170 March 26, 2025 Page 3

Thankfully, my law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, has done reasonably well. I have represented dozens of clients since mid-2023. They range from individuals and startups to investment funds and public companies. I offer my clients a variety of legal services. While I handle disputes, I also advise them on a variety of legal issues: e.g., employment and labor issues, regulatory issues, investigations, and commercial agreements. Some of my clients either don’t have the resources to hire in-house counsel or simply appreciate my flexibility, so they rely on me for general legal advice. SafeLease falls into this category.

SafeLease’s reliance on me for general legal advice does not transform me into an in-house lawyer for SafeLease. As a simple Google search will show, countless lawyers at large law firms — including your fine firm — serve as “outside general counsel” for their clients, including clients where they previously served in an in-house role. My arrangement is hardly unique, and your letter’s suggestion that my prior operating role with SafeLease somehow disqualifies me from representing SafeLease as its counsel in this action is baseless.

My role for SafeLease is not news to Storable. Storable knew that I operated a law firm independently of SafeLease before this dispute arose in December 2024. Indeed, Storable’s in- house general counsel, Neil Verma, joined me for coffee on the morning of December 6, 2024, before Storable cut off SafeLease’s authorized user accounts. During our coffee meeting, he noted that he and Storable’s CEO Chuck Gordon knew I was working independently of SafeLease, and it would be great for Storable to hire me if it wouldn’t pose a conflict (I politely noted it would).

In short, for Storable to now suggest that I am not independent of SafeLease — and that my past role excludes me from being its outside counsel — is misguided and ignores my recent discussions with both you and Storable.

3. Mr. Yetter’s Comment Does Not Transform Me into an In-House Lawyer.

Finally, your letter notes that Mr. Yetter said at the February 11 TI hearing that SafeLease’s “outside general counsel is Adam Locke.” This is true. My legal services can be more or less categorized as falling under “outside general counsel” services, as I explained above. Your letter then notes that Mr. Yetter said, “when we get into outside/counsel only, we will ask [him] to be excused.” It seems to suggest, incorrectly, that Mr. Yetter’s statement implies that I am not “outside counsel” to SafeLease or cannot become counsel of record in this action.

Simply put, Mr. Yetter’s reference to “outside/counsel only” was a reference to the Protective Order’s distinction between discovery materials designated for counsel of record in this action (i.e., OCO) and materials that all other lawyers, advisors, etc. are able to see (including

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 171 March 26, 2025 Page 4 materials marked as merely “confidential”). At the time of the hearing, I was not counsel of record in this action, as I had not filed an appearance for SafeLease.

While my client felt that a good-faith settlement was possible, I was not counsel of record for SafeLease and did not have access to OCO materials. As such, I was in a position to maintain equal footing with Mr. Verma so that he and I could engage in good faith efforts to resolve this dispute. Regrettably, those efforts failed. And just weeks ago, you told me on our phone call that I was not to direct any further settlement communications to Mr. Verma, but rather to talk only to you — outside counsel to outside counsel — about settlement.

Respectfully, your letter tries to contort Mr. Yetter’s reference to the Protective Order into an admission that I am not outside counsel to SafeLease, despite admitted evidence to the contrary.

Lastly, let me add my hope that your own experience with me and my professional ethics is consistent with the contents and assurances of this letter. A dozen years ago, after clerking for the Fifth Circuit, I started my legal career at a (then-small) commercial litigation boutique where you were a respected partner. As I’ve told you, I always thought highly of you. Recently, on our call, you offered very kind words to me, which I greatly appreciated. Those kind words, and your personal experience with me on which they were based, are at odds with the tone and suggestions of your letter. Based on what you know about me, and on what I have shared with you in this response, I sincerely hope that this much is clear: the demands in your letter are unfounded.

I trust that this resolves any legitimate concerns that Storable may have.

Sincerely,

Adam Locke

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM

EXHIBIT H

--------------------- From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, March 28, 2025 1:11:46 PM To: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]> Subject: SafeLease/Storable — Protective Order and OCO External E-mail Katherine - Thank you for making time today to discuss your clients’ concerns about my representation of SafeLease as counsel of record.

I appreciate and share your desire not to burden the Court with matters that the parties should be able to resolve by agreement.

As we have discussed, and as stated in my response to your clients’ cease and desist letter, I am outside counsel to SafeLease and have been since July 2023. I have a broad client base. I run my own firm and have since 2020.

Most importantly, I will fully abide by the Agreed Protective Order. You and your clients have my word. As an attorney and officer of the Court, nothing could be more important to me than honoring my ethical and legal obligations.

To that end, I ask: is there any assurance I can provide regarding my compliance with the Agreed Protective Order, other than those I have already given, that would allow us not to burden the Court with this disagreement over my role in the case? If so, please let me know.

Kind regards, Adam

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On Fri, Mar 28, 2025 at 10:30 AM Adam Locke <[email protected]> wrote: Katherine - I’m in a meeting at the moment. I can call you back at 10:45 if that works. Thanks.

.Ad m Lioc::l«I• LDCKELAW Lg~111 li!!"" PLLC 713-S:32-·0 •2 42

EXHIBIT I

Arnold&Porter Katherine G. Treistman +1 713.576.2433 Direct [email protected]

March 31, 2025

VIA E-MAIL Adam Locke LOCKELAW PLLC 2617 Bissonet, Ste. 503 Houston, Texas 77005 [email protected] Re: SafeLease Ins. Servs., LLC v. Storable, Inc. et al., Cause No. 35-BC03A- 0001 (Tex. Bus. Ct. 3d Div.) Dear Adam: Thank you for your March 26, 2025 letter, our phone call on March 28, 2025, and your email on March 28, 2025.

Based on our communications, we understand your (and Plaintiff’s) position to be the following: 1. You will not agree to stop reviewing Defendants’ OCEO documents; 2. You will not agree to stop reviewing Defendants’ OCEO documents temporarily while we are working to investigate and resolve this issue; 3. You believe that you have been both Plaintiff’s “outside counsel” and Plaintiff’s “outside general counsel” from July 2023 to the present, including during the TI hearings in this dispute.

If I am mistaken as to any of the above points, please advise. Assuming I am not mistaken, we may need to seek Court intervention on this matter. To be clear, as I expressed during our call, our concern is less about whether you are personally maintaining the confidentiality of the documents, but rather that this is a case between competitors— and you are extensively involved in Plaintiff’s business, including now as an “outside general counsel” to whom you admit to providing “general legal advice,” as a former C- level executive during relevant time periods for this case, and as a potential witness in this Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP I 700 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 | Houston, TX 77002-2755 | www.arnoldporter.com Arnold&Porter Adam Locke March 31, 2025 Page 2 dispute. As you are aware, when the parties agreed to the Protective Order, you had not entered an appearance, and both Storable and the Court understood based on Mr. Yetter’s representations that you were being excluded from OCEO materials.

“Walling off” does not resolve Storable’s concerns. While ethical walls can be effective for protecting first-tier “Confidential” documents, they do not work for OCEO documents, which are so sensitive that individuals involved in a party’s general business activities are not allowed to see them. For example, if SafeLease asks for your “general” advice relating to language in operator contracts, language that you will have seen in Storable’s contracts and other OCEO documents will improperly influence your advice and SafeLease’s resulting business decisions. An ethical wall does not allow you to unsee such documents or unlearn their contents.

Finally, in an attempt to resolve this issue and remove the need for Court intervention, we note there is a procedure under the Protective Order for removing OCEO designations. If you will agree to stop reviewing Defendants’ OCEO documents as a general matter, and there are OCEO documents that SafeLease’s outside law firms (Yetter Coleman or Stone Hilton) believe that you, as “outside general counsel,” need to review in order for SafeLease to properly litigate this case, in a continued effort to reach a compromise, Storable is open to conferring regarding limited de-designations of specified documents.

Please consider, and I look forward to your response.

Respectfully yours,

Katherine G. Treistman Attorney for Defendants

EXHIBIT J LDCKELAW 2617 Bissonnet, Ste. 503, Houston, Texas 77005 Tel: 713-832-0242 • Fax: 713-565-4709 Attorney Adam Locke Direct: 713-832-0243 • [email protected]

April 2, 2025 Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002-2755 Via email: [email protected] Re: SafeLease Ins. Servs., LLC v. Storable, Inc., et al., Cause No. 35-BC03A- 0001 (Tex. Bus. Ct. 3d Div.) Dear Katherine: This letter responds to your March 31, 2025, letter, which demands that I effectively withdraw as counsel of record in this litigation. Given how important this case is to my client and my unqualified commitment to follow the protective order, I respectfully decline to do so.

Your letter begins with three points you believe to be my position. Here is my position: 1. I cannot agree, as counsel of record for SafeLease, not to review materials defendants have designated as Outside Counsel Eyes Only (“OCO”). My client has the right to choose its counsel, and it chose me for this critically important matter. As counsel of record, I have the ethical duty to zealously represent my client, and such zealous representation requires that I have full access to discovery materials that may be reviewed by other counsel of record.

2. That said, I unequivocally agree to faithfully abide by all obligations the Court has imposed on counsel of record relating to materials defendants have designated as OCO.

As noted in my last letter to you, I have read the Agreed Protective Order, and I acknowledge that my access to OCO materials comes with strict limitations — all of which I will honor.

Your letter goes on to make certain allegations and characterizations that I will briefly address to ensure that the record of our respective positions is clear.

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 180 April 2, 2025 Page 2 First, your letter mistakenly describes my serving as SafeLease’s outside counsel from July 2023 to the present as a “belief.” But this is a fact, as I explained in my March 26, 2025, letter.

Since July 2023, my relationship to SafeLease has only been one of outside counsel to client.

Second, your letter suggests that my role as outside counsel is at odds with the nature of my legal services to SafeLease, which I describe as “outside general counsel” services due to the variety of legal issues I advise on. I trust that your letter does not juxtapose these concepts to imply that I cannot both be outside counsel and offer general legal advice: as explained in my last letter to you, and as you acknowledged on our last phone call, there are many examples of lawyers at outside law firms—including yours—that describe their services to their clients in this exact way.

Third, your letter goes on to state that your client apparently is not concerned about whether I am “personally maintaining the confidentiality of the [OCO] documents.” Respectfully, if there is no concern that I would violate the Protective Order and subject myself to serious sanctions, there should be no objection to my representing SafeLease as counsel of record and doing so on the same footing as other counsel of record. Yet your letter proceeds to offer several unfounded reasons why your client should have a veto over my client’s right to choose its counsel: • Your letter makes false assertions, such as that I am “extensively involved in Plaintiff’s business.” I am not involved in SafeLease’s business decisions. As I have explained, I provide legal advice to SafeLease. I neither make nor participate in non-legal, commercial decisions for any of my firm’s clients, including SafeLease.

• Your letter raises my former employment with SafeLease and suggests that I could be a “potential” witness. I am surprised that your clients consider a job I held 17 months before they unlawfully interfered with my client’s business to be relevant to this dispute. My past employment with SafeLease, which lasted from April 2022 to June 2023, is irrelevant to whether I may serve as counsel of record in this case.

• Your letter says that “the Court understood based on Mr. Yetter’s representations that [I was] being excluded from OCEO materials.” What is clear is that the Agreed Protective Order allows outside counsel to review OCO materials, and I am outside counsel to SafeLease. And Mr. Yetter never so much as suggested to the Court that I would not file an appearance in this case. Rather, as my last letter to you explained, Mr. Yetter told the Court that I would be excused for “outside/counsel only” testimony, which owed to the fact that I had not filed an appearance (and thus was not counsel of record) as of the hearing.

Finally, your letter seems to suggest that my merely seeing OCO documents in this case would permanently prevent me from representing SafeLease as counsel in any matter other than

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 181 April 2, 2025 Page 3 this litigation. Surely this is not your position. If so, it is inconsistent with how seasoned litigators (like you) routinely and ethically practice law following exposure to OCO documents. Consider: 1. A litigator is not barred from going in house with a client merely because the litigator, as outside counsel, saw OCO documents of a competitor.

2. A litigator is not barred from advising a client on employment disputes or regulatory matters merely because the litigator saw OCO documents pertaining to a competitor’s anticompetitive API fees or nonsolicitation/noncompete terms.

3. A litigator is not barred from suing a company merely because it was exposed to OCO materials produced by that company in prior litigation.

These are just a few examples that undercut your letter’s suggestion that my representation of SafeLease is forbidden once I lay eyes on OCO materials. However, to address the example in your letter, let me say: there is nothing in your clients’ operator contracts that could affect the advice I give to SafeLease. As explained, I don’t make or participate in decisions about commercial terms; SafeLease’s executives do. Knowing that Storable may impose anticompetitive terms on operators, as it does SafeLease, would not affect my legal advice. If your letter was actually referring to vendor contracts, then the example is even more strained. Nothing about the supracompetitive API fees Storable charges, or the restrictive covenants it imposes, is relevant to SafeLease’s dealings with other FMS providers.

Your letter’s final request—that my access to OCO materials be requested by my co- counsel on a need-to-know basis and subject to your client’s approval—is unnecessary and impractical. I have repeatedly assured your clients that I will follow the Protective Order. I emailed to see if there was anything, short of walling me off from OCO materials, that would allow your client to avoid burdening the Court with this dispute. The final request ignores my efforts to find a resolution, implies that my law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, is not one of SafeLease’s “outside law firms” (it has been since July 2023), and suggests that I seek to see OCO materials as “outside general counsel.” Again, I am outside counsel. My need to see OCO materials produced by your clients owes solely to my role as counsel of record in this case and my ethical obligation to zealously advocate for SafeLease—something I cannot do if forced to litigate with a hand tied behind my back.

Sincerely,

Adam Locke

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM E-filed in the Office of the Clerk 4/11/2025 11:51 AM182 for the Business Court of Texas Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO MODIFY PROTECTIVE ORDER AND REQUIRE DISCLOSURE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Introduction ................................................................................................................................. - 1 - Factual and Procedural Background ........................................................................................... - 1 - Applicable Legal Standards ........................................................................................................ - 8 - Argument and Authorities........................................................................................................... - 9 - 1. The Protective Order Permits Counsel of Record to View OCO Materials. .................. - 9 - 2. Mr. Locke Is Counsel of Record in this Action. ............................................................. - 9 - 3. As Counsel of Record, Mr. Locke Is Permitted to Review OCO Materials. ................ - 12 - 4. The Protective Order Should Not Be Modified to Exclude Mr. Locke. ....................... - 13 - 5. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Know What OCO Materials He Has Reviewed. ........ - 14 - Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ - 15 - Certificate of Service ................................................................................................................ - 16 - Certificate of Compliance ......................................................................................................... - 16 -

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INTRODUCTION This litigation seeks to put an end to the significant and irreparable harm Storable has inflicted, and is intent on continuing to inflict, upon our State’s only low-cost innovator in the tenant insurance industry. Given how important this litigation is to SafeLease—to its ability to service its customers, protect their tenants, and survive—its outside general counsel, seasoned litigator Adam Locke of Lockelaw PLLC, filed a notice of appearance on March 24, 2025, becoming an attorney of record in this case.

Since appearing, Mr. Locke has given repeated, unconditional assurances to Storable that he has abided and will always abide by the Agreed Protective Order, to no avail. Defendants ask the Court to grant extraordinary and unwarranted relief in modifying the order to exclude Mr. Locke from seeing key documents. In making their request, defendants mischaracterize his relationship with SafeLease and recklessly accuse him (without basis) of violating a court order by “likely” reviewing OCO documents before he became an attorney of record. Not so. There simply is no basis effectively to neuter one of SafeLease’s chosen counsel nor to strip Mr. Locke of his right to zealously litigate as an attorney of record.

For these and other reasons discussed below, Storable’s motion should be denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Given the significance of defendants’ effort to change the Protective Order, and limit who may represent SafeLease and how, we will provide a fulsome recitation of relevant background.

Mr. Locke’s experience. Mr. Locke is a seasoned litigator and counselor who practices law at his own firm, Lockelaw PLLC. He founded his firm in December 2019, after more than six years in private practice, including at Susman Godfrey. A. Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 5. SafeLease was a regular client. Id. ¶ 12. In April 2022, he joined SafeLease as its in-house General Counsel and

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Chief Operating Officer. Id. ¶ 13. While employed by SafeLease, and with its permission, he kept his firm and a limited roster of clients. Id. ¶ 14.

In June 2023, Mr. Locke resigned from SafeLease. Id. ¶ 16. Since then, he has had no in- house or business role with SafeLease. Id. He has represented SafeLease as outside counsel through his firm. Id. ¶ 17. It is one of dozens of clients that he and his firm have represented. Id. ¶ 11. Clients, like SafeLease, who regularly retain him for advice on discrete legal issues often have him serve as a first point of contact for general advice and triage before deciding whether to hire a specialist. See id. ¶ 9. These clients get what he describes on his website as “outside general counsel” services. See Services, LockeLaw PLLC, https://www.lockelaw.com/services. Clients who use such services may refer to Mr. Locke as their “outside general counsel,” as SafeLease has chosen to do since July 2023. See A. Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 18. Such services are routinely provided by litigators at national law firms, including the fine defense counsel in this case. 1 As an outside lawyer, Mr. Locke does not provide commercial advice to SafeLease, make business decisions for it, or participate in non-legal, commercial decisions. A. Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 19. He is not involved in its general business operations or discussions, which are reserved for SafeLease business leaders. Id. ¶ 20.

See, e.g., Ex. 2 at 1-2, Porter Hedges Welcomes Back Derek Forinash, Porter Hedges (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.porterhedges.com/newsroom-news-porter-hedges-welcomes-back-derek-forinash (his “practice focuses on serving as outside general counsel to private companies”); id. at 4, Ray Torgerson, Porter Hedges, https://www.porterhedges.com/professionals-RayTTorgerson (practice includes “consult[ing] with businesses on technology matters, including licensing, cybersecurity, and data privacy”); id. at 6, Michael T. Larkin, Porter Hedges, https://www.porterhedges.com/professionals-MichaelTLarkin (his experience includes providing corporate advice “as outside general counsel”); id. at 7, Michael Burshteyn, Greenberg Traurig, https://www.gtlaw.com/en/professionals/b/burshteyn-michael (“He draws on this business background to serve as outside general counsel . . . .”); id. at 8, Galit Kierkut, Greenberg Traurig, https://www.gtlaw.com/en/professionals/k/kierkut-galit (“She also takes on the role of outside general counsel for many of her start-up and growth-stage clients . . . .”); id. at 9, Ben Fackler, Arnold & Porter, https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/people/f/fackler-ben (he “often serves as outside general counsel to his clients”).

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Mr. Locke’s role as a law firm owner and outside counsel to SafeLease was known to Storable prior to this case. Id. ¶ 26. For example, on December 6, 2024, before Storable cut off authorized user accounts, its in-house general counsel, Neil Verma, joined Mr. Locke for coffee in Houston. Id. ¶ 27. In the meeting, Mr. Verma noted that he and Storable’s CEO Chuck Gordon knew that Mr. Locke was working independently of SafeLease. Id. Mr. Verma even said Storable would like to hire Mr. Locke in the future if it would not pose a conflict. Id. ¶ 28. Mr. Locke believed such an engagement likely would create a conflict and politely suggested as much. Id. Litigation role. From the outset of this case through the temporary injunction hearing, Mr. Locke was not counsel of record for SafeLease with access to OCO materials. See id. ¶¶ 41-42. As SafeLease told the Court, he was outside general counsel. At that time, SafeLease believed that a good-faith settlement was possible. Since Mr. Locke had not filed a notice of appearance, he had parity in settlement discussions with Mr. Verma and could try to work in good faith toward a resolution. See id. ¶ 29.

Regrettably, those efforts failed. On February 3, 2025, before the Protective Order was entered, Mr. Locke and Mr. Verma had a 21-minute call to discuss a potential settlement. Id. ¶ 30.

Given the tone of the discussion and his concern that talks were breaking down, Mr. Locke said that he would file a notice of appearance in this case if settlement talks failed. Id. ¶ 31. Mr. Verma told him to “go ahead” and do what he needed to do. Id. So, while Mr. Locke chose to wait until March 24 to appear as counsel of record, defendants had been on notice for several weeks.

Last month, Defendants were reminded that Mr. Locke is outside counsel for SafeLease.

On March 7, Storable’s then-new lead counsel, Ms. Treistman, called Mr. Locke. Id. ¶ 32. On their call, she asked about his relationship to SafeLease, including if he was “in house.” Id. ¶ 35. Mr. Locke told her that he was not in-house but provided general legal advice through his firm, and he

-3- represents many other clients. Id. She said she “got it.” Id. ¶ 36. She also said that all settlement communications from Mr. Locke should be with her—outside counsel to outside counsel—not Mr. Verma. Id. ¶ 37.

Access to OCO materials. Given how important this case is to SafeLease, it decided to add Mr. Locke as counsel of record. Before gaining access to any OCO materials, he reviewed the Protective Order. Id. ¶ 40. He filed and served a notice of appearance and became counsel of record in this action on March 24 at 6:25 p.m. Id. ¶ 41. He got access to OCO materials later that night.

Id. ¶ 42. The timing of his appearance was not arbitrary. Earlier that day, Storable had said it would seek permanent sealing of dozens of exhibits and hundreds of pages of testimony in this case. Id. ¶ 39. Mr. Locke’s review of OCO documents was to assist with that issue and related briefing. Id. ¶ 40.

The next day, Mr. Locke participated in a meet and confer regarding the parties’ motions to seal, which included discussion of OCO documents. Id. ¶ 44. He was introduced as “outside counsel,” consistent with his role. Id. ¶ 45. At the end of the call, Storable’s counsel said “[his] clients do not accept [plaintiff’s] characterization of Mr. Locke as outside counsel.” Id. ¶ 47. Mr. Locke was surprised, given his call with Ms. Treistman, but noted that defendants were entitled to “raise it with the Court.” See id. ¶ 49.

Assurances. Mr. Locke provided detailed explanation of his role with SafeLease and clear assurances of compliance with the Protective Order prior to this issue coming before the Court.

The following chronology reflects his unqualified commitments as an officer of the Court.

On March 25, defendants sent a letter demanding that Mr. Locke stop viewing Storable OCO documents, provide a list of OCO documents he had reviewed, and agree never to view any such documents. Mot., Ex. F at 1-2. In a reversal from Ms. Treistman’s call a few weeks earlier,

-4- the letter alleged that “Mr. Locke is not outside counsel for SafeLease.” Id. at 1. It said his former employment by SafeLease barred him from being its outside counsel. See id. It suggested he was a potential witness based on his “involvement” with SafeLease in 2022–23. See id. It also cast Mr. Yetter’s representations to the Court as inconsistent, despite accurately describing Mr. Locke’s status as outside general counsel. See id. On March 26, Mr. Locke responded with an unequivocal commitment: his “appearing as an attorney of record for SafeLease in this matter will not compromise the protections in the Agreed Protective Order.” Mot., Ex. G at 1. He acknowledged the “strict limitations” of access to OCO materials, confirming that defendants “can rest assured that I will honor the following obligations”: • I will use OCO materials only to prepare for, try, and appeal this matter.

• I will not use OCO materials to advise SafeLease on business or legal matters.

• I will not disclose OCO materials to SafeLease employees, agents, or affiliates.

• I will disclose OCO materials, and offer advice based on it, only as permitted by the Protective Order.

Id. at 1-2. Mr. Locke also confirmed that the above obligations were “just some of the limitations on [his] conduct pursuant to the Protective Order,” and that accessing OCO materials may limit his “participation in business dealings or negotiations between the parties if they implicate OCO information.” Id. at 2. “In short,” he said, “I fully understand and take seriously the limitations in the Protective Order. I will protect your clients’ non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information that is designated as OCO. And I will adhere strictly to the limits imposed on me as an attorney of record for SafeLease.” Id.

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Mr. Locke’s response offers extensive information about his history with SafeLease, his law firm, and his representation of SafeLease as outside counsel. See id. at 2-4. His response also confirms that Mr. Yetter correctly represented that because Mr. Locke was not counsel of record during the temporary injunction hearings, he could not be present for testimony about OCO materials in accordance with the Protective Order. Id. at 3-4.

On March 28, Ms. Treistman called Mr. Locke to discuss his response. She reiterated her clients’ demands and asked him not to review OCO materials going forward. A. Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 51. She suggested that, even with no access to OCO materials, he could “do everything that Mr. Yetter could do in the litigation—take depositions, represent [SafeLease] at hearings,” etc. Id. ¶ 55. He responded that any counsel of record needs full access to discovery materials to zealously represent their clients. Id. ¶ 56.

Mr. Locke followed up with an email emphasizing his desire to resolve this issue without burdening the Court. He stressed his unqualified commitment to follow the Protective Order, and honor his ethical and legal obligations, as an experienced litigator. He asked: “is there any assurance I can provide regarding my compliance with the Agreed Protective Order, other than those I have already given, that would allow us not to burden the Court with this disagreement over my role in the case? If so, please let me know.” Mot., Ex. H at 1.

On March 31, Ms. Treistman sent a follow up letter. It confirmed that defendants’ “concern is less about whether [Mr. Locke is] personally maintaining the confidentiality of the documents, but rather that this is a case between competitors.” Mot., Ex. I at 1. The letter repeats the mistaken view that Mr. Locke is “extensively involved in Plaintiff’s business,” despite repeated assurances that he does not make business decisions or provide business advice to SafeLease. Id. The letter

-6- offers to have other SafeLease counsel decide what OCO materials Mr. Locke needs to see to litigate this case and then ask for defendants’ permission for limited de-designations. Id. at 2.

Contrary to assertions in Storable’s motion, the letter does not ask Mr. Locke to state when he gained access to OCO materials. See Mot. at 6. Its incorrect claim that he refused to disclose “when he reviewed” OCO documents is especially troubling given its assertion that he “likely” violated the Protective Order by accessing OCO documents before becoming counsel of record.

Id. at 9.

On April 2, Mr. Locke responded. He confirmed that he is SafeLease’s counsel of record, and that SafeLease has the right to choose him as its litigator in this case. Mot., Ex. J at 1. He emphasized that he has an ethical duty to zealously represent SafeLease in this case, and this requires that he has full access to discovery materials available to other counsel of record. Id. He also unequivocally agreed faithfully to abide by all obligations imposed on counsel of record under the Protective Order. Id. Mr. Locke’s response addressed defendants’ claim that exposure to their OCO contracts would affect the advice he gives SafeLease, noting that nothing in the contracts could affect his legal advice outside of this case, and he does not make or advise on commercial decisions anyway. Id. at 3.

On April 3 (at 9:42 p.m.), defense counsel emailed to ask SafeLease to confirm whether it refuses to disclose which OCO documents Mr. Locke reviewed and when. The email incorrectly states that Ms. Treistman’s earlier letter requested this information. Ex. 3 at 1. It concludes by asking whether SafeLease is opposed to this motion. Id. The next day, Storable filed its motion without getting a response from SafeLease.

The most aggressive accusation in the motion could have been omitted had Storable waited for a response. Storable never requested to know when Mr. Locke first gained access to OCO

-7- materials until its late-night email. Yet, its motion alleges that “it is possible, if not likely, that Locke was accessing and viewing Storable’s OCEO documents before his March 24, 6:26 PM [sic] notice of appearance.” Mot. at 9. This assertion is baseless, as Mr. Locke gained access to OCO materials only after he filed an appearance as an attorney of record.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS Absent agreement of the parties, a court may modify discovery procedures, including agreed protective orders, for “good cause.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.1; see In re Navistar, Inc., 501 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.). A court also may enter a protective order to “protect the movant from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, annoyance, or invasion of personal, constitutional, or property rights.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6.

But a court’s power to modify discovery agreements is not “unbounded.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.1 cmt. 1. Whenever possible, a court should give effect to the parties’ otherwise enforceable agreements. “When the parties conclude an agreement, the court should not lightly ignore their bargain.” In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. 2008). There must be a “valid basis” for setting aside a discovery agreement, which is supported by the record. Id. at 846, 848 (finding the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside a valid discovery agreement without good cause; the movant’s grounds of misrepresentation, estoppel, and changed circumstances were not supported by the record; and one party had acted in reliance on the agreed procedure).

The movant bears the burden of proving that a motion to modify a discovery agreement is based on good cause and has a valid basis. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.1; BP Prods., 244 S.W.3d at 846; see also EEOC v. BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 2017) (a movant “bears the burden of showing that a protective order is necessary, which contemplates a particular and

-8- specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements” (internal quote and citation omitted)).

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 1. The Protective Order Permits Counsel of Record to View OCO Materials.

Under the Protective Order, all counsel of record may view all discovery materials. It says that “‘Confidential’ or ‘Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only’ information shall not be disclosed or made available by the receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons as delineated above.”

Protective Order ¶ 12. For both Confidential and OCO information, Qualified Persons include “Attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation.” Id. ¶ 5(a), ¶ 6. Attorneys of record have no limitation on their ability to access OCO information. Id. By contrast, the Protective Order excludes “parties and their respective in-house counsel, paralegals, legal staff or experts” from the definition of Qualified Persons permitted to access OCO information. Id. ¶ 5(c), ¶ 6 (emphasis added).

2. Mr. Locke Is Counsel of Record in this Action.

It is undisputed that under the Protective Order, Mr. Locke is counsel of record, i.e., an “attorney of record,” for SafeLease. To become counsel of record, he filed a public notice of appearance. Storable argues that he should not be a counsel of record, so “was not permitted to view OCEO documents,” for a litany of reasons. All of Storable’s arguments fail.

“He gives general legal advice.” There is no prohibition on lawyers who advise clients on day-to-day legal issues from being counsel of record here. Storable does not cite a legal basis for this argument. Some or all defense counsel surely do the same. Mr. Locke has provided repeated assurances about his commitment to abide by the Protective Order, including his understanding of the “strict limitations” associated with accessing OCO materials. He has assured Storable that “I will use OCO materials only to prepare for, try, and appeal this matter,” and “I will not use OCO

-9- materials to advise SafeLease on business or legal matters.” Mot., Ex. G at 1. There is no credible basis to dispute his commitment to abide by the order. Indeed, Storable earlier confirmed, “our concern is less about whether [he is] personally maintaining the confidentiality of the documents.”

Mot., Ex. I at 1. This is no basis to deprive Mr. Locke from access to critical case documents.

“He once was employed by SafeLease.” That Mr. Locke worked for SafeLease two years ago is irrelevant. Litigators often go in-house and then back to outside firms where they represent former clients. Nothing about his history undermines his commitment to abide by court orders.

“He was not counsel of record at the hearings or until after the Protective Order was entered.” Neither point is relevant to Mr. Locke’s current status in the case. After the temporary injunction order, the Court set this case for trial in June 2026, beginning a long road of discovery, briefing, and trial preparation. This was a natural juncture for the parties to assess their lawyer teams. Indeed, Arnold & Porter was not counsel of record during these hearings either, which does not affect its ability to be counsel now. In addition, when SafeLease hoped a good-faith settlement was possible, Mr. Locke refrained from filing a notice of appearance so that he and Mr. Verma were on equal footing in the talks. A. Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 29. The efforts failed, and Storable wants settlement discussions now to be directed exclusively to outside counsel. Id. ¶ 37.

“He is estopped because of Yetter’s representations and was a client representative at the January hearing.” Mr. Yetter’s representations were true and in no way suggested that Mr. Locke was in-house counsel or otherwise ineligible to be counsel of record. Mr. Yetter accurately referred to him as “outside” SafeLease general counsel. See Mot., Ex. A. He was a “client representative” at that hearing, just as all attorneys are representatives of their clients. But unlike Mr. Stein, Mr. Locke was there as outside counsel and could not bind SafeLease to any decision without his client’s consent. Storable also claims Mr. Yetter’s stating that Mr. Locke would be

- 10 - excused from a hearing when OCO materials were introduced shows that Mr. Locke is not outside counsel. The statement was accurate and proper under the Protective Order. As of February 11, Mr. Locke was not counsel of record, he could not view OCO materials, and he was excused for those parts of the hearing. Nothing in these comments estops SafeLease from choosing him as its attorney of record.

“He is involved in ‘general business operations’ of SafeLease.” The premise of this point is far from true. Mr. Locke gives legal advice to SafeLease. He is not involved in its business decisions or giving it business advice. A. Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 21. He last participated in business decisions at SafeLease two years ago, in June 2023. Id. ¶ 16. He runs a law firm, not a business consulting firm, and bills SafeLease by the hour for discrete legal work. As his malpractice policy doesn’t cover claims relating to non-legal advice, he is careful not to provide such advice. Id. ¶ 23.

“He did not tell Storable he would file an appearance before the Order was entered.”

In fact, on a February 3 phone call, Mr. Locke told Mr. Verma that he would file an appearance if settlement talks failed. Rather than object, Mr. Verma said Mr. Locke should “go ahead” and do “what he needed to do.” Id. ¶ 31. This was weeks before the Protective Order was entered on February 27. Even had this conversation not taken place, SafeLease had no duty to give advance notice of who would serve as its counsel of record (nor did Storable).

Mr. Locke is a Texas-licensed attorney who is committed to uphold the Protective Order.

He has served as SafeLease’s outside counsel for nearly two years. He filed an appearance as its attorney of record on March 24, allowing him to represent his client in this bet-the-company case.

As such, he was entitled under the Protective Order to view all discovery materials.

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3. As Counsel of Record, Mr. Locke Is Permitted to Review OCO Materials.

The Protective Order provides that the Qualified Persons who may see OCO information include “Attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation.” Id. ¶ 5(a), ¶ 6. Mr. Locke is an attorney of record for SafeLease and thus may see any materials defendants have marked OCO.

Storable argues that it is not “necessary” for Mr. Locke, as counsel of record, to see OCO materials, so the Protective Order bars him from accessing the information. Mot. at 8. Its argument rests on omitting a key clause from paragraph 5(a) of the Protective Order, emphasized below, so as to change the order’s plain meaning: Under the PO, counsel permitted to view OCEO documents include “[a]ttorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees and/or agents of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the information be shown for purposes of this litigation.

The “necessary” condition applies to employees/agents of the attorneys, not attorneys themselves.

Storable’s reading of paragraph 5(a) makes no sense and invites mischief. It would allow opposing counsel to challenge whether access to discovery by an attorney of record is “necessary” and seek to deny attorneys of record access to Confidential documents, which even the parties themselves may access without restriction.

The “necessity” requirement does not limit counsel of record’s access for several reasons.

First, attorneys of record need access to all discovery materials to represent their clients diligently and zealously. And, of course, all counsel of record should have equal access to discovery materials to ensure the litigation is procedurally fair. Plus, extending the “necessity” requirement to counsel of record would subject them to a higher threshold for accessing Confidential materials than that imposed on the parties themselves and their in-house counsel (for whom there is no necessity requirement). Protective Order ¶ 5(a), ¶ 5(c).

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Mr. Locke is an attorney of record for SafeLease. Under the Protective Order, he may see OCO materials marked by defendants. Storable’s misreading of the order should be rejected.

4. The Protective Order Should Not Be Modified to Exclude Mr. Locke.

Mr. Locke has complied with the Protective Order in every respect, and he has assured this Court and defendants that he will continue to comply with it. “When the parties conclude an agreement, the court should not lightly ignore their bargain.” BP Prods., 244 S.W.3d at 846. What Storable requests is to create unequal classes of attorneys of record. This would be a serious and unjustified departure from norms and standard litigation practice in Texas courts.

Storable first argues that the order was not fairly negotiated but provides no valid basis to say that. See Mot. at 10-11. Contrary to the motion’s claim, Mr. Locke did raise his intent to file an appearance before the order was entered, in the February 3 settlement call with Mr. Verma (discussed above), with not a word of objection by Mr. Verma on behalf of defendants. See A.

Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 31. Moreover, Storable’s claim that Mr. Yetter represented that Mr. Locke was not outside counsel ignores his words, which correctly state that Mr. Locke is outside general counsel (but not yet an attorney of record) and would be excused during OCO testimony. There was no “bait-and-switch.” Mot. at 10.

Storable’s second claim is that Mr. Locke is “objectively a client representative.” See id. at 11. This is both incomplete and beside the point. Like all lawyers, he was a “representative” of his client, but that does not alter the fact that during this case, he has always been its outside counsel and, as of March 24, one of its attorneys of record in the case. It also is based on the false assumption he is “involved in SafeLease’s general business operations or discussions.” In fact, he has not advised SafeLease on business operations or participated in its commercial decisions since he resigned in June 2023. See A. Locke Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 16. Beyond that, he became SafeLease’s

- 13 - attorney of record under the Protective Order when he filed an appearance. This entitles him to access all of defendants’ discovery materials, both confidential and OCO.

Finally, SafeLease will be prejudiced if Mr. Locke is excluded from OCO materials.

SafeLease does not have unlimited means to prosecute this case. It is not the industry’s “10,000- pound gorilla,” as Mr. Manes described Storable. It is a small, innovative startup fighting for survival against a monopolist. It wishes to be represented by Mr. Locke, who has been a litigator longer than all but two members of SafeLease’s trial team (and whose rate is the lowest). To ensure vigorous advocacy and control costs in this critical case, he is an indispensable member of SafeLease’s trial team.

Accordingly, the motion to modify the Protective Order is unmerited and should be denied.

5. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Know What OCO Materials He Has Reviewed.

Although not required under the Protective Order, SafeLease will disclose when Mr. Locke first accessed defendants’ OCO materials: March 24 at 6:54 p.m. Id. ¶ 42. It was after he filed an appearance and became an attorney of record. SafeLease makes this disclosure to lay to rest the specious claim that he “likely” accessed OCO materials earlier and so violated the Protective Order. See Mot. at 9.

SafeLease has no obligation to disclose what Storable OCO materials he has reviewed. To force counsel of record to divulge such information would invade the protections given to attorney work product under established legal principles. The documents he chose to review after becoming an attorney of record would reveal his mental processes, which warrant protection and are not subject to compelled disclosure. “The attorney work product privilege protects . . . the mechanical compilation of information to the extent such compilation reveals the attorney’s thought processes.” Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Banales, 907 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. 1995); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.5(b) (attorney work-product privilege).

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Moreover, there is no question Mr. Locke accessed OCO materials only after becoming an attorney of record for SafeLease. Storable cites paragraph 15 of the Protective Order in support of its request for disclosure: “If a receiving party learns of any unauthorized disclosure of [OCO], the party shall immediately upon learning of such disclosure inform the producing party of all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure.” But disclosure of OCO materials to Mr. Locke was authorized once he became an attorney of record. SafeLease has no duty to divulge facts relating to his review. Accordingly, Storable’s request to compel disclosure should be denied.

CONCLUSION The Court should deny defendants’ motion to modify the Protective Order and to compel disclosure of attorney work product. SafeLease does not request an oral hearing on this motion but is happy to provide oral argument if it would assist the Court.

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Date: April 11, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Paul Yetter Judd E. Stone II R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24087727 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] [email protected] Alexander M. Dvorscak Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24120461 State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] [email protected] STONE HILTON PLLC Shannon N. Smith Congress Ave. State Bar No. 24110378 Austin, Texas 78748 [email protected] (737) 465-3897 YETTER COLEMAN LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 632-8000 Adam T. Locke State Bar No. 24083184 [email protected] LOCKELAW PLLC 2617 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 Houston, Texas 77005 (713) 832-0243 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via the Court e- filing service and/or by email, on April 11, 2025.

/s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 4692 words, not including the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates.

/s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

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Exhibit 1

The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DECLARATION OF ADAM LOCKE 1. My name is Adam Locke, and I am over 18 years of age and competent to make this declaration.

2. The facts set forth in this declaration are based on my personal knowledge, and are true and correct.

My Background and Current Practice 3. I have been licensed to practice law in Texas since 2012.

4. I have operated my law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, since founding it in December 2019.

5. Prior to founding Lockelaw, I was a counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP in New York City from 2016 to 2019. Prior to working at Akin Gump, I was an associate in the Kansas City offices of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP and Rouse Hendricks German May PC from 2015 to 2016. Before working at Shook, I was an associate in the Houston office of Susman Godfrey LLP from 2013 to 2015.

6. I served as a law clerk to the Honorable Carolyn Dineen King of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from 2012 to 2013.

7. I graduated from Yale Law School and received my Juris Doctor in 2012.

8. At Lockelaw, my law practice consists of commercial litigation, employment litigation, arbitration, investigations, regulatory advice, and legal due diligence for credit investors.

9. On a limited basis, Lockelaw also offers outside general counsel services. “Outside general counsel services” refers to serving as a first point of contact for my business and investor clients, providing general legal advice on the issues they encounter on a regular basis when possible, and referring specialized work to other outside counsel as needed.

10. I do not offer business advice to my clients or advise on commercial issues, such as the suitability of price terms in agreements.

11. My law firm has represented dozens of clients, including investment managers, startups, public companies, family-owned businesses, and individuals.

My Relationship with SafeLease 12. SafeLease became a client of Lockelaw PLLC in 2021.

13. In April 2022, I joined SafeLease as its General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer.

14. While employed by SafeLease, with SafeLease’s permission, I maintained my law firm and certain clients I had served since founding my law firm.

15. Over the year I was employed with SafeLease, demand for my legal services from outside clients grew, and I could not service these clients while employed with SafeLease.

16. In June 2023, I resigned from SafeLease and no longer had any in-house or business role with SafeLease.

17. Following my resignation from SafeLease, I began to represent SafeLease as outside counsel through Lockelaw PLLC.

18. I remain outside counsel to SafeLease, a role I have had since July 2023.

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19. I do not provide commercial advice to SafeLease, make business decisions for SafeLease, or participate in non-legal, commercial decision-making with SafeLease.

20. I am not involved in SafeLease’s general business operations or discussions, which are operations handled by and discussions maintained by SafeLease’s internal business leaders.

21. I do not participate in SafeLease’s business operations or discussions because my role as outside counsel is to provide legal advice.

22. Lockelaw PLLC is not a business consultancy, and I do not run a business consultancy.

23. In addition, I do not participate in SafeLease’s business operations or discussions because, as SafeLease’s outside counsel, were I to give SafeLease business advice, any claims arising out of such advice would not be covered by my professional malpractice insurance, which exclusively covers claims relating to legal advice.

24. As a small firm owner, I do not and cannot expose myself to risks associated with giving business advice to my law firm clients, which would be outside of my circle of competence.

My Relevant Communications with Storable’s Counsel Before I Filed an Appearance 25. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in SafeLease’s response to Storable’s motion to modify the agreed protective order and to compel disclosure of a list of certain documents that I have reviewed as counsel of record in this action, which response this declaration supports.

26. Storable has known that I am outside counsel to SafeLease since before this case was filed.

27. On December 6, 2024, I had coffee with Neil Verma, Storable’s General Counsel.

During this meeting, Mr. Verma told me that he and Storable’s CEO, Chuck Gordon, understood

-3- that I was independent of SafeLease and was operating an outside law firm. I confirmed to Mr. Verma that I was and had been representing SafeLease as outside counsel through my law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, since the summer of 2023. I explained to Mr. Verma at this meeting high-level details about why I had left SafeLease, the nature of my client base and services, and confirmed that I was outside counsel to SafeLease among many other clients of my firm.

28. Mr. Verma noted that he would like to retain me on behalf of Storable in the future once his department had the resources to do so. Mr. Verma suggested that such an arrangement might not be possible at that time due to potential conflicts, but that the situation could change. I indicated to Mr. Verma that I appreciated the kind words and consideration, but there likely was a conflict.

29. Once this lawsuit was filed, Mr. Verma and I engaged in multiple rounds of settlement discussions. I believe these good faith settlement talks were enabled by my being on equal footing with Mr. Verma, in that I had refrained from filing a notice of appearance and gaining access to discovery materials that he could not view as in-house counsel under a Rule 11 agreement.

30. A 21-minute-long settlement call I had with Mr. Verma on February 3, 2025, was memorable because it was far more negative in tone from our other settlement calls, which were generally polite and constructive.

31. Based on the negative tone of the February 3 call, I informed Mr. Verma that I would file a notice of appearance in the action if settlement talks continued to break down or failed.

Mr. Verma responded for me to “go ahead” and do what I needed to do.

32. On March 7, 2025, Storable’s new lead counsel, Katherine Treistman, called me.

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33. Ms. Treistman knows me from when I began my career in private practice in 2013 at Susman Godfrey LLP, the litigation boutique where Ms. Treistman was then a partner.

34. On the March 7 call, I spoke with Ms. Treistman for twenty minutes. On the call, Ms. Treistman told me she wanted to reconnect with me and discuss her approach towards this litigation. Ms. Treistman told me that she hoped the parties could take a more constructive approach to this litigation, a statement with which I agreed.

35. Ms. Treistman also inquired into my relationship to SafeLease, specifically asking me if I was “in house” counsel. I informed Ms. Treistman that I was not “in house” but had been outside counsel to SafeLease since July 2023. I explained to Ms. Treistman that, like many litigators at private firms, I provided legal advice on various issues to SafeLease, my longtime client, through my firm, Lockelaw PLLC, where I have represented dozens of other clients.

36. Following my explanation, Ms. Treistman said she “got it,” indicating she understood the outside counsel arrangement between me and SafeLease.

37. Also following my explanation, Ms. Treistman told me that all settlement communications from me going forward needed to be directed to her, not Mr. Verma.

38. Now that I could no longer engage in settlement discussions with Mr. Verma, I felt that I no longer had any reason not to file a notice of appearance.

I File an Appearance and Afterward Receive Access to OCO Materials 39. On March 24, Storable indicated that it would seek permanent sealing of dozens of exhibits and hundreds of pages of testimony in this case.

40. To assist with the sealing issue and related briefing, I decided to file an appearance.

Before gaining access to any OCO materials, I reviewed the Protective Order.

41. On March 24, 2025, at 6:25 PM CDT, I filed and served my notice of appearance in this action, becoming counsel of record to SafeLease.

-5-

42. On March 24, 2025, at 6:54 PM CDT, I first received access to OCO materials.

43. Following receipt of the OCO materials, I reviewed some of them.

My Relevant Communications with Storable’s Counsel After I Filed an Appearance 44. On March 25, 2025, I participated in a meet and confer about the parties’ motions to seal.

45. On that call, my co-counsel introduced me as outside counsel to SafeLease.

46. Later on the call, I noted that defendants’ OCO designations appeared overbroad, citing an email defendants produced and marked OCO where Storable executives discussed an email they had received from the parties’ mutual customer. I noted that there was nothing in the email that appeared confidential, certainly nothing that would warrant an OCO designation.

47. At the end of the March 25 call, without prompting or explanation, Storable’s counsel, Andrew Bergman, said the following to me and my co-counsel: “my clients do not accept your characterization of Mr. Locke as outside counsel.”

48. I was surprised by this, given that weeks earlier, I told Ms. Treistman I was outside counsel, and even explained my relationship to SafeLease, and she said that she understood my role and invited me to participate in settlement talks directly with her, outside counsel to outside counsel.

49. I ended the call by saying that Mr. Bergman was entitled to “raise it with the Court.”

50. On March 25, 2025, lead counsel for Storable, Ms. Treistman, sent the first of two letters demanding that I immediately and permanently stop viewing Storable’s OCO materials and disclose what OCO materials I had reviewed.

51. Ms. Treistman reiterated her clients’ demands to me on a March 28 phone call and in a March 31 letter.

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52. Both of Ms. Treistman’s letters mischaracterize my relationship to SafeLease as “not outside counsel” and as someone “extensively involved in Plaintiff’s business” or involved in SafeLease’s “general business activities.”

53. I informed Ms. Treistman in response to her letters that I am outside counsel to SafeLease, have been since July 2023, and am not involved in SafeLease’s business activities.

54. I assured Ms. Treistman in several written responses to her letters and on the March call that I had abided by the Agreed Protective Order in this case and always would do so.

55. On the March 28 phone call, Ms. Treistman said to me that even with no access to OCO materials, I could “do everything that Mr. Yetter could do in the litigation—take depositions, represent [SafeLease] at hearings,” etc. 56. I disagreed with Ms. Treistman and responded that any counsel of record needs full access to discovery materials to zealously represent their clients.

57. Storable’s counsel at Arnold and Porter emailed me on April 3 (at 9:42 pm) and said that, in her March 31 letter, Ms. Treistman had requested to know when I first viewed OCO materials in this case.

58. In this April 3 email, Storable’s counsel alleged that I had failed to respond to Ms. Treistman’s request for the date and time I first accessed OCO materials; however, prior to the April 3 email, Storable’s counsel had never asked me to disclose when I first gained access to OCO materials in this litigation.

My Appearance Benefits SafeLease in this Litigation 59. In this action, the hourly rate I charge SafeLease is the lowest charged by any member of SafeLease’s trial team.

60. Of the members of SafeLease’s trial team, just two have litigated longer than me.

-7- My name is Adam Locke, my date of birth is October 11 , 1986, and my business address is 2607 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 , Houston, Texas 77005. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Houston, Texas, on the 11 day of April, 2025.

£?__ Adam T. Locke

-8-

Exhibit 2

Porter Hedges Welcomes Back Derek Forinash Firm News | 03.16.2020 Porter Hedges announced today that Derek Forinash has returned to the firm as a Partner. His practice focuses on serving as outside general counsel to private companies as well as continuing to provide comprehensive intellectual property legal services to various clients.

His experience includes more than eighteen years in both private practice and as in-house counsel, including serving as Senior Corporate Counsel for an oilfield services company and as Vice President and General Counsel of a Houston-based reservoir engineering company.

“Derek brings a unique perspective to clients having served both as lead in-house counsel as well as in private practice. We are excited to have him back as an asset for our clients representing them in both general business management issues as well as intellectual property matters,” said Managing Partner Rob Reedy.

As outside general counsel, he provides practical legal advice to private companies on the day-to-day issues that impact their businesses including employment matters, commercial contracts, intellectual property, governance, financial transactions, and risk management.

His intellectual property practice focuses developing, protecting, and monetizing clients' intellectual property portfolios as well as drafting and negotiating various technology-related transactions, including SaaS agreements, technology licenses, and joint development agreements.

Prior to law school, Derek worked as an engineer designing oilfield equipment.

Derek received his J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center and his B.S. from Louisiana State University in Mechanical Engineering.

Attorneys

Derek V. Forinash Partner

Practice Areas Intellectual Property Patent and Trademark Prosecution Trade Secret Litigation Trademark and Copyright Litigation

6 213 PORTER HEDGES I Ray T. Torgerson Partner 1000 Main St., 36th Floor Houston, TX 77002 713.226.6650 [email protected]

Ray Torgerson has extensive first- and second-chair jury trial experience in Education both state and federal courts, as well as arbitration before various ADR J.D., University of Texas School of bodies, on behalf of both plaintiffs and defendants. He has represented Law, 1997 public and private corporations, partnerships, small companies, and B.A., Texas A&M University, magna foreign and domestic individuals across various industries. cum laude, 1994 Ray handles the full range of intellectual property disputes; disputes Admissions involving investors, operators, and services contractors in the upstream Texas and midstream energy sectors; and commercial claims involving breach of contract, personal injury, and business torts such as fraud and breach of Practices fiduciary duty. He has substantial experience in disputes involving Litigation partnerships and closely held corporations and has handled a wide array Commercial Litigation of cases involving real estate, environmental, securities, white collar, and Energy Litigation construction matters. He also consults with businesses on technology Intellectual Property matters, including licensing, cybersecurity, and data privacy.

Trademark and Copyright Litigation In addition, Ray helps resolve American Indian law issues, having worked Alternative Dispute Resolution for tribes, businesses, organizations, and individual tribal members across Native American Law the United States on a variety of topics, including sovereignty, jurisdiction, Private Company Disputes / civil rights, natural resources, and economic development. He also taught Business Divorce an American Indian law course at the University of Houston Law Center.

Patent Litigation Honors & Recognitions Real Estate Litigation and Disputes Trade Secret Litigation Best Lawyers in America, Commercial Litigation w w w. p o r t e r h e d g e s . c o m Houston Oklahoma City 7 214 PORTER HEDGES I Michael T. Larkin Partner 1000 Main St., 36th Floor Houston, TX 77002 713.226.6629 [email protected]

Mike Larkin practices primarily in the areas of mergers and acquisitions, Education public and private offerings of securities, joint ventures and strategic J.D., St. Mary's University School of alliances, and corporate and securities law. Mike represents companies Law, 1991 primarily in the oil and gas, health care, telecommunications, technology, M.B.A., Texas Christian University, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, and professional services industries. 1987 B.A., University of Texas at Austin, Affiliations 1985 American Bar Association, Member Admissions Texas State Bar of Texas, Member Practices Houston Bar Association, Member Corporate Association for Corporate Growth, Member Mergers & Acquisitions Energy Transactions Experience Capital Markets Mike’s representations have included the following: Corporate Governance, Compliance & Investigations Mergers and Acquisitions Real Estate Joint Ventures and ● An online continuing education provider for emergency medical Partnerships services and firefighting professionals in its sale to a portfolio Renewable & Alternative company of a private equity firm. ● A privately held consumer products company in a leveraged recapitalization and sale transaction with private equity buyer.

w w w. p o r t e r h e d g e s . c o m Houston Oklahoma City 8 215 PORTER HEDGES I Michael T. Larkin Continued

● Numerous public and privately held issuers in private placements of debt and equity securities. ● A NYSE.MKT issuer in underwritten offerings of preferred stock, including subsequent ATM offerings.

Corporate Advisory ● A natural gas pipeline company regarding securities and general corporate matters, including listing and securities law compliance, disclosure matters, and numerous merger and acquisition transactions. ● Numerous publicly traded and privately held companies in the oil and gas exploration and production, pipeline, and oil field service industries as outside general counsel. ● Publicly traded companies in a cross section of industries (including telecommunications, technology, oil and gas exploration and production, oil and gas pipelines, and oil field services) in all aspects of SEC reporting, corporate governance matters, and general securities law.

Litigation Finance and Additional Expertise ● Numerous lenders, investors and borrowers in litigation finance transactions, including loans and prepaid forward structures. ● Attorneys and law firms in purchase and sale and joint venture transactions. ● Numerous corporate borrowers in connection with syndicated credit agreements, L/C facilities, and loan agreements.

Recent News Porter Hedges Represents Cathedral Energy Services in its $41 Million Acquisition of Rime Downhole Technologies 07.13.2023 The Houston Business Journal Once Again Names Porter Hedges Among the Largest Corporate Firms in Houston 06.02.2023 Porter Hedges Represents Founder of Fitzgerald Wealth Management in Sale to Wealth Enhancement Group 08.04.2021 w w w. p o r t e r h e d g e s . c o m Houston Oklahoma City

II GreenbergTraurig Michael Burshteyn SHAREHOLDER [email protected] SAN FRANCISCO T +1 415.655.1300

Mike Burshteyn litigates complex commercial disputes and class actions involving privacy, crypto, data security, AI, defamation, and other novel Internet law and technology issues. He is lead counsel in multiple cases involving more than $100m in controversy. Mike also represents clients in cybercrime, crypto, and consumer protection investigations and regulatory inquiries. He has litigated matters in federal and state courts in California, New York, Texas, Florida, Arizona, Georgia, Ohio, Delaware, Puerto Rico, and internationally.

Mike previously founded and was the CEO of CryptoMove, a security startup that developed novel moving target defense technology. He draws on this business background to serve as outside general counsel to

- crypto, SaaS, AI, e-commerce, and other technology startups, as well as individual and institutional investors. Mike helps these innovators define and manage their legal roadmaps based on practical business needs across corporate, financing, M&A, licensing, IP, regulatory, and other issues.

Mike graduated from Emory Law School and, as a visiting student, attended the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, where he worked in the Samuelson Law and Technology Clinic. Mike analyzed early legal implications of bitcoin and blockchain technologies as an associate editor of the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.

Mike honed his passion for client advocacy during his time as a college debater at University of California, Berkeley, where he led the Cal debate team to the number one national ranking. Mike maintains an active pro bono practice defending internet rights, security researcher rights, and housing rights.

Capabilities Intellectual Property Litigation | Intellectual Property & Technology | Blockchain & Digital Assets | Data Privacy & Cybersecurity | Innovation & Artificial Intelligence

Experience Representative Matters • Class actions. Defended tech, media, and financial services companies in dozens of privacy and consumer protection class action and mass-tort claims.

© 2025 Greenberg Traurig, LLP www.gtlaw.com | 1

II GreenbergTraurig Galit Kierkut SHAREHOLDER [email protected] NEW JERSEY D +1 973.443.3292 T +1 973.360.7900

Galit Kierkut is a seasoned litigator and advisor to national and international clients in the pharmaceutical, medical device, financial services, hospitality, and health care industries, among others. She also takes on the role of outside general counsel for many of her start-up and growth-stage clients, assembling and leading teams of professionals to seamlessly address her clients’ legal needs.

Galit is also a key member of Greenberg Traurig’s Israel Practice, providing employment counsel to Israeli start up and growth stage clients in their U.S. operations.

Galit practices in the areas of trade secret and non-compete counseling and litigation, employment law, and complex commercial litigation. She is a skilled litigator who is never afraid to champion her client's rights but also works to reach non-litigation solutions when possible. She trains and counsels employers in all employment compliance areas, including reasonable accommodations, anti-harassment and implicit bias and is a frequent writer and speaker on these topics.

Galit has been honored by numerous organizations for her leadership and advocacy for women in the law and has received an award from the New Jersey Commission on Professionalism in the Law in conjunction with the New Jersey Women Lawyers Association. Galit is a past President of the New Jersey Women Lawyers Association and serves as the chair of the Trial Practices Committee of the Executive Committee of the Employment Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association.

Concentrations • Serving as outside general counsel • Restrictive covenant drafting, counseling and litigation • Trade secret litigation • Employment discrimination counseling and litigation • Employee leave and accommodation counseling• Employment compliance training and litigation • Complex commercial litigation • Israel practice • Start-ups The attorney is providing legal services through and affiliated with Greenberg Traurig, LLP, a New York Limited Liability Partnership. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

© 2025 Greenberg Traurig, LLP www.gtlaw.com | 1

Arnold&Porter Ben Fackler Partner San Francisco Tel +1 415.471.3125 [email protected]

Credentials Ben Fackler is an experienced, pragmatic corporate advisor who draws from his work in law, Education investment banking, principal investment, and business to help his clients successfully navigate complex situations and complete critical transactions. He focuses his practice on mergers and J.D., Harvard Law School, acquisitions, capital raising transactions, and matters affecting corporate strategy and magna cum laude governance. Ben has represented numerous public and private companies, including boards of B.S., Pomona College, magna directors, special committees, management, and founders, as well as investment firms, financial cum laude sponsors, venture investors, and family offices, in domestic and cross-border M&A, buyouts, corporate reorganizations, venture and later stage investments, and other transactions, totaling Admissions over US$250 billion in deal value. He also advises on matters involving shareholder activism,

- proxy contests, and contested situations. He regularly assists entrepreneurs and investors in California growing new businesses and new technologies, and often serves as outside general counsel to his New York clients.

Experience Representative Experience Various companies on mergers & acquisitions, buyouts and restructurings, including Rewrite Therapeutics Inc., a private biotechnology company focused on advancing novel DNA writing technologies, on its sale to Intellia Therapeutics Inc. (Nasdaq: NTLA) Pfizer Inc. (NYSE: PFE) on its acquisition of the assets of Lucira Health Inc. through a Bankruptcy Code Section 363 transaction Xoriant Technologies Inc., a digital product, software development and technology services firm, on its sale to affiliates of ChrysCapital, a leading private equity firm based out of India HomeSnap Inc., a digital residential real estate solutions provider, on its sale to CoStar Group Inc. (Nasdaq: CSGP) Mayne Pharma Group Limited (ASX: MYN), a specialty pharmaceutical company focused on commercializing novel and generic pharmaceuticals, on its exclusive license and acquisition of pharmaceutical assets from TherapeuticsMD Inc. (Nasdaq: TXMD)

Robertson Stephens Wealth Management LLC, on various acquisitions of investment advisory businesses Founders of Alter Eco Americas PBC, a leading sustainability-focused chocolate-centric food company, on the sale of the company to NextWorld Evergreen, a private equity firm focused in the consumer and retail industry

Exhibit 3 Saturday, Saturday, April April 5, 5, 2025 2025 at at 15:09:22 15:09:22 Central Central Daylight Daylight Time Time Subject: Subject: RE: SafeLease/Storable - Mar. 31 letter Date: Date: Thursday, April 3, 2025 at 9:42:51 PM Central Daylight Time From: From: Bergman, Andrew D.

To: To: Adam Locke, Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg CC: CC: Yetter, Paul Attachments: Attachments: ~WRD2222.jpg, image001.png

Paul and Adam, Can you please confirm whether SafeLease is refusing to disclose which of Defendants’ OCEO documents Adam has reviewed and when they were reviewed? Katherine’s March letter requested this, and Adam’s letter received yesterday does not address this request.

If SafeLease is refusing to provide this information, please indicate whether you are opposed to a motion for the Court to require SafeLease to do so. Please also indicate whether SafeLease opposes a motion to modify the Protective Order to exclude Adam from viewing Defendants’ OCEO documents going forward.

Thank you, Andrew _______________ Andrew D. Bergman Senior Associate | Bio

Arnold&Porter Louisiana Street | Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002-2755 T: +1 713.576.2430 [email protected] - ----- www.arnoldporter.com | LinkedIn

From: From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Sent: Sent: Wednesday, April 2, 2025 9:30 PM To: To: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]> Cc: Cc: Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]>; YeQer, Paul <[email protected]> ------ Subject: Subject: Re: SafeLease/Storable - Mar. 31 leQer External E-mail Hi Katherine, Please see the aQached response.

1 of 3

Kind regards, Adam

From: From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Date: Date: Wednesday, April 2, 2025 at 7:43 PM To: To: Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]> Cc: Cc: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]> Subject: Subject: Re: SafeLease/Storable - Mar. 31 letter I’m going to respond. Thanks.

From: From: Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]> Date: Date: Wednesday, April 2, 2025 at 6:24 PM To: To: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Cc: Cc: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]> Subject: Subject: SafeLease/Storable - Mar. 31 letter Adam, Katherine has been out this afternoon but asked me to check with you on the status of your response to our March 31 letter.

Thanks, Andrew _______________ Andrew D. Bergman Senior Associate | Bio

Arnold&Porter Louisiana Street | Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002-2755 T: +1 713.576.2430 [email protected] - ----- www.arnoldporter.com | LinkedIn

This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer. ___________________________________________

2 of 3 For more information about Arnold & Porter, click here: -http://www.arnoldporter.com ------- -----

3 of 3 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 99565332 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: SafeLease's Response to Motion to Modify PO Status as of 4/11/2025 12:11 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 99565332 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: SafeLease's Response to Motion to Modify PO Status as of 4/11/2025 12:11 PM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 4/11/2025 11:51:06 AM SENT FILED IN BUSINESS COURT 225 OF TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 4/15/2025

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants.

§ § ═══════════════════════════════════════ Order Denying Motion to Modify Protective Order ═══════════════════════════════════════ Having considered Storable’s Motion to Modify Protective Order/Require Disclosure and Request for Expedited Consideration, Plaintiff’s response, the reply, the evidence, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the motion.

SIGNED ON: April 15, 2025.

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 99686066 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Order Denying Motion to Modify Status as of 4/15/2025 12:17 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 99686066 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Order Denying Motion to Modify Status as of 4/15/2025 12:17 PM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 4/15/2025 12:12:31 PM SENT

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S FIRST MERITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc.; SiteLink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (“Storable” or “Defendants”) hereby submit the following objections and responses to the First Set of Merits Requests for Production served by Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC (“SafeLease” or “Plaintiff”). These responses will be amended and/or supplemented in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS 1. Storable objects to each of SafeLease’s Definitions as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent that SafeLease seeks information outside the scope of discovery or otherwise purports to impose discovery obligations beyond those set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Storable will therefore construe these requests as seeking non-privileged information within the bounds of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Storable objects to the Definition of “API” as vague and ambiguous.

3. Storable objects to the Definition of “Authorized User” as inaccurate and argumentative.

4. Storable objects to the Definitions of “Defendants,” “you,” and “your” as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent SafeLease seeks information in the possession, custody, or control of any third-party or all/any employees. Storable further objects to these definitions to the extent they include Storable’s attorneys, agents, consultants, representatives, and advisors, whether past or present, who have facilitated or provided legal advice to Storable. Storable will therefore construe the requests as seeking non-privileged, responsive documents in the possession, custody, or control of Storable.

5. Storable objects to the Definitions of “Document,” and/or “Documents,” to the extent such Definitions cause any request to seek irrelevant information, render any request overbroad, unduly burdensome, or disproportionate to the needs of this case, are duplicative, or purport to require the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, or other applicable immunities.

Storable will construe requests employing these definitions as seeking non-privileged information, reasonably giving words their ordinary meaning consistent with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Storable objects to the Definition of “Facility management software” in that it improperly characterizes facility management software as covering only products offered by Defendants.

7. Storable objects to the Definition of “Facility management software market” as calling for a legal conclusion.

8. Storable objects to the Definition of “Tenant insurance” as vague and ambiguous.

9. Storable objects to the Definition of “Tenant insurance market” as vague and ambiguous and calling for a legal conclusion.

OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS 1. Storable objects to each of SafeLease’s Instructions as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent that SafeLease seeks information outside the scope of discovery or otherwise purports to impose discovery obligations beyond those set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, including with respect to the production of native documents. Storable will therefore construe these requests as seeking non-privileged information within the bounds of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Storable objects to SafeLease’s Instructions to the extent that it seeks information that is not in Storable’s possession, custody, or control.

RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Request for Production No. 1: All documents that reflect communications with any customer, tenant, or other third-party (including consultants and the like) regarding SafeLease. This includes complaints or feedback regarding SafeLease’s access to your facility management software, discussions about purported performance or security issues caused by SafeLease’s access to your facility management software, discussions about any technical restrictions put in place to limit SafeLease’s access to your facility management software, and discussions about switching from your tenant insurance products or offerings to SafeLease’s tenant insurance products or offerings.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase “communications . . . regarding SafeLease” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 2: All documents reflecting your internal communications regarding SafeLease. This includes communications regarding SafeLease’s access to your facility management software, competition with SafeLease over tenant insurance customers, any competitive analysis of SafeLease, any antitrust implications of restricting SafeLease’s access to your facility management software, discussions incident to any business negotiations between you and SafeLease (including API access negotiations and discussion of any potential acquisition), and any performance or security issues caused by SafeLease’s access to your facility management software.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase “communications regarding SafeLease” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 3: All documents reflecting your communications with SafeLease regarding access to your facility management software, including any performance, stability, privacy, or security issues allegedly caused by the same.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks information that is already in the possession of SafeLease.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 4: All documents reflecting your communications with board members, investors, or senior management regarding SafeLease. This includes reports submitted to a director, investor, or senior management regarding SafeLease, any approvals or directives issued by a board member regarding your dealings with SafeLease, and any communications your employees or agents had with a director, investor, or senior management regarding SafeLease.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase “communications . . . regarding SafeLease” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects that this Request is duplicative and cumulative of

Request No. 2. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 5: All documents reflecting communications with board members, investors, or senior management regarding your market share in the facility management software market or tenant insurance market.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the phrase “communications . . . regarding your market share” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 6: All documents reflecting analysis or documentation of your market share in the tenant insurance market or facility management software market.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 7: All documents relating to your business plans, strategies, initiatives, or analyses concerning your market share in the tenant insurance market, including about acquiring Third-Party Insurance Vendors, restricting Third-Party Insurance Vendors from accessing your facility management software, and establishing fees for API access to your facility management software for Third- Party Insurance Vendors.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to everything after “including” as cumulative.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 8: All documents relating to your business plans, strategies, initiatives, or analyses concerning how to gain or maintain your market share in the facility management software market, including cross- selling of facility management software with any other product and restricting or controlling access to any other product or service offered by you.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 9: All documents concerning your strategy, decision making, business plans, or analyses concerning API access pricing for Third-Party Insurance Vendors or SafeLease.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “API access pricing” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 10: Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that use your facility management software, including addresses for those facilities.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as seeking irrelevant information, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case, as well as on the basis that it seeks confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable’s possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will not produce documents in response to this Request.

Request for Production No. 11: Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that you contend constitute the relevant market for purposes of this dispute.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “relevant market” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to this Request as calling for a legal conclusion. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable’s possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 12: Documents sufficient to show all Authorized Users on your storEDGE and SiteLink facility management software during the relevant time period.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as seeking irrelevant information, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case, as well as on the basis that it seeks confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable’s possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will not produce documents in response to this Request.

Request for Production No. 13: All documents reflecting any efforts by you to acquire customers from SafeLease, including any business plans or strategies regarding the same.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase “efforts by you to acquire customers” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 14: All documents reflecting your policies and procedures for granting, maintaining, tracking, or terminating Authorized User access to your facility management software applicable at any point during the relevant time period.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the terms “tracking” and “access” as vague and ambiguous.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 15: All documents relating to the planned, actual, or potential removal or restriction of SafeLease or any Third-Party Insurance Vendor from accessing your facility management software as an Authorized User or otherwise, including plans, strategies, and reasoning for any such removal or restriction.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “accessing” as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 16: All documents regarding your decision to remove the third-party producer option or custom insurance module from the SiteLink marketplace.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the undefined terms “third-party producer option” and “custom insurance model” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 17: Documents sufficient to show each Third-Party Insurance Vendor with access to the SiteLink custom third-party insurance module at any time during the relevant time period, along with the dates such access was available.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the undefined term “SiteLink custom third-party insurance module” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the term “access” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non- parties to this lawsuit.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable responds that it will produce non-privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 18: Documents sufficient to show each Third-Party Insurance Vendor with access to your Easy Storage Solutions facility management software at any time during the relevant time period, along with the dates such access was available.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “access” as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 19: All documents relating to identification, diagnosis, analysis, or consideration of any purported security, privacy, performance, stability, or related issue caused by SafeLease’s access to your facility management software.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable objects to the term “related issue” as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 20: All documents evidencing any technical security measures implemented by you to manage, disable, limit, restrict, or block SafeLease’s access to your facility management software.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case, as well as on the basis that it seeks confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will not produce documents in response to this Request.

Request for Production No. 21: Documents sufficient to show the occurrence of and reason for any system outage, interruption, slowdown, or other material performance issue on your facility management software from 2021 to present.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to this Request as overbroad in time to the extent it seeks documents prior to August 1, 2021. Storable further objects to this Request as overbroad in scope to the extent it seeks documents on “any system outage, interruption, [or] slowdown,” regardless of materiality.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 22: Documents sufficient to show the capabilities of the storEDGE and SiteLink APIs, including the customer data available to Third-Party Insurance Vendors who access storEDGE and SiteLink via API and the reports Third-Party Insurance Vendors are able to generate through access to storEDGE and SiteLink via API.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “capabilities” as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks to require Storable to create documents not in existence.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 23: All documents related to your negotiations with SafeLease for API access to your facility management software, including pricing proposals, fee schedules, and communications with any person reflecting the pricing structure offered to SafeLease.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks information that is already in the possession of SafeLease. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 24: All documents regarding the restoration or restriction of SafeLease’s access to your facility management software in response to the issuance or expiration of any court order.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “access” as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 25: All documents related to any communications with any journalist, reporter, media outlet, or website regarding SafeLease or this dispute.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to this Request as duplicative of Request No. 1.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Respectfully submitted April 21, 2025. /s/ Mikaila Skaroff Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) Colorado Bar No. 60688 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 1144 Fifteenth St, Suite 3100 Denver, Colorado 80202 Tel.: (303) 863–1000 Fax: (303) 863–2301 [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002

Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record on April 21, 2025.

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4.1 . Right to Access and Use the Services. Subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement, and upon timely payment of all applicable Fees set forth in an Order Form, we hereby grant to you a non-exclusive, non- transferable, limited right to access and use (and permit your Users to use) the Services to which you have subscribed solely for your internal business purposes.

4.2. Authorized Users. You may designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement. You (i) are responsible for your Users' compliance with the Agreement, and (ii) shall use commercially reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized access to or use of the Services and shall notify us immediately of any such unauthorized access or use. It is your responsibility to remove access to the Services if authorized status of a User or designated employee changes .

4.3. Your Responsibilities and Restrictions. You are responsible for all activities that occur under your use of the Services and the use by your Users .... You may not, and you shall ensure your Users do not ... (ii) license, sublicense, sell, rent, assign, distribute, time share transfer, lease, loan, resell, distribute or otherwise commercially exploit, grant rights in or make the Services available to any third party; (iii) use the Services except as ÿ ÿ expressly authorized hereunder or in violation of any applicable laws; ... or or (viii) interfere with or disrupt the integrity or performance of the Services ÿ or third-party data contained therein.

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Via electronic filing May 16, 2025 The Honorable Melissa Andrews The Business Court of Texas, Third Division 1000 Guadalupe St, Austin, TX 78701 Re: SafeLease Ins. Servs. LLC v. Storable, Inc., et al., No. 25-BC03A-0001 — Letter Summarizing Discovery Dispute Regarding Plaintiff’s RFPs Dear Judge Andrews: Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC respectfully submits this letter summarizing an unresolved discovery dispute. Defendants (“Storable”) refuse to produce documents in response to SafeLease requests for production (“RFPs”) Nos. 10, 12, and 20.

This letter follows SafeLease’s good-faith attempts to resolve this dispute through emails and calls, including a 90-minute meet and confer on May 7, 2024, as detailed in the Certificate of Conference. During the May 7 call, SafeLease explained the relevance and proportionality of these requests to issues of market definition, market power, and anticompetitive conduct. SafeLease also noted that the Protective Order addresses any confidentiality concerns. Despite these efforts, the dispute remains unresolved. Storable maintains its refusal to produce responsive documents.

The RFPs at issue seek information central to the parties’ claims and defenses.

RFP 10: “Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that use your facility management software, including addresses for those facilities.”

• Storable refused to produce any documents, based on irrelevance, overbreadth, burden, proportionality, and confidentiality grounds. It offered only to provide the number of facilities using its FMS and a breakdown by state. This would not permit SafeLease to verify this information. Storable suggested that its counsel or a third party could verify.

• SafeLease narrowed its request to “Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that use your facility management software, including the City, State, ZIP, and FMS for those facilities, as of December 30, 2024.” Storable refuses to produce documents responsive to this narrowed request, maintaining its previous offer.

• This information is relevant and proportional to the needs of this case. It is critical for defining the relevant antitrust market and assessing Storable’s market power and competitive impact of its conduct—all core issues. SafeLease must be able to assess

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Hon. Melissa Andrews 278 May 16, 2025 Page 2 and verify this data and not be required to accept representations by Storable or a third party hired by Storable.

RFP 12: “Documents sufficient to show all Authorized Users on your storEDGE and SiteLink facility management software during the relevant time period.”

• Storable refused any production based on similar grounds as RFP 10, including burden, irrelevance, proportionality, and confidentiality. It only offered to provide the total number of Authorized Users on storEDGE and SiteLink and said it could identify third- party insurance producers who are Authorized Users on the systems. This information is insufficient to analyze Storable’s exclusionary conduct and targeting of SafeLease.

• SafeLease narrowed its request to “Documents sufficient to show all third-party Authorized Users on your facility management software as of December 30, 2024.” On May 14, Storable refused to produce documents responsive to this narrowed request, stating that it has no way to know the full universe of third-party users and objecting that it does not maintain lists of such users, so it does not possess documents showing who such users are. It admitted that creating such a list is possible.

• Understanding the scope of Authorized Users, including how many other vendors have Authorized User access, is relevant and proportional to the needs of this case. This information is critical to assess Storable’s exclusionary conduct and its market impact.

RFP 20: “All documents evidencing any technical security measures implemented by you to manage, disable, limit, restrict, or block SafeLease’s access to your facility management software.”

• Storable refused any production, citing overbreadth, proportionality, confidentiality concerns, and burden, particularly as to computer code. It does not dispute relevance.

• SafeLease narrowed this request to documents responsive to the original request other than computer code. On May 14, Storable refused to produce documents responsive to this narrowed request, offering instead to produce documents showing only “when it took specific security measures that affected SafeLease.”

• This information is necessary to evaluate Storable’s justifications defense and are key issues for SafeLease’s antitrust and tortious interference claims. Documents showing only when such actions were taken are not enough.

As the parties remain at an impasse regarding RFPs 10, 12, and 20, SafeLease seeks relief from the Court.

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Adam Locke Adam Locke LOCKELAW PLLC Counsel for SafeLease Insurance Services LLC LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Hon. Melissa Andrews 279 May 16, 2025 Page 3 CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE I certify that the parties diligently tried to resolve the discovery dispute before filing the accompanying Letter Summarizing Discovery Dispute Regarding Plaintiff’s RFPs.

1. Dates: A conference was held via Zoom on May 7, 2025. This followed six emails from SafeLease seeking to schedule this conference, beginning in mid-April.

2. Participants: Counsel participated in the May 7 call. For SafeLease, they included Julia Risley and Luke Schamel of Yetter Coleman, and me. For Storable, they included Andrew Bergman, Mikaila Skaroff, and John Holler of Arnold & Porter.

3. Results: On the May 7 call, Storable proposed a limited production of documents in response to RFPs 10, 12, and 20. On May 8, via email, SafeLease proposed narrowed RFPs 10, 12, and 20. On May 14, Storable maintained its position that it would not produce any documents responsive to these requests at this time.

4. Topics: On May 7, SafeLease explained its view on the relevance and proportionality of the requests to the claims and defenses in this matter. It also discussed alternative methods to address Storable’s stated confidentiality concerns, such as applying designations under the existing Protective Order. Storable maintained its objections to relevance, proportionality, and confidentiality for these specific RFPs but proposed making a limited production in response to these RFPs. SafeLease determined such a limited production would not be appropriate in this case and would exclude relevant information. On May 8, SafeLease proposed narrowed RFPs. Storable refused to produce all documents responsive to these narrowed requests. The parties were unable to resolve or narrow the dispute.

Dated: May 16, 2025. /s/ Adam Locke Adam Locke LOCKELAW PLLC Counsel for SafeLease Insurance Services LLC

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Hon. Melissa Andrews 280 May 16, 2025 Page 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on May 16, 2025, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument was served upon all parties via eFile in accordance with Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

/s/ Adam Locke Adam Locke

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court281 of Texas 5/22/2025 3:25 PM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings The Business Court of Texas Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § SUPPLEMENT TO PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC (“SafeLease”) respectfully supplements its Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction as to the following paragraph and in no other respect: DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 14. SafeLease intends that this case be conducted under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plain in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4. As stated in its prior pleadings and representations to the Court, and other than attorney fees and costs to which it may be entitled, SafeLease only seeks non-monetary injunctive relief at this time.

Date: May 22, 2025 Respectfully submitted, Judd E. Stone II /s/ R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 R. Paul Yetter [email protected] State Bar No. 22154200 Christopher D. Hilton [email protected] State Bar No. 24087727 Susanna R. Allen [email protected] State Bar No. 24126616 Alexander M. Dvorscak [email protected] State Bar No. 24120461 Luke A. Schamel [email protected] State Bar No. 24106403 STONE HILTON PLLC [email protected] Congress Ave., Suite 2350 Shannon N. Smith Austin, Texas 78701 State Bar No. 24110378 (737) 465-3897 [email protected] YETTER COLEMAN LLP Adam T. Locke 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 State Bar No. 24083184 Houston, Texas 77002 [email protected] (713) 632-8000 LOCKELAW PLLC 2617 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 Houston, Texas 77005 (713) 832-0243 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record via the Court e-filing service and/or by email, on May 22, 2025.

/s/ Luke A. Schamel Luke A. Schamel

-2- Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Steven Vacek on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101174075 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Supplement to Plaintiff's Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for TRO, TI and PI Status as of 5/22/2025 3:45 PM CST Associated Case Party: SafeLease Insurance Services LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Delonda Dean [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT

Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Steven Vacek on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101174075 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Supplement to Plaintiff's Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for TRO, TI and PI Status as of 5/22/2025 3:45 PM CST Case Contacts Andrew Bergman [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Carolyn Reed [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 5/22/2025 3:25:11 PM SENT E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court285 of Texas 5/23/2025 4:05 PM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Arnold&Porter Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 Katherine G. Treistman +1 713.576.2433 Direct [email protected] May 23, 2025 VIA E-FILING The Honorable Melissa Andrews Business Court of Texas, Third Division 1000 Guadalupe St., Austin, TX 78701 Re: SafeLease Ins. Servs. LLC v. Storable, Inc., et al., No. 25-BC03A-0001 Dear Judge Andrews: I write on behalf of Storable in response to SafeLease’s May 16, 2025 letter.

The accusations that Storable “refused” to produce responsive documents are inaccurate.

For each request, Storable offered, as a compromise, to produce documents that would provide SafeLease with discovery relevant and proportional to its stated needs. SafeLease rejected these reasonable compromises to seek the Court’s intervention.

RFP 10 (All facilities using Storable’s FMS and their addresses) SafeLease stated that the relevance of this request is to help calculate Storable’s FMS market share. Rather than producing its entire customer list with addresses—a highly confidential document—to a hostile competitor with whom Storable is in litigation, Storable proposed to produce information sufficient to show the total number of Storable’s FMS customers, including a breakdown of the totals in each state. This compromise would provide the numerator needed to calculate Storable’s market share.

SafeLease refused this proposal, insisting that it needs the list with city-level address information to verify that the facilities listed are accurate. In addition to the verification mechanisms noted by SafeLease in its letter, Storable proposed as a further compromise that SafeLease’s expert review the list in person or remotely, while the list remained in Storable’s possession. SafeLease rejected this proposal.

Before the TI hearings in this matter, Storable produced its calculation of the number of facilities using its FMS as of December 2024 (see DX-198), yet SafeLease’s economist, Michael Williams, did not use this information. Instead, at both the January 16 and February 11 hearings, his market share testimony was based solely on the approximate customer count listed on Storable’s website without further verification. 1/16 Tr. 221:1–7; 2/11 Tr. 120:3–16. If SafeLease or its expert relied on and presented this estimate as reliable at the TI hearings without further “verification,” it is unclear why further verification is even needed.

Thus, based on the stated relevance, it is unclear why Storable’s alternative proposals were inadequate.

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP I 700 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 | Houston, TX 77002-2755 | www.arnoldporter.com Arnold&Porter The Honorable Melissa Andrews May 23, 2025 Page 2 RFP 12 (All authorized users for storEDGE and SiteLink) SafeLease’s stated relevance of this request is determining whether Storable “singled out” SafeLease for allegedly unfavorable treatment.

Storable informed SafeLease that no such documents exist. Storable does not maintain lists of authorized users. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a party to create documents that do not otherwise exist. Further, SafeLease has not requested this information in a proper manner, which would be to propound interrogatories. Storable has already informed SafeLease that it intends to amend its response to the document request to reflect that no responsive documents exist.

Still, given the stated relevance of the request, Storable offered as a compromise to produce the total number of authorized users and information showing whether other tenant insurance providers have authorized users. SafeLease rejected this compromise.

RFP 20 (All documents evidencing security measures impacting SafeLease’s access to Storable’s FMS) As the Court is aware from testimony in this case, the security measures implemented at issue were uniform, not targeted at SafeLease. Thus, the request as written asks for “all documents” regarding Storable’s general security measures. This request is overbroad and burdensome as it would require Storable to produce potentially every document it has relating to its general security measures. As a compromise, Storable offered to produce documents sufficient to show the specific security measures that affected SafeLease and when it took those measures.

Again, inexplicably, SafeLease refused this reasonable compromise designed to get it the discovery it allegedly needs.

In conclusion, Storable’s offered compromises are reasonable and would provide to SafeLease the discovery it allegedly needs without the Court’s intervention. For the reasons presented, Storable respectfully requests that the Court dismiss SafeLease’s discovery dispute.

Respectfully submitted, s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman cc: Counsel of Record (by e-filing) Arnold&Porter The Honorable Melissa Andrews May 23, 2025 Page 3 Response to Certificate of Conference Storable generally does not dispute Plaintiff’s certificate of conference and would simply direct the Court’s attention to the conflict between SafeLease’s statement in the certificate that “Storable proposed making a limited production in response to these RFPs” with its statements in the uncertified letter that Storable “refused to produce any documents” or “refused any production.” s/ Katherine G. Treistman Attorney for Defendants Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Grace Ojionuka on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101228824 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Storable's Response to SafeLease's Discovery Dispute Letter Status as of 5/23/2025 4:09 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Grace Ojionuka on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101228824 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Storable's Response to SafeLease's Discovery Dispute Letter Status as of 5/23/2025 4:09 PM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 5/23/2025 4:05:20 PM SENT FILED IN BUSINESS COURT OF290 TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 5/28/2025

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants.

§ ═══════════════════════════════════════ Discovery Order ═══════════════════════════════════════ Before the Court is plaintiff SafeLease’s discovery-dispute letter, filed under Business Court Local Rule 4(d), and the response letter filed by defendants (collectively, Storable). SafeLease seeks, and Storable resists, production of documents responsive to SafeLease’s requests for production (RFPs) numbers 10, 12, and 20. The Court ORDERS as follows: RFP 10: Storable is ORDERED to produce documents sufficient to show the name, city, state, and zip code of all self-storage facilities using Storable’s FMS platforms as of December 30, 2024.

Storable asserts that its customer list with addresses is “a highly confidential document” 1 and that SafeLease is “a hostile competitor with whom Storable is in litigation.” 2 The agreed protective order in this case contains “confidential” and “outside counsel’s eyes only” (OCEO) designations, both available to Storable to protect its confidential information as appropriate. Because the parties previously disputed whether certain counsel should have access to OCEO material, the Court directs them to Westlake Longview Corp. v. Eastman Chemical Co., 2025 Tex. Bus.

19, for guidance on the evidentiary standards applicable to such disputes. 3 RFP 12: Storable is ORDERED to either (a) produce documents sufficient to show all authorized users on storEDGE and SiteLink as of December 30, 2024 or (b) amend its RFP 12 response to state that no responsive documents exist and give the number of authorized users on storEDGE and SiteLink on December 30, 2024.

Storable states that “no [] documents exist” that are responsive to RFP 12, it “does not maintain lists of authorized users,” and it will amend its discovery responses “to reflect that no responsive documents exist.” If that is the case, amending the discovery responses is sufficient. Storable is correct that it is not

Storable did not assert that the information at issue constitutes a trade secret.

While SafeLease may be a competitor of Storable’s insurance affiliates, the customer list at issue is for Storable’s FMS customers. SafeLease does not compete in the FMS market.

The Westlake decision addresses access for in-house counsel but notes that federal courts have applied the same test for both outside and in-house lawyers. Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 at n.16.

obligated to create a document that does not exist in response to this RFP.

The Court notes, however, that RFP 12 is not limited to a list of authorized users and “documents” is broadly defined to include not just physical files but also, for example, electronic data. 4 If Storable has data that shows the authorized users on storEDGE and SiteLink as of December 30, 2024, Storable need not process such data to create a list for SafeLease but must produce the data (subject to privilege). 5 The Court raises this because Storable offered “to produce the total number of authorized users and information showing whether other tenant insurance providers have authorized users,” and it is plausible that the data from which Storable would derive that information would be responsive to RFP 12.

RFP 20: Storable is ORDERED to produce documents evidencing the specific security measures it took that affected SafeLease’s access to Storable’s FMS, other than computer code, and when it took such measures.

This reflects SafeLease’s offer to limit its request to exclude computer code and Storable’s offer to produce “documents sufficient to show the specific security measures that affected SafeLease and when it took those measures.”

Storable is ORDERED to comply with this order by June 13, 2025.

Under the parties’ agreed ESI protocols, electronic data should be produced in TIF format.

Storable need not produce data that is duplicative—only data that is “sufficient to show” the authorized users on the given date.

Date signed: May 28, 2025

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division

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Envelope ID: 101329629 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Discovery Order Status as of 5/28/2025 12:43 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 101329629 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Discovery Order Status as of 5/28/2025 12:43 PM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 5/28/2025 12:37:00 PM SENT E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of 296 Texas 6/3/2025 9:22 AM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SAFELEASE’S ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 1 II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS ........................................................................ 2 A. Background on Storable................................................................................................ 2 B. Competition for Tenant Insurance................................................................................. 3 C. Storable’s Right to Determine Who Accesses its FMS Platforms and on What Terms 4 D. Storable’s API Pricing ................................................................................................... 5 E. SafeLease’s Dispute with Storable................................................................................ 7 III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................................ 8 IV. LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................................... 10 V. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... 11 A. STORABLE DOES NOT HAVE A DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF MONOPOLIZING THE TENANT INSURANCE MARKET................................... 11 B. STORABLE’S CONDUCT DID NOT HARM COMPETITION FOR TENANT INSURANCE.............................................................................................................. 14 C. STORABLE’S CONDUCT IS NEITHER ANTICOMPETITIVE NOR PREDATORY ............................................................................................................. 16 1. Storable Has Not Excluded or Refused to Deal with SafeLease .......................... 17 2. Storable’s Conduct Has Legitimate Business Justifications ................................. 21 D. STORABLE DOES NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC INTENT TO MONOPOLIZE THE TENANT INSURANCE MARKET ........................................................................... 23 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 24 i

Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively, “Storable”) respectfully move the Court for summary judgment on the First Cause of Action (Violation of the Texas Antitrust Act, Section B) in Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC’s Second Amended Petition, and would show as follows: I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim is fatally flawed and fails as a matter of law for myriad reasons. Storable is nowhere close to monopolizing the alleged tenant insurance market. Storable’s challenged conduct is not anticompetitive and it has not harmed competition for tenant insurance. And Storable has no intent to monopolize the tenant insurance space.

Storable’s conduct also has legitimate business justifications, which provide a complete defense to SafeLease’s claim.

SafeLease tries to repackage as an antitrust claim its failed negotiations with Storable over an API agreement to access Storable’s FMS platforms. But the undisputed facts do not support that claim and no potentially discoverable facts could save it. The Court should resolve this Motion now to avoid expansive, unnecessary discovery on this claim and the disclosure of highly confidential, competitively sensitive information to one of Storable’s competitors. SafeLease’s suit rises and falls on its tort claims and only those claims should proceed at this stage.

Without any further discovery, the undisputed facts in SafeLease’s petition and the record doom SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim. Storable and SafeLease are just two of more than a dozen tenant insurance competitors in the U.S. No tenant insurance competitor is dominant or anywhere close to being a monopolist; even construing all facts in SafeLease’s favor, Storable has less than 25% share. No facts in the record or potentially obtainable through discovery could show that Storable’s conduct harmed tenant insurance competition or that Storable has attempted to exclude any tenant insurance competitor apart from SafeLease. The undisputed evidence shows the opposite: instead of excluding competitors, Storable has promoted competition by entering into API agreements with more than a dozen tenant insurance competitors—every other tenant insurance provider that has sought to access its FMS platforms. Out of all these competitors, only SafeLease has complained about Storable’s conduct. Yet Storable is treating SafeLease just like any other competitor: it offered SafeLease the same API terms that it has offered every tenant insurance competitor newly seeking to connect to its platforms in the last three years, terms to which at least four other competitors have agreed. While SafeLease may not like the terms of accessing Storable’s platform, SafeLease’s gripes do not transform its ordinary business grievance into attempted monopolization of the tenant insurance space.

Because there are no genuine disputes of material fact relevant to multiple elements of this claim, the Court should grant Defendants’ Motion, which will help streamline discovery, promoting judicial efficiency and preserving the parties’ resources.

II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS This Motion relies on the following undisputed facts based on evidence in the record. True and correct copies of the materials cited herein are attached as exhibits to the authenticating Declaration of Katherine Treistman in support of this Motion.

A. Background on Storable Storable offers a suite of products and services for self-storage facilities, including three facility management software (“FMS”) platforms and multiple tenant insurance and protection products. See Ex. L at 140:11-141:1 (Gordon). Storable’s FMS platforms rely on proprietary software owned and controlled solely by Storable. See generally Exs. M-O. By offering a full suite of offerings, Storable adds significant value to its self-storage customers. See Ex. L at 139:12-

140:10 (Gordon) (Storable’s “comprehensive platform” helps “simplify the daily lives of our customers, mak[ing] them more efficient and more profitable”).

B. Competition for Tenant Insurance There is broad competition for self-storage tenant insurance in the United States. Storable and SafeLease are just two of more than a dozen tenant insurance competitors in the U.S., including Deans & Homer, MiniCo, SafeStor, Savvy, SBOA, Storage Shield, and Xercor. Ex. L at 146:11- (Gordon); Ex. P at 2; Ex. K at 139:6-21 (Caminade), 236:16-19 (Manes); see also Ex. J at 231:18-232:4 (Rudkin). SafeLease admits that it competes with a “variety of insurance providers” for “the same business.” Ex. K at 79:9-15 (Kinet).

There is no evidence that any competitor has more than 25% share of the alleged tenant insurance market. See Ex. J at 177:21-178:1, 179:8-18 (Williams); Ex. H at 175:9-24 (Stein); Ex. K at 141:23-25 (Caminade). Even using SafeLease’s improperly small market size and assuming its tenant insurance market is properly defined, Storable has at most ~23% share ( facilities). See - - Ex. R at 5. SafeLease estimates that it has a “low single digit” share in /43,764 tenant insurance. Ex. H at 175:9-12 (Stein). SafeLease serves ~2,575 to L at 28:14-21 (Stein) - - facilities, see Ex. , 1 so again using SafeLease’s improperly small market size, see Ex. R at 5, SafeLease would have ~6% share.

There has been recent entry in the tenant insurance space, suggesting that barriers to entry are low. SafeLease itself was started less than five years ago, in late 2021. Ex. H at 149:13-14 (Stein); see also Ex. K at 251:5-22 (Manes) (Storage Shield started in 2020 or 2021).

Based on Mr. Stein’s testimony, ~70% of SafeLease’s customers, or 1,800 facilities, use a Storable FMS, so SafeLease has ~2,571 total customers.

Self-storage facilities can readily switch between tenant insurance providers. See Ex. K at 89:13-20 (Kinet). Self-storage facilities are not required to use a tenant insurance product offered by their FMS provider. Storable, for example, does not require that its FMS customers use its tenant insurance products; today, less than a third of Storable’s FMS customers use its insurance products. Ex. L at 148:18-20, 155:3-8 (Gordon). Similarly, SafeLease has pushed customers to switch from Storable’s to Cubby’s FMS, while staying with SafeLease for insurance. Ex. K at 82:4-18 (Kinet); see also Ex. T; Ex. J at 309:10-310:8 (Kinet).

C. Storable’s Right to Determine Who Accesses its FMS Platforms and on What Terms As the owner of its proprietary FMS software, Storable is entitled to define the terms under which companies can access it. Storable has standard terms that outline and limit its self-storage customers’ use of its FMS platforms. Exs. M-O. Under those terms, Storable can control who has “authorized user” access to its platforms. Ex. M at 2; Ex. N at 6; Ex. O at 6. Under Storable’s interpretation of its terms, third-party service providers like SafeLease are not allowed to access Storable’s platforms as authorized users. See Ex. H at 260:16-24, 266:12-14 (Gordon).

While Storable could restrict third-party access to its FMS platforms, Storable instead has promoted provider choice and competition among service providers on its platforms. Storable wants to provide its customers with broad choice for services that integrate with Storable’s FMS platform, including tenant insurance. Id. at 132:25-133:12 (Gordon). Indeed, the value of Storable’s platforms is predicated in part on offering a broad choice of providers to its FMS customers. Ex. L at 147:25-148:17 (Gordon).

To connect to its FMS platforms, Storable requires that third-party service providers enter an application programming interface (“API”) agreement and access its platforms using an API.

Using APIs to facilitate information exchanges between FMS platforms and third-party service providers is an industry-standard process. Ex. H at 179:13-23 (Stein); see Ex. L at 145:4-18 (Gordon) (other FMS providers use APIs as well). Storable’s API agreements enable third-party service providers to securely send and receive information from Storable’s FMS systems so the providers can serve their customers. See Ex. H at 103:23-104:5 (Gordon); Ex. L at 191:12-17 (Gordon). Integrated API access to Storable’s FMS platforms provides value for self-storage operators and tenant insurance companies by helping them pull data cheaply and increasing demand for their services. See Ex. K at 143:5-144:20, 148:22-149:12 (Caminade); Ex. L at 157:3- (Gordon).

To date, Storable has entered into API agreements with more than 100 third-party service providers, including over a dozen tenant insurance providers. See, e.g., Ex. L at 146:14-147:24 (Gordon); Ex. U; Ex. V at 2. SafeLease does not have an API agreement with Storable. Ex. CCC at 2. Apart from SafeLease, every other tenant insurance company seeking to connect to Storable’s FMS platforms has entered into an API agreement with Storable.

Ex. H at 87:6-17 (Gordon); Ex. L at 151:1-4 (Gordon).

Storable’s requirement that third parties access its platform using an API have legitimate business justifications. If third parties can unrestrictedly access Storable’s systems without an API, those systems face security and stability risks, including surges and outages. To protect its proprietary software and its customers’ sensitive information, Storable needs to be able to control who can access to its platforms and how information flows to and from them. Ex. H at

- 256:10-21 (Fritcher); D. Storable’s API Pricing see also Ex. K at 233:25-234:15 (Manes). - Over the years, Storable has adjusted the terms under which third-party service providers can access its FMS platforms. In 2021, Storable reevaluated how to price API access for third- party service providers, including tenant insurance companies. Ex. H at 87:18-88:17 (Gordon); Ex. Y. Based on that evaluation, Storable adopted a two-pronged pricing strategy.

First, for providers that had integrated with Storable’s FMS platforms before 2021, Storable

At least eight tenant insurance providers with API agreements with Storable have terms along these lines. - Second, for providers that had not integrated with Storable’s FMS platform before 2021, Storable set its standard fees at

- this - . See Ex. L at 45:20-25 (Stein) . At least four tenant insurance providers have API agreements with Storable using rate structure.

Storable adopted this updated pricing strategy to align with the value that Storable’s platforms provide to third-party service providers.

Operators and service providers receive value from being able to access Storable’s rich marketplace. See 142:14-24 (Caminade). Building and maintaining APIs has costs for Storable and provides value for which service providers are willing to pay. Ex. L at 155:9-21 (Gordon); Ex. K at 232:25- 233:5 (Manes). Storable is constantly investing in and improving its APIs by adding new features and making them more secure. Ex. L at 155:9-21 (Gordon). Storable set a higher price for serving facilities that previously used a Storable insurance product because there is greater value in connecting with those facilities. Id. at 153:8-155:2 (Gordon); - see also Ex. K at 181:14- 183:4 (Caminade). Storable has invested in building the insurance revenue opportunity with these facilities, so they are more valuable prospective customers for Storable’s tenant insurance competitors. Ex. L at 153:13-154:10 (Gordon).

If an FMS platform provides more value to third-party service providers, those providers may have to pay a higher fee to access that platform.

Compared to other FMS providers’ APIs, Storable’s API offers access to a platform with a broader suite of services, exposure to more facilities, and strong service, which provides significantly more value. Ex. L at 145:4-24, 157:14-24 (Gordon); see also Ex. K at 148:3-149:12 (Caminade) I .

E. SafeLease’s Dispute with Storable SafeLease, unlike any other tenant insurance provider, has systematically accessed Storable’s FMS platforms using automated bots and other unauthorized means. See Ex. H at 255:25-256:21 (Fritcher); Ex. L at 150:17-25 (Gordon), 234:24-236:5 I (Fritcher)

- . In or around April 2024, Storable realized the extent of SafeLease’s unauthorized access to its FMS platforms. See Ex. L at 234:24-236:5 (Fritcher) . - SafeLease’s unauthorized use of Storable’s FMS platforms, in particular its use of automated bots to run millions of reports,

After uncovering the extent of SafeLease’s unauthorized access, Storable informed SafeLease that it needed to enter into an API agreement to access Storable’s FMS platforms. See id. at 116:6-10, 117:9-16 (Gordon). In mid-October 2024, Storable informed SafeLease that it was implementing security measures that would block unauthorized access to its systems and may affect SafeLease.

Ex. RR; Ex. H at 112:22-113:6 (Gordon).

In late 2024 into early 2025, Storable and SafeLease exchanged multiple offers for pricing under an API agreement. On October 22, 2024, Storable offered Several days later, Storable offered an updated proposal with the same framework but

-■ . SafeLease countered with . ■ Between then and February 2025, the parties exchanged multiple other offers. During these negotiations, Storable offered SafeLease

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 30, 2024, unsatisfied with these API negotiations, SafeLease sued Storable in district court in Travis County, alleging an attempted monopolization claim and seeking a temporary injunction (“TI”). SafeLease alleged that Storable had leveraged its purported monopoly power in FMS services to attempt to monopolize the alleged tenant insurance market.

Ex. SS ¶¶ 83-84. Specifically, SafeLease alleged that Storable’s decision to cut off SafeLease’s “authorized user” access to its FMS platforms was a “refusal to deal [] intended to remove a low- cost competitor from the market to help defendants gain market share and solidify a second monopoly in the market for tenant insurance.” Id. On January 21, 2025, the district court denied SafeLease’s request for a TI on the attempted monopolization claim. Ex. TT. In so ruling, the court inherently rejected SafeLease’s arguments that the evidence showed a probable right to relief on this claim.

On January 28, 2025, SafeLease filed its Second Amended Petition, tacking on two tort claims and again requesting a TI. Ex. A. In this amended petition, SafeLease does not allege that

Storable targeted any tenant insurance competitor apart from SafeLease. Rather, it states that Storable “singled out and targeted SafeLease” (¶ 12) through a scheme to “cut off a competitor” (¶ 13) (emphasis added). It further states that Storable “did not block access to [the SiteLink] customer module for any other insurance provider.” Id. ¶ 79.

After losing in district court, SafeLease forum shopped by improperly removing this case to this Court to get a second bite at the apple. See Ex. DDD. This Court held a four-day evidentiary hearing between February 11 and 18, 2025. On February 18, 2025, Storable moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. Williams, SafeLease’s economic expert, arguing, inter alia, that Dr. Williams’s opinion was unsupported ipse dixit. Ex. E at 1. Among other things, Storable argued that Dr. Williams’s opinion that Storable posed a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power was conclusory, unreliable, and failed to analyze myriad relevant factors. Id. at 3-7.

On February 19, 2025, this Court granted a TI on SafeLease’s tortious interference with existing contracts claim, not its antitrust claim. Ex. C. On February 21, 2025, Storable filed objections to the TI order and moved the Court for reconsideration of the TI order and to rule on its motion to exclude Dr. Williams’s testimony. Ex. F.

On March 11, 2025, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration but confirmed that “the TI order does not rely on SafeLease’s antitrust claim; it relies exclusively on SafeLease’s claim for tortious interference with existing contracts.” Ex. B at 4. Similarly, the Court declined to exclude Dr. Williams’s testimony but noted that it “did not consider Dr. Williams’s opinion regarding whether Storable had a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power” in reaching its decision. Id. at 7. The Court also stated that it considers the district court’s prior decisions “as carrying the same weight as its own prior decisions in this case.” Id. at 3 n.1. In so ruling, the Court effectively confirmed that SafeLease’s antitrust claim is unlikely to be successful on the merits and that changed circumstances between December 2024 and January 2025 did not justify a TI on that claim.

On March 11, 2025, the Court entered an amended TI order, adjusting the language to clarify that the order was based solely on one of the tort claims and that SafeLease had not proven any cause of action, including its attempted monopolization claim. Ex. D. On March 26, 2025, Storable appealed this amended TI order. That appeal is pending.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD Under Texas law, summary judgment is appropriate on a claim for which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).

SafeLease claims that Storable leveraged its alleged monopoly in FMS services to attempt to monopolize the tenant insurance space. To support this claim, as a threshold matter, SafeLease must show that Storable’s challenged conduct harmed competition in the alleged tenant insurance market. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 2 Additionally, to establish standing to bring this claim, SafeLease must show a threat of “antitrust injury”—i.e., “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.” Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109, 111 (1986); Roberts v. Whitfill, 191 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Tex. App. 2006) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). If SafeLease’s alleged injury is based on conduct that harmed SafeLease but not

This Motion relies largely on federal antitrust caselaw because the Texas Antitrust Act (“TFEAA”) is construed in line with federal antitrust laws, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.04, and Texas courts “rely heavily” on federal antitrust jurisprudence given the limited state caselaw interpreting the TFEAA. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 689 (Tex. 2006).

competition, it is not antitrust injury. See Patel v. Midland Mem'l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 346 (5th Cir. 2002); Midwest Commc’ns v. Minnesota Twins, Inc., 779 F.2d 444, 453 (8th Cir. 1985).

Separate but related to these threshold requirements, SafeLease must prove that Storable “(1) ... engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power” in the alleged tenant insurance market. Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at 690 (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456). Valid business justifications for Storable’s conduct are a defense to SafeLease’s allegations that that conduct was anticompetitive. Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1295-1296 (11th Cir. 2004).

If Storable negates any element of SafeLease’s antitrust claim or conclusively proves an affirmative defense, the Court must grant summary judgment for Storable on this claim because SafeLease cannot present evidence creating a fact issue. Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996).

V. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES Based on the undisputed facts, SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim fails as a matter of law for myriad reasons. Any of these reasons is an independent basis to grant summary judgment for Defendants on this claim.

A. STORABLE DOES NOT HAVE A DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF MONOPOLIZING THE TENANT INSURANCE MARKET The undisputed facts show that Storable does not have a dangerous probability of monopolizing the alleged tenant insurance market. To establish this element of its claim, SafeLease would need to show, inter alia, that Storable has a high market share (usually 50% or greater) in the alleged tenant insurance market. M & M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant

Valley Hosp., Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1992); see generally Puentes v. Spohn Health Network, No. 13-08-00100-CV, 2009 WL 1974592, at *6 (Tex. App. June 11, 2009) (market share finding required for a TFEAA claim). Storable’s market share is calculated at the time it started engaging in the challenged conduct (i.e., late 2024), not after. See Taylor Pub. Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 2000); Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 563, 592 (Tex. App. 2007). SafeLease cannot establish that Storable had more than a 25% share in this space, so its antitrust claim fails as a matter of law.

It is impossible for SafeLease to establish—and SafeLease does not even claim—that Storable has anywhere close to 50% share in the alleged tenant insurance market. The record supports just the opposite. As described in Section II.B, there are more than a dozen tenant insurance providers in the U.S. and there has been entry in the last 4-5 years. See Lens Exp., Inc. v. Ewald, 907 S.W.2d 64, 70 (Tex. App. 1995) (“The word monopoly loses much of its meaning when applied to a market in which there are ten or more competitors.”). Even adopting SafeLease’s improperly small market size, Storable has at most ~23% share. See Sec. II.B supra. This share is far too low to infer a “dangerous probability” of monopolization. See M & M, 981 F.2d at 168 (less than 30% share presumptively rejected).

Establishing that Storable could ever obtain 50% market share through its allegedly exclusionary practices would require multiple illogical leaps that run against the law and the facts.

Take a counterfactual where, contra the law, market share is calculated after the alleged exclusion, not before. Even in this scenario, the Court would need to make multiple unsupported assumptions contradicted by the facts to show that Storable could ever approach 50% share. First, the Court would need to assume that Storable pushes SafeLease out of business and captures all its tenant insurance customers—both baseless assumptions. Again using SafeLease’s claimed market size,

SafeLease has ~6% market share. See Sec. II.B supra. Even if Storable (improbably) took all of SafeLease’s business, it would still have at most ~29% share. Second, the Court would need to assume that Storable is likely to foreclose multiple other tenant insurance providers and fully recoup their lost insurance business. But no evidence or further discovery could show that Storable has even attempted to exclude any other tenant insurance companies. The facts show the opposite: that Storable has encouraged competition by allowing more than a dozen tenant insurance competitors to access its FMS platforms. SafeLease’s inability to show that Storable could reach 50% share under even this counterfactual illustrates the ludicrousness of SafeLease’s claim that Storable is poised to monopolize the tenant insurance space.

Dr. Williams’s vague claim that Storable will likely obtain “substantial market share” in the tenant insurance space is baseless, conclusory, and does not create a dispute of material fact.

See Ex. H at 225:20-226:20 (Williams). Dr. Williams conducted no analysis of the tenant insurance space: he did not analyze the number of competitors, the strength of those competitors, or any competitor’s market share in that space. Ex. J at 177:21-178:1, 179:8-18 (Williams). Similarly, Dr. Williams’s claim that there is a “dangerous probability” that if Storable continues its conduct, it would “be successful in leveraging its monopoly power from the FMS market to the tenant insurance market” is wholly speculative—a throwaway line at the end of his presentation. Id. at 151:21-152:4 (Williams). 3 There is no evidence that Storable’s conduct affected any tenant insurance competitor other than SafeLease or that Storable is anywhere close to having market power in the tenant insurance space. No further discovery would provide such evidence.

Summary judgment is appropriate when an expert suggests the court adopt an irrational inference based on implausible assumptions inconsistent with record evidence. See Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 n. 19 (1986).

Thus, SafeLease cannot show as a matter of law that Storable had a dangerous probability of monopolizing the alleged tenant insurance market.

B. STORABLE’S CONDUCT DID NOT HARM COMPETITION FOR TENANT INSURANCE SafeLease’s antitrust claim fails as a matter of law because SafeLease cannot show that Storable’s conduct harmed competition for tenant insurance. SafeLease has not adduced any evidence showing that Storable’s allegedly exclusionary conduct harmed tenant insurance competition market-wide or affected any competitor apart from SafeLease. Additional discovery cannot save SafeLease’s claim.

In an antitrust case between competitors, the plaintiff competitor always complains that they have been harmed. But antitrust laws focus on harm to “competition, not competitors.”

Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488; Marlin v. Robertson, 307 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. App. 2009) (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.04) (same); see also Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458 (monopolization law prohibits “conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself”).

To establish harm to competition, showing “harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58. “Even the elimination of a single competitor, standing alone, does not prove anticompetitive effect.” Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 739 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). Rather, SafeLease must show “proof of market-wide harm.” Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at 688-690; see also Cohlmia v. St. John Med. Ctr., 693 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2012) (challenged conduct must impact “[m]arket wide prices, quantity or quality”); Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1014 (6th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff must show “adverse effect on the market as a whole”).

Storable’s conduct has not harmed competition for tenant insurance. As explained above, broad competition for tenant insurance exists, with more than a dozen tenant insurance providers in the U.S. See Sec. II.B supra. There is no evidence that the many other tenant insurance providers are not competitive or that Storable’s conduct had any market-wide effect—and no further discovery could show this. Indeed, despite having the opportunity to do so, SafeLease’s economist did not evaluate competition or even the number of competitors in the tenant insurance space. Ex. J at 177:21-178:1 (Williams); Ex. K at 139:3-8 (Caminade).

Rather than harming competition, Storable has promoted competition in the tenant insurance space. See Ex. K at 142:1-13 (Caminade). Instead of excluding its competitors, Storable has entered into API agreements and invested in building, supporting, and improving APIs with more than a dozen tenant insurance competitors that allow them to access Storable’s FMS platforms in order to serve their customers and compete for tenant insurance business. Id. at 139:6- 140:11 (Caminade); Ex. L at 146:14-147:3, 155:9-21 (Gordon); Ex. U; Ex. V at 2.

SafeLease has repeatedly admitted that no competitor has been excluded or targeted by Storable except SafeLease. The Second Amended Petition focuses only on alleged harm to SafeLease, not harm to competition or any other competitors. Ex. A ¶¶ 12-13, 79. At the hearing on January 30, 2025, SafeLease’s counsel emphasized that there is “no other insurer who’s been locked out of access to a Storable platform in the way that SafeLease has.” Ex. I at 13:15-17.

SafeLease’s fact-free suggestions that other competitors will be “driven out” of the market, Ex. A ¶ 100, are baseless and contradicted by Storable’s history of entering API agreements with its tenant insurance competitors. This history and the lack of evidence that any tenant competitor apart from SafeLease has been or will be harmed by Storable dooms SafeLease’s antitrust claim.

Dr. Williams’s claim that Storable’s conduct “substantially reduced competition in the tenant insurance market” is completely unsupported by any facts. Ex. J at 145:2-8 (Williams). No evidence that Dr. Williams referred to showed any effect on competition; at most, it showed an effect on SafeLease. See id. at 144:9-145:8, 148:14-25 (Williams). Dr. Williams’s discussion of how Storable allegedly “leveraged” its FMS market power, id. at 126:5-143:11, does not show that that purported leveraging had any effect on tenant insurance competition.

Finally, SafeLease has not established antitrust injury because the injury it allegedly suffered or is threatened by is not the type of injury that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and does not flow from harm to competition. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 109-110. Rather, any alleged injury to SafeLease flows from Storable’s legitimate business policy that third-party service providers access its FMS platforms under an API agreement on commercially reasonable terms and SafeLease’s refusal to accept those terms. SafeLease complains about Storable’s API policy, but through that policy, Storable has promoted competition by enabling more than a dozen tenant insurance competitors to access and compete for business on its platforms. Even if Storable’s conduct were tortious (it is not), it has not harmed competition, thus the purported injury flowing from it is not antitrust injury. See Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. Iams Co., 254 F.3d 607, 616 (6th Cir. 2001). As such, SafeLease cannot establish antitrust injury, so it lacks antitrust standing.

C. STORABLE’S CONDUCT IS NEITHER ANTICOMPETITIVE NOR PREDATORY While SafeLease may complain about Storable’s conduct, monopolization laws do not prohibit all allegedly “unfair” conduct, Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d 883, 892 (5th Cir. 2016), or afford a remedy for every tort allegedly committed by one competitor against another. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993); see also Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 500 S.W.3d 26, 49 (Tex. App. 2016). “[A]ntitrust law is rife with [] examples of what competitors find to be disreputable business practices that do not qualify as predatory behavior.” Retractable Techs., 842 F.3d at 892 (quoting Taylor, 216 F.3d at 476).

SafeLease alleges that Storable engaged in two types of anticompetitive conduct: “monopoly leveraging” and a refusal to deal. See, e.g., Ex. G. Standing alone, “‘monopoly leveraging’ does not violate antitrust laws unless it takes a particular form, such as a … refusal to deal.” Schor v. Abbott Lab’ys, 457 F.3d 608, 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2006). Put differently, “leveraging” is not inherently anticompetitive but rather “presupposes anticompetitive conduct.” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4 (2004). In this case, SafeLease’s leveraging and refusal-to-deal theories of harm challenge the same conduct— Storable’s requirement that SafeLease access its FMS platforms under an API agreement on its standard terms and its decision to cutoff SafeLease’s unauthorized access to those platforms—so the analysis of those theories is the same. See Morris, 364 F.3d at 1294 n.11.

As explained in Section V.B, to be “condemned as exclusionary,” Storable’s conduct must “harm the competitive process,” not just SafeLease. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58. “Even a company with monopoly power has no general duty to cooperate with its business rivals and may refuse to deal with them if valid business reasons exist for such refusal.” Morris, 364 F.3d at 1295. Thus, to determine whether conduct is exclusionary, the court must consider the “proffered business justification” for the conduct. Retractable Techs., 842 F.3d at 892 (quoting Taylor, 216 F.3d at 475). Conduct is deemed anticompetitive only if it has “no rational business purpose other than its adverse effects on competitors.” Id.; see also Morris, 364 F.3d at 1295.

1. Storable Has Not Excluded or Refused to Deal with SafeLease Despite SafeLease’s gripes, Storable has not engaged in any anticompetitive or predatory conduct. Contrary to SafeLease’s claims, Storable has not actually or de facto excluded SafeLease from the market or refused to deal with SafeLease, much less harmed competition through its challenged conduct. To the contrary, Storable asked SafeLease to access its FMS platforms using an industry-standard API on commercially reasonable terms that others have accepted. Moreover, SafeLease continues to compete for tenant insurance business today even with restricted access to Storable’s FMS platforms.

SafeLease does not - need - - access to Storable’s FMS platforms to offer a competitive tenant insurance product. SafeLease has not claimed that Storable’s FMS platforms are a so-called “essential facility.” See, e.g., Ex. G (no reference to “essential facilities”); see generally MCI Comm’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (outlining elements of the essential facilities doctrine). Nor could it. Even if Storable’s FMS platforms were somehow essential (they are not), see Morris Comm’ns Corp. v PGA Tour, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1285 (M.D.

Fla. 2002) (access to information on a proprietary platform is not considered “essential”), Storable has not refused to provide SafeLease with access to its platforms: it has made them accessible on the same terms offered to all third-party insurance providers not connected to Storable’s FMS platforms before 2021. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-33 (firms controlling an essential facility only have to make it available “on non-discriminatory terms”).

Further, SafeLease and its customers have found ways to work around Storable’s restrictions on SafeLease’s access to its platforms. See Ex. J at 221:25-222:19 (“just more work for us”), 261:5- (Rudkin), 319:14-320:5 (Kinet); Ex. L at 128:20-129:6 (Stein), 149:10-24, 161:23-162:6 (Gordon); Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991) (“plaintiff must show more than inconvenience, or even some economic loss; he must show that an alternative to the facility is not feasible”).

While Storable has not refused to deal with SafeLease, it has a right to do so: Storable has no duty to deal with SafeLease. A company has no duty to deal with its competitors except under the limited carveout described in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). To fall within that carveout, SafeLease would need to show that Storable terminated a voluntary, profitable, multiyear course of dealing between Storable and SafeLease. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-09; Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2013). SafeLease would further need to show that Storable was unwilling to enter into any agreement with SafeLease whatsoever, even one with a high fee. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-09.

SafeLease’s claim plainly falls outside the Aspen Skiing carveout. Here, there was no voluntary, longstanding, profitable course of dealing between the parties. Storable has never had an API agreement or other type of access agreement with SafeLease. Nothing about SafeLease’s unauthorized use of Storable’s platforms was profitable for Storable

- Storable’s purported knowledge that SafeLease was using “authorized user” accounts to access its platforms does not make that access authorized or transform it into an actionable course of dealing between the parties. The only conduct terminated was SafeLease’s unilateral, unauthorized access to Storable’s platforms. Further, unlike in Aspen Skiing, Storable has not refused to deal with SafeLease all together; it has requested that SafeLease enter an API agreement on its current, standard terms.

Despite SafeLease’s bluster, the undisputed facts show that Storable has not attempted to exclude SafeLease from the tenant insurance space. Storable has repeatedly offered to enter an API agreement with SafeLease, including one that . See Sec. II.E supra. Storable has never told its customers that they can’t use SafeLease or tried to get them to leave SafeLease. Ex. L at 164:3-21 (Gordon); Ex. V at 3 (“If you wish to continue using SafeLease, you are more than welcome to do so”). Storable even created articles to explain how customers can automate sending reports to SafeLease. Ex. L at 165:19-166:20 (Gordon); Exs. UU-WW.

Storable’s requirement that SafeLease access its FMS through an API and pay its standard fee is not de facto exclusion and SafeLease’s claim that it would put it out of business does not hold water. First, this fee structure has been accepted by multiple other tenant insurance providers, none of whom it put out of business. Second, SafeLease has never explained how Storable’s offers to are anticompetitive or would not fully address its concerns. The fact that SafeLease has an unsustainable business model predicating on free riding on Storable’s platform ad aeternum does not transform Storable’s standard, market- accepted fee into an antitrust violation.

Further, other FMS platforms’ actions show that Storable’s move to block SafeLease’s “authorized user” access for violating its terms of service was a valid business decision, not exclusionary. At least one other FMS provider (WSS) has blocked SafeLease from using “authorizer user” accounts to access its platform because it breached its terms of service too. Ex. XX; Ex. K at 75:9-78:10 (Kinet).

Moreover, even without an API agreement with Storable, SafeLease is not excluded from serving customers that use a Storable FMS. Indeed, Storable today serves insurance customers that use other FMS providers even though it does not have an API agreement with those providers.

Ex. L at 145:25-146:10 (Gordon). SafeLease could do the same. SafeLease also can serve customers by having them pull reports manually, just as it would do for a tenant insurance customer that does not use an FMS platform at all. Id. at 149:10-24, 164:3-21 (Gordon). While serving its customers this way might be more difficult or expensive for SafeLease, requiring access through a mode that makes interconnection more difficult or expensive is not predatory or anticompetitive.

See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 440-41, 443- (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machines, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (switching to a different interconnection strategy “at least as justifiable as the alternative” does not violate monopolization law even if it forces a competitor to “change some of its product designs”); Logic Process Corp. v. Bell & Howell Publications Sys. Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 533, 540 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (defendant has right to adjust manner of delivering services even if it does not “improve[] the quality or efficiency of [plaintiff’s] products or services to mutual customers”).

The fact that SafeLease may bear additional costs to access its customers’ data in a particular way is not antitrust harm.

Finally, even assuming arguendo that Storable has excluded SafeLease from serving Storable FMS customers, SafeLease has not been excluded from a broad portion of the market: it still has access to and serves many customers that do not use Storable’s FMS. SafeLease has API agreements with at least three other FMS providers.

Ex. L at 48:17-22 (Stein). Indeed, SafeLease has been actively encouraging customers to switch to Cubby’s FMS. Ex. K at 82:4-18 (Kinet); Ex. L at 116:10-12 (Stein). SafeLease’s ability to compete for customers using these FMS providers’ platforms undermines any argument that its alleged exclusion from Storable’s FMS platforms harmed competition market-wide.

2. Storable’s Conduct Has Legitimate Business Justifications Storable has legitimate business justifications for its requirement that SafeLease access its FMS platforms under an API agreement using its standard terms and its decision to cut off SafeLease’s unauthorized access to its platforms.

As a matter of law, Storable’s conduct cannot be considered anticompetitive if it has a legitimate business justification. Morris, 364 F.3d at 1295; see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 (refusal to deal with a competitor does not violate monopolization law “if valid business reasons exists for that refusal”). Once Storable offers a valid business justification, the burden shifts to SafeLease to show that the proffered justification is pretextual. Morris, 364 F.3d at 1295. To rebut Storable’s proferred justification, SafeLease must show that Storable’s conduct “makes sense only because it eliminates competition.” Id. (citing cases); Novell, 731 F.3d at 1075 (plaintiff must show that defendant’s conduct was “irrational but for its anticompetitive effect”). If Storable’s alleged refusal to deal with SafeLease is “designed to protect or further [Storable’s] legitimate business purposes,” it “does not violate the antitrust laws, even if that refusal injures competition.”

Morris, 364 F.3d at 1295.

It is undisputed that Storable has (and has had) a legitimate business interest in protecting the security and control over its FMS platforms. Storable has a legitimate interest in controlling who can access its platforms and on what terms in order to safeguard its proprietary software and its customers’ sensitive information. Storable requires that third parties access its FMS platforms using an API to mitigate security and stability risks, including surges and outages. See Sec. II.C supra. Storable also has a legitimate business interest in preventing free riding on its FMS platforms. See Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); Morris, 364 F.3d at 1295-1296 (describing prevention of free riding by competitors as a legitimate business purpose and a defense to an antitrust claim). Storable invests millions of dollars annually to develop, improve, and maintain its FMS platforms to better serve its customers. See

- Ex. L at 142:9-19 (Gordon). Storable has also invested heavily to set up, enroll, and manage its customers’ accounts and help them make more money from tenant insurance. See Ex. H at 93:5-94:4 (Gordon); Ex. L at 153:13-154:10. Storable is allowed to require that competitors access its FMS platforms on terms that help recoup and prevent free riding on those investments.

See Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Grp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding restrictive covenants because defendant had a “legitimate interest in protecting [its investment] from opportunistic appropriation”).

Because Storable’s challenged conduct has legitimate, non-pretextual business justifications, it cannot be considered anticompetitive as a matter of law. No further discovery can show otherwise. Storable’s legitimate business justifications provide a complete defense to SafeLease’s antitrust claim.

D. STORABLE DOES NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC INTENT TO MONOPOLIZE THE TENANT INSURANCE MARKET Finally, SafeLease cannot establish as a matter of law that Storable had “a specific intent to destroy competition or build monopoly” in the alleged tenant insurance market. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); see also Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at 690. Even if Storable had the “mere intention” to exclude SafeLease (which it did not), that would not establish specific intent. Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532, 541 (7th Cir. 1986). Merely finding that Storable engaged in “unfair” or “predatory” tactics is also insufficient to show specific intent. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 457-59. To infer intent from allegedly predatory conduct, that conduct must have “no legitimate business justification other than to destroy or damage competition.” Great Escape, 791 at 541.

The only allegation SafeLease musters related to this prong is its conclusory claim that Storable is trying to “drive out as many competitors in the tenant insurance market as it can.” Ex. A ¶ 100. But no evidence supports this claim. Indeed, SafeLease’s only other allegations related solely to SafeLease. See id. ¶¶ 61, 63, 96. Based on the to “driving out” competition relate ---- undisputed facts, the only intent SafeLease can show is that Storable had the intent to get SafeLease to sign an API agreement on its standard terms. See Ex. H at 117:9-16 (Gordon).

There is no evidence and no further discovery could show that Storable had an intent to destroy competition in the tenant insurance space, much less monopolize it. Even assuming arguendo that Storable attempted to exclude SafeLease, there is zero evidence that Storable “drove out” or even attempted to “drive out” any other tenant insurance competitors. To the contrary, Storable has API agreements with more than a dozen tenant insurance providers that enable them to compete for tenant insurance business on its marketplace. See Sec. II.C supra. And Storable was willing to enter an API agreement with SafeLease too. If Storable had an intent to monopolize the tenant insurance space, it would not have entered API agreements with every other tenant insurance company that requested one.

Finally, as explained in Section V.C.2, Storable’s conduct has legitimate business justifications other than to destroy or damage competition. Great Escape, 791 F.2d at 541.

Storable has the right to determine the terms under which third parties access its proprietary FMS platforms and take security measures to prevent them for accessing its platforms by unauthorized means. Requiring that third-party providers use an API to access its FMS platforms helps Storable ensure the security and stability of its platforms. And the API fee reflects the value of connecting to SafeLease’s platforms. See Sec. II.C-D supra. The legitimate business justifications for Storable’s API requirements and security measures undermine the specific intent prong of SafeLease’s claim and preclude this claim as a matter of law.

VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Storable respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion and any other relief to which Storable may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted June 2, 2025.

/s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] John Holler (admitted pro hac vice) New York Bar No. 5922463 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP West 55th Street New York, New York 10019 Tel.: (212) 836–8000 Fax: (212) 836–8689 [email protected] Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) Colorado Bar No. 60688 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 1144 Fifteenth St, Suite 3100 Denver, Colorado 80202 Tel.: (303) 863–1000 Fax: (303) 863–2301 [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462

GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

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Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101537432 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on SafeLease???s Attempted Monopolization Claim Status as of 6/3/2025 9:32 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101537432 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on SafeLease???s Attempted Monopolization Claim Status as of 6/3/2025 9:32 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/3/2025 9:22:17 AM SENT E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of Texas The Business Court of Texas, 6/3/2025 9:22 AM Third Division Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DECLARATION OF KATHERINE GINZBURG TREISTMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SAFELEASE’S ATTEMPTED2MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM I, Katherine Ginzburg Treistman, declare as follows: 1. I am counsel of record for Defendants Storable, Inc.; Rednova Labs, Inc. (d/b/a StorEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (“Storable” or “Defendants”) in the above-captioned action.

2. I am a partner at the law firm Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. My business address is Louisiana Street, Suite 4000, Houston, Texas 77002. I am an active member of the State Bar of Texas. My State Bar number is 00796632.

3. I submit this declaration in support of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on SafeLease’s Attempted Monopolization Claim.

4. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction, filed in the District Court of Travis County on January 28, 2025.

5. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Court’s March 11, 2025 Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider.

6. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of this Court’s Order Granting Temporary Injunction, signed on February 19, 2025.

7. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of this Court’s Amended Order Granting Temporary Injunction, signed on March 11, 2025.

8. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Motion to Exclude or Disregard Opinions of Dr. Williams on the Ground that They Are Unreliable and Constitute No Evidence, filed in this Court on February 18, 2025.

9. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Objections to Temporary Injunction Order, Motion to Rule On Exclusion of Opinions of Dr. Williams, and Motion to Reconsider Based on Objections and Exclusion, filed in this Court on February 21, 2025.

10. Attached as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Hearing Brief on Texas Antitrust Law, filed in this Court on February 10, 2025.

11. Attached as Exhibit H is a true and correct excerpted copy of the transcript of the January 16, 2025 proceedings before the District Court of Travis County.* 1 12. Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct excerpted copy of the transcript of the January 30, 2025 proceedings before the District Court of Travis County in the above-captioned action.

13. Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct excerpted copy of the transcript of the February 11, 2025 proceedings before this Court in the above-captioned action.* 14. Attached as Exhibit K is a true and correct excerpted copy of the transcript of the February 13, 2025 proceedings before this Court in the above-captioned action.* Defendants have added page numbers to the transcript excerpt for the Court’s convenience.

15. Attached as Exhibit L is a true and correct excerpted copy of the transcript of the February 14, 2025 proceedings before this Court in the above-captioned action.* 16. Attached as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 1 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000001.

17. Attached as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 2 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000010.

18. Attached as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 3 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000028.

19. Attached as Exhibit P is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 366 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was introduced as an exhibit by Defendants in the above-captioned action without a Bates stamp.

An asterisk (*) indicates that an exhibit or transcript excerpt was previously permanently sealed by the Court, either in full or in part.

20. Attached as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 199 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE001027.* 21. Attached as Exhibit R is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 357 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which is a demonstrative used by Defendants in the above-captioned action without a Bates stamp.

22. Attached as Exhibit S is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 175 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0000906.* 23. Attached as Exhibit T is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 123 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0030406.

24. Attached as Exhibit U is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 352 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which is a public webpage without a Bates stamp.

25. Attached as Exhibit V is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 207 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE001061.

26. Attached as Exhibit W is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 35 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000526.* 27. Attached as Exhibit X is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 36 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000423.* 28. Attached as Exhibit Y is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0000053.

29. Attached as Exhibit Z is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 4 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000079.* 30. Attached as Exhibit AA is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 6 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000109.* 31. Attached as Exhibit BB is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 8 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000138.*

32. Attached as Exhibit CC is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 9 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000167.* 33. Attached as Exhibit DD is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 12 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000252.* 34. Attached as Exhibit EE is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 13 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000279.* 35. Attached as Exhibit FF is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 14 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000307.* 36. Attached as Exhibit GG is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 15 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000335.* 37. Attached as Exhibit HH is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 5 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000094.* 38. Attached as Exhibit II is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 7 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000111.* 39. Attached as Exhibit JJ is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 19 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000378.* 40. Attached as Exhibit KK is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 176 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000055.* 41. Attached as Exhibit LL is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 122 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0000137.* 42. Attached as Exhibit MM is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 55 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000599.* 43. Attached as Exhibit NN is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 100 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000655.*

44. Attached as Exhibit OO is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 103 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000661.* 45. Attached as Exhibit PP is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 104 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000662.* 46. Attached as Exhibit QQ is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 107 from the Temporary Injunction Hearings before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000665.* 47. Attached as Exhibit RR is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 40 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0000140.

48. Attached as Exhibit SS is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Verified Original Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction, filed in the District Court of Travis County on December 30, 2024.

49. Attached as Exhibit TT is a true and correct copy of an email sent by the District Court of Travis County on January 21, 2025 denying Plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction.

50. Attached as Exhibit UU is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 228 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE001115.

51. Attached as Exhibit VV is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 229 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE001120.

52. Attached as Exhibit WW is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 230 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE001128.

53. Attached as Exhibit XX is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 349 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0030332.

54. Attached as Exhibit YY is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 23 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0000639.* 55. Attached as Exhibit ZZ is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 24 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE0000655.*

56. Attached as Exhibit AAA is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 24 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action as SAFELEASE000678.* 57. Attached as Exhibit BBB is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Exhibit 39 from the Temporary Injunction Hearing before this Court, which was produced by Defendants in the above-captioned action as STORABLE000433.* 58. Attached as Exhibit CCC is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ First Requests for Admission, which was served by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action on May 19, 2025.

59. Attached as Exhibit DDD is a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Motion to Remand, filed in this Court on January 31, 2025.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Harris County, State of Texas, on the 2nd day of June, 2025. ~f~ Katherine Ginzburg Treistman

Exhibit A

No. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC (“SafeLease”) files this Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction against defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc.; SiteLink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP.

NATURE OF THE CASE 1. This action is necessary to prevent a monopoly software provider from using its market power to cripple a low-price competitor in this State in a related market for insurance.

2. Founded and based in this County since 2021, plaintiff SafeLease is a startup that offers low-cost insurance plans through self-storage facilities to protect people who store goods at those facilities. SafeLease’s plans cover tenants at facilities in Texas and elsewhere throughout the United States. Most self-storage companies rely on third-party vendors like SafeLease for these products. With better prices and service, SafeLease has seen steady growth and an enthusiastic response from customers.

3. To administer its policies, SafeLease is required to access the facility management software systems of self-storage facility operator partners. Operators rely on facility management software to run virtually all aspects of their day-to-day operations. Operators give their advance permission to SafeLease to secure access to their software systems and agree to provide, through these software systems, the information SafeLease needs to administer policies.

4. Defendants are affiliated companies that also offer products and services to the self- storage industry, including facility management software. In fact, with products marketed as storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions, defendants have a dominant role in the market for facility management software. Their market share in the relevant market likely exceeds 75%.

Given the central role of these systems to operations of self-storage facilities, defendants’ power over mission-critical software provides them with considerable control and influence across the self-storage industry.

5. Relatedly, defendants offer insurance plans that compete directly with products and services of SafeLease. Defendants aggressively have grown their share of the tenant insurance market through acquisitions of industry leaders. Despite defendants’ efforts to consolidate the tenant insurance market, SafeLease has made considerable inroads, winning customers from defendants with its competitive products. Witnessing SafeLease’s potential and rapid rise, Storable has made overtures to buy SafeLease for years and as recently as late 2024.

6. On December 17, 2024, defendants abruptly went on the attack. They blocked SafeLease’s “authorized user” access to defendants’ storEDGE system, a widely used facility management software, for which customers specifically designate SafeLease as an authorized user.

In so doing, defendants cut off SafeLease’s ability to access critical data to properly service its tenant insurance plans and administer policies for customers covering thousands of storage units.

This action was both sudden and unprompted, as SafeLease has been an authorized user to access customer accounts for years with defendants’ full knowledge.

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7. Notably, these impacted customers are joint customers, as they use defendants’ storEDGE system as well as SafeLease’s insurance products. In January 2025, over 44,000 self- storage units were scheduled to commence or renew coverage under SafeLease insurance plans.

Countless more units would incur claims on existing plans that need to be serviced. SafeLease would be unable to properly service the several thousands of these new or renewed customers and claims on storEDGE systems without access to its customers’ storEDGE systems.

8. Making matters worse, defendants began taking steps to cut off SafeLease’s access to other facility management software products, SiteLink and Easy Storage Solutions. This would impact hundreds of thousands of additional tenants. These actions are unwarranted, threaten the viability of SafeLease’s business, interfere with current and future contracts with customers, and put innocent self-storage operators and tenants at imminent risk of substantial and needless harm.

9. In short, defendants were using dominance in one market (facility management software) to get power over another market (tenant insurance). Their actions were calculated to cripple SafeLease and force customers to switch to defendants’ higher-cost, competing insurance products. This was blatant monopoly leveraging, not legitimate competition.

10. To protect its customers and business, SafeLease filed suit on December 30, 2024, requesting a temporary restraining order, as well as temporary and permanent injunctions, to prevent irreparable harm from defendants’ conduct. The Court granted SafeLease’s request for a temporary restraining order on December 31. Defendants restored SafeLease’s access to their facility management software less than an hour after the TRO became effective. The Court then denied defendants’ request to dissolve the TRO and extended the TRO through January 21, 2025.

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11. For the three weeks the TRO was effective, SafeLease again was able to service the parties’ mutual customers without interruption. However, on January 21, 2025, the day the TRO expired, the Court denied SafeLease’s request for a temporary injunction.

12. Defendants wasted no time in resuming and amplifying their attack. In just hours, they cut off SafeLease’s access not only to storEDGE but also SiteLink and Easy Storage Solutions. The scope of the blocking is massive and exceeds even what SafeLease feared prior to entry of the TRO. Defendants have singled out and targeted SafeLease. Its access has been completely severed, and its customers have no way to grant SafeLease access to the customers’ own critical data in the software. As a result, SafeLease is unable to fully and timely service its customers that use defendants’ facility management software products. This affects over 275,000 tenants at facilities with SafeLease insurance coverage.

13. These new attacks are proof positive of defendants’ anticompetitive scheme to cut off a competitor and to avoid competition on the merits for tenant insurance, ensure higher insurance prices, and eliminate or buy out the only discount insurance competitor in the industry.

Unless restrained, defendants will cause substantial, irreparable harm to self-storage operators and tenants in this State and to SafeLease, which has no choice but to seek injunctive relief from the Court.

DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 14. SafeLease intends that this case be conducted under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plain in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4.

PARTIES 15. Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC is a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business in this County at 800 Brazos Street, Suite 320, Austin, Texas

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78701. It provides insurance plans to protect tenants and operators of independent self-storage facilities.

16. Defendant Storable, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in this County at 11000 N. Mopac Expressway, #300, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a supplier of products and services to the self-storage industry and the corporate parent, directly or indirectly, of the other defendants.

17. Defendant RedNova Labs, Inc. is a Texas foreign for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in this County at 10900 Research Blvd., Suite 160C, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 18. Defendant SiteLink Software, LLC is a North Carolina limited liability company with its principal place of business in this County at 10900 Research Blvd., Suite 160C, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 19. Defendant Easy Storage Solutions, LLC is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of business in this County at 10900 Research Blvd., Suite 160C, Austin, Texas 78759. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 20. Defendant Bader Co. is an Indiana corporation with a principal place of business in Indiana. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 21. Defendant Property First Group, LP is a Pennsylvania limited partnership with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. It has appeared and answered. It is a subsidiary of Storable, Inc. 22. Defendants RedNova, SiteLink, Easy Storage Solutions, Bader, and Property First are commonly and centrally owned and controlled by Storable, Inc., their parent company. Their

-5- activities are coordinated together by or with Storable, Inc. As such, defendants are a single business enterprise controlled by Storable, Inc., from Austin, Texas.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 23. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court pursuant to the Texas Constitution, Art. 5, Sec. 8 and TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.21 and § 15.26. Defendants do substantial business in this County and State.

24. This case could not be filed in and is not removable to federal court. There is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, and no federal claim is raised in this petition. See Am. Airlines, Inc. vs. Sabre Inc., 694 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2013).

RELEVANT BACKGROUND A. Self-Storage Industry 25. There are an estimated 52,301 self-storage facilities in the U.S. See SpareFoot, U.S. Self-Storage Indus. Stats. (Oct. 10, 2024), https://www.sparefoot.com/blog/self-storage-industry- statistics/. The industry is largely made up of operators that own/run facilities that lease storage space to businesses and individuals on a temporary basis, usually month-to-month. The industry is valued at $44.3 billion, and it is anticipated to reach nearly $50 billion by 2029. Id. According to the Self Storage Association, 11.1% of U.S. households currently rent a self-storage unit—some 14.6 million households. See The Self-Storage Almanac 2024, Sec. 1, https://digital.modernstorage media.com/almanac/self-storage-almanac-2024db/.

26. Self-storage is big business in Texas. This State has the most self-storage facilities of any state in the country. In 2023, there were 5,564 total storage facilities in Texas, representing more than 10% of all facilities in the nation. Id. (Table 1.4). The amount of rentable self-storage

-6- space in Texas is 256 million square feet. This is one of the highest square feet of rentable space per capita, at 8.70, compared to a national average of 6.32. Id. (Table 1.3).

27. Some self-storage space in the U.S. is owned by large public companies. Four of these companies are real estate investment trusts: Extra Space, Public Storage, CubeSmart, and National Storage Affiliates Trust. The fifth is U-Haul, also a public company. Together, these companies operate 22.5% of self-storage facilities, representing 37.6% of self-storage space by rentable square footage. Id. at Sec. 2. Most or all of these companies have their own insurance programs and proprietary management software.

28. Most self-storage facilities and square footage are owned and operated by small- and medium-sized businesses or individuals. These independent owners represent 77.5% of self- storage facilities and 62.4% of all rentable square feet. Id. Many of these businesses are mom-and- pop shops. Id. (Chart 2.1). Independent facility owners rely on third-party vendors for their facility management software and tenant insurance plans.

i. Facility Management Software 29. Independent self-storage facilities rely on third-party software to run the day-to- day operations of their businesses. Facility owners subscribe to facility management software, sometimes referred to as FMS, which allows them to track and manage their storage units. This software facilitates core services, such as tracking tenant data, allowing for billings, managing communications, generating financial reports, and servicing tenant insurance policies.

30. Facility management software is an essential tool for owners and their vendors. It is common in the industry for owners to permit vendors to access their facility management software to provide the vendor’s services. These services range from onsite management to remote financial services. For example, owners routinely authorize facility management software access

-7- for an on-site manager (who may run front-of-house) and for access control systems (which operate gate codes). It is also essential for vendors that offer remote or administrative services. For example, an owner may authorize a third-party call center to access its facility management software to follow sales leads or address customer inquiries. Similarly, owners may authorize a bill collection agency to access their facility management software to collect payment data and follow up on delinquent payments. This software is designed to facilitate many services in one place for owner management.

31. Defendants are the largest supplier of facility management software systems to independent self-storage facilities. They offer three such systems: storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions. Defendants rolled up the companies that offered these systems under common ownership from 2018-20. See SpareFoot, Tech Firms Combine Under Storable Brand Name To Serve Self-Storage Indus. (Apr. 29, 2024), https://www.sparefoot.com/blog/tech-firms-combine- storable-brand-name-serve-self-storage-industry/; Inside Self Storage, Storable Acquires Self- Storage Software Provider Easy Storage Solutions (June 5, 2020), https://www.insideselfstorage. com/software/storable-acquires-self-storage-software-provider-easy-storage-solutions.

32. According to industry statistics, defendants control some 75% of the U.S. market for facility management software systems for independent self-storage facilities.

33. According to defendants, “more than half of every single storage facility in the United States” uses their facility management software. 2023 State of the Self-Storage Indus., https://www.storable.com/resources/learn/unpacked-webinar-2023-state-of-the-self-storage- industry/. The numbers are even starker considering that the only storage facilities that use third- party facility management software are independent facilities. Some 40,500 facilities in the U.S. are independent self-storage facilities. See The Self-Storage Almanac 2024, Sec. 2 (independent

-8- owners represent 77.5% of self-storage facilities). And nearly 32,000 self-storage facilities used defendants’ facility management software systems as of 2023. See 2023 State of the Self-Storage Indus., supra. Today, defendants advertise that 36,000 self-storage facilities “are currently managed with Storable software.” Storable, About Us, https://www.storable.com/about-us/.

34. SafeLease does not offer facility management software. Rather, its independent self-storage customers rely on their facility management software to facilitate the administration of SafeLease’s tenant insurance plans. Each of these customers expressly authorizes SafeLease to be one of its third-party vendors, to access its facility management software with administrative user credentials, and to use its systems to offer tenant insurance plans. Customers also agree to provide the information SafeLease needs to administer policies through access to their facility management software.

B. Tenant Insurance Plans 35. SafeLease basically offers two types of related insurance products for its independent self-storage customers: tenant insurance and tenant protection.

36. Tenant insurance is produced directly to the tenant by the facility. In most states, the facility operates under a limited lines license, where SafeLease is the designated responsible licensed producer—that is, the overseer for the program. The tenant is directly insured for stored goods, rather than having recourse to the owner-operator of the storage facility.

37. Tenant protection involves the placement of a contractual liability insurance policy with the storage facility owner-operator. The policy covers risk to tenant stored goods on the rental agreement. Under SafeLease’s program, rental agreements are amended so that the standard exculpatory clause (where owners/operators disclaim liability for tenant stored goods) is pared back, and the facility owner-operator instead has limited liability for certain types of loss.

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38. These products are marketed largely as substitutes. Some facility owner-operators prefer conventional tenant insurance, while others choose tenant protection. The coverage levels and cost for the product borne by the tenant and the revenue that can be earned by the facility owner-operator for distribution are comparable.

39. Defendants directly compete with SafeLease on both insurance product lines.

40. In addition to rolling up facility management software system vendors, defendants also acquired various insurance producers and books of business. These include Property First Group LP (StorSmart) and Bader Co. See Inside Self-Storage, Storable Adds Self-Storage Ins. Providers Bader, Storsmart to Stable of Cos. (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.insideselfstorage.com/in -surance/storable-adds-self-storage-insurance-providers-bader-storsmart-to-stable-of-companies.

Defendants also acquired a large book of insurance business from Sage Insurance in 2021.

41. In short, defendants provide tenant insurance at independent facilities. In addition, they offer an unlicensed, insurance-like “protection plan” program to independent facilities through Easy Storage Solutions facility management software. In total, defendants together control the single largest share of the market for tenant insurance and tenant protection (“tenant insurance”) at independent self-storage facilities.

42. The parties compete in the market for tenant insurance at independent self-storage facilities.

C. SafeLease Access to Customer Accounts 43. SafeLease opened for business in mid-2021 and has grown steadily. It now covers 2576 facilities, representing about 322,000 units with active SafeLease-acquired coverage.

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44. SafeLease currently administers insurance policies/plans through customer facility management software systems. Access to this software is critical to enable SafeLease to effectively administer its customers’ insurance protection and to protect facility owners/operators and tenants.

45. To administer these policies, SafeLease must access facility management software that its self-storage customers use. Given defendants’ dominance in the facility management software market, the vast majority of customer plans that SafeLease administers must be managed through defendants’ software systems. Over 275,000 tenants at nearly 2000 facilities must be administered through defendants’ facility management software: a. storEdge: 83,992 plans (683 facilities) b. SiteLink: 147,233 plans (734 facilities) c. Easy Storage Solutions: 44,681 plans (514 facilities) 46. The remaining policies are administered through third-party facility management software offered by companies other than the defendants, such as Self Storage Manager, Cubby, and WebSelfStorage.

47. Since 2021, for defendants’ storEDGE and SiteLink systems, SafeLease has accessed its customers’ accounts as a designated “Authorized User” on the systems after its customers granted SafeLease such access in accordance with its contracts with those customers.

StorEDGE and SiteLink permit a customer to designate “as many” Authorized Users to access its accounts “as you wish,” according to the terms of service for their facility management software.

a. Sitelink Terms of Use, https://www.storable.com/privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ (“4.2. Authorized Users. You may designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement.”); and b. storEDGE Terms of Service, https://www.storable.com/privacy/storedge- terms-of-service/ (“4.2. Authorized Users. You may designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement.”).

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48. Likewise, SafeLease’s access to defendants’ Easy Storage Solutions (which is a more basic software than storEDGE or SiteLink) only occurs when access is given by defendants at the request of a customer. Access is “locked” otherwise. Easy Storage Solutions customers then must create an Authorized User account for SafeLease. Defendants knew SafeLease was accessing the facility management software on behalf of customers and provided access for it to do so.

49. In SafeLease’s customer contracts, storage facilities are obligated to give SafeLease access to their facility management software for it to administer the relevant insurance policies.

The data within the facility management software—for example, information about a particular facility, its tenants, and its operations—belongs to SafeLease’s customers (not to defendants).

SafeLease’s customers grant SafeLease permission to access this information kept on their facility management software by logging in with a username and password, exactly as the facility owners would log in to access the same information. This is how SafeLease has accessed its customers’ facility management software.

50. The information SafeLease can access is controlled by its facility customers.

SafeLease only accesses the information that is necessary to carry out its insurance functions. It does not access sensitive information that is irrelevant to SafeLease providing its contractual insurance services. SafeLease never has access to tenant credit card information. SafeLease uses secure, independently audited, SOC-2 certified processes when accessing and storing customer data.

51. Storable has known for years that SafeLease is an Authorized User to administer its customer insurance policies. In general, SafeLease can access facility management software to administer coverage policies by a direct connection to the software through an application programming interface (API) or as an Authorized User through the graphical user interface (GUI).

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In 2021, just months after SafeLease opened, it reached out to defendants regarding API access for SiteLink. Defendants declined, saying they are “not planning to add additional providers.” As a result, SafeLease moved forward as an Authorized User and successfully has operated that way ever since.

52. As an Authorized User, SafeLease efficiently can collect targeted data every day or few days from a customer’s facility management software that it needs to administer policies.

SafeLease accesses the least data necessary and only the data that its customers allow, even gathering information more efficiently than if a user were manually operating the software.

SafeLease’s access to facility management software has not intensified in nature or scope across time. In fact, since 2021, SafeLease has further tailored its operations to make its access of facility management software even more narrow and efficient. Until this case was filed, defendants never claimed that SafeLease’s practices harmed defendants’ facility management software and never demanded that SafeLease stop or change its Authorized User access.

53. SafeLease’s ability to access the facility management software as an Authorized User has been beneficial to defendants. For example, SafeLease products are low-cost options that defendants admit are popular with and beneficial to facility operators and their tenants. Operators want to use SafeLease products, so having a facility management software that is compatible with SafeLease products enhances defendants’ software, making it more valuable to facility management software customers and increasing its marketability. Conversely, cutting off SafeLease’s access to facility management software hurts defendants’ own customers, who are left at risk of disruption and uninsured loss.

D. Defendants’ Actions Towards SafeLease 54. Since SafeLease’s founding, defendants have expressed interest in acquiring its insurance business. Storable’s CEO sees SafeLease’s business as “interesting” and “compelling.”

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He believes SafeLease can “help our customers” increase tenant enrollment in insurance coverage, which “benefits” self-storage operators, their tenants, and insurance providers, which can “grow the business.” SafeLease repeatedly has declined defendants’ overtures.

55. In March 2022, less than a year after SafeLease’s founding, defendants inquired about buying SafeLease. The next year, following discussions in May 2023, the parties entered into a term sheet regarding a potential long-term partnership. The parties ultimately could not agree on terms and agreed to pause negotiations in March 2024. In September 2024, defendants again expressed general interest in acquiring SafeLease.

56. Defendants’ tactics then changed after acquisition talks broke down in October. On October 15, 2024, SafeLease got a cryptic email from defendants noting upcoming “security measures” on the facility management software, including “stricter policies around user roles, access authorization, and ensuring only authorized personnel can access Storable systems.” This raised possible concerns that defendants might limit SafeLease access to the facility management software—access that its shared customers long had authorized and that SafeLease successfully had used without issue for many years.

57. In this message and the surrounding communications, defendants made no specific complaint about any specific SafeLease practice—referring only to nebulous “security” issues but never telling SafeLease that defendants believed it was causing or responsible for any such issues.

They could not and did not explain any harm from SafeLease’s continued operation as an Authorized User in the same manner as it had done for years.

58. In response, SafeLease asked about an interim agreement with defendants to “avoid disruptions to the services and agreements with [their] shared customers.” SafeLease sought a call as soon as possible, including technical resources, so that it could understand the planned “security

-14- changes” and take appropriate measures. In addition, SafeLease proposed as a potential solution an agreement to access defendants’ API—access that they had denied years earlier.

59. Defendants responded with egregious terms to access the system via an API. They proposed a penalty price of $1.00 per unit per month, far greater than the market price for such access. Moreover, they would charge SafeLease an even higher price for units that had been served by defendants if the customer chose to switch to SafeLease for its insurance products. In that case, SafeLease would have to pay $1.50 for API access—50% more—whenever it out-competed defendants for business. The terms were confiscatory, exclusionary, anticompetitive, and another example of defendants flexing their monopoly power.

60. Indeed, defendants’ demanded price was so high that it would drive SafeLease out of business. Defendants knew this since they offer similar insurance plans and are well aware of the economics. For example, the most common protection plans typically cost a tenant $12/month for $2000 of coverage. The facility will keep most of that $12, as it has the relationship with the tenant, and a coverage provider like SafeLease will get $2-3/plan per month, which also must cover the cost of the insurance itself, which is not less than $2/plan per month. So, charging $1 to $1.50 per unit for API access would consume 50% or more of SafeLease’s gross profit, which would not leave enough to cover insurance premiums.

61. In short, API access was no option at all on defendants’ monopolistic terms, which were designed as merely another way to drive a low-cost competitor out of the market to the detriment of consumers and the industry.

62. Defendants then took their next step. On November 4, 2024, SafeLease noticed issues logging into storEDGE. Its engineers found that SafeLease IP addresses had been blocked

-15- from logging into storEDGE. On November 6, 2024, SiteLink similarly blocked SafeLease IP addresses, although SafeLease was able to re-establish its authorized access.

63. On December 4, 2024, there was another wave. Defendants blocked the IP address for the SafeLease office from accessing storEDGE and SiteLink facility management software.

This cut off SafeLease’s access to customer accounts and was a direct interference with servicing its policies. Again, SafeLease was able to engineer a solution to restore access.

64. At the same time, defendants’ buyout overtures continued. On December 9, 2024, they again expressed interest in acquiring SafeLease, warning that additional “security” measures soon would be implemented.

65. On December 17, 2024, defendants took a dramatic step. They blacklisted SafeLease from storEDGE. In addition to blocking the SafeLease office IP address, defendants deactivated storEDGE users with @safelease.com emails even though they were customer- designated as Authorized Users. There was no technical workaround. As a result, SafeLease could not access storEDGE on behalf of customers. It lost the ability to service 84,062 insurance plans for storage facilities that use storEDGE facility management software. This caused, and if left unchecked was set to cause more, serious harms, including gaps in coverage and delays in adjudication of claims for SafeLease and defendants’ shared customers.

66. SafeLease filed this petition and request for temporary and permanent injunctive relief on December 30, 2025, to prevent irreparable harm that would commence January 1, 2025.

SafeLease was due to issue thousands of contracted-for new and renewed policies to its customers, a process that it could not do without accessing its customers’ facility management software.

67. The Court acted swiftly and granted SafeLease’s requested temporary restraining order on December 31. Defendants’ actions in the hours that followed showed that the status quo

-16- imposed no burden at all on them. Indeed, less than an hour after the TRO became effective, defendants restored SafeLease’s access as a customer-designated Authorized User on storEDGE.

68. Defendants moved to dissolve the TRO on January 2, 2025. In turn, SafeLease moved for expedited discovery and to extend the TRO to allow for this discovery. On January 9, the Court denied the motion to dissolve, extended the TRO to January 21, and granted targeted discovery in advance of a temporary injunction hearing, which was set for January 16.

69. While the TRO was in effect prior to the temporary injunction hearing, SafeLease got to work. It was able again to service the parties’ mutual customers by: a. sending notices to self-storage facilities with tenants transferring into SafeLease insurance coverage; b. confirming coverage for 33,000+ units switching to SafeLease coverage for facilities using defendants’ facility management software; c. helping facilities meet insurance requirements by confirming tenants have valid homeowner policies linked to their accounts or are enrolled in SafeLease; d. collecting reports to bill facilities for premiums that must be paid to insurance carriers to maintain necessary coverage; and e. securing facility data to advance adjustor files to pay pending claims.

70. On January 16, 2025, the parties participated in an evidentiary hearing on the request for a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo through trial.

71. The Court denied the request for a temporary injunction on January 21, the day the TRO dissolved by its extended terms.

72. Defendants wasted no time in resuming their anticompetitive attacks. The next day, January 22, defendants reinstated their block on SafeLease access to storEDGE. Then they went further to cut off SafeLease from the other two facility management software products, SiteLink and Easy Storage Solutions.

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73. The impact of defendants’ attacks has increased dramatically. SafeLease cannot access its customers’ data in the facility management software, despite express user authorization from those same mutual customers. The number of units, tenants, and facilities that defendants are preventing SafeLease from servicing properly and timely under their existing contracts has tripled.

There are over 275,000 tenants at nearly 2000 facilities who SafeLease no longer can provide the insurance services that they and the facilities have contracted for.

74. Defendants have not merely disabled SafeLease’s Authorized User accounts. They also have fully disabled SafeLease from having access by any means to any of defendants’ facility management software systems. Their excuse for cutting off access is alleged “security” concerns posed by SafeLease’s using automated log-in to its customers’ software to access its customer data (as customers have authorized and contracted for). Defendants have said that manually logging in would resolve those concerns. But they now will not allow even that means of access, that is, access that is identical to how any facility owner would access its own facility management software.

75. This newly restricted means of access for SafeLease is no different from how other contractors, consultants, or third parties with which facility owners do business access customers’ facility management software. For example, a certified public accountant who a facility owner has designated as an Authorized User to provide accounting or tax services also accesses the customer software via username and password manually. That access is allowed for third parties who don’t compete with defendants, but defendants have denied the same access to its competitor SafeLease.

76. Defendants took further steps to target SafeLease and eliminate competition. They disabled all SiteLink accounts where SafeLease had been using the system’s legacy custom third- party insurance module to provide insurance to facility customers. Disabling SafeLease’s accounts

-18- that used this custom insurance module has no legitimate purpose. It simply singles out SafeLease to block access for a competitor and to interfere with its contracts with customers.

77. This custom insurance module is a means of access long approved by defendants and used by other insurance vendors. The module was created by defendants specifically to enable facility owners to use an insurance provider that does not have API access to SiteLink. Facility owners pay defendants $10 per facility/month to use this custom insurance module, and SafeLease reimburses the customers. So, when and whether a facility owner is using a third-party insurance provider via this module is known to and long allowed by defendants.

78. Using this custom module poses none of the alleged security issues that defendants claim justify cutting SafeLease’s access. Indeed, this custom module is defendants’ own creation.

79. To SafeLease’s knowledge, defendants did not block access to this custom module for any other insurance provider. Cutting off SafeLease from even this method of accessing data and servicing customers further shows that defendants are targeting SafeLease, and their in-court excuses for removing SafeLease’s access are pretextual.

80. Since defendants cut off access again only days ago, the parties’ mutual customers have expressed confusion and concern about how it will impact them and their tenants. Reactions from customers have ranged from anxiety to frustration to anger, including the following: a. “Help me understand where our account stands as of today; 1. Are our tenants covered and how long will they be covered? 2. How do we continue coverage? 3. Will the payments by our tenants no longer be accessed by SafeLease? . . . I am just scratching the surface with questions, by my greatest concern is to make sure that our tenant protection doesn’t lapse during this struggle.”

b. “We utilize SiteLink at our facility and currently pay $10 per month for the ability to use SafeLease. We are concerned about the potential disruption of service and insurance coverage for our tenants.”

c. “I see that SafeLease has been deleted as a user in my corporate account. . . . Should I add you back as an authorized user? They deleted without

-19- mentioning anything to me. . . . Also, if a tenant moves in now, will they even have access to coverage?”

d. “I want safe lease to immediately have access to manage my tenant protection. . . . I have been with easy storage solutions way before storable purchased them. I have been a loyal customer since 2012 and demand the right to choose my tenant protection for the best options for my tenants.” (email sent to defendants) e. “Sounds like you already don’t have access to our system. What issues is this going to cause us until you regain access?”

f. “Safelease was removed from each of my locations. They are my tenant protection company. . . . I’m going to be adding them back in today so that I can go over my numbers as I do monthly with them. Please, can you make sure Storable does not remove someone I have given permission to.” (email sent to defendants) g. “Could you please clarify if Storable’s actions have also impacted the data transfer and service for SiteLink users who pay for SafeLease access? Are you still receiving our information, or has this been interrupted as well?”

h. “Team Storable, Please immediately restore access to all authorized users. SafeLease must have full access.” (email sent to defendants) i. “Have you guys looked into any legal recourse? My opinion is that Storable is doing some potentially illegal stuff throughout (not a lawyer).”

j. “This seems like it is breaking some sort of law and at a minimum a terrible way to do business.”

k. “We have also experienced the anticompetitive activities of Storable.

When we attempted to access our own data, they demanded an outrageous toll fee for the access.”

l. “Not surprised that Storable would pull such a dirty trick. Can’t expect much better from them.”

Common to the customer reactions to defendants’ actions are concerns about disruption of service, increased risks, and loss of protection for them and their tenants.

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81. By contrast, as SafeLease was cut off from accessing these facility management software systems, defendants’ insurance products offered through Bader and StorSmart remained integrated in the software.

82. Defendants’ actions have been greatly damaging to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry. As a result, SafeLease cannot operate its business as it has done for years with defendants’ knowledge, consistent with its terms, and with customer authorization and agreement.

E. Relevant Markets 83. The relevant primary product market is for tenant insurance at independent self- storage facilities. SafeLease and defendants, as well as firms such as Xercor, Deans & Homer, Insurance Office of America, and MiniCo Insurance Agency, compete in this market.

84. Because of the fragmented nature of self-storage facility ownership and the fact that large public companies offer their own insurance plans, this tenant insurance is offered only at independent self-storage facilities. Consumers at these facilities can turn to either tenant protection or tenant insurance products. These products are substitutable in that a consumer reasonably could turn from one product to the other in response to a price increase to satisfy their insurance needs.

85. Market share in this market can be measured based on the number of facilities using a tenant insurance product. Defendants are collectively the largest provider in this market.

86. The relevant secondary product market is for facility management software.

Defendants dominate this market. Other competitors are Self Storage Management, Cubby, and WebSelfStorage.

87. Because of the fragmented nature of self-storage facility ownership and the fact that large public companies use their own proprietary management software, these facility management software products are offered only to independent self-storage facilities.

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88. Market share can be measured based on the number of facilities that use facility management software. Defendants control over 75% of this market within the United States.

89. Defendants have a monopoly in this secondary market. They are leveraging their market power to harm and control competition in the primary market, for tenant insurance at independent self-storage facilities, and to acquire monopoly power.

a. Geographic Market 90. The relevant geographic market for both product markets is the United States.

91. For tenant insurance, the parties and others operate throughout the nation.

Consumers in Texas looking to purchase tenant insurance reasonably can turn to any such product offered by a provider if it is licensed to provide insurance in this State.

92. For facility management software systems, defendants and its competitors operate throughout the nation. Consumers looking to purchase such software for their independent self- storage facilities may turn to any competitor in the country to provide this product.

F. Defendants’ Anticompetitive Conduct and Effects 93. Defendants have engaged in an anticompetitive scheme to monopolize the market for tenant insurance and drive a low-cost competitor out of business. They are leveraging their monopoly power in the facility management software market to try to monopolize the connected market for tenant insurance. Facility management software is vital to the market they are attempting to monopolize, and defendants have a monopoly of that software market. Their actions are an attempt to exploit that connection to the detriment of consumers and competition.

94. So, armed with this unique power in an adjacent market, defendants are engaging in prohibited predatory conduct by refusing to deal with SafeLease by cutting off SafeLease’s access to their facility management software systems. This shuts out SafeLease from the tenant

-22- insurance market, excluding or foreclosing competition and harming consumers including with higher prices. SafeLease is precluded from accessing more than 75% of the market, so defendants will be able to scoop up the customers that SafeLease no longer can compete for.

95. Defendants cut off SafeLease after years of allowing what it now prohibits. This long-known and consented-to access was voluntary and to defendants’ benefit, as it made their facility management software product more enticing to consumers, some of whom would not have chosen it if SafeLease were not allowed access, severely limiting their tenant insurance options.

And defendants cut off SafeLease’s access without warning or valid business justification. As is clear from defendants’ conduct, their motive is to achieve anticompetitive ends.

96. Defendants are familiar with SafeLease and how it does business, including that it has Authorized User access to defendants’ facility management software granted by their shared customers. Defendants have expressed interest in partnering with or buying SafeLease. As recently as just weeks ago, they proposed acquiring SafeLease. It was only after talks broke down that they sought to drive SafeLease out of the market and remove a low-cost competitor. They retaliated by cutting off SafeLease and making a confiscatory “offer” for API access that was no offer at all and was, instead, another way to try to destroy a competitor to reduce competition, to the detriment of consumers. The timing shows that defendants’ “justifications” for their conduct are pretextual.

97. Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct escalated after suit was filed. In December, SafeLease successfully competed for a new customer that uses defendants’ SiteLink as its facility management software. That customer had used defendant Bader as its tenant insurance provider, until SafeLease out-competed Bader for this customer’s business. On December 31, 2024, the same day the Court granted the TRO, defendant Bader tried to scare the customer into switching back to Bader’s insurance coverage by informing the customer that defendants were going to block

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SafeLease from accessing SiteLink, just as they had done with storEDGE. Confused and concerned, the customer alerted SafeLease, who assured the customer that a TRO was in place.

98. Although the TRO was in place, defendants’ threat to remove access proved too much for this customer. He determined that the risk of SiteLink severing ties with SafeLease posed a significant operational challenge and financial risk to the customer, which he could not bear, so he chose to cancel his planned contract with SafeLease.

99. This recent conduct is further proof of defendants’ plans to monopolize the tenant insurance market not by competing on the merits but by removing competition through leveraging their monopoly in the facility management software market and interfering with SafeLease’s prospective business with these customers.

100. With defendants’ monopoly power, their scheme to drive out competitors in the related tenant insurance market has a dangerous probability of success. Defendants know how vital facility management software is to independent self-storage facilities. Having captured more than 75% of the market for this software, while allowing SafeLease and others to access the software for years, defendants are able to leverage that monopoly and customer reliance on the software to drive out as many competitors in the tenant insurance market as it can by refusing to deal with them, or by allowing them to use defendants’ software products only on the condition that the competitors promise not to compete for defendants’ customers and pay a penalty if they do. This will, in turn, drive customers to their only practical option at that point: buying higher-cost tenant insurance from defendants.

101. This anticompetitive scheme is an attempt to monopolize the market for tenant insurance. It will harm competition and consumers, remove low-cost competitors like SafeLease, and drive-up costs and reduce options.

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G. Damages and Continuing Injury 102. Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct is causing irreparable harm to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry.

103. On December 17, 2024, defendants cut off SafeLease accounts from accessing the storEDGE facility management software, revoking the Authorized User status granted to SafeLease by storage facility customers. The only thing that stopped this anticompetitive scheme and prevented further harm to SafeLease, consumers, and competition was the TRO. But when the TRO expired, defendants escalated their attacks by cutting off SafeLease from accessing all their facility management software systems. Without access, SafeLease cannot service insurance policies for tenants with units in facilities that use those systems. Practically, this means that SafeLease’s customers will experience delays in adjudication of their insurance claims and risky gaps in coverage while SafeLease is unable to renew or issue new policies it has or would have contracted with customers to issue.

104. This risk and these gaps cannot be filled by these mutual customers. They cannot legally intake or adjust tenant insurance claims, which is something that only a licensed insurance agent like SafeLease can do. This disruption and interference with customer-authorized access to customer data on its customers’ software has wholly impaired SafeLease’s ability to service more than 275,000 tenants and thousands of customer facilities. This harms not only SafeLease but also innocent customers and their tenants.

105. Defendants’ actions have jeopardized SafeLease’s entire business, which is worth over $100 million. It has and will continue to harm and cause loss to SafeLease’s goodwill, clientele, and operations. Defendants’ actions also put at risk the insurance coverage that customers secured through SafeLease, which exceeds $600 million.

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106. Defendants’ unjustified and anticompetitive actions are calculated to and do destroy competition by excluding a low-cost competitor from competing in the market to the detriment of competition and consumers. This harm will be outsized in Texas which has more storage units than any other state and in which the parties are based and conduct their business.

H. Status Quo Poses No Harm to Defendants 107. SafeLease accessed defendants’ facility management software as an Authorized User with defendants’ consent for over three years until they abruptly cut off access in December.

Defendants’ actions after the TRO was entered show that returning to the status quo imposes no burden at all on them. Indeed, in less than an hour after the TRO became effective, defendants restored SafeLease’s access as a customer-designated Authorized User of storEDGE.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the Texas Antitrust Act, Section B 108. SafeLease incorporates the material fact allegations from the preceding paragraphs.

109. Through anticompetitive conduct, defendants intend to secure dominant market power and a monopoly in the market for tenant insurance at independent self-storage facilities.

They leveraged their monopoly of the facility management software market to lessen or destroy competition in the tenant insurance market by cutting off SafeLease from accessing storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions facility management software on behalf of and for the benefit of customers. This refusal to deal is contrary to defendants’ prior voluntary practice of allowing such access for years, which benefited defendants, and it will harm defendants’ own customers.

110. This refusal to deal is intended to remove a discount competitor from the market to help defendants gain market share and solidify a second monopoly in the market for tenant insurance. Their monopoly of the facility management software market gives them a unique ability

-26- to exclude or foreclose competition in the market for tenant insurance by excluding competitors in that market, like SafeLease, from facility management software.

111. Defendants are exercising this unique anticompetitive ability here by excluding SafeLease from their facility management software systems after years of knowing use. Given this unique power to exclude or foreclose competition in the vast majority of the market, made possible by leveraging a monopoly of facility management software, defendants’ scheme has a dangerously high probability of success.

112. This conduct is an attempted monopolization in violation of TEX. BUS. & COMM.

CODE § 15.05(b). This unlawful conduct has been willful and flagrant.

113. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful conduct, SafeLease has been injured in its business and property, including by being foreclosed from competing in the market for tenant insurance.

114. These injuries to SafeLease and the public are injuries to the competitive process and are the type of injuries that the antitrust laws are intended to prohibit. They constitute antitrust injuries in Texas.

115. SafeLease did and will suffer irreparable injury and loss of business and property, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, unless the Court enjoins defendants’ continuing and imminent violations.

116. SafeLease has been forced to retain attorneys to protect its rights and to prosecute this claim. Under TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 15.21, it is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees and costs spent in this matter.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Tortious Interference with Existing Contracts 117. SafeLease incorporates the material fact allegations from the preceding paragraphs.

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118. SafeLease has a contract with each of its customers that use defendants’ facility management software. These contracts are commonly titled “Storage Partner Agreements.” They require the customers to provide SafeLease with access to their facility management software and their data that they keep on these software systems for the sole purpose of providing the parties’ contractually agreed insurance services.

119. SafeLease’s contracts with its customers are valid contracts. Defendants are not parties to these contracts.

120. Defendants are willfully and intentionally interfering with SafeLease’s contracts with its customers. Defendants know that SafeLease provides insurance services to their mutual customers. Defendants know that such services are under contracts between SafeLease and the customers. Defendants know that these services require SafeLease to access and use customer data that is stored on the facility management software systems. Defendants know that SafeLease’s customers grant it access to their facility management software as an Authorized User.

121. Defendants intentionally cut off SafeLease’s access to their facility management software. Defendants are preventing the parties’ mutual customers from providing SafeLease the access that the customers want and are obligated to provide. Defendants know or reasonably should know that blocking access interferes with the customers’ ability to perform under their contracts, including by preventing customers from being able to give SafeLease the agreed, desired, and necessary access to their facility management software systems and data.

122. Defendants cut off SafeLease’s access in order to interfere with performance of these obligations, and it was substantially certain that the consequences of cutting off access would be to interfere with performance of these obligations.

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123. Defendants’ interference with SafeLease’s customer contracts proximately caused SafeLease harm and loss to its business, business operations, goodwill, and clientele. It threatens to destroy SafeLease’s entire business. This harm and loss are continuing, increase with every day, and given their nature are not easily or readily quantifiably.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations 124. SafeLease incorporates the material fact allegations from the preceding paragraphs.

125. Defendants have willfully and intentionally interfered with SafeLease’s ability to compete in the market for tenant insurance. They have removed SafeLease’s ability to service customers that use defendants’ facility management software systems, which comprise over 75% of the market.

126. Defendants’ leveraging of their monopoly in the facility management software market to cut off SafeLease from thousands of customers in the tenant insurance market makes it nearly impossible for SafeLease to compete for new business, as customers now are effectively unreachable to SafeLease. Defendants are telling SafeLease’s prospective customers that they plan to and now have cut off SafeLease’s access, for the purpose of interfering with SafeLease’s attempts to enter contracts to provide services to the potential customers.

127. Defendants’ software is so vital to customers that their threat of stopping SafeLease access already has lost SafeLease customers, including a customer who cancelled his contract with SafeLease when he learned that SiteLink was planning to remove SafeLease’s access.

128. Defendants’ threats to remove SafeLease’s access and then actual removal of that access have caused customers to cancel or back out of agreements with SafeLease, thus injuring it. These injuries are the direct result and intent of defendants’ anticompetitive acts to leverage their monopoly power to interfere with SafeLease’s prospective business relations.

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129. Defendants’ interference with SafeLease’s prospective business with customers has proximately caused SafeLease harm and loss to its business, business operations, goodwill, and clientele. It threatens to destroy SafeLease’s entire business. This harm and loss are continuing, increase with every day and with every prospective customer with which defendants interfere, and given their nature are not easily or readily quantifiably.

SERVICE ON ATTORNEY GENERAL 130. SafeLease has mailed a copy of this amended petition to the Attorney General of Texas, in compliance with TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §15.21(c).

VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION 131. SafeLease has requested that the Court issue a TRO and temporary injunction against defendants to prevent probable imminent and irreparable harm to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry. The Court issued the requested TRO on December 31, 2024 and extended it to January 21, 2025. In the interim, it held a temporary injunction hearing on January 16. The Court denied the requested temporary injunction via email notice from its clerk on January 21.

GROUNDS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 132. Temporary injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo prior to a trial on the merits. The last actual, peaceable, non-contested status preceding the pending controversy is SafeLease’s accessing defendants’ facility management software systems so that it may service the parties’ shared customers, which SafeLease did for years with defendants’ knowledge until they cut off access. See In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004) (status quo is “the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy”) (cite omitted).

133. Defendants’ cutting off access to this critical software did and will cause irreparable harm to SafeLease, its customers, and the industry. Without access SafeLease will be unable to

-30- run its business and administer insurance services for its customers. Temporarily enjoining defendants imposes no or minimal burden on them and also will allow SafeLease to service these mutual customers as it had done with defendants’ knowledge and consent for years.

134. SafeLease pleads valid causes of action and has shown a probable right to relief. It has furnished evidence that defendants’ actions and threatened imminent actions are an illegal monopolization attempt of the market for tenant insurance, using an anticompetitive scheme and predatory or exclusory means. Given defendants’ monopoly power and ability to leverage it to exclude or foreclose competition, they have a dangerous probability of succeeding. Defendants’ actions also improperly interfere with SafeLease’s current and prospective customer contracts.

135. Federal antitrust case law, which the Texas Antitrust Act follows, supports the state law claim raised here. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (“If Kodak [a monopolist] adopted its . . . policies [refusing to deal] as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it will have violated §2.”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (monopolist liable for refusing to deal with competitor where parties had prior voluntary course of dealing that was ended without justification); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (finding monopolization where defendants used monopoly power in one market to acquire monopoly control of other markets); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Monopoly leveraging occurs when a firm uses its market power in one market to gain market share in another market other than by competitive means.”), vacated on other grounds, 540 U.S. 1147 (2004).

136. SafeLease also has shown probable imminent and irreparable injuries prior to a trial on the merits. Accessing defendants’ software is its only means of servicing customers that use the

-31- software. Without access, it cannot address claims made by tenants, correctly bill its customers, or commence new or renew insurance policies that it has contracted with tenants to provide.

137. The impact of this disruption is wholly or largely immeasurable to SafeLease and the tenants that it helps insure. It did and will cause immediate and irreparable harm to SafeLease’s business and customers by preventing SafeLease from, among other things, renewing or issuing new policies, notifying tenants of changes in coverage, adjusting or adjudicating insurance claims, or billing facilities accurately. This harm from loss of access critically impairs SafeLease’s business and its ability to service thousands of customers, is ongoing, and is irreparable because it places its entire business at risk, making much or all of the current harm to SafeLease’s business impossible to measure in damages.

138. As such, the Court issued a TRO enjoining defendants before the application for temporary injunction was heard: a. Defendants should be ordered to restore SafeLease’s status as an Authorized User on the storEDGE or any other facility management software for customer accounts that grant SafeLease such authorization.

b. Defendants should be ordered to take no action to remove or otherwise restrict SafeLease’s access to its storEDGE, SiteLink, or Easy Storage Solutions facility management software systems as an Authorized User for customer accounts that grant SafeLease such authorization.

139. SafeLease posted a bond to make the TRO effective. A minimal bond was required and warranted because the TRO simply restored the way that the parties have operated for years.

As a result, the risk of irreparable harm to defendants was nil.

140. SafeLease further requested that the Court temporarily enjoin Storable from these same acts until the trial of this case and that, after trial, the Court permanently enjoin Storable upon entry of final judgment.

141. On January 21, 2025, the Court denied the temporary injunction request.

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PRAYER SafeLease respectfully seeks a TRO, temporary injunction, and permanent injunction that enjoins defendants and their officers, agents, servants, and employees from performing the anticompetitive and tortious acts described above, and a judgment for SafeLease and against defendants for reasonable and necessary attorney fees, costs of court, pre- and post-judgment interest, and all other relief to which SafeLease may be entitled.

Dated: January 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Paul Yetter R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] Shannon N. Smith State Bar No. 24110378 [email protected] YETTER COLEMAN LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 632-8000 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record via the Court e-filing service and/or by email, on January 28, 2025.

_/s/ Shannon N. Smith_______ Shannon N. Smith

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VERIFICATION

My name is Sh:n.~n Stein. My date of birth is November 18. 1994. I am the Chief E:xecutiYC ()nicer of plaintiff Sak lease and have hccn s ince its inception. My business address is ~00 Brazos Street. Suite 320. Austin. Texas 78701. I declare under penalty o f perjury that the mate1ial facts alleged in this Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Temporary Injunction. and Permanent Injunction, except for paragraphs 80 and 97- 98 (as to which another Safelease employee is verifying}, are true and correct based on my personal knowledge or. as indicated. on reliable referenced information sources.

Executed in TraYis County, Texas on this 28th day of January, 2025.

-JS-

VERIFICATION

My naml' is athanid Kinl'I. My date of birth is Oeccmbcr 12. I 986. I am Chicf Revenue Ot1icl'r of plaintiff Safrlease and haw been an employee of SafcLcase since May 202 1. My business addrl'SS is ~00 Brazos Street. Suite :no. Austin. Texas 78701. I declare under penalty of pct:iury that the material facts alleged in panigraphs 80 and 97- 98 of this Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Temporary Injunction. and Pennanent Injunction are true and con-cct based on my personal knowledge.

Executed in Tra,·is County, Texas on this 28th day of January. 2025.

ExhibitB FILED IN BUSINESS COURT OF371TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 3/11/2025 2025 Tex. Bus. 10

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ═══════════════════════════════════════ MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ═══════════════════════════════════════ ¶1 Before the Court is a document titled “Objections To Temporary In- junction Order, Motion to Rule On Exclusion Of Opinions Of Dr. Williams, And Motion to Reconsider Based On Objections And Exclusion” (hereafter, the Motion to Reconsider) filed by defendants Storable Inc., RedNova Labs Inc., Bader Co., SiteLink Software LLC, Easy Storage Solutions LLC, and Property First Group LP (collectively, Storable). The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Reconsider, as detailed below.

Background ¶2 This suit arises out of a dispute between SafeLease Insurance Services LLC (SafeLease), which provides insurance for self-storage facilities, and Storable, which licenses facility-management software (FMS) to such facilities. Storable’s FMS platforms include storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions (ESS). The dispute centers on SafeLease’s access to information maintained on these platforms by self-storage facilities that license FMS software from Storable and that are also customers of SafeLease. Until recently, SafeLease accessed these FMS platforms as an authorized user on its customers’ accounts. In late 2024, Storable began blocking SafeLease’s access to storEDGE. The parties dispute the impetus of these actions: SafeLease alleges that Storable seeks to drive it out of the self-storage insurance market to benefit Storable’s own self-storage insurance products; Storable asserts that it is enforcing its software’s terms of use and mitigating security threats posed by SafeLease’s misuse of the platform.

¶3 SafeLease sued Storable in the 345th District Court in Travis County on December 30, 2024. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) compelling Storable to restore SafeLease’s authorized-user access to storEDGE and prohibiting Storable from removing or restricting SafeLease’s access to storEDGE, SiteLink, or ESS. After extending the TRO, the District Court denied the request for a temporary injunction (TI). A week later, SafeLease amended its petition to include new tortious interference claims and allegations about Storable’s actions after the TI was denied. SafeLease then removed the action to this Court.

¶4 In this Court, SafeLease filed a new application for a TRO and TI to protect its access to the information on Storable’s FMS platforms while the lawsuit is pending. 1 On January 30, 2025, the Court denied the TRO and set a TI hearing.

The TI hearing was conducted on February 11, 13, and 14, with closing arguments on Tuesday, February 18. The Court issued a TI Order the following day, February 19, granting SafeLease limited injunctive relief. Storable filed this Motion two days later, on Friday, February 21, and set it for written submission today, March 11.

Analysis A. Storable’s Request for Ruling and Reconsideration ¶5 The Motion to Reconsider asks the Court to rule on another motion filed by Storable—its “Motion To Exclude Or Disregard Opinions Of Dr. Williams On The Ground That They Are Unreliable And Constitute No Evidence” (the Motion to Exclude)—and to reconsider the TI Order on that basis. The Court determines that reconsideration is unnecessary for several reasons.

The Court treats this as a new application, based on the newly asserted claims and the changed circumstances that occurred after the District Court denied the prior TI application. In any event, the Court views the District Court’s prior decisions in this case with the same deference and as carrying the same weight as its own prior decisions in the case.

¶6 First, exclusion of the challenged testimony would not alter the Court’s decision to grant the TI Order. The Motion to Exclude challenges the testimony of SafeLease’s antitrust economist, Dr. Michael Williams. Dr. Williams testified in support of SafeLease’s antitrust claim, but the TI Order does not rely on SafeLease’s antitrust claim; it relies exclusively on SafeLease’s claim for tortious interference with existing contracts. The Motion to Reconsider points to a reference in paragraph of the TI Order to Storable “leveraging” its “market power in the FMS market.”

Although “leveraging” and “market power” may be terms of art in antitrust law, the Court refers to Storable’s use of its position in the FMS market and as the FMS provider for a large segment of SafeLease’s tenant-insurance customers, and not to SafeLease’s antitrust claims. To avoid any potential confusion, the Court will amend the TI Order to replace “leveraging their market power in the FMS market” with “using their position in the FMS market.”

¶7 Second, while the Motion to Reconsider was set for written submission, the underlying Motion to Exclude was never set for either written submission or oral hearing. A motion must be presented to the court to trigger the court’s duty to rule. 2

See, e.g., Ballard v. King, 652 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1983); Lawrence v. Jones, No. 14-23-00270- CV, 2024 WL 1269874, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2024, no pet.); In re Ogaz, No. 08-23-00344-CR, 2023 WL 8519276, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 7, 2023, no pet.); In re Liverman, 658 S.W.3d 881, 882 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding); Guyot v. Guyot, 3 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); Evans v. First Nat’l Bank of Bellville, 946 S.W.2d 367, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied).

Merely filing the motion does not satisfy this requirement; presentation requires that the motion be set for an oral hearing or written submission. 3 This process is important because, among other reasons, it puts opposing parties on notice of when responsive filings are due. Because the Motion to Exclude was never set, SafeLease never responded and was not required to do so. Given the pace of the TI proceedings, the Court likely would have expedited setting the Motion to Exclude, while still giv- ing SafeLease an opportunity to respond, if requested. 4 But the Court received no request to do so or to otherwise set the Motion to Exclude.

¶8 Third, the February 18 Motion to Exclude challenges Dr. Williams’s testimony given at the TI hearing on February 11. A motion to exclude filed a week after the conclusion of the challenged testimony generally comes too late. 5 ¶9 Storable’s Motion to Exclude asserts challenges to the foundation and methodology underlying Dr. Williams’s opinions. 6 To be timely, those objections

E.g., Lawrence, 2024 WL 1269874, at *4; Moore v. Carder, No. 01-22-00156-CV, 2023 WL 3102582, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 27, 2023, no pet.); Smith v. El Paso Veterans Transitional Living Ctr., 556 S.W.3d 361, 362 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); see also TEX. BUS. CT. LOC. R. 5; 3RD DIV. CT. PRO. at V(A)–(B).

The parties have known since February 14 that the Court would issue its TI Order on February 19.

When it filed the Motion to Exclude on February 18, Storable was aware that it was filing the day before the TI Order would issue.

See, e.g., Knoderer v. State Farm Lloyds, 515 S.W.3d 21, 44 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pets. denied); Farm Servs., Inc. v. Gonzales, 756 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Randolph, 467 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Tex. App.—Ama- rillo 1971, writ dism’d).

For example, Storable argues that Williams: failed to “provide reliable data to support his market- share opinion” or “study the factors that determine the likelihood of monopoly power”; should have used revenue or output, rather than the number of facilities, in measuring market share; “used had to be raised and ruled on before or when the testimony is offered. 7 The purpose of this requirement is two-fold: (1) it gives the trial court the necessary opportunity to look beyond the face of the testimony to inquire into its underlying basis before ruling, 8 and (2) it “gives the proponent a fair opportunity to cure any deficiencies and prevents trial and appeal by ambush.” 9 Once opinion testimony is admitted without objection, “it may be considered probative evidence even if the basis for the opinion is unreliable.” 10 ¶10 The Motion to Exclude also argues that Dr. Williams’s opinion that Storable had “a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power” in the tenant- insurance market is conclusory. 11 Unlike objections to foundation or methodology, a party need not timely object to expert testimony that is conclusory on its face; such incorrect numbers, without necessary adjustments, for the number of Storable’s facilities and the total number of self-storage facilities in the United States”; and should not have excluded certain large operators in defining the relevant market. Motion to Exclude at 1, 7.

Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 786 (Tex. 2020); City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816–17 (Tex. 2009).

Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 786 (quoting Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petrol. Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex. 2004)); Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 816–17 (same).

Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 786; Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 817; see also, e.g., Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry- Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 716 (Tex. 2016); Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998).

W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu, 610 S.W.3d 884, 899 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 818); see also Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 786 (same).

Motion to Exclude at 3–7.

testimony inherently lacks probative value. 12 But the Court need not reach this issue because it did not consider Dr. Williams’s opinion regarding whether Storable had a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power in the tenant-insurance market.

As Storable points out in its Motion to Exclude, 13 that opinion related to SafeLease’s antitrust claims, which the Court did not rely on in granting injunctive relief under the TI Order.

¶11 The Court notes that Storable objected to Dr. Williams’s testimony on several grounds at the TI hearing and took Dr. Williams on voir dire. To the extent any objections were timely raised and ruled on at the hearing, no further objection or ruling is needed. The Court further notes that there was limited opportunity for discovery and to vet the expert opinions before the TI hearing, which occurred less than two months after the case was filed. While it was necessary to expedite the TI proceedings, the substance of any testimony offered in the TI proceedings remains subject to challenges and objections at future stages of the case, including summary judgment and trial.

B. Storable’s Objections to the TI Order ¶12 Storable objects that the TI Order decides the “ultimate merits” of the case rather than only whether SafeLease demonstrated a “probable” right to

Pike, 610 S.W.2d at 786 (quoting Coastal Transp., 136 S.W.3d at 233); Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 816 (same).

Motion to Exclude at 3.

recover. 14 The Court disagrees and notes that Storable issued a press release shortly after the TI issued demonstrating that it correctly understood that the TI Order “does not represent a final determination on the merits of the case.” 15 The TI Order states that SafeLease demonstrated a “probable right to relief” and expressly notes that such a showing does not mean that SafeLease will ultimately prevail on the merits based on a fully developed record. 16 Rule 683 compels the Court to include in the TI Order the findings that form the reasons it granted the injunction, 17 and the TI Order makes it clear that the findings are based on the evidence presented at the TI hearing and that a final trial on the merits has not yet occurred. Nevertheless, to avoid any potential confusion, the Court will amend the TI Order to further clarify that the holdings in the order are based on the evidence the parties presented at the

Motion to Reconsider at 2–3.

Exhibit A to “Supplement to Plaintiff’s Response to Objections to Injunction and Motion to Re- consider.”

TI Order at ¶ 3 & n.1 (quoting Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, 691 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex. 2024); Transp. Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 556, 261 S.W.2d 549, 552 (1953)).

TEX. R. CIV. P. 683 (requiring order to specify the reasons the court granted the relief). Storable objects to the statement in the TI Order that “SafeLease has pleaded and proved valid causes of action against Defendants; a probable right to the relief sought; and a probable, imminent, and ir- reparable injury in the interim.” Motion to Reconsider at 3 (emphasis added). But this is a common way of stating the elements required for a TI. See, e.g., State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 226 (Tex. 2024); Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Hughs v. Dikeman, 631 S.W.3d 362, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Adobe Oilfield Servs., Ltd. v. Trilogy Operating, Inc., 305 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.); 8100 N. Freeway Ltd. v. City of Houston, 329 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). The statement is in no way a ruling that SafeLease has or ultimately will prevail on the merits.

TI hearing and do not prevent either party from proving or disproving any of the dis- puted facts at the trial on the merits.

¶13 The Court will also amend the TI Order to remove a statement that the parties agreed to the form but not the substance of the order. Although the Court instructed the parties to confer and reach an agreement as to the form (but not the substance) of each side’s proposed orders, the Motion informs the Court that Stora- ble refused to do so. 18 The Court notes that if Storable had meaningfully engaged in this process, some of its concerns might have been ameliorated before the TI Order issued.

SIGNED ON: March 11, 2025.

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division

Motion to Reconsider at 3.

ExhibitC

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § Defendants. § ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION On this day, the Court considered the Application for Temporary Injunction and, in the Alternative, Motion for Reconsideration (the Application) filed by plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC (SafeLease) against defendants Storable, Inc. (Storable), RedNova Labs, Inc., SiteLink Software, LLC, Easy Storage Solutions, LLC, Bader Co., and Property First Group, LP (collectively, Defendants). After due notice, the parties appeared in person and by counsel for an evidentiary hearing commencing on February 11, 2025. After considering the Application, evidence presented, arguments of counsel, and papers on file, the Court finds that a Temporary Injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable injury, loss, or damage.

The Court grants the Application.

The Court further finds or concludes that: 1. SafeLease has pleaded and proved valid causes of action against Defendants; a probable right to the relief sought; and a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.

2. SafeLease has properly pleaded valid causes of action against Defendants in the Second Amended Petition (“Petition”) for violations of the Texas Antitrust Act, tortious interference with existing contracts, and tortious interference with prospective business relations.

The Petition gives fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which SafeLease bases its claims.

3. The evidence shows that SafeLease has a probable right to relief on its claims for tortious interference with valid, existing SafeLease contracts. 1 Defendants reasonably do or should know that these contracts involve providing tenant-insurance services that require SafeLease to access and use certain customer-owned data within the processes of the FMS systems that customers license from Defendants and expressly authorize and enable SafeLease to access and use, as required by their agreements with SafeLease. FMS systems licensed from Defendants are critical to customers to maintain and access their data, which is not readily or effectively accessible otherwise. Under the terms of their contracts with Defendants, customers are entitled to designate third-party contractors as authorized users to access and use this customer data within the processes of the FMS systems to assist customer operations. Defendants’ actions are calculated to impede, prevent, and interfere with performance of these contract rights by preventing SafeLease’s access to customer-owned data on customers’ FMS systems. Defendants reasonably do or should know that their actions impede, prevent, and interfere with performance of these customer contracts, proximately causing harm and loss to SafeLease and its business, operations, reputation, and goodwill.

4. Defendants intentionally interfere with existing SafeLease customer contracts through exclusionary, anticompetitive, or otherwise wrongful means, including by blocking SafeLease from accessing customer-owned data within the processes of their licensed FMS systems—a marked change from Defendants’ past practices; by leveraging market power in the

See, e.g., Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, 691 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex. 2024) (observing that party’s showing of probable right to relief at temporary-injunction stage “does not mean that the party obtaining temporary relief will prevail on the merits based on a fully developed record” and conversely, failure to demonstrate probable right to temporary relief does not mean party will not prevail at trial); Transp. Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 556, 261 S.W.2d 549, 552 (1953) (“To warrant the issuance of the writ [of temporary injunction], the applicant need only show a probable right and a probable injury; he is not required to establish that he will finally prevail in the litigation.”).

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FMS market to prevent and impede SafeLease from providing services to customers in the tenant insurance market; and by making false or misleading representations about SafeLease to mutual customers regarding misuse of sensitive customer data, use of malicious code and processes, and the risks to cybersecurity.

5. The evidence failed to show that SafeLease misused or improperly disclosed customer data; that SafeLease used spybots, engaged in hacking, or introduced or attempted to introduce malicious code or viruses; that SafeLease overloaded Defendants’ FMS system, causing a crash, outage, or otherwise interfered with or interrupted the performance or integrity of the FMS systems; that SafeLease accessed customer data in a manner not authorized by the customer; or that SafeLease’s access and use of its customers’ data on FMS systems licensed by Defendants materially increased the risk of a security breach beyond what it otherwise was. The evidence presented by Defendants to support these claims was not credible, and SafeLease’s controverting evidence was credible. While there was evidence that SafeLease used automated processes, or “bots,” to conduct its business, evidence from both sides showed that “bots” can be good bots or bad bots, and the evidence did not show that SafeLease’s automated processes were harmful. The evidence also did not establish that SafeLease caused Defendants’ SiteLink or storEDGE FMS systems to crash or have an interruption of services. While there was some evidence indicating that Defendant’s Easy Storage Solutions (ESS) FMS Platform may have crashed in April 2024, for which Defendants blamed SafeLease, there was conflicting evidence as to whether a crash or outage actually occurred and insufficient evidence that SafeLease was a sole or principal cause.

6. The evidence fails to show that Defendants’ actions are justified or privileged. 2

Justification or privilege is an affirmative defense on which Defendants bear the burden of proof. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77–78 (Tex. 2000); ACS Invs., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997).

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7. Storable’s Terms of Service authorize customers to “designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement.” These Terms of Service specify that a User “may include . . . consultants, contractors and agents, and third parties with which you transact business.”

Storable asserts that customers’ designation of SafeLease, and possibly any insurance provider, as an authorized user violates the Terms of Service. Storable also asserts that it could amend their Terms of Service at any time, such as to preclude customers from designating insurance providers as authorized users. But Defendants admit that they have not changed their Terms of Service or informed their customers that they are allegedly in breach of the Terms of Service or otherwise attempted to enforce their alleged contractual rights against the customers themselves. After SafeLease made a public statement to mutual customers, Storable communicated to customers that “this is not your problem” and that its actions were motivated by data privacy and the threat that SafeLease allegedly posed to the stability of Defendants’ platforms. As discussed above, the evidence presented at the temporary-injunction hearing does not support these claims.

8. Storable asserts that the Terms of Service for SiteLink and storEDGE require that “any use to develop a commercial product requires a separate third-party DEI [Data Exchange Interface] agreement.” The evidence presented at the temporary-injunction hearing does not show that SafeLease was using SiteLink or storEDGE to develop a commercial product.

9. While the evidence does establish that SafeLease needs access to the customer data on the FMS platforms to perform insurance services for the parties’ mutual customers, the evidence establishes that the same is generally true for other third-party vendors that customers designate as authorized users on the FMS platforms, and Defendants agree that designation of other vendors, such as accountants, does not violate their terms of services. Defendants attempt to distinguish

-4- accountants, as authorized users, from insurance providers (like SafeLease), as authorized users, based on the extent of use, but the Terms of Service do not draw such a distinction.

10. The evidence shows that Defendants’ actions are not motivated by any alleged breach of their Terms of Service.

11. Defendants assert justification or privilege based on an alleged right to prevent “free riders” on their services. The evidence at the hearing shows that Defendants are paid for their services by their customers, that their customers are authorized to designated third-party vendors as authorized users, and that the customers in question have designated SafeLease as an authorized user. Additionally, Defendants have not identified, and the Court has not found, any authority holding under what circumstances, if ever, an alleged right to prevent free riders constitutes a justification or privilege defeating a tortious-interference claim under Texas law.

12. The evidence shows that SafeLease will incur a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury absent injunctive relief before trial of this case. Beginning in 2021, it routinely accessed customer-owned data within the processes of their FMS systems licensed from Defendants with express customer permission for such access and use. This access was through the graphical user interface as an authorized user, consistent with the customers’ own access and their rights to appoint authorized users. On December 17, 2024, Defendants cut off SafeLease from access to Defendants’ storEdge system, which was restored through a temporary restraining order. After January 21, 2025, Defendants cut off SafeLease from access to all three of their FMS systems and revoked access granted to SafeLease by the parties’ mutual customers. Without access to customer-owned data within the processes of these customer FMS systems, SafeLease’s ability to service customers is wholly or significantly impaired. Among other services, SafeLease is prevented from or impeded in issuing contracted-for new or renewed policies to customers,

-5- providing timely and effective lease compliance services, amending lease documentation for tenant protection plans, processing opt-out tenants with separate coverage, providing timely and accurate insurance data visualization services, issuing required tenant notices or billing, and promptly and fully adjusting tenant claims for loss.

13. The evidence shows that Defendants intend to continue to refuse to allow SafeLease to access customer-owned data within the processes of FMS systems licensed by customers who grant SafeLease such access.

14. The evidence at the temporary-injunction hearing supported SafeLease’s assertion that it cannot practicably perform its contractual obligations to the parties’ mutual clients while blocked from the FMS systems by Defendants, and that obtaining reports from customers is not, alone, a long-term viable solution.

15. The evidence shows that the harm to SafeLease is and would be irreparable. Its loss of ability to service customers that license Defendants’ FMS will be difficult or impossible to measure fully with damages. It is likely to permanently damage SafeLease’s customer relationships and reputation and good will in the industry, as well as put customers at risk of disruption and loss. Without access to customer-owned data in its customers’ FMS systems, SafeLease will be substantially impaired or prevented from offering its services to its customers, and SafeLease likely will be unable to continue operating or competing in the tenant-insurance market. These harms could not be adequately remedied with money damages or otherwise at law, and some portion of the likely pecuniary injury will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accurately identify, trace, quantify, and prove with reasonable certainty.

16. The evidence shows that temporary injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo before trial. The status quo is the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status that

-6- preceded this controversy. Here, it is customer-authorized access by SafeLease to customer-owned data within the processes of FMS systems licensed from Defendants. The status quo is preserved by ensuring resumed access to such customer-owned data in their FMS systems so that SafeLease may provide agreed services to the parties’ mutual customers.

17. The evidence shows that the balance of equities favors issuance of injunctive relief.

Beginning in 2021, and with customer permission and Defendants’ knowledge, SafeLease accessed customer-owned data in their licensed FMS systems in order to provide tenant insurance services to the parties’ mutual customers. On December 17, 2024, with no advance customer permission or notice, Defendants cut off SafeLease’s access to the storEDGE platform. On December 31, 2024, it took Defendants less than an hour to restore access after TRO relief was granted. After the TRO expired on January 21, 2025, and the district court denied SafeLease’s original temporary-injunction application, Defendants immediately disabled access by SafeLease to customer-owned data in all three of Defendants’ FMS platforms. Access by SafeLease to customer-owned data in their FMS systems, as it had for three years before this dispute arose, will create no imminent or likely risk of SafeLease data breach or misuse, nor of disruption to Defendants’ server performance or stability. SafeLease employs SOC-2 certified data protection processes and uses customer data only consistent with its customer agreements. If temporary injunctive relief is granted, Defendants will suffer no irreparable harm and, at most, immaterial monetary harm that will be protected by the bond ordered below.

18. The evidence also shows significantly changed circumstances that further altered the status quo from the time the district court denied SafeLease’s first request for temporary injunction.

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19. The Court finds it equitable and appropriate to restore the status quo and protect SafeLease from irreparable injury by entering this Temporary Injunction against Defendants.

Therefore, it is Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that Defendants are enjoined as follows: As to SafeLease customers as of January 21, 2025, Defendants shall take no action to prevent, impede, or otherwise interfere with SafeLease’s authorized-user access to mutual customers’ data stored in FMS systems licensed from Defendants (i.e., storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions), as well as SafeLease’s use of such data within the processes of the FMS systems, as authorized by and available to such customers and for the purpose of providing insurance services for such customers.

This injunctive relief is subject to SafeLease maintaining SOC-2 certification of its data protection processes and only using customer data stored in FMS licensed from Defendants consistent with its customer agreements and historic practices.

The Clerk of the Court shall issue a writ of injunction to Defendants in accordance with the terms of this Order. Service of the writ by private process server is authorized.

This Order is binding upon Defendants and all their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.

It is further Ordered that this Order shall expire 30 days after a trial on the merits in this case is completed, unless extended or earlier terminated by further order of this Court. Trial on the merits shall be scheduled to begin on the 30th day of June, 2026.

It is further Ordered that SafeLease shall post with the Clerk of this Court a bond in the amount of $6,600,000. This bond reflects Defendants' estimate of their potential losses resulting from the temporary injunction; but it does not include potential additional losses Defendants could suffer in the result of a data breach during the pendancy of the temporary

-8- injunction, as no credible evidence has been presented to indicate that such a data breach is likely to occur as a result of this injunctive relief.

The bond must be filed and approved by the Clerk of the Court before any writ of injunction may issue pursuant to this temporary injunction. SafeLease may post a cash deposit in lieu of a bond under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 14c.

The parties have agreed as to the form of this order but not its substantive content, which is in dispute.

SIGNED ON: February 19, 2025.

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division

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ExhibitD FILED IN BUSINESS COURT391OF TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 3/11/2025 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § Defendants. § AMENDED ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION On this day, the Court considered the Application for Temporary Injunction and, in the Alternative, Motion for Reconsideration (the Application) filed by plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC (SafeLease) against defendants Storable, Inc. (Storable), RedNova Labs, Inc., SiteLink Software, LLC, Easy Storage Solutions, LLC, Bader Co., and Property First Group, LP (collectively, Defendants). After due notice, the parties appeared in person and by counsel for an evidentiary hearing commencing on February 11, 2025 (the TI Hearing). After considering the Application, evidence presented, arguments of counsel, and papers on file, the Court finds that a Temporary Injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable injury, loss, or damage. The Court grants the Application.

The Court makes the findings and conclusions below based on the evidence presented at the TI Hearing and the parties’ filings properly before the Court. The Court recognizes that the case is in its early stages, discovery is still ongoing, and the evidence presented at future stages of the case (including summary judgment and trial) may differ from the evidence presented at the TI hearing and could support different findings and conclusions.

1. SafeLease has pleaded and proved the elements required for temporary injunctive relief: a valid cause of action against Defendants; a probable right to the relief sought; and a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.

2. SafeLease has properly pleaded valid causes of action against Defendants in the Second Amended Petition (“Petition”) for violations of the Texas Antitrust Act, tortious interference with existing contracts, and tortious interference with prospective business relations.

The Petition gives fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which SafeLease bases its claims.

3. The evidence shows that SafeLease has a probable right to relief on its claims for tortious interference with valid, existing SafeLease contracts. 1 Defendants reasonably do or should know that these contracts involve providing tenant-insurance services that require SafeLease to access and use certain customer-owned data within the processes of the FMS systems that customers license from Defendants and expressly authorize and enable SafeLease to access and use, as required by their agreements with SafeLease. FMS systems licensed from Defendants are critical to customers to maintain and access their data, which is not readily or effectively accessible otherwise. Under the terms of their contracts with Defendants, customers are entitled to designate third-party contractors as authorized users to access and use this customer data within the processes of the FMS systems to assist customer operations. Defendants’ actions are calculated to impede, prevent, and interfere with performance of these contract rights by preventing SafeLease’s access to customer-owned data on customers’ FMS systems. Defendants reasonably do or should know that their actions impede, prevent, and interfere with performance of these customer contracts, proximately causing harm and loss to SafeLease and its business, operations, reputation, and goodwill.

See, e.g., Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, 691 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex. 2024) (observing that party’s showing of probable right to relief at temporary-injunction stage “does not mean that the party obtaining temporary relief will prevail on the merits based on a fully developed record” and conversely, failure to demonstrate probable right to temporary relief does not mean party will not prevail at trial); Transp. Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 556, 261 S.W.2d 549, 552 (1953) (“To warrant the issuance of the writ [of temporary injunction], the applicant need only show a probable right and a probable injury; he is not required to establish that he will finally prevail in the litigation.”).

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4. Defendants intentionally interfere with existing SafeLease customer contracts through exclusionary, anticompetitive, or otherwise wrongful means, including by blocking SafeLease from accessing customer-owned data within the processes of their licensed FMS systems—a marked change from Defendants’ past practices; by using their position in the FMS market to prevent and impede SafeLease from providing services to customers in the tenant insurance market; and by making false or misleading representations about SafeLease to mutual customers regarding misuse of sensitive customer data, use of malicious code and processes, and the risks to cybersecurity.

5. The evidence failed to show that SafeLease misused or improperly disclosed customer data; that SafeLease used spybots, engaged in hacking, or introduced or attempted to introduce malicious code or viruses; that SafeLease overloaded Defendants’ FMS system, causing a crash, outage, or otherwise interfered with or interrupted the performance or integrity of the FMS systems; that SafeLease accessed customer data in a manner not authorized by the customer; or that SafeLease’s access and use of its customers’ data on FMS systems licensed by Defendants materially increased the risk of a security breach beyond what it otherwise was. The evidence presented by Defendants to support these claims was not credible, and SafeLease’s controverting evidence was credible. While there was evidence that SafeLease used automated processes, or “bots,” to conduct its business, evidence from both sides showed that “bots” can be good bots or bad bots, and the evidence did not show that SafeLease’s automated processes were harmful. The evidence also did not establish that SafeLease caused Defendants’ SiteLink or storEDGE FMS systems to crash or have an interruption of services. While there was some evidence indicating that Defendant’s Easy Storage Solutions (ESS) FMS Platform may have crashed in April 2024,

-3- for which Defendants blamed SafeLease, there was conflicting evidence as to whether a crash or outage actually occurred and insufficient evidence that SafeLease was a sole or principal cause.

6. The evidence fails to show that Defendants’ actions are justified or privileged. 2 7. Storable’s Terms of Service authorize customers to “designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement.” These Terms of Service specify that a User “may include . . . consultants, contractors and agents, and third parties with which you transact business.”

Storable asserts that customers’ designation of SafeLease, and possibly any insurance provider, as an authorized user violates the Terms of Service. Storable also asserts that it could amend their Terms of Service at any time, such as to preclude customers from designating insurance providers as authorized users. But Defendants admit that they have not changed their Terms of Service or informed their customers that they are allegedly in breach of the Terms of Service or otherwise attempted to enforce their alleged contractual rights against the customers themselves. After SafeLease made a public statement to mutual customers, Storable communicated to customers that “this is not your problem” and that its actions were motivated by data privacy and the threat that SafeLease allegedly posed to the stability of Defendants’ platforms. As discussed above, the evidence presented at the temporary-injunction hearing does not support these claims.

8. Storable asserts that the Terms of Service for SiteLink and storEDGE require that “any use to develop a commercial product requires a separate third-party DEI [Data Exchange Interface] agreement.” The evidence presented at the temporary-injunction hearing does not show that SafeLease was using SiteLink or storEDGE to develop a commercial product.

Justification or privilege is an affirmative defense on which Defendants bear the burden of proof. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77–78 (Tex. 2000); ACS Invs., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997).

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9. While the evidence does establish that SafeLease needs access to the customer data on the FMS platforms to perform insurance services for the parties’ mutual customers, the evidence establishes that the same is generally true for other third-party vendors that customers designate as authorized users on the FMS platforms, and Defendants agree that designation of other vendors, such as accountants, does not violate their terms of services. Defendants attempt to distinguish accountants, as authorized users, from insurance providers (like SafeLease), as authorized users, based on the extent of use, but the Terms of Service do not draw such a distinction.

10. The evidence shows that Defendants’ actions are not motivated by any alleged breach of their Terms of Service.

11. Defendants assert justification or privilege based on an alleged right to prevent “free riders” on their services. The evidence at the hearing shows that Defendants are paid for their services by their customers, that their customers are authorized to designated third-party vendors as authorized users, and that the customers in question have designated SafeLease as an authorized user. Additionally, Defendants have not identified, and the Court has not found, any authority holding under what circumstances, if ever, an alleged right to prevent free riders constitutes a justification or privilege defeating a tortious-interference claim under Texas law.

12. The evidence shows that SafeLease will incur a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury absent injunctive relief before trial of this case. Beginning in 2021, it routinely accessed customer-owned data within the processes of their FMS systems licensed from Defendants with express customer permission for such access and use. This access was through the graphical user interface as an authorized user, consistent with the customers’ own access and their rights to appoint authorized users. On December 17, 2024, Defendants cut off SafeLease from access to Defendants’ storEDGE system, which was restored through a temporary restraining order. After

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January 21, 2025, Defendants cut off SafeLease from access to all three of their FMS systems and revoked access granted to SafeLease by the parties’ mutual customers. Without access to customer-owned data within the processes of these customer FMS systems, SafeLease’s ability to service customers is wholly or significantly impaired. Among other services, SafeLease is prevented from or impeded in issuing contracted-for new or renewed policies to customers, providing timely and effective lease compliance services, amending lease documentation for tenant protection plans, processing opt-out tenants with separate coverage, providing timely and accurate insurance data visualization services, issuing required tenant notices or billing, and promptly and fully adjusting tenant claims for loss.

13. The evidence shows that Defendants intend to continue to refuse to allow SafeLease to access customer-owned data within the processes of FMS systems licensed by customers who grant SafeLease such access.

14. The evidence at the temporary-injunction hearing supported SafeLease’s assertion that it cannot practicably perform its contractual obligations to the parties’ mutual clients while blocked from the FMS systems by Defendants, and that obtaining reports from customers is not, alone, a long-term viable solution. If injunctive relief is not granted, the interim injury to SafeLease may prevent the case from reaching a final resolution on the merits.

15. The evidence shows that the harm to SafeLease is and would be irreparable. Its loss of ability to service customers that license Defendants’ FMS will be difficult or impossible to measure fully with damages. It is likely to permanently damage SafeLease’s customer relationships and reputation and good will in the industry, as well as put customers at risk of disruption and loss. Without access to customer-owned data in its customers’ FMS systems, SafeLease will be substantially impaired or prevented from offering its services to its customers,

-6- and SafeLease likely will be unable to continue operating or competing in the tenant-insurance market. These harms could not be adequately remedied with money damages or otherwise at law, and some portion of the likely pecuniary injury will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accurately identify, trace, quantify, and prove with reasonable certainty.

16. The evidence shows that temporary injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo before trial. The status quo is the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status that preceded this controversy. Here, it is customer-authorized access by SafeLease to customer-owned data within the processes of FMS systems licensed from Defendants. The status quo is preserved by ensuring resumed access to such customer-owned data in their FMS systems so that SafeLease may provide agreed services to the parties’ mutual customers.

17. The evidence shows that the balance of equities favors issuance of injunctive relief.

Beginning in 2021, and with customer permission and Defendants’ knowledge, SafeLease accessed customer-owned data in their licensed FMS systems in order to provide tenant insurance services to the parties’ mutual customers. On December 17, 2024, with no advance customer permission or notice, Defendants cut off SafeLease’s access to the storEDGE platform. On December 31, 2024, it took Defendants less than an hour to restore access after TRO relief was granted. After the TRO expired on January 21, 2025, and the district court denied SafeLease’s original temporary-injunction application, Defendants immediately disabled access by SafeLease to customer-owned data in all three of Defendants’ FMS platforms. Access by SafeLease to customer-owned data in their FMS systems, as it had for three years before this dispute arose, will create no imminent or likely risk of SafeLease data breach or misuse, nor of disruption to Defendants’ server performance or stability. SafeLease employs SOC-2 certified data protection processes and uses customer data only consistent with its customer agreements. If temporary

-7- injunctive relief is granted, Defendants will suffer no irreparable harm and, at most, immaterial monetary harm that will be protected by the bond ordered below.

18. The evidence also shows significantly changed circumstances that further altered the status quo from the time the district court denied SafeLease’s first request for temporary injunction.

19. The Court finds it equitable and appropriate to restore the status quo and protect SafeLease from irreparable injury by entering this Temporary Injunction against Defendants.

Therefore, it is Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that Defendants are enjoined as follows: As to SafeLease customers as of January 21, 2025, Defendants shall take no action to prevent, impede, or otherwise interfere with SafeLease’s authorized-user access to mutual customers’ data stored in FMS systems licensed from Defendants (i.e., storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions), as well as SafeLease’s use of such data within the processes of the FMS systems, as authorized by and available to such customers and for the purpose of providing insurance services for such customers.

This injunctive relief is subject to SafeLease maintaining SOC-2 certification of its data protection processes and only using customer data stored in FMS licensed from Defendants consistent with its customer agreements and historic practices.

The Clerk of the Court shall issue a writ of injunction to Defendants in accordance with the terms of this Order. Service of the writ by private process server is authorized.

This Order is binding upon Defendants and all their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.

It is further Ordered that this Order shall expire 30 days after a trial on the merits in this case is completed, unless extended or earlier terminated by further order of this Court. Trial on the merits shall be scheduled to begin on the 30th day of June, 2026.

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It is further Ordered that SafeLease shall post with the Clerk of this Court a bond in the amount of $6,600,000. 3 This bond reflects the amount of anticipated losses resulting from the temporary injunction as estimated by Defendants; but it does not include potential additional losses Defendants could suffer in the result of a data breach during the pendency of the temporary injunction, as no credible evidence has been presented to indicate that such a data breach is likely to occur as a result of this injunctive relief.

The bond must be filed and approved by the Clerk of the Court before any writ of injunction may issue pursuant to this temporary injunction. SafeLease may post a cash deposit in lieu of a bond under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 14c.

SIGNED ON: March 11, 2025.

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division

The Court notes that SafeLease has done so, and a writ of injunction has issued, as of the date of this Amended Order.

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ExhibitE E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of Texas 2/18/2025 11:54 AM401 Accepted by: Beverly Crumley Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 NO. 25-BC03A-0001 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS LLC, § Plaintiff, § § v. § THIRD DIVISION § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, § INC., (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS Defendants. § Motion To Exclude Or Disregard Opinions Of Dr. Williams On The Ground That They Are Unreliable And Constitute No Evidence Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively “Storable” or “Defendants”) file this Motion to Exclude or Disregard Opinions of Dr. Williams.

I. Introduction.

Dr. Michael Williams provided a bare expert opinion unsupported by analysis of the factors critical to forming that conclusion. Dr. Williams opined that Storable had a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power, a required element for SafeLease’s claims. 1 But Dr. Williams did not provide reliable data to support his market-share opinion, or study the factors that determine the likelihood of monopoly power, including supracompetitive pricing, barriers to entry, the number or capabilities of competitors, Storable’s ability to exclude insurers in the manner SafeLease alleges without counterproductively losing market share, or how pricing works in the relevant markets.

Dr. Williams’s opinion is merely his ipse dixit—his unsupported opinion that constitutes no evidence. Therefore, SafeLease lacks evidence of a dispositive element of its claims.

Defendants have identified a number of other defects in Dr. Williams’ opinions that will be brought to the Court’s attention. However, due to the expedited timetable and the Court’s indication it desired succinct briefing to assist in making its decision within the next two days, Defendants focus on the issues briefed herein at this time.

IMANAGE\17091056v1 1

II. Expert Opinion Must Be Excluded When It Is Unreliable.

An “expert must not only be qualified, but his proposed testimony must be relevant and reliable.” Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 904–05 (Tex. 2004). Expert testimony is unreliable if it is not grounded “in the methods and procedures of science” and is no more than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556, 557 (Tex. 1995). Moreover, expert testimony is unreliable when based on data that has not been established as reliable. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997).

Expert testimony is also unreliable if there is too great an analytical gap between the data on which the expert relies and the opinion offered. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 727 (Tex. 1998). Therefore, expert testimony is unreliable even if the underlying data is sound if the expert draws conclusions from that data based on flawed methodology. Merrell, 953 S.W.2d at 714. Analytical gaps may include circumstances in which the expert unreliably applies otherwise sound principles and methodologies, see Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002), the expert’s opinion is based on assumed facts that vary materially from the facts in the record, Independent Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995), or the expert’s opinion is based on tests or data that do not support the conclusions reached, City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818–19 (Tex. 2009).

To help judges determine reliability, Justice Harvey Brown recommended using three reliability “gates” based on Texas precedents. Harvey Brown, Eight Gates For Expert Witnesses, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 743 (1999); Harvey Brown and Melissa Davis, Eight Gates For Expert Witnesses: Fifteen Years Later, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (2014). Those gates are:  Methodological Reliability Gate: The expert’s methodology must be reliable.

 Connective Reliability Gate: There must be sound reasoning connecting the expert’s basis to their conclusion.

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 Foundational Reliability Gate: The data underpinning the expert’s opinion must be reliable. Id. As shown below, and in the testimony of Defendants’ expert witness showing miscalculations of market share, all three gates should bar Dr. Williams’s opinion.

“Opinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact more probable or less probable.” Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004). Therefore, an “expert’s bare opinion [ipse dixit] will not suffice.” Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. 1999).

III. Dr. Williams Lacked Any Basis For His Conclusory Opinion That Storable Posed A Dangerous Probability Of Achieving Monopoly Power.

Both SafeLease and Storable acknowledge that whether conduct is predatory or anticompetitive and has a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power are topics requiring expert testimony.

In the evidentiary injunction hearing, SafeLease proffered expert Michael Williams, Ph.D. and Defendants countered with Juliette Caminade, Ph.D. to address these issues.

A. Standard for proving dangerous probability.

To establish attempted monopolization, Plaintiff must prove “1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.” Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 690 (Tex. 2006) (emphasis added). To determine if the third element is established, a court must “consider the relevant product and geographic market and the defendant’s economic power in that market.” Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 563, 592 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). In Tex. Disposal, the monopolization claim failed on this “essential element” because the plaintiff did not prove the alleged monopolist’s “ability to lessen competition in that market” and sufficient details about the power of competitors in that market. Id. at 593.

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B. Dr. Williams’s opinion on dangerous probability is no evidence.

Dr. Williams admitted that he had not conducted studies or analyses of at least 20 factors necessary for developing a reliable opinion. He made no examination of pricing of FMS provided to self-storage facilities, much less any determination that Storable could charge supracompetitive prices.

He acknowledged that Storable could not prevent other FMS providers from seeking customers. In addition, Dr. Williams simply repeated the mantra “That’s certainly possible” when asked about inaccuracies in his numbers in estimating market shares, such as whether the number of U.S. facilities using Storable’s FMS was likely substantially lower than the number Dr. Williams used, and whether the total number of U.S. facilities had grown since the one report Dr. Williams relied on. Tr. 87, 90.

Notwithstanding the clear lack of confidence in the veracity of any of his numbers, Dr. Williams pointed to his PowerPoint slide and conclusorily decided that a denominator of 52,000 and a numerator of 36,000 would support SafeLease’s position that Storable had 82% of the FMS market. Tr. 25, 103.

Dr. Williams’s testimony on dangerous probability is comprised merely of the following conclusory statement: what I’ve concluded here is this kind of dangerous probability that if its allowed to continue, that there is I think a substantial risk that Storable would be successful in leveraging2 its monopoly power from the FMS market to the tenant insurance market.

Dr. Williams did not collect data or conduct studies necessary to support this conclusion. He merely leapt from his invalid conclusion that Storable has a high market share to his conclusion that it has monopoly power. A “claim will not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness.”

Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 235 (citation omitted).

Dr. Williams failed to collect necessary, reliable data because he did not:

Dr. Williams offered no opinion about the probability of Storable achieving a monopoly in the tenant insurance market without leverage from the FMS market. Tr. 84.

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 Communicate with the manager of any FMS provider, Dr. Williams’s Testimony, Rough Tr. 71;3  Communicate “with any storage operator about how they went about selecting the FMS that they used,” Tr. 79;  Gather data on the number of U.S. facilities that use Storable’s FMS, beyond looking at one website that was not limited to U.S. facilitates, Tr. 25, resulting in his substantial error in arriving at any valid conclusions on Defendants’ share of the market;  Gather data on the number of self-storage facilities in the United States, beyond looking at a number in the Self-Storage Almanac that was outdated and acknowledged to have omitted many facilities, Tr. 60–62, 90, resulting in the error in calculations noted above. Dr. Williams did not even consider, let alone analyze sufficiently to justify disregarding, reports of a significantly higher number of facilities. For example, Dr. Williams did not consider that the Self Storage Association describes a TractIQ database with information on “over 68,000” self-storage facilities that are already operating or being constructed.

Appx. A, DX365 at 2; Appx. B, SafeLease’s Expert Disclosure at 68 (showing data Dr. Williams reviewed).

Dr. Williams also failed to conduct studies necessary to understand the economic power or options of Storable and its competitors, because he did not study any of the following critical factors:  “how many FMS licensors … have entered the market and when they entered,” Tr. 65;  “how common it is for self storage operators to switch from one FMS to another,” Tr. 65;  “the cost of switching from one FMS provider,” Tr. 66;  “FMS prices,” Tr. 64;  “FMS margins,” Tr. 64;  “whether the prices for FMS have gone up or down,” Tr. 64;  “the market for storage facilities and how competitive that market is,” Tr. 67;  “the number of FMS providers that provide services to operators in the U.S.,” Tr. 69;  “the number of competitors in the tenant insurance market,” Tr. 82;  The biggest operators’ “willingness to sell their FMS,” Tr. 69;  “what it takes to develop the software to get into the FMS business,” Tr. 73; or

Unless otherwise specified, all of this motion’s citations to a transcript are citations to the rough transcript of Dr. Williams’s testimony. Defendants have uploaded a rough version of the transcript to Dr. Williams’s testimony to the Court’s platform.

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 whether the alleged leveraging plan was infeasible because an FMS limiting access to insurers would cause operators to switch FMS providers, Tr. 78.

Without these studies, Dr. Williams could not reliably opine on the probability of Storable achieving monopoly power. For example, Dr. Williams had no knowledge of Storable’s ability to limit access to insurance providers without losing FMS market share, the number and abilities of competitors, and barriers to entry of new competitors. Dr. Williams did speculate that barriers to entry into the FMS market are high because of the difficulty of developing FMS software and the fact that the three largest operators have not yet directly licensed their FMS externally, but this speculation is no evidence because Dr. Williams admitted that he did not study what it takes to develop FMS software nor the willingness of the three largest operators to license their already developed FMS. Tr. 73, 69.

He excluded the largest operators, even though they provide management services, including FMS, to other owners of self-storage facilities.

In summary, rather than rely on knowledge about the relevant markets or the companies and products at issue, Dr. Williams relied on general theories published in academic articles. Tr. 9, 31.

This is insufficient. See Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 905–906 (excluding methodology that relied on general “laws of physics” rather than analyzing the particular product, and failed to cite specific studies).

Dr. Williams also offered an opinion that Storable’s API price was a “choke price” for SafeLease. Tr. 50. However, this is no evidence because Dr. Williams admitted that he had done “no particular analysis” of this issue, had not analyzed SafeLease’s financial condition or profitability, and had simply relied on the conclusory statement of SafeLease’s CEO that SafeLease could not operate at that price. Tr. 52. Importantly, as revealed at other points in the hearing and undermining any testimony that SafeLease could not continue to exist without its free use of Storable’s FMS platform, SafeLease has several ways to continue operating at the offered price, including:  reducing the excessive amount of revenue it shares with operators, IMANAGE\17091056v1 6

 using the funding sources that have allowed it to overcome profit-margin obstacles for years,  relying on the sources that provided SafeLease with ample funds in October 2024. DX 127, 128; Feb. 14 Tr. 92–93.

Dr. Williams studied none of these options and considered none of them in his conclusory opinion.

Unreliable opinions like this are excluded. Writing for the Court in Houston Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch, 443 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. 2014), Justice Boyd explained that the expert testimony on market value was unreliable because of its speculative assumptions and analytical gaps. In Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 580–81 (Tex. 2006), the expert opinion was unreliable because while the expert mentioned relying on extensive studies, he did not identify evidence specific to the fire in question or explain why he ruled out alternative explanations. See also Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft, 77 S.W.3d 805, 806–10 (Tex. 2002) (excluding appraisal method that was not tied to commonly accepted factors); Innovative Block of S. Tex., Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 409, 420–26 (Tex. 2020) (excluding a method of calculating reputational damage that was not sufficiently based on the actual facts of the defamation alleged).

Dr. Williams’s method for calculating market share is unreliable for several additional reasons.

First, instead of using the generally accepted method of measuring market share using revenue or output (or proxies such as number of storage units in self-storage facilities), Dr. Williams used the number of facilities ignoring the fact that facilities range from a few dozen units to over 700. Second, Dr. Williams used incorrect numbers, without necessary adjustments, for the number of Storable’s facilities and the total number of self-storage facilities in the United States. In other words, both the numerator and denominator for his market-share equation were incorrect. Third, Dr. Williams unjustifiably omitted portions of the relevant market (both self-storage facilities and FMS providers) in a transparent attempt to reach a desired conclusion, i.e., excluding large operators in his market share explanation whose facilities could choose to use FMS and risk-protection products of other providers.

IMANAGE\17091056v1 7

IV. Conclusion.

For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court find unreliable and therefore exclude or disregard the testimony and opinions of Dr. Williams as constituting no evidence of market share or the probability of Storable achieving monopoly power.

V. Appendix.

Tab Description A DX365, an exhibit showing database describing over 68,000 self-storage facilities B Plaintiff’s Rule 195.5 Disclosures

IMANAGE\17091056v1 8

Respectfully submitted, PORTER HEDGES LLP By: /s/ Ray T. Torgerson Ray T. Torgerson SBN: 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander SBN: 00996600 Jonna N. Summers SBN: 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff SBN 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar SBN: 24144581 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 226-6000 Facsimile: (713) 226-6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP Dale Wainwright Texas Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein Texas Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 320-7240 Facsimile: (512) 320-7240 [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys For Defendants

IMANAGE\17091056v1 9

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 2,300 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates.

/s/ Ray T. Torgerson

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on February 18, 2025.

/s/ Ray T. Torgerson

IMANAGE\17091056v1 10

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APPX. B

No. 25-BC03A-0001 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES § THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § THIRD DIVISION § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS PLAINTIFF’S RULE 195.5 DISCLOSURES Pursuant to the Tex. R. Civ. P. 195.5, plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC serves the following expert disclosures.

Mr. Daniel Steinbrook, Vice President, Elysium Digital, LLC, 2001 K Street NW, Suite North, Washington, DC 20006, (617) 807-8533, who will offer opinions on the following: 1. Cybersecurity concepts, software system performance, and programmatic data access methods. In addition to his testimony and education credentials, his IT duties at Elysium inform his opinions, including development, maintenance and deployment of internal and public- facing web applications; provisioning, monitoring, and migration of cloud software, including on Amazon Web Services; and building integrations with third-party software systems.

2. Defendants’ misuse of technical or cybersecurity terminology to mischaracterize or falsely represent SafeLease activities, which are being performed on behalf of its customers with their permission. For example, defendants misuse terms like “backdoors”, “circumvented” and “hacking,” which are understood in the industry to refer to vulnerabilities or malicious software that allow unauthorized access; “botnets” and “zombies,” which are understood in the industry to refer to compromised machines that have been unknowingly harnessed by third parties to do their bidding; and “spamming,” which is understood in the industry to refer to generating unwanted messages or content on a platform.

3. A technical person in the industry would not reasonably understand the Terms of Service for SiteLink, storEDGE, or Easy Storage Solutions to prohibit third-party access or automation through legitimately obtained credentials. As a technical matter, the terms do not specify what kind of legitimate activity on behalf of a customer may not be automated. SafeLease did not transmit or store malicious code through any customer FMS system, nor did it automate the aggregation of data from their FMS systems.

4. Storable’s performance concerns are not well founded or supported. Easy Storage Solutions has had system issues unrelated to SafeLease access. Storable implemented techniques to resolve load and performance issues allegedly caused by SafeLease’s access. Storable fails to demonstrate that any issue with the load on its servers would be resolved if SafeLease accessed customer FMS systems through an API.

5. Storable’s security concerns are not well founded or supported. Storable does not know what data, if any, SafeLease captured or stored from the accounts it had legitimate access to, offers no evidence that SafeLease accessed a customer account without getting permission from and being designated as an authorized user by that customer, and fails to demonstrate that accessing their customer systems through a UI versus an API would expose more sensitive data.

6. Storable’s claims about the superiority of API access do not consider SafeLease’s specific needs and use cases. Storable cites advantages for it as the provider, such as mechanisms for access controls and rate limiting, which are not specific to API-based access. An API was not available as an option to SafeLease when it first approached Storable, and other customers required custom development by Storable at additional cost to meet their business needs.

7. Differences in programmatic access functionality between FMS systems can have security and performance impacts, which Storable does not account for. For example, storEDGE has a publicly documented API, but SiteLink is older software where API functionality was added later, and ESS has no API at all. Because of these differences, it is not reasonable to extrapolate the security and performance implications of specific data access patterns across the three systems.

8. Even if Storable provided APIs that fulfill SafeLease’s requirements, it would take time for SafeLease to adapt their processes. Moreover, vendors like SafeLease serving FMS customers need UI access to perform functions their customers expect them to perform. Storable acknowledges that some types of automated UI access can be “good” but fails to justify why access to authenticated (i.e. non-public) resources should be different. Notably, SafeLease’s existing access method was to be maintained until sufficient API access was in place.

He is being compensated $650 per hour for his work in this case. His CV is attached as Exhibit A. A list of documents provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by him in anticipation of his testimony is attached as Exhibit B.

Dr. Michael Williams, Managing Director, Berkely Research Group LLC, 2200 Powell Street, Suite 1200, Emeryville, California 94608, (510) 874-5946, an antitrust economist who will testify regarding relevant markets, market or monopoly power, supra-competitive prices, raising rivals’ costs, monopoly leveraging, and refusals to deal, including the following: 1. The two relevant antitrust markets here are the FMS market and tenant insurance market. For the FMS market, the relevant product market includes FMS products sold by Storable (storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions), as well as other providers like Cubby, SSM and U-Haul’s WWS. This product market does not include software used by large self-storage operators that provide their own software which is not available for purchase by other operators.

The relevant geographic market is the U.S. Operators in the U.S. can practically purchase FMS from providers anywhere in the U.S. 2. For the tenant insurance market, the relevant product market includes tenant insurance and tenant protection program products purchased by independent self-storage facilities.

-2-

These products are reasonably interchangeable. They provide similar coverage for similar types of hazards. A facility that purchases one would have no need to purchase the other. The relevant geographic market is the U.S. Operators can practically purchase tenant insurance from providers anywhere in the U.S. 3. Defendants’ share in the FMS market is about 82% based on currently available data from defendants and industry sources. This calculation excludes large self-storage facilities that provide their own FMS and do not sell it to third parties. Including such facilities, defendants’ market share is about 69%.

4. Market concentration in the FMS market, based on defendant’s 82% market share and using a conservative estimate of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is equal to 6,724. This value indicates a highly concentrated market.

5. Defendants are leveraging monopoly power. This opinion is based on analyses of competitive benchmark prices using currently available data and other exclusionary practices or acts by defendants. Defendants offered an API price to SafeLease of $1.00/unit per month if the facility operator was not previously using a Storable insurance product, and $1.50/unit per month if the operator was using a Storable insurance product. These prices reflect leveraging of monopoly power. The $1.00 price exceeds a conservative estimate of the competitive benchmark price offered by Cubby by 567% and by SSM by 100%. The $1.50 price exceeds those benchmark prices by 900% and 200%, respectively.

6. Based on these benchmark prices and the fact that, based on currently available data, defendants’ current average API fee paid by other insurance providers is $0.25/unit per month, the prices offered to SafeLease are supra-competitive. This reflects leveraging of monopoly power in the ability to access FMS to the market for tenant insurance.

7. Defendants’ non-compete restrictions and penalty prices if the customer previously purchased tenant insurance from a Storable affiliate are exclusionary. This price difference is not attributable to a difference in defendants’ forward-looking marginal costs of providing API access.

The price difference demonstrates leveraging of monopoly power.

8. Defendants’ cutting off SafeLease from customer FMS systems is, from an economics perspective, the equivalent of charging an infinite price. There is no positive price, however large, at which defendants will allow SafeLease to access the customer systems as a customer-authorized user.

He is being compensated $850 per hour for his work in this case. His CV is attached as Exhibit C. A list of documents provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by him in anticipation of his testimony is attached as Exhibit D.

-3-

Date: February 9, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Paul Yetter Judd E. Stone II R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24087727 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] [email protected] Alexander M. Dvorscak Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24120461 State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] [email protected] STONE HILTON PLLC Shannon N. Smith Congress Ave. State Bar No. 24110378 Austin, Texas 78748 [email protected] (737) 465-3897 YETTER COLEMAN LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 632-8000 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the 9th day of February, 2025, this pleading was served by email to all counsel of record. /s/ Shannon N. Smith Shannon N. Smith

-4-

Exhibit A

ELYSIUM® DIGITAL

Daniel W. Steinbrook (617) 807-8533 [email protected] 2001 K Street NW, Suite 625 North Vice President Washington, DC 20006

Professional Experience • Elysium Digital, LLC, a subsidiary of Aon Corporation, Vice President, 2022 – Present • Elysium Digital, LLC, a subsidiary of Aon Corporation, Director, 2019 – 2022 • Stroz Friedberg, LLC, an Aon company, Director, 2018 – 2019 • Stroz Friedberg, LLC, an Aon company, Manager, 2016 – 2018 • Stroz Friedberg, LLC, an Aon company, Senior Consultant, 2015 – 2016 • Elysium Digital, LLC, Computer Scientist, 2010 – 2015 • Elysium Digital, LLC, Consulting Computer Scientist, 2010 • Harvard Law School Berkman Center for Internet and Security, Summer Intern, 2009 • Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Fall Teaching Fellow, 2008 – 2009 • Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Summer Research Fellow, 2008

Education • S.M., Electrical Engineering, Harvard University, 2011 • A.B., Computer Science, Harvard University, 2011

Training • CopyrightX, Harvard Law School, 2015

Patents • Medical Image Viewing and Manipulation Contactless Gesture-Responsive System and Method.

Alexander Bick, Ammar Sarwar, and Daniel W. Steinbrook. US Patent Application No. 14/006,866, filed September 23, 2013.

Daniel W. Steinbrook, 1 of 2

Testimony [1] Wood et al. v. Mike Bloomberg 2020, Inc. U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:20-cv-02489 Was deposed and submitted expert report on behalf of Mike Bloomberg 2020 (represented by Proskauer Rose) in a class-action lawsuit involving issues related to interstate commerce and cloud computing, 2023. [2] Card Isle Corporation v. Farid et al.

U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Case No. 1:21-cv-01971 Was deposed and submitted expert report on behalf of Card Isle Corporation (represented by Mitchell Sandler) on the structural and source-code-level similarity of web applications, 2022. [3] Opal Labs Inc. v. Sprinklr, Inc. et al.

U.S. District Court, District of Oregon, Case No. 3:18-cv-01192 Testified at trial, was deposed and submitted expert report on behalf of Sprinklr, Inc. (represented by Tonkon Torp) on the security of user experience trade secrets, 2021. [4] Tradeshift, Inc. v. BuyerQuest, Inc. US District Court, Northern District of California, Case No. 3:20-cv-01294 Was deposed and submitted expert report on behalf of BuyerQuest, Inc. (represented by Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani) in a contract dispute between SaaS vendors providing enterprise procurement software, 2021. [5] Asner et al. v. Raizada American Arbitration Association, Case No. 01-19-0001-2031 Testified at arbitration and submitted written expert testimony on behalf of Claimant (represented by Spencer Fane) on search engine optimization (SEO) in a matter involving online defamation, 2020, 2021. [6] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Mutual Benefits Corp. et al.

U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 0:04-cv-60573 Testified at hearing on behalf of Litai Assets, LLC (represented by AXS Law Group) on data interchange formats and the confidentiality of relational database structure, 2020. [7] Yosowitz v. Kay et al.

In the District of Harris County, Texas, 334th Judicial District, Case No. 2018-37750 Submitted declarations on behalf of Laura Elizabeth Yosowitz (represented by Schlanger Silver Barg & Paine) in a trade secret matter involving misappropriation of source code for an online real estate platform, 2020. [8] Nuance Communications, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corporation U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 7:16-cv-05173 Submitted declaration on behalf of International Business Machines Corporation (represented by Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan) in a breach of contract matter involving machine learning systems, 2017. [9] Government Employees Insurance Company et al. v. Dorchester Chiropractic, Inc. et al.

U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, Case No. 1:13-cv-10744 Submitted expert report on behalf of Government Employees Insurance Company (represented by Smith & Brink) in an insurance fraud investigation regarding medical and billing records stored in database tables, 2015.

Daniel W. Steinbrook, 2 of 2

Exhibit B

Materials Considered Plaintiff's First Amended Petition Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition Defendant’s Answer Plaintiff’s Original Petition SafeLease’s Motion for a TRO Jan. 16, 2025 Safelease v. Storable TI Hearing Transcript Jan. 30, 2025 TRO Hearing Transcript Transcript of Deposition of Charles Gordon SAFELEASE0000573 SAFELEASE0000551 SAFELEASE0000571 SAFELEASE0000256 SAFELEASE0000722 SAFELEASE0000734 SAFELEASE0000748 SAFELEASE0000741 SAFELEASE0000328 SAFELEASE0000692 SAFELEASE0000602 SAFELEASE0000751 SAFELEASE0000323 SAFELEASE0000636 SAFELEASE0000678 SAFELEASE0000758 SAFELEASE0000001 SAFELEASE0000211 SAFELEASE0000275 SAFELEASE0000340 SAFELEASE0000576

SAFELEASE0000698 SAFELEASE0030326 SAFELEASE0000185 SAFELEASE0000781 SAFELEASE0000132 SAFELEASE0000280 SAFELEASE0000811 SAFELEASE0030335 SAFELEASE0000788 SAFELEASE0000647 SAFELEASE0000652 SAFELEASE0000214 SAFELEASE0000583 SAFELEASE0030333 SAFELEASE0001623 SAFELEASE0006476 SAFELEASE0030341 SAFELEASE0030342 SAFELEASE0030343 SAFELEASE0030344 SAFELEASE0030345 SAFELEASE0030346 SAFELEASE0030347 SAFELEASE0030348 SAFELEASE0030349 SAFELEASE0030350 SAFELEASE0030351 SAFELEASE0030352 SAFELEASE0030353 SAFELEASE0030354 SAFELEASE0030355

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Exhibit C Curriculum Vitae

MICHAEL A. WILLIAMS BERKELEY RESEARCH GROUP, LLC 2200 Powell Street, Suite 1200 | Emeryville, CA 94608 Direct: 925.200.5515 [email protected]

SUMMARY Michael A. Williams, Ph.D. is a Managing Director at Berkeley Research Group, LLC (BRG). He specializes in analyses involving antitrust, industrial organization, and regulation. He has published articles in a number of academic journals, including the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Science Advances, American Economic Review, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Law and Economics, American Law and Economics Review, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Review of Industrial Organization, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Economics Letters, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Behavioral Science, Antitrust Bulletin, Physica A, Texas Law Review, and Yale Journal on Regulation.

Dr. Williams been retained as an economic consultant by the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and the Canadian Competition Bureau.

Previously, he was an economist with the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. He holds a B.A. degree in economics from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and he received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in economics from the University of Chicago.

He has provided written and/or oral testimony before: • United States District Court, Middle District of Alabama • United States District Court, Western District of Arkansas • United States District Court, Central, Northern, and Southern Districts of California • United States District Court, District of Delaware • United States District Court, Middle District of Florida • United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia • United States District Court, Eastern Division, District of Idaho • United States District Court, Northern and Southern Districts of Illinois • United States District Court, District of Kansas

• United States District Court, District of Massachusetts • United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division • United States District Court, District of Minnesota • United States District Court, District of New Jersey • United States District Court, Eastern and Southern Districts of New York • United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania • United States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee • United States District Court, Northern and Southern Districts of Texas • United States District Court, District of Utah • United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia • United States Court of Federal Claims • State of Connecticut, Superior Court • State of New Mexico, Second Judicial District • State of Nevada, Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board • State of Vermont, Superior Court • Public utilities commissions: Arkansas, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington • The Netherlands, Amsterdam District Court

EDUCATION Ph.D., Economics University of Chicago M.A., Economics University of Chicago B.A., Economics University of California, Santa Barbara

PRESENT POSITION Managing Director, Berkeley Research Group, LLC

PREVIOUS POSITIONS Director, Competition Economics, LLC Economist, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CASES • MERGER INVESTIGATIONS • General Electric Company’s acquisition of RCA.

• Westwood One, Inc.’s acquisition of NBC Radio.

• Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.’s attempted acquisition of CBS.

• Norfolk Southern, Inc.’s acquisition of North American Van Lines.

• Cooper Industries, Inc.’s acquisition of Westinghouse Electric, Corp.’s Lighting Fixture Business.

• Southwestern Public Service Company’s acquisition of New Mexico Electric Service Company.

• ITT-Continental Baking Company’s acquisition of Bost Bakery, Inc. • Williams Companies’ acquisition of Northwest Energy, Corp. • Archer-Daniel-Midland’s acquisition of Gold Kist’s Valdosta, Georgia soybean processing plant.

• PRICE FIXING • United States of America v. Weeks Marine, Inc. • CONSENT DECREES • United States of America v. Wallpaper Institute • United States of America v. Greyhound, Corp.

• United States of America v. Balley Manufacturing, Corp.

PUBLICATIONS (PAST TEN YEARS) 1) “International Trade and the Survival of Mammalian and Reptilian Species,” Science Advances (2022), vol. 8, no. 1 (with Tilman Klumpp and Hugo M. Mialon).

2) “Market Share Liability: Lessons from New Hampshire v. Exxon Mobil,” Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation (2019), vol. 34, pp. 219-251 (with Justine S. Hastings).

3) “The Voting Rights of Ex-Felons and Election Outcomes in the United States,” International Review of Law and Economics (2019), vol. 59, pp. 40-56 (with Tilman Klumpp and Hugo M.

Mialon).

4) “Masters of the Universe: Bid Rigging by Private Equity Firms in Multibillion Dollar LBOs,” University of Cincinnati Law Review (2018), vol. 87, pp. 29-76 (with Christopher M. Burke, Stephanie A. Hackett, David W. Mitchell, Simon J. Wilke, Melanie Stallings Williams, and Wei Zhao).

5) “Rules of Evidence and Liability in Contract Litigation: The Efficiency of the General Dynamics Rule,” Journal of Public Economic Theory (2017), vol. 19, pp. 1154–1165 (with Vlad Radoias and Simon J. Wilkie).

6) “The OPEC of Potatoes: Should Collusive Agricultural Production Restrictions Be Immune From Antitrust Law Enforcement?,” Virginia Law & Business Review (2017), vol. 11, pp. 399-450 (with Melanie Stallings Williams and Wei Zhao).

7) “Global Evidence on the Distribution of GDP Growth Rates,” Physica A (2017), vol. 468, pp. 750- (with Grace Baek, Yiyang Li, Leslie Y. Park, and Wei Zhao).

8) “What is a But-For World?,” Antitrust (2016), vol. 31, pp. 102-108 (with Justine S. Hastings).

9) “The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections,” Journal of Law and Economics (2016), vol. 59, pp. 1-43 (with Tilman Klumpp and Hugo M. Mialon) (lead article).

10) “Global Evidence on the Distribution of Economic Profit Rates,” Physica A (2016), vol. 458, pp. 356-363 (with Grace Baek, Leslie Y. Park and Wei Zhao).

11) “Fraud Cycles,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2016), vol. 172, pp. 544-572 (with R. Preston McAfee and Jiong Gong).

12) “Counterintuitive Signs in Reduced Form Price Regressions,” ABA Economics Committee Newsletter (2016), vol. 16, pp. 7-19 (with Yonghong An and Wei Zhao) (lead article).

13) “Brief of Economists and Other Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Peg Bouaphakeo, et al., U.S. Supreme Court No. 14-1146, September 29, 2015. Cited in Opinion of the Court, 577 U.S. ___ (2016).

14) “Leveling the Playing Field? The Role of Public Campaign Funding in Elections,” American Law and Economics Review (2015), vol. 17, pp. 361-408 (with Tilman Klumpp and Hugo M. Mialon) (lead article) (awarded 2015 Distinguished Article Prize).

15) “Global Evidence on the Distribution of Firm Growth Rates,” Physica A (2015), vol. 432, pp. 102- (with Brijesh P. Pinto and David Park).

16) “The Deterrent Effect of Cable System Clustering on Overbuilders: An Economic Analysis of Behrend v. Comcast,” Economics Bulletin (2015), vol. 35, pp. 519-527 (with Philip J. Reny).

17) “Auctions and Bid Rigging,” in Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics (2015), vol.

2, eds. Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, Oxford University Press, Chapter 20, pp. 498-522 (with Ken Hendricks and R. Preston McAfee).

18) “Evaluating Big Deal Journal Bundles,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2014), vol. 111, no. 26, pp. 9425-9430 (with Theodore C. Bergstrom, Paul N. Courant, and R. Preston McAfee).

19) Book Review, Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement. Law and Economics Approaches to Bid Rigging, by Stefan E. Weishaar, Journal of Economic Literature (2014), vol. 52, pp. 548-549 (with Brijesh P. Pinto).

20) “Oracle’s Acquisition of PeopleSoft: U.S. v. Oracle,” in The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy (2014), eds. John E. Kowka and Lawrence J. White, Oxford University Press, 6th ed. (with R. Preston McAfee and David S. Sibley).

TESTIMONY AND EXPERT REPORTS (PAST FOUR YEARS) 1) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA In Re: Cattle and Beef Antitrust Litigation 2) SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF VERMONT State of Vermont v. 3M Company et al.

3) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Elizabeth Belyea, et al. v. GreenSky, Inc.

4) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Maximilian Klein, et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. 5) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Quadvest, L.P. and Woodland Oaks Utility, L.P. v. San Jacinto River Authority.

6) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS In Re: Turkey Antitrust Litigation.

7) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA In Re: Hard Disk Drive Suspension Assemblies Antitrust Litigation.

8) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION Alexiss Wright, et al., v. GreenSky, Inc. 9) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA In Re: Pork Antitrust Litigation.

10) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA In Re: Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation.

11) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS In Re: Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation.

12) UNITED STATES DISTRIT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN In Re: FCA US LLC Monostable Electronic Gearshift Litigation.

13) THE NETHERLANDS, AMSTERDAM DISTRICT COURT Follow-on-damages proceeding further to decisions of the European Commission (AT.39824 – Trucks).

14) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA In Re: Peanut Farmers Antitrust Litigation.

15) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Richard Bartlett et al. v. BP West Coast Products, LLC et al. (employed by Competition Economics, LLC).

16) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA In Re: Apple Inc. Device Performance Litigation.

17) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA In Re: Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litigation.

18) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation.

19) THE NETHERLANDS, AMSTERDAM DISTRICT COURT Unilever et al./Smurfit Kappa, DS Smith et al. (Cardboard).

20) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS In Re: Dealer Management Systems Antitrust Litigation.

21) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA In Re: Capacitors Antitrust Litigation.

Exhibit D

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STORABLE001296 STORABLE001297 Depositions Deposition of Steven Stein (January 13, 2025) Deposition of Charles Gordon (January 14, 2025) Case Documents Plaintiff’s Verified Original Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction (December 31, 2024) Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Injunction (December 31, 2024) Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order (January 2, 2025) Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dissolve TRO (January 3, 2025) Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Discovery and Entry of Discovery Control Plan (January 6, 2025) Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Extend Temporary Restraining Order (January 6, 2025) Plaintiff’s Verified First Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction (January 6, 2025) Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Discovery, Response to Motion to Extend TRO, and Reply in Support of Motion to Dissolve TRO (January 7, 2025) Defendants’ Motion to Quash (January 7, 2025) Notice of Appearance of Counsel for Storable et al. (January 8, 2025) Defendants’ Bench Brief on Territorial Limits of Texas Antitrust Law (January 15, 2025) Defendants’ Bench Brief on Attempted Monopolization (January 15, 2025) Defendants’ Verified Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Injunction and Counterclaims (January 15, 2025) Transcript of Temporary Injunction Hearing (January 16, 2025) Plaintiff’s Hearing Brief on Scope of Texas Antitrust Law (January 17, 2025) Plaintiff’s Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (January 22, 2025) Notice of Appeal (January 23, 2025) Request for Preparation of Reporter’s Record (January 23, 2025) Request for Preparation of Clerk’s Record (January 24, 2025) Plaintiff’s Verified Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction (January 28, 2025) Notice of Removal to the Texas Business Court (January 29, 2025)

Hearing on Plaintiff’s Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction, and Alternative Motion for Reconsideration (January 30, 2025) Defendants’ Objection to Removal and Request for Hearing (January 30, 2025) Defendants’ Motion to Remand (January 31, 2025) Notice of Hearing (January 31, 2025) Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery and Entry of Discovery Control Plan (February 4, 2025) Third-Party Documents Belleflamme, P. and Peitz, M. (2015), “Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies,” Cambridge University Press, Chapter 16 Brennan, T. (1988), “Understanding ‘raising rivals’ costs,” The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 33, pp. 95-113 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (1962) Church, J. and Ware, R. (2000), “Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach,” Irwin McGraw-Hill, Chapter 22 Crocioni, P. (2008), “Leveraging of market power in emerging markets: a review of cases, literature, and a suggested framework,” Journal of Competition Law and Economics, vol. 4, pp. 449-534 Hausman and Sidak (2007), “Evaluating market power using competitive benchmark prices instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,” Antitrust Law Journal, pp. 387-407 Modern Storage Media, “Section 1: Industry Data,” available at https://digital.modernstoragemedia.com/almanac/self-storage-almanac-2024db/section-1- industry-data/ Modern Storage Media, “Section 2: Industry Ownership,” available at https://digital.modernstoragemedia.com/almanac/self-storage-almanac-2024db/section-2- industry-ownership/ Salop, S. and Scheffman, D. (1983), “Raising Rivals’ Costs,” American Economic Review, vol.

73, pp. 267-271 Schmalensee, R. (1987), “Standards for Dominant Firm Conduct: What Can Economics Contribute?” in The Economics of Market Dominance (D. Hay and J. Vickers, eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 61-88 Sparefoot (2024), “U.S. Self-Storage Industry Statistics,” available at https://www.sparefoot.com/blog/self-storage-industry-statistics/ Storable, “About Us,” available at https://www.storable.com/about-us/ U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2023), Merger Guidelines, available at https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-12/2023%20Merger%20Guidelines.pdf

NO. 25-BC03A-0001 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS LLC, § Plaintiff, § § v. § THIRD DIVISION § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., § (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE OR DISREGARD On this date, the Court considered Defendants’ Motion To Exclude Or Disregard Opinions Of Dr. Williams On The Ground That They Are Unreliable And Constitute No Evidence (the “Motion”). Based on the Motion; the evidence, argument, and testimony presented at hearings on Plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction; and any other filings and evidence related to the Motion, the Court finds that the Motion should be granted.

The Court finds that the testimony and opinions of Dr. Williams are unreliable and constitute no evidence.

Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED, and that the testimony and opinions of Dr. Williams are excluded and disregarded.

Signed on this _____ day of ____________, 2025.

_________________________________ Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Dolores Brunelle on behalf of Ray Torgerson Bar No. 24003067 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97490382 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Motion to Exclude or Disregard Opinions of Dr. Williams on the Ground that they are Unreliable and Constitute No Evidence Status as of 2/18/2025 12:09 PM CST Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Neil KentonAlexander [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Liza Eoff [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT

Associated Case Party: SafeLease Insurance Services LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Courtney Smith [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT

Case Contacts Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Dolores Brunelle on behalf of Ray Torgerson Bar No. 24003067 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97490382 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Motion to Exclude or Disregard Opinions of Dr. Williams on the Ground that they are Unreliable and Constitute No Evidence Status as of 2/18/2025 12:09 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Justin Bernstein [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 2/18/2025 11:54:50 AM SENT

ExhibitF E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of Texas 2/21/2025 4:33 PM 492 Accepted by: Beverly Crumley Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 NO. 25-BC03A-0001 § SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS § LLC, § Plaintiff, § § THIRD DIVISION v. § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, § INC., (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS Defendants. § Objections To Temporary Injunction Order, Motion to Rule On Exclusion Of Opinions Of Dr. Williams, And Motion to Reconsider Based On Objections And Exclusion Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively “Storable” or “Defendants”) file this Objections to Temporary Injunction Order, Motion to Rule On Exclusion Of Opinions Of Dr. Williams, And Motion to Reconsider Based On Objections And Exclusion (Motion).

I. Introduction.

On February 19, 2025, this Court signed a temporary injunction order (Order) that contains findings and conclusions, and enjoins Storable with the following language: As to SafeLease customers as of January 21, 2025, Defendants shall take no action to prevent, impede, or otherwise interfere with SafeLease’s authorized-user access to mutual customers’ data stored in FMS systems licensed from Defendants (i.e., storEDGE, SiteLink, and Easy Storage Solutions), as well as SafeLease’s use of such data within the processes of the FMS systems, as authorized by and available to such customers and for the purpose of providing insurance services for such customers.

This injunctive relief is subject to SafeLease maintaining SOC-2 certification of its data protection processes and only using customer data stored in FMS licensed from Defendants consistent with its customer agreements and historic practices.

See Order at 8.

Storable reserves all objections to any aspects of the injunction, and nothing in this Motion should be construed as agreeing to any aspect of the Order. However, rather than restate here all of Storable’s arguments, this Motion focuses on a narrow set of the points that warrant reconsideration.

II. This Court Should Rule On, And Reconsider The Order In Light Of, The Motion To Exclude.

On February 18, 2025, Storable filed its Motion To Exclude Or Disregard Opinions Of Dr. Williams On The Ground That They Are Unreliable And Constitute No Evidence. Storable requests that this Court rule on the Motion to Exclude, and use that ruling to reconsider the Order.

Excluding Dr. Williams’s unreliable opinions should result in removing foundations of the Order, including findings that Storable engaged in “anticompetitive” conduct, is “leveraging market power in the FMS market to prevent and impede SafeLease from providing services to customers in the tenant insurance market,” and was not “justified” in denying access. Order at ¶¶ 4, 6. As explained in the Motion to Exclude, those findings are not supported by any evidence.

III. The Order Contains Findings That Improperly Decide The Ultimate Merits Without Due Process.

The purpose of a hearing on an application for temporary injunction is to determine whether the plaintiff has a “probable” right to recover, not to decide the “ultimate merits” of the plaintiff’s claims. See Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911, 916–917 (Tex. 2020). For that reason, a “temporary injunction is defective when it purports to grant the same relief being sought upon final hearing.” Elliott v. Lewis, 792 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1990, no writ).

The Order exceeds this authority by describing as confirmed, rather than “probable,” many contested facts and legal conclusions, such as by stating:

• “SafeLease has pleaded and proved valid causes of action against Defendants,” Order ¶ (emphasis added); • “Defendants intentionally interfere with existing SafeLease customer contracts through exclusionary, anticompetitive, or otherwise wrongful means,” ¶ 4; • Storable is “leveraging market power in the FMS market,” ¶ 4; • “Defendants’ actions are not motivated by any alleged breach of their Terms of Service,” ¶ 10; • SafeLease accesses Storable’s FMS “as an authorized user, consistent with the customers’ own access and their rights to appoint authorized users,” ¶ 12; and • SafeLease operated with “Defendants’ knowledge … in order to provide tenant insurance services.” ¶ 17.

The Texas Constitution guarantees that “[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. This protection extends to intangibles such as reputation. Mosley v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 264 (Tex. 2019). The Order should be modified to remove decisions on the ultimate merits and findings of wrongdoing before the due process of a trial.

For these and other reasons, the Order incorrectly states that the “parties have agreed as to the form of this order.” Order at 9. Storable has never, and does not now, agree to the form of the Order or of any of the temporary injunction orders that SafeLease proposed to this Court.

IV. Conclusion.

Storable requests that the Court grant these objections and the motion to exclude the opinions of Dr. Williams, reconsider the Order, and issue a new order denying the temporary injunction in its entirety. In the alternative, if this Court does not reconsider the temporary injunction, Storable requests that the injunction include the safeguards and corrections identified above. 1 Storable requests that this Motion be set for written submission.

Respectfully submitted,

PORTER HEDGES LLP By: /s/ Ray T. Torgerson Ray T. Torgerson SBN: 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander SBN: 00996600 Jonna N. Summers SBN: 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff SBN 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar SBN: 24144581 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 226-6000 Facsimile: (713) 226-6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP Dale Wainwright Texas Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein Texas Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 320-7240 Facsimile: (512) 320-7240 [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys For Defendants

On February 20, 2025, SafeLease deposited a $6.6 million cash bond into the court registry.

Storable plans to inquire into questions raised by the timing and amount of that deposit by conferring with SafeLease, after which Storable may raise an additional issue.

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 843 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates.

/s/ Justin Bernstein Justin Bernstein

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on February 21, 2025.

/s/ Justin Bernstein Justin Bernstein

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Sylvia Dominguez on behalf of Justin Bernstein Bar No. 24105462 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97670247 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Objections to temporary injunction order and motion to reconsider Status as of 2/21/2025 5:03 PM CST Associated Case Party: SafeLease Insurance Services LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Courtney Smith [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT

Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Justin Bernstein [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Neil KentonAlexander [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM I I SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Sylvia Dominguez on behalf of Justin Bernstein Bar No. 24105462 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97670247 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Objections to temporary injunction order and motion to reconsider Status as of 2/21/2025 5:03 PM CST Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Liza Eoff [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT

NO. 25-BC03A-0001 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS LLC, § Plaintiff, § § v. § THIRD DIVISION § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., § (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE AND RECONSIDER On this date, the Court considered Defendants’ Objections To Temporary Injunction Order, Motion to Rule On Exclusion Of Opinions Of Dr. Williams, And Motion to Reconsider Based On Objections And Exclusion (Motion). Based on the Motion; the evidence, argument, and testimony presented at hearings on Plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction; and any other filings and evidence related to the Motion, the Court finds that the Motion should be granted.

The Court finds that the testimony and opinions of Dr. Williams are unreliable and constitute no evidence. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED, and that the testimony and opinions of Dr. Williams are excluded and disregarded.

The Court further finds that the objections raised in the Motion have merit and the February 19, 2025 Order Granting Temporary Injunction, should be reconsidered. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the temporary injunction is dissolved, and that SafeLease’s Application for Temporary Injunction and, in the Alternative, Motion for Reconsideration, is DENIED.

Signed on this _____ day of ____________, 2025.

_________________________________ Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Sylvia Dominguez on behalf of Justin Bernstein Bar No. 24105462 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97670247 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Objections to temporary injunction order and motion to reconsider Status as of 2/21/2025 5:03 PM CST Associated Case Party: SafeLease Insurance Services LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT

Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Justin Bernstein [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Neil KentonAlexander [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM I I SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Sylvia Dominguez on behalf of Justin Bernstein Bar No. 24105462 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97670247 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Objections to temporary injunction order and motion to reconsider Status as of 2/21/2025 5:03 PM CST Associated Case Party: Storable, Inc. Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT Liza Eoff [email protected] 2/21/2025 4:33:28 PM SENT

ExhibitG E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of Texas 2/10/2025 9:01 AM Accepted by: Beverly Crumley Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 No. 25-BC03A-0001 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES § THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § THIRD DIVISION § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS PLAINTIFF’S HEARING BRIEF ON TEXAS ANTITRUST LAW Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services LLC respectfully submits this brief in advance of the temporary injunction hearing to address certain antitrust issues. It explains the relevance of federal antitrust law, the refusal-to-deal doctrine, monopoly leveraging, and the scope of the Texas Antitrust Act, as well as how these doctrines and principles apply here.

1. Texas follows federal antitrust precedent.

Federal cases are instructive in applying the Texas Antitrust Act. It “shall be construed in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes to the extent consistent with [its] purpose.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.04. Since the Act is applied “in harmony with federal antitrust caselaw to promote competition for consumers’ benefit,” and state “caselaw is limited,” courts “rely heavily on the jurisprudence of the federal courts.” The Coca- Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 688 (Tex. 2006) (footnote omitted).

Here, the relevant terms of state and federal law regarding monopolization are virtually identical. Under the Texas Antitrust Act, it is “unlawful for any person to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.05(b). The Sherman Act also makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Precedent applying analogous claims under federal law is therefore instructive for analyzing antitrust claims under Texas law. See Caller-Times Pub. Co. v. Triad Commc’ns, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1992) (“[W]e look to federal law interpreting section of the Sherman Act for guidance in interpreting section 15.05(b) of the Texas Antitrust Act.”).

The only substantive difference is that the federal statute applies to commerce “among the several States, or with foreign nations,” while the Texas Antitrust Act is focused on competition and consumers in this State. But whether interstate commerce also is impacted does not rob a court of jurisdiction under the Texas Antitrust Act. The issue is whether competition or consumers here in Texas are impacted by the challenged conduct. See Part 4, infra.

2. Monopolists may not refuse to deal with rivals for exclusionary reasons.

Defendants’ refrain has been that firms are free to do business with whomever they choose and on any terms they prefer. Usually, that’s true. But the law is not so absolute for a monopoly.

A monopolist that voluntarily deals with a rival, but then refuses to do so for anticompetitive ends, violates the antitrust laws. That is the case here. Defendants’ refusals to deal with SafeLease are part of an attempt to extend their software dominance to the market for tenant insurance.

Generally, refusal-to-deal claims require showing a prior, voluntary course of dealing that was terminated without a valid business reason. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-11 (1985). Such a refusal, if adopted to pursue monopoly power, violates the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Verizon Comm’ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“[A] refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate § 2.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (“If Kodak adopted its . . . policies [refusing to deal] as part of a scheme of willful acquisition of monopoly power, it will have violated § 2.”).

The key is whether the refusal was for an exclusionary purpose. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602-03 (stressing “exclusionary” or “anticompetitive” intent). The refusal must be “prompted not

-2- by competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. Courts look to whether “the monopolist’s conduct [would] be irrational but for its anticompetitive effect.” Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1064 (10th Cir. 2013). That a refusal sacrificed short-term profits is relevant but not required. See Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 462 (7th Cir. 2020) (sacrificing profit “is relevant but should not always be dispositive” as it “is not necessary for conduct to be exclusionary”) (cleaned up). This is because monopolizing conduct “is not necessarily costly to the defendant.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 651b3 (2022).

And despite the name, a refusal-to-deal claim doesn’t require an absolute refusal. “An offer to deal with a competitor only on unreasonable terms and conditions can amount to a practical refusal to deal.” MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004).

Aspen is a leading case for this doctrine. There, the defendant owned three of four mountain runs for skiing, and the plaintiff owned the fourth. 472 U.S. at 593-94. Despite being competitors, they had issued a joint all-area ski ticket for years, until the defendant demanded an increased share of the proceeds. When the plaintiff would not agree, the defendant cancelled the joint ticket, even refusing an offer to buy the defendant’s tickets at retail price. These actions imperiled the plaintiff’s ability to remain in business. The plaintiff sued, alleging monopoly abuse, and the jury found for it. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict: the “jury may well have concluded that [the defendant] elected to forgo . . . short-run benefits because it was more interested in reducing competition . . . over the long run by harming its smaller competitor.” Id. at 608. The parties’ history of dealings implied that they were beneficial for both parties and suggested that the refusal to deal sacrificed short-term profits, meaning it was for purely exclusionary reasons. Id. at 611.

So too here. The parties compete in the tenant insurance market. For three years, SafeLease served customers by accessing their data on customer FMS systems provided by Storable—with

-3- customer permission and Storable support. This history of access benefited the parties and their mutual customers. Storable customers got to partner with an insurance vendor of their choice, so the access improved the attractiveness and marketability of defendants’ FMS. And it benefited consumers by letting them choose a low-cost, high-quality insurance vendor.

Despite a long arrangement that benefited both sides and their mutual customers, Storable decided to abruptly cut off its insurance competitor’s access to its customers’ data on its customers’ FMS systems. This about-face is “irrational but for its anticompetitive effect.” Novell, 731 F.3d at 1064. It harms Storable customers: it prevents their customers’ chosen vendor from providing vital services; it disrupts their business; it restricts their contract rights; and it puts their tenants at risk of loss. In doing so, this refusal harms defendants’ own goodwill with their own customers.

In short, refusing to allow access that SafeLease used for years with consent by defendants and their customers reflects a sacrifice of “short-run benefits because [defendants] [are] more interested in reducing competition . . . over the long run by harming [their] smaller competitor.”

Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608. Storable’s actions make no economic sense but for the anticompetitive end of driving a discount competitor from the market. Such actions for exclusionary reasons violate the Texas Antitrust Act. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §15.05(b); Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602-03.

In response, defendants say there is another way to access the FMS systems: an API access agreement. They also claim to be justified in cutting off access. Neither excuse survives scrutiny.

First, the API access offer applies to only two of defendants’ three FMS products, SiteLink and storEDGE. For the third, Easy Storage Solutions, defendants refuse to allow SafeLease any access on any terms to its customers’ data on its customers’ systems.

Second, the price offered is so unreasonable that it amounts to a refusal to deal. Defendants have demanded $1.00/unit per month, with a 50% penalty of $1.50/unit per month for any customer

-4- that SafeLease wins from defendants. At this price, SafeLease would be driven out of business. It would leave SafeLease without enough money to cover insurance premiums, let alone overhead.

And even if SafeLease could pay $1.00/unit, it could not afford to compete for Storable customers (from which it historically has won most of its switching customers) because of the 50% penalty.

The penalty price equates to a non-compete term that would eliminate its largest pool of new customers. Therefore, an offer to deal on such “unreasonable terms and conditions amount[s] to a practical refusal to deal.” MetroNet, 383 F.3d at 1132.

Third, the alleged justifications for cutting off SafeLease are pretextual. Defendants point to alleged security or performance concerns that justify their refusal to deal. Yet they knew of these alleged issues by April 2024 and never raised them with SafeLease before they abruptly cut off its access eight months later. They never asked SafeLease to adjust its practices to allay any concerns.

Nor did they raise any such issue with the customers they claim to be protecting. They never said SafeLease posed any security threat, or asked whether it had authorized access, or accused anyone of violating terms of use agreements. They simply shut off access without a word of explanation.

Instead, defendants tried to convince customers, newly deprived of their chosen insurance partner, to switch to a Storable insurance product. Their actions belie any legitimate business or technical reason for refusing to deal with SafeLease. See MCI Commc’ns, 708 F.2d at 1133.

The parties competed in the tenant insurance business for more than three years. All that time, SafeLease served mutual customers by accessing customer data on its customers’ systems with its customers’ permission—and defendants’ knowledge. Now, Storable is looking to land a kill-shot on a smaller competitor, despite years of beneficial dealings and the irreparable harm it is causing mutual customers. Defendants’ purely exclusionary actions seek to reduce competition in the tenant insurance market and, therefore, violate Texas antitrust law.

-5-

3. Defendants’ exclusion of SafeLease is classic monopoly leveraging.

Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct is multifaceted in its illegality. Defendants are not only refusing to deal with a rival for purely exclusionary reasons, but also engaging in textbook monopoly leveraging. In short, Defendants cut off SafeLease from the FMS market, in which they are dominant, to gain market power in the related tenant insurance market, where they compete with their only discount competitor, SafeLease.

“Monopoly leveraging occurs when a firm uses its market power in one market to gain market share in another market other than by competitive means.” Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 540 U.S. 1147 (2004). See also Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 652 (where “defendant uses monopoly power in A to place rivals in B at a competitive disadvantage, perhaps by raising their costs or making their offerings less attractive”); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106–09 (1948) (defendants used monopoly power in one market to acquire monopoly control of other markets). Here, defendants’ actions hark back to one of the largest antitrust cases in history, United States v. Microsoft Corp., where Microsoft exploited its dominant Windows operating system to harm competition and gain an advantage in a related market for web browsers. 253 F.3d 34, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Defendants are likewise leveraging their dominance in the FMS software market to stifle competition in the related tenant insurance market. With some 80% of the FMS market, they have fenced off SafeLease from all current or new customers who use defendants’ FMS products. This exclusionary tactic gives defendants an open path to scoop up customers that SafeLease no longer can service. They are not trying to win customers through innovation, higher quality, or low prices.

Rather, they are exploiting a crisis they created when they disabled SafeLease access. The strategy is to remove SafeLease from the field, not to out-compete it. This has no procompetitive upside.

-6-

Further proof of monopoly leveraging is the API-access terms they offer. Even ignoring that $1.00/unit is far above market levels, the $1.50 penalty has no purpose but to stop competition.

So too with the express non-compete terms that defendants impose on firms that partner with them.

These terms allocate defendants’ customers only to themselves and shield them from competition from these rivals/partners. Penalty prices and non-compete terms are weapons that protect Storable turf from competitors and keep consumers trapped inside defendants’ walled garden. Together, these terms accomplish a singular purpose: to eliminate competition over Storable customers.

Deals between competitors to divide customers are nakedly exclusionary. Such “customer allocation agreements are among the ‘most elementary’ violations . . . and are generally subject to a per se analysis.” Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alitor Corp., 565 F.3d 417, 423 (8th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) (agreement between lawyers not to advertise in each other’s cities was per se unlawful). Such exclusionary agreements or practices, which defendants have used to increase their power in the tenant insurance market, are made possible from their having and leveraging dominant power in the FMS market.

Absent relief from this Court, defendants’ plan to leverage their monopoly to drive a low- price competitor from the market will succeed. It will remove both a much-needed check on prices for consumers and a competitor that plays a vital pro-consumer role in the market.

4. Relief under the Texas Antitrust Act is not limited just to Texas.

Despite what defendants now may say, the parties agree on the law: the scope of the Texas Antitrust Act allows relief outside the State if it protects consumers or competition inside Texas.

The leading Texas case on this issue, Harmar, confirms that courts may grant relief under the Act that extends outside Texas so long as it “promotes competition within Texas or benefits Texas consumers.” 218 S.W.3d at 674. Defendants have admitted this principle. Indeed, the Act states it plainly: “What the Act says, rather plainly we think, is that it is to be used to promote

-7- competition in Texas, even if the trade or commerce involved extends outside Texas.” Id. at 682.

And that is what the Act says: no suit will be barred “on the grounds that the activity or conduct affects or involves interstate or foreign commerce.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.21(a)(1).

What defendants won’t admit is how relief here, to restrain Texas parties from engaging in Texas-based conduct that prevents Texas access, will protect Texas consumers and competition.

That factual connection is why Harmar supports SafeLease’s claim and requested relief. In short, antitrust violations are actionable under state law if aspects of the transaction implicate commerce in Texas. See Pounds Photographic Labs, Inc. v. Noritsu Am. Corp., 818 F.2d 1219, 1224 (5th Cir. 1987). This is why one court upheld state-law allegations of a “‘nationwide scheme’ to thwart competition on a ‘nationwide basis’” as “compatible with a claim for violations of only Texas antitrust law.” Settlement Funding, L.L.C. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 851 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2017). “[E]ven where a transaction primarily affects interstate commerce, the Texas antitrust statutes may apply if only a component of the transaction implicates intrastate commerce.” Id. Defendants have instead focused on the different facts in Harmar. There, soda bottlers in Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas sued Coca-Cola and its distributors in those states for allegedly anticompetitive deals with retailers. Each plaintiff was restricted to operate in assigned territories within the region, with two plaintiffs “operat[ing] entirely outside Texas.” 218 S.W.3d at 675. Some defendants also operated entirely outside Texas. And many geographic markets were at issue; each plaintiff’s “exclusive territory” was a “separate market.” Id. at 675 n.4. As such, certain markets were, like many of the parties, entirely outside Texas. Yet the trial court enjoined defendants in all “specified counties in each of the four states,” id. at 674, even though the injunction applied in markets and to parties wholly outside Texas.

-8-

The Supreme Court held that the relief, which would protect competition in non-Texas markets, exceeded the limits of the Act. In fact, some enjoined conduct was in markets outside Texas by non-Texas defendants against non-Texas plaintiffs. It was not enough that some conduct by some defendants against some plaintiffs happened to extend into Texas. The Act “does not say that it is to be used to promote competition outside Texas as long as the trade or commerce involved extends into Texas.” Id. at 682. Indeed, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to fix this problem by asking the Court to apply the antitrust law of the neighboring states for their out-of-state injury.

See id. at 674-75 (“We also hold that Texas courts, as a matter of interstate comity, will not decide how another state’s antitrust laws and policies apply to injuries confined to that state.”).

The facts here are uniformly Texas-centric. SafeLease is a Texas company. It is suing defendants based in or controlled from Texas. It is challenging conduct planned and carried out in Texas, namely, cutting off a Texas competitor’s access to FMS systems operated from Texas. See Defs’ Ans. ¶¶ 3-6 (the principal place of business for Storable and its FMS providers is Austin).

Access occurs entirely in Texas, where SafeLease operates. As relief, it is seeking to preserve a 3- year status quo of uninterrupted access so that it may compete in and from Texas, providing service to self-storage facilities and tenants in Texas—its top state—and elsewhere from Texas. The relief of re-enabling and not disabling SafeLease access is implemented by Storable from Texas.

In short, this case presents a classic case for relief under the Act. In the words of Harmar, the Act “is to be used to promote competition in Texas, even if the trade or commerce involved extends outside Texas,” 218 S.W.3d at 682, and the relief sought “promotes competition within Texas or benefits Texas consumers.” Id. at 674. Enjoining Texas defendants from taking actions here to monopolize a market that includes Texas, which will harm Texas consumers and competition, undoubtedly protects competition and consumers in this State.

-9-

Moreover, limiting relief to the borders of Texas would harm competition and consumers in Texas. The reason is simple. If defendants can cut off SafeLease’s access to these Texas systems to service customers in 49 states, it would make no difference to SafeLease’s viability that it has access in one state. It will be driven out of business long before trial, and the State will lose its discount tenant insurance provider. Harm to competition and consumers here would be profound.

In short, while defendants will claim that Harmar bars the requested relief as exceeding the bounds of the Texas Antitrust Act, the opposite is true. Harmar supports full relief under the Act, as this relief will stop Texas misconduct, protect Texas consumers and competition, and preserve a low-price Texas competitor.

Moreover, this relief is agnostic to any claimed burden to defendants. The Texas Antitrust Act, like the federal law, is a statute whose enforcement is in the public interest. It encourages and empowers private parties to sue to protect competition and consumers as private attorneys general.

Cf. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (the Sherman Act encourages the creation of a set of “private attorneys general” to enforce the antitrust laws). Because of this, the antitrust laws do not balance the harm to a defendant against the public benefit; they instead balance only the procompetitive effects against the anticompetitive. So, it follows that any burden to a party in complying with these public-interest laws is irrelevant as a matter of law.

- 10 -

Date: February 10, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/R. Paul Yetter ____ Judd E. Stone II R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24087727 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] [email protected] Alexander M. Dvorscak Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24120461 State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] [email protected] STONE HILTON PLLC Shannon N. Smith Congress Ave. State Bar No. 24110378 Austin, Texas 78748 [email protected] (737) 465-3897 YETTER COLEMAN LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 632-8000

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via the Court e- filing service and/or by email, on February 10, 2025.

/s/Luke A. Schamel __________ Luke A. Schamel

- 11 - Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 97160803 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Plaintiff's Hearing Brief Status as of 2/10/2025 9:07 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Neil KentonAlexander [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT Liza Eoff [email protected] 2/10/2025 9:01:04 AM SENT

Exhibit H FILED UNDER SEAL

1 REPORTER'S RECORD CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES , )IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LLC , ) 4 Pla in tiff , ) ) v. ) )TRAVIS COUNTY , TEXAS STORAB LE, IN C ., RE DNOVA LABS ) (D/B/A storEDGE ) , S ITELI NK ) SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE ) SOL UT IONS, LLC, BADER CO ., AN D) PROPERTY FIRST GROUP , LP , ) Defendants . )345TH JU DI CIAL DISTRI CT TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING 17 On th e 16th day of J anuary , 2025, th e fol l owing proceedings came on to be held in the above - titled and numbered cause before the Ho norab le Jessica Mangrum , J udge Presiding , held in Austin, Travis County , Te xas.

21 Proceedings reported in computerized machine s h orthand by a Texas Cert i fied Shortha nd Reporter, Cer ti fication Number 7076 .

1 Wasn ' t he?

2 A He ' s on our corpora t e deve l opmen t t eam, business deve l opment team.

4 Q (Reading) Wou l d i t be poss i b l e to get a quote f or a pu l l on l y access o f the S i teLink API. And that means to be ab l e t o re t rieve data from the Site Link FMS system?

8 A Yes.

9 B And your response -- your company ' s r esponse , is: We ' re not ab l e t o give read- on l y AP I access to SafeLease at this time . Do you see where you said that?

12 Yes.

13 Because you were no t p l anning to add an YJ additiona l providers unti l yo u -- u ntil you had kind of worked through some internal assessment. Right?

16 Yes. So , pu l l on l y access to the AP I , that ' s not a thing t ha t exists . So, what he asked for isn ' t a thing . And so, this sit uation where we ' re eva l uating how to work wi th insurance providers going forward is, we were -- SafeLease was not the only other i nsurance provider asking us for access, and we were going through a process of figuring out, how do we price to va l ue the actua l services that we're providing to insurance providers going forward. And so, this is exact l y what

2 figure t hat out .

3 Q But the answer was no . Right?

4 A For the ti me being .

5 Q And so, you know and your company knew that SafeLease went to its customers and said, under th e terms and conditions for Site Link and storEDGE, you, Mr . Customer, can authorize SafeLease to access on your behalf to service you through the FMS system.

10 Ri ght?

11 A No, I did not know tha t that ' s how they were doing it .

13 Q Well, okay . Let ' s go to Ta b 7, Plaintiff ' s Exhibit 18 . Your salespeop l e -- le t 's go to Page 2 .

15 Your salespeople knew that SafeLease was asking customers to give them authority to service t he customer by accessing the FMS systems. Your salespeop l e knew that . Did n ' t t hey?

19 A They may have .

20 Q Because here is an email in 2022 from your colleague, Kristen Zirkle, and she is what ro l e?

22 A I ' m not sure .

23 Q Senior account manager . I skipped it . Let me just give that to you. Do yo u see that? Senior account manager .

1 back as 2022 , over three y ears ago, you r team knew that SafeLease was get t ing authorized user permission from customers to service them using the FMS systems of your company?

5 A I would not agree with that .

6 Q Next -- oh, by the way, there are -- there are a number of insurance providers that have reached API access contracts wit h Storable, I nc. companies. Have there not -- are there not?

10 A Every other insurance provider in th e self- storage industry, except for SafeLease 12 (Simultaneous discussion) 13 Q (BY MR. YETTER) Okay . Every other one . Is that what you're t e l ling us?

15 A Yes. Every other one who is trying to interface with our software has an API agreement wit h us.

23 (Si multaneo us discussion) Q (BY MR . YETTER) And -- A -- th a t ' s beca us e t he y --

1 00

10 t h at effort, after he was hired, started an investigation in to security prob l ems we were hav i ng wi th high amounts of traff ic , unknown bots , systems being taken down, et ce t era, and t h rough that investigation determined that SafeLease was th e main cause of th ese problems. And so , then , this presen t ation , which is mon ths after that, no t weeks , was a result of him f inding who is the main culp ri t and a discussion about what to do about t hat .

19 Q So , the f irs t page of th is presentation, says it ' s a strategic discussion of impact to insu r ance competi t ors , which aren ' t approved vendors from enhanced FMS security measures. Righ t?

23 A Correct .

24 Q So , you'r e talking about , you' re going to do something wi t h your FMS systems. True?

1 03

1 A Tha t is cons i stent wi t h wh at we have been saying t he who l e ti me, yes.

3 Q And every reference in this document is about Safe Lease . Isn ' t i t?

5 A We l l, o nce you discover th at one party is doing the vas t ma j ority of these unauthorized automated attempts a t get t ing in t o our software, then, yes, you do f ocus on who that i s.

9 Q Let me just get back to t h e quest i on I -- t h is is not about any insurance competitors or u napproved vendors . This is all about SafeLease. Isn ' t it?

12 A I t ' s not al l about SafeLease . There are o t hers, too . I am ag r ee i ng th at th ey a r e the main one, which is why they ' re ta l ked about frequently.

15 Q Okay. Now , you ' re talking abo u t how you' r e go i ng to cut them off. Let ' s go to Page 4, and one of the t hings yo u rea l ize i s that there's going to be disruption in the marketplace when you cu t off . Don' t you?

20 A Potent i al l y, and that ' s wh at we ' re t r y i ng t o mitigate .

22 Q Wel l , we ' l l get t o th at in a minute.

23 But the whole goal was to get SafeLease to pay you , Storab l e , what you wanted them to pay?

25 A Th e goal was t o get SafeLease to sign an API

1 agreemen t and access our platforms the same way that every other th ird- party vendor does, which is safety safely and -- subject t o the safety and security standards of our cyber security protoco l s and the app r op ri a te l i mitations of l i ab i l it y. For example, if they were to be breached, and th en that breach enab l es a hack in t o o u r system , th ey need to be liable for that .

8 That's just one example.

9 Q The whole goal was to get SafeLease to sign an agreement to pay Storable mo ney. Wasn ' t it?

11 A And to access our systems the appropriate way.

12 Q And , as you ' re sitting here today, you don ' t know whether SafeLease has ever accessed your systems in a ma l icious way . Do yo u?

15 A I would say that abusing our systems and coming up with a hack to get in is malicious .

17 Q You have never -- you ' ve testified before in this case in a deposition earlier this week . Haven ' t you?

20 A I did .

21 Q And you -- and isn ' t it tr ue that you do not know whether SafeLease has ever accessed info r ma tio n that it had no authority to access? I sn ' t that true?

24 A We can ' t know exactly what SafeLease is doing because we have no visibi l ity into their backdoor 2

12 Q Wha t were you -- you have anot h er box that says, wha t are you t e l l i ng operato r s. Tr ue?

14 A Yes .

22 And you never to l d SafeLease, before you them off , that you were going to cut them off 24 A That's fa l se.

25 -- did you? Did you?

1 !No , I did.

2 Q Is that -- was that in writing?

3 A I ca l led Steven and said: Hey, we ' re putting in place security mea sures that may i mpact you. He then aske d me to send an email to him saying t he same, and that ema i l is definite l y in th e evidence .

7 Q Fair enough.

8 Le t's go to that next: Tab 14 , Plaintiff ' s 40 . You never said yo u were going to cut off SafeLease. Did you?

11 A I to ld -- I told him what we were doing to enhance our security.

13 Q Mr . Gordon, did you ever tell Steven Stein or anyone at SafeLease that Storable was about to cut off their access to your FMS systems at any time before December 17 th, 2024?

17 A You have to 18 Q Did you, yes or no?

19 A You ha ve to t a ke into account that we don ' t know exactl y what they're doing. So, it ' s impossible fo r me t o say whe t her t he security meas ur es we were going to put in p l ace were going to cu t t hem off, l imit them, affect them. We knew that it was going to do something , but we didn ' t know exactly wh at.

25 Q Did you ever t el l them you were going to cut

1 customers . True?

2 A Something both of us would like, I would think .

3 Q And to ensure continuity of services and avoid customer frustration. Right?

5 A Tha t 's what he said.

6 Q At any point did you t e l l Mr . S t e in that SafeLease was vio l a ting the t erms of service?

8 A We told Mr . Stein that we were enhancing ou r sec uri ty measure s and those were going to i mpact hi m and that we needed to get an API agreemen t in p l ace.

11 Q At any point did you t ell Mr. Stein tha t SafeLease was violating th e terms of se r vice for any o f the FMS systems in your company?

14 A I don ' t be l ieve we had an explicit conversation about that, no .

16 Q At any po int did you ask Mr . Stein to work with h is group at SafeLease to adjust how t hey were accessing Storable's FMS systems to account for any impact that you be l ieve you were feelin g?

20 A There is no way to adjust the way the y ' re accessing our sys t ems. You ei th er use the API, or you don ' t . I t ' s not -- like, I can -- that ' s like saying : Hey, Steven, can you hack my software di ffere ntly , pl ease?

25 Q Mr. Gordon, I ' m asking yo u , did you ever ask

1 anyone at SafeLease to ad j ust how Safe Lease was accessing t he FMS systems to avoid wha t ever you t hink was happening?

4 A No, for th e reason I just exp l ained.

5 Q At any po int d i d you t ell Mr . St e i n or anyone a t Sa f eLease that what SafeLease was doing was harming your system?

8 A I 'm not sure.

9 At any po i nt, other than asking -- demanding B t h at SafeLease pay $ 1 .00 or $1 . 50 per unit, did you ever ask SafeLease to take any other technical actions to account for whatever you believe was -- whatever disruption you bel i eve was happening?

14 A Yes . We asked them repeated l y to sign an AP I agreement and become verified and contracted partners l ike everyone e l se in the ecosystem.

17 Q Okay. Respec t f u l ly, Mr . Gordon, my question was: Did you ever ask t h e m t o take any t echnol ogical steps to avoid wh at you be l ieve -- whatever disruption you be l i e ve was h appe n ing e ve r ?

21 A Integrating through the AP I is a techno l ogical s t ep .

23 Q Now , last topic . The one t h ing you demanded of Sa f e Leas e was to s i gn a n AP I contract t h at had a p r ice of $ 1. 00 or $1 . 50 per uni t . Tr ue?

1 A I do.

2 Q Are these companies based al l over the country?

3 A They are .

4 Q Are some i nternational maybe even?

5 A Indeed .

6 MR . TO RGERSON : Al l right . If we cou l d go to the insurance slide, p l ease.

8 Q (BY MR . TORGERSON} Are you familiar with these risk p r oduct p rovider s?

10 A I am.

11 Q And are th ey a ll over the country?

12 A They are .

13 Q And the Storabl e p roduc ts that you ' ve described, are th ey compe titiv e and compe t e against , on a regu la r basis , the se other companies?

16 A We do .

17 Q Of th ese companies that we see on th is with logos on t his page for risk product providers, do each of them ha ve an API to access Storabl e ' s FMS?

20 A Not every single p erson on this page, but most do.

22 Q And i f they don ' t have access via an AP I agreement , what do they do?

24 A They mus t be operating ma n ual l y.

25 Q Th e companies that do have a re l ationship via 3

1 an API agree ment , i s that something t ha t ' s even put Oj your website?

3 A The integ ra ted partners?

4 Q Yes.

5 A It is .

6 Q Tel l t he Cour t abou t that , p l ease .

7 A Yeah. We l is t a l l of our integrated partners across a l l the different categories that we do business in as our marketplace . So, we ' re actua l ly advertising the fac t t ha t we ha ve choice in all of our different categories of business because that ' s a big thing that our customers want and care about.

13 Q We heard abo ut this , a l ittle bi t about opting out or excl uding or excep ting o ut of t hese t enan t protection plans or tenant insurance. This wh o le bus iness that we ' v e been talking about on th e tenant side or on the insurance side, would you agree with me that it ' s premised on a requirement that th e s t orage fa cil i ty requ i res i nsurance in the f ir st place?

20 A Yes .

21 Q Is t hat ever y storage faci l ity t ha t you ' re aware of?

23 A Def initely no t .

24 Q And i f a tenant has insurance in place a lready , whe ther in t he form of homeowners in coverage or renters

19 Q You understood th at Mr. Stein at some point conveyed -- expressed h is concern that these ra tes that you were asking for were not market?

22 A I unde rs t and th at he sa i d that .

23 Q Were they mar ke t from your opinion?

24 A Yes.

1 tak ing on risk for their customers ' stored goods , and that is the purpose for a company like ours and purpose fo r the coverage that we offer .

4 Q Thank you, Mr. Stein.

5 Taki ng a step back, can you tell us just a litt l e bit abou t you r background? Where did you grow up?

8 A I grew up in Hous ton.

9 Q And where did you go to col l ege?

10 A I went to UT Austin and graduated in 2 0 1 7 .

11 Q And where do you l ive now?

12 A About 15 blocks sout h of h ere.

13 Q And when d id SafeLease open for business?

14 A We opened in l ate 202 1.

15 Q And how ma ny employees were you at t ha t time?

16 A It was just me , and I hired our first executive; and from the re we grew the team organica l ly.

18 Q And abou t how big is your team now?

19 A Today , it 's approximately 59 peopl e.

20 Q 59?

21 A Correc t , full - time .

22 Q And are you the owner of SafeLease?

23 A I ' m the majority owner, but our employees own th e rest.

25 Q And abou t how much is employee owned?

1 75

1 se l l two -- th ese are t wo products. Right? We offer both tenan t pro t ection and tenant insurance. I be l ieve we are t he larges t provider t h at offers both of those products. So , I t hink t h at ' s a he l pfu l clari fication, but we are a dis c o u n t prov i de r because, as I men ti oned earlier, we have a number of different func t ions in the insurance base t hat are u nder one roof . We ' re able to offer offer a better price to o u r customers.

9 Okay. So, wha t do you think your ma rket share B is for th e tenant insu rance space, if you ' re going to draw a distinction?

12 Probably in the low sing le dig it percentage.

13 Q What about in the TPP space?

14 A It ' s hard to -- it ' s hard to say because I don't know exactly I don't have the specific breakou t . I mean , we real l y do view these products interchangeably. We don ' t have any kind of separation on them internally .

19 Q Well , what we do know is you tell the public that you're the larges t prov i der o f tenan t insurance and protection p l ans . Right?

22 A Wel l , it ' s beca u se th ere ' s a l mos t no one that provides both of those products. The tenant protection product i s re l atively new.

25 Q Mr. S t ein, le t ' s go back to my original 9

1 coverages and benefits.

2 Q And you be l ieve th a t Safe Lease ' s presence in this space has made it l ower cost and actually made more money for operators . Tr ue ?

5 A Yes .

6 Q All righ t . So, you h ad a positive impact on t he ma rket , you be l ieve?

8 A Yea h, and I th ink our custome rs wou ld agree wit h t ha t .

10 Q Okay. And you certainly have more customers now than you did in 2021?

12 A Yes .

13 Q All righ t . Let ' s go back to -- let ' s go to DX- 1 33, which is t he emai l chain from October where we ta lked about this API negotiation. You understand that an API agreement is the industry standard approach?

17 A I mean , for -- for two back- end systems to talk to each other, I would agree with that.

19 Q Well , that ' s important. Back- end systems , what does that mean?

21 A I mean , i f you need a -- a back end of a software sys t em , t a l k t o the back end of another software system.

24 Q Wha t 's th e front end o f the so ft war e system?

25 A It ' s t he u ser int erface.

1 determined onl y by forward - looking costs. Firms t ha t operate in competitive marke ts don ' t get to reach back in time and say , oh , I spent some money las t year. I have some sunk cost . I'd really like to recoup them.

5 Tha t 's not what happens in competitive ma rkets . Competitive prices are determined by -- 7 (Simu l tan eous discussion) 8 MR. ALEXANDER : Your Honor , th is , again, going in to a narrative answer way beyond the scope of the question.

11 MS. EOFF: And , Your Honor, it's been well more t han 10 mi n utes , so 13 (Simultaneous discussion) 14 THE COURT : Yea h , you ' re a t 15. So, I 'm going to ask you to conclude.

16 MR. SCHAMEL: Yes, Your Honor . I will -- do you mind if I ask j ust two more questions, Your Honor?

19 THE COURT: Well, let ' s try one .

20 (BY MR. SCHAMEL) Based on your v ie w of what B the relevant anti t rust market is and your -- what you have seen with respect to AP I pricing and Storab l e ' s removing SafeLease from FMS access, what is your view on the like l ihood that Storable wi ll be successful in obtaining substantial market share in an insurance

1 marke t if the y ' re allo wed t o contin u e wit h their excluding and p r icing schemes?

3 A I wou ld -- to me , i t seems substantial because i f th ey do i mpos e this $1 . 00 - $1.50 on companies in addi tion to Storab le , then that , in my opinion , is a -- is a monopoly price that reflects their ef forts to leve rage t heir ma rke t powe r -- as was discussed ea r l ie r th is mo rning, to leverage t heir market power from FMS in to insurance .

10 MR . ALEXANDER : Ob j ec tio n, Your Honor.

11 Again , th e answer we nt well beyond the scope of th e quest ion . Once more , we mov e to strike all of th i s testimony for t he reasons that I ' ve p revi o usl y s t ated .

14 The y haven ' t l aid a n adequate foundation for this witness' testi mo ny , whic h incl udes no t only t he disclosure of all of th e information st ill no t disclosed t ha t -- as required by Ru l e 1 95.5, and t he re 's significant gaps in th e l o g ical in f erences th a t he ' s attempted to make , wh i c h is exactly what is p r o hib ited by Robinson and Havner .

21 THE COURT : Okay .

22 I ' l l ove rr u le th e ob j ections fo r t he record.

24 And you can pass t he wi tn e ss.

25 MR. SCHAME L : Th ank yo u , Your Honor. I 7

24 Q What ' s a ReCAPTCHA?

25 A You ' ve -- you ' ve probab l y enco u ntered it

1 before . A l itt le fire h ydrant pops up or a lit tle click the t raffic l i ghts to verify that you ' re h u man .

3 Sometimes they ' re impossibly h ard ; sometimes they're pretty s i mp le .

16 From a security and stabi l ity standpoint -- 17 A Rig h t .

18 -- would yo u t e l l t he Court wh y an API connection is important?

20 A So , an API connection , we can target exactly wha t it e ms we wan t someone to ha v e access to . We can a pp l y thrott l es to i t . So, we mi ght say , you can have access to the general ledger , fo r example , bu t you ca n on l y read i t. ou can 't write it. Yo u can 't change i t.

25 You can ' t de l ete it. We 'l l give you permissions on what

1 you can access , how fast you can access it. That also helps keep our systems stab l e .

2 54

14 there disc u ssions in- house about risk of data breac h ?

16 Yes.

17 And how serious is th at being taken in t oday ' s environmen t ?

19 !Al Yery serious .

20 And i s tha t so me th ing that was conc er n i ng t o B you and St orab l e?

22 A Of course .

23 Q Th e r e ' s bee n di sc u ss i on in t hi s c a s e , Mr . Fr itcher , t hat y ou need an FMS platform in ord e r to per f orm t h is t enant insuran c e bu si ne s s. Do yo u a gree

1 wit h t h at?

2 A Tha t ' s out of my sandbox.

3 Q Okay . Have you heard abo u t obtaining reports to run th ose th i ngs manual l y? Is that f am i l i ar?

5 A Tha t 's -- (s h ak i ng head) 6 (Simu l t aneous discussion) 7 Q (BY MR . TORGERSON) Not your lane .

8 A -- out of my lane.

9 Q I ' l l stay out o f i t, Mr . Fr i tc h er.

10 Did the servers, during your t enure in 2024, crash?

12 A They have a f ew t i mes .

13 Q Te l l t he Cou rt abou t th a t and a b o ut any ala r ms that you experienced .

15 A So , any t i me servers are running h ot we ' l l get notif i catio n s. Somebody wi l l have to get yo u know , somebo dy wil l get paged. Somebody wi l l have to go hop on there and fig u re o ut what ' s going on and sol ve the i ss u e.

20 Q So, in a ddi ti on t o th e do l la r s out t h e door fo r ser v er capacity, is it t h e case t ha t St orab l e also had to expend persons and resources, t ime and resources?

23 A Yeah, we ' ve definite l y spent q u ite a few hours o n th i s.

25 Q At t he end of t h e day, with yo u r investiga t ion,

1 Mr. Fritcher , did you find any company other thaj SafeLease accessing your systems through th e front door in an i mp rop er fashion?

4 SafeLease was by far the la rgest.

5 And , to be clear , this type of access , these B types of spikes , i s that an appropriate way to come t hr ough the front door of an FMS system?

8 A No, we expec t users to be doing tha t -- 9 (Simultaneous discussion) 10 (BY MR . TORGERSON} In your -- 11 A not automa t ed .

12 Q experience , sir , i s there any le git i mat e us e by Sa feLease for automating this process and send in g bots into o u r sys t em?

15 A Not t hro ugh th i s -- no t this method . I wou ld ha ve used an API .

17 Q In your opinion, does it create i l l eg i timate opport u n ity and risks t o Storable and its customers?

19 I mean , i t does , and i t's also frag ile fo r f ut ure breakage, as wel l . That 's why we always wan t an y any connection l i ke t ha t t h roug h an API.

22 Q And what are t he ri s ks by way of a da t a breach?

23 Wha t are some of the t ypes of information th a t Storable i s concerned cou l d be t aken?

25 A Driver ' s l icense number, financial informa t ion,

1 p roblem . We communicated to th e business that SafeLease was identified, and as I understand it, communications with SafeLease were initiated .

4 Q And when you say you communicated to the business, you're t alking about your own company?

6 A Correc t .

7 Q You personally and no one at your direction ever reached out to SafeLease to tel l them: These are o ur spec i fic secur i ty concerns. Did yo u?

10 A I did no t , persona l ly .

11 Q And you never asked anyone on your group to do that?

13 A It wasn ' t my p l ace to do so. I communi cate to our business team who, as I understand it , was in communication with SafeLease on those topics.

B ~ow , in your investigation , yo u learned t ha t SafeLease accessed t he system as an au tho rized user from its c u s tomers . You learned th at . Did n ' t you?

19 I ne ver said it was an authorized user .

B You l earned that its customers authorize SafeLease to access th e ir da t a on your system. Did you not l earn that ?

23 A I s ti l l wou l d disagree about it being authorized because that's aga inst our terms of service.

25 Q So, you never checked with any customer about

1 A Tha t 's one of t hem , yes .

2 Q And did you know that SafeLease is a SOC 2 certi fi ed t echno l ogy comp any?

4 A Okay. I did not know that.

5 MR. YETTER : Thank yo u, Your Honor . Pass the witness .

7 THE COURT : Okay .

8 MR. TORGERSON : One quest i on, if I ma y.

9 TH E COURT : You may.

10 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR . TO RGERSON: 12 Q I s anyone a utho rized und er Storab le 's t erms o f service to operate l i ke Sa f e Lease did in 2024?

14 A No .

15 MR. YETTER : No furt he r ques tio ns .

16 THE COURT : Okay.

17 MR. YETTER: Nothing else, Your Hono r .

18 Thank you .

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 You may step down. Thank you.

21 MR. TORGERSON : May t he wi t ness be exc us ed?

23 MR. YETTER : Fine with us.

24 THE CO URT: Yes.

25 Yo u are free to go .

1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE STATE OF TE XAS COUNTY OF TRAV I S 5 I, J a ni s Simon , Official Co urt Reporter in and for the 200 th District Co u rt of Travis, State of Texas, do he reby certi f y that th e above and fo re going contains a t rue and correct t ranscr ip t ion of all portions of e v i den ce and other pro c eedings reques t ed in wr iting by counsel for th e parties to be incl ud ed in t h is volume of the Reporter 's Record in the above - styled and numbere d cause, a l l of wh i c h occ urred in open co urt and were reported by me .

14 I furt her certify th a t t h is Reporter ' s Record of th e proceedings t ru l y and correct l y reflects the exhibits , if any , offered by the r es pective part ies .

17 WITNESS MY OFF ICI AL HAND this 30th day of January , 2025 .

19 Isl Janis Simon 20 J an is Simon , CSR Texas CSR 7076 21 Expires: 07/31/2026 Official Court Re port er 22 200 th Di strict Co ur t Travis Co unt y, Texas 23 P .O. Box 174 8 Au s ti n, Texas 78767 24 Tele phone: (512) 854 - 9325

Exhibit I

1 REPORTER'S RECORD 2 THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS, 3 THIRD DIVISION SAFELEASE INSURANCE ) SERVICES, LLC, ) ) 6 Plaintiff, ) ) Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. ) ) STORABLE, INC., et al., ) ) 9 Defendants. ) ________________________________________________________ 13 HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR 14 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, 15 AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 16 (Via Zoom Videoconference) ________________________________________________________ 19 On the 30th day of January, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in Austin, Travis County, Texas; 23 The proceedings were reported remotely by machine shorthand.

Lorrie A. Schnoor, CSR, RDR, CRR

1 They've cut off access to any Storable facility management software platforms for SafeLease.

3 They've deleted accounts that Storable's own customers set up and authorized SafeLease to use. And they've put us in a situation where it's absolutely impossible for us to service our customers.

7 Now, Storable allows its customers to have third-party vendors who log in to their system to help self storage facilities run their businesses. A whole host of different types of vendors and third-party suppliers and agents have to routinely log in to these software platforms for these facilities to run.

13 That could be accountants, it could be third-party call centers handling customer complaints, and insurers. Many insurers, to our knowledge, there's no other insurer who's been locked out of access to a Storable platform in the way that SafeLease has.

18 SafeLease -- you know, at first Storable began by blocking IP addresses. Then they've gone so far now as to disable and delete any accounts that have a Storable -- or a SafeLease email address in them.

22 Their customers are asking them to provide SafeLease access to these accounts. And their customers have the right under the terms of service with Storable to designate authorized users to log in to the platform and

Lorrie A. Schnoor, CSR, RDR, CRR

1 C E R T I F I C A T E STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF TRAVIS 4 I , Lorrie A . Schnoor , Deputy Official Court Reporter in and for the Business Court of Te x as, 3rd Division , State of Te x as , do hereby certify that the foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter ' s Record , in the above-styled and numbered cause , all which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter ' s Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the e x hibits , if any , admitted, tendered in an offer of proof or offered into evidence .

17 I further certify that the total cost for the preparation of this Reporter ' s Record is $1 , 888 and will be paid by Yetter Coleman , LLP .

20 WI TNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND this the 31st day of January , 2025 .

LORRIE A'. SCHNOOR, CSR 4 642 , RDR, CRR 23 Ex piration Date: 1/31/26 Deputy Court Reporter , Business Courts 24 2330 Verne l l Way Round Rock , Te x as 78664 25 512-914-2638

Lorrie A . Schnoor , CSR, RDR , CRR

Exhibit J FILED UNDER SEAL 557 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD 2 VOLUME 3 OF 13 VOLUMES CAUSE NO. 15-25-00020-CV 4 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 5 Sitting at Austin, Texas STORABLE, INC.; REDNOVA LABS, INC. (D/B/A STOREDGE); SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC; EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC; BADER CO.; AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP 9 V. 10 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC -------------------------------------------------------- 12 REPORTER'S RECORD 13 FEBRUARY 11, 2025 -------------------------------------------------------- On the 11th day of February, 2025, the hearing on Discovery Motions and a Temporary Injunction came on to be heard in the above-entitled and -numbered cause; and the following proceedings were had before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in Austin, Travis County, Texas: 19 Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype machine; Reporter's Record produced by computer-assisted transcription.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 558 126

1 purposes of the record, maybe instead of calling them ESS, we call them Extra Space because there is an ESS FMS at issue.

4 THE WITNESS: I understand.

5 ■ Q. (By Mr. Schamel) Dr. Williams, you also looked at the issue of whether -- Storable's leveraging market power, correct?

8 ■ A. That's correct.

9 ■ Q. And when you are evaluating that here, what were some of the things that you looked at to try to evaluate whether they were leveraging monopoly power?

12 A. So the first question is how to -- when we look at the prices that Storable charges for API access, that is what is at issue, is there an accepted methodology that allows an economist to determine whether or not certain prices reflect substantial market power. And there are several different ways to do it, but one way that's very well accepted is described in this article in the Antitrust Law Journal by Professor Jerry Hausman and Greg Sidak. I should say, briefly, Professor Hausman is a world famous economist at MIT. And so, yes -- I'm trying to stay within the question. Yes, there is an accepted methodology.

24 Q. So you looked at competitive benchmark prices.

25 And you kind of covered this, but why do economists look

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 559 127

1 at competitive benchmark prices?

2 A. I think it's pretty common sense. So if you're asking, hey, does an observed price reflect substantial market power, does an observed price reflect monopoly power, well, how can you tell? There are several different ways to do it, but one way to do it is to find a competitive benchmark price that you can compare it to. You can say, well, are they similar, are they different, is one a lot higher than the other. That's what I've done, Your Honor; and I'll talk about it in a minute.

12 Q. Dr. Williams, when you were looking at competitive benchmark prices, that was the prices for what here?

15 A. For API access.

16 Q. What were some of the prices you considered when trying to determine what the competitive benchmark price was?

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-

9 - ■

- - ■

19 THE COURT: May I ask a quick question? I think you said that Cubby does not provide insurance.

21 THE WITNESS: That's my understanding.

22 THE COURT: Do you know if SSM provides insurance?

24 THE WITNESS: My understanding is they do - not.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 561 129

1 ■ Q. (By Mr. Schamel) Dr. Williams, what is your understanding of the prices that Storable offered to SafeLease for API access here?

4 A. As you can see Storable offered, as I understand it, two prices to SafeLease. $1 per unit per month if the facility operator was not using Storable's insurance product. So we know already the linkage between these two markets, right. There is a price for API access; but they're saying the price is -- Storable is saying, "Our price is conditional on something in a different market," in the insurance market. Or it's $1.50 per unit if the facility operator was using a Storable insurance product.

14 Q. And, Dr. Williams, when it says was using a Storable insurance product, is it your understanding that that means that SafeLease -- this will be a customer that SafeLease essentially won away from Storable?

19 A. Right, that they -- until very recently, until the facility operator made the decision to switch from Storable to SafeLease, they had been a Storable customer for the insurance product; but upon switching, Storable's API price -- again you can see that linkage now, that the API price is going up not because of something like their software costs went up. Their API

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 562 130

1 price is going up because of something going on in the second market, the tenant insurance market. It's, in my opinion, clearly exclusionary conduct; but we'll talk more about that.

5 ■ Q. Now, you then did some comparison of the Cubby and SSM prices to the Storable prices; is that right?

7 A. ■ That's correct.

8 ■ ■ -

17 Q. I'll ask the next question. So based on that comparison of these prices, what conclusion did that lead you to about the prices that Storable offered SafeLease?

21 A. ■ So, again, remember -- you already know what I'm going to say, but it's all based on this Hausman/Sidak concept of evaluating whether or not a given price is a monopoly price or is the result of substantial market power by comparing it to a

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 563 131

1 competitive benchmark. And now you've seen the first tranche of that, and there will be more. But what my conclusion is is that the $1 and the $1.50 certainly are supra-competitive prices. They're substantially in excess of the prices that Cubby and SSM have charged to SafeLease for the same product, API access.

7 THE COURT: Do you mind if I slide in another question?

9 MR. SCHAMEL: Absolutely.

10 THE COURT: How did you choose Cubby and SSM as your benchmarks?

12 THE WITNESS: That's what I was provided.

13 If there were more, I would love to get them; but we're early in the litigation. I'm showing you everything that I've seen.

16 ■ Q. (By Mr. Schamel) Now, you kind of previewed this a little bit in one of your other answers. -Could you talk a bit about that 50 cents price difference and to you, as an economist, what the significance of that

- - is?

■ A. Yeah. So, Your Honor, remember when we looked at the supply and demand curve and we said, well, what is the supply curve? The supply curve is the forward looking cost to a firm of providing whatever product we're talking about. Now, my understanding -- so just

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 564 132

1 ask yourself this question: Is a 50 percent markup on the API price, is that connected to -- that's explicitly tied to something going on in a different marketplace, is that 50-cent difference attributable to Storable's forward looking marginal costs of providing API access; and the answer clearly is no. It's a premium or a tax or a penalty, whatever you want to call it, that Storable is charging or wants to charge to SafeLease in one circumstance, and that circumstance being "You just took one of our insurance customers." And to me, as an economist, that's absolutely exclusionary conduct.

12 THE COURT: Do you mind if I ask another question?

14 MR. SCHAMEL: Absolutely, Your Honor.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 565 133

6 THE COURT: That answers my question.

7 Thank you.

8 Q. (By Mr. Schamel) Now, Dr. Williams, so in a competitive market, then, can a firm normally charge forward looking costs like this? And by "this" I mean forward looking costs from a separate market.

12 A. Yeah. If a firm has a -- if firms are competing and they're -- and there might be an increase in all their forward looking costs, then it is not surprising that the market price is going to go up. Of course, as I talked about, that is a very different thing than what's going on here.

18 Q. And, Dr. Williams, in your view does this 50-cent penalty have any sort of an impact on competition or consumers?

21 A. Yeah. It has a deleterious effect because the API price is being increased for reasons that have nothing to do with the forward looking costs of providing the API services. Again, it is just a function of whether or not Storable did or did not lose

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 566 134

1 a customer to SafeLease. So that's unrelated to their forward looking cost of providing the API access. Of course, if -- if the $1.50 price is paid, then it is going to get passed to the storage operators. It's going to get passed through to ultimately the tenant insurance rates. So it's a harm to competition.

7 Q. Now, Dr. Williams, you also looked at API prices that Storable charges other insurance providers, correct?

10 ■ A. Yes, that's correct.

11 MR. SCHAMEL: I think actually for this next part, Your Honor, we have to ask our -- this is outside/counsel only. So we need to remove some people from the courtroom.

15 THE COURT: I think we're going to have some people step out to maintain confidentiality for attorney's eyes only.

18 (Whereupon, after those people falling under the rule left the courtroom, the following proceedings commenced:) 21 THE COURT: Is everybody satisfied with who is in the courtroom right now?

MR. SCHAMEL: MR. ALEXANDER: - Yes.

Yes, Your Honor.

Q. ■ (By Mr. Schamel) So, Dr. Williams, what were

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 567 135

1 the -- what were some of the prices that you looked at in some of the other API contracts that Storable has with other insurance providers?

4 A. Yeah. So if you think about where we are, so we just did competitive benchmarks against some prices that independent FMS suppliers had offered to SafeLease.

7 Now we're going to look at some of the other prices that Storable charges to -- for API access to other buyers.

9 And just to be clear, Your Honor, I've looked at all of them, every single one that was provided to me. I'm going to show you all of them.

12 Q. On your first bullet here you listed an October 2024 agreement. Why did you list that October 2024 agreement on your slide?

15 A. Well, it's a very recent transaction and it's a voluntary transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller. So to an economist that means it's a market price. And what is the price? The price is -- and you can see it was quite recent, October 2024. It

22 And, Your Honor, the average number of units in these facilities, a conservative estimate of them is about 150. It's actually higher than that.

25 That's a conservative estimate.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 568 136

1 If you say, well, what is the apples to apples of API price in terms of the per unit per month

- also -- ■ Q. So the -- just to make sure I understand and that we're clear, so there is a contract that Storable has with an insurance vendor from October 2024, a few months ago, where the equivalent price per unit is about

13 ■ A. Correct.

14 ■ Q. And how does that compare to the price that Storable has offered SafeLease?

16 A. ■ Well, obviously it's hugely smaller.

17 ■ Q. And based on your understanding of the contracts, as well as testimony that you either reviewed or were present for, how does that compare to Storable's other API contracts?

21 A. So it's -- in a second I'm going to show you a bar chart that will show the average cost across all of the -- I think the short answer is that -- and you can see this box that I've culled out, which Your Honor has already read because it's from the transcript of the

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 569 137

1 earlier hearing. But the question from Mr. Yetter: 2 "The vast majority of people, referring to the facilities owners, that have signed these agreements are at a price that is nowhere near the price that you demanded from SafeLease; isn't that true?"

6 Answer from Mr. Gordon: "The majority of them, correct."

8 And, not surprisingly, Mr. Gordon was exactly right. So if we go to the next slide -- 10 Q. Before we go to the next slide, can you remind for the record who Mr. Gordon is?

12 ■ A. Mr. Gordon is the CEO of Storable.

THE COURT: Let me ask a question.

for my records and so I know what I'm looking at, this October 2024 transaction, do we know who the entity is - Just

16 on the other side of that?

17 MR. SCHAMEL: I don't remember off the top of my head.

19 THE COURT: If you'll figure it out later and let me know, so that if I see evidence related to that entity, I know what it's relevant to.

22 Q. (By Mr. Schamel) Now, Dr. Williams, you said you also prepared a chart summarizing the prices that you looked at for all of the API contracts, true?

■ 25 A. Yes. - KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 570 138

1 ■ Q. Could you explain to the court what this chart is showing?

3 A. Sure. So if we just go left to right, Your Honor, so left is the $1.50 which we talked about earlier. That's Storable's price to SafeLease for -- if the buyer was a prior Storable insurance client. Then

-

21 dollar versus a dollar fifty? Do you know what they're actually paying or is it based on -- how do you know -- if you are just looking at the contract, how do you know who is actually being charged a dollar and who is being charged a dollar fifty?

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 571 139

1 THE WITNESS: I'm glad you asked that because it turns out -- I have been provided, Your

-

-

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 572 140

9 I

■ Q.

THE COURT: (By Mr. Schamel) - Okay.

So, Dr. Williams, even at the $1 price, what does this chart and the data you looked at demonstrate to you about Storable's market power?

19 A. So, again, go back to Hausman and Sidak. The basic intuition here is we're going to evaluate whether or not a firm's prices exhibit substantial market power, whether or not they're supra-competitive, by comparing them to other benchmarks. We have three benchmarks here. We have the average price that Storable charges to other buyers, other API purchasers. Insurance

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 573 141

1 companies that are purchasing API access. We have these two prices that were offered to SafeLease. - The bar chart is pretty clear that both the dollar and the dollar fifty are substantially higher than all three of these benchmarks. So my takeaway is, yeah, the dollar and the dollar fifty are -- those are effectively monopoly prices. They are prices that reflect substantial market or monopoly power.

9 Q. In addition to this dollar/a dollar fifty pricing and the 50-cent difference if a customer is one away from Storable, was there anything else in the testimony that you heard about the API terms that gave you any sort of concerns as an economist?

14 A. Yeah. So, Your Honor, if we look at the next slide -- and, obviously, as you know, I'm not an attorney and I'm not going to offer any legal opinions;

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 574 142

10 and that, to me as an economist, that's exclusionary conduct.

12 They're saying, look, we -- and how are they able to do this? Because ask yourself this question. Think about a world in which there were a hundred FMS suppliers and each one had a 1 percent market share, an intensely competitive marketplace, and

20 We know what would happen. It's not -- people would say, "I'm not going to agree to that.

22 There is 99 other suppliers that won't ask me to sign that." But Storable is able to do that because their market share is so big because they have substantial market power.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 575 143

12 Q. Thank you, Dr. Williams.

13 MR. SCHAMEL: Your Honor, just to let you know, the October 2024 agreement, that was with a group called Cowan, C-O-W-A-N. The exhibit would be Plaintiff's Exhibit 38.

17 THE COURT: Thank you: And while we're paused, are we doing okay in terms of restroom breaks?

19 MR. SCHAMEL: We're very close to being done.

21 THE COURT: Let's do that, then.

22 Q. (By Mr. Schamel) Just to make sure I understand, Dr. Williams, so there is the 50-cent penalty price if you were to win a customer away from -- a Storable insurance customer away from it and there is

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 576 144

1 also the additional promise not to try to get them in the first place? Is that kind of the arrangement you've described?

4 A. Yeah, that's my understanding.

5 Q. And that understanding is based at least on part on this testimony that you -- that was from Storable's CEO?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Let's talk really briefly about the removal of SafeLease's access. As an economist -- one second.

11 Before I ask you that question, what is your understanding of what Storable has done to SafeLease's access?

14 A. Well, I'm not a technical expert. I'm not an expert in the underlying software. But my understanding is that at the present time SafeLease has denied access to their FMS -- I'm sorry, Storable has denied access to SafeLease. Sorry about that. And I talked earlier about to an economist what is a refusal to deal. It is basically there is just no price at which I'm going to do this.

22 Q. And, Dr. Williams, so -- I think you were kind of getting to that, is the cutting off access. That is essentially from an economics perspective a refusal to - deal?

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 577 145

■ 1 A. Yes.

- ■ Q. And what is then -- a refusal to deal -- what is the impact to competition on refusals to deal?

4 A. Well, I mean, here it is a deleterious effect in the tenant insurance market because now, in my opinion, this exclusionary conduct has substantially reduced competition in the tenant insurance market, which I'll summarize in a moment.

9 Q. And the prices that we were just looking at, I believe you used the term choke prices. Would you say that, based on what you've seen, that Storable's prices are a choke price?

13 A. My understanding is that at the price of a dollar, a dollar fifty, that that's really -- according to Mr. Stein that's really not a price at which they can operate.

17 MR. ALEXANDER: Objection. This is hearsay. We're not hearing an expert opinion about anything.

20 THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that one, and maybe we come at this from a different angle about choke price and maybe how you determine whether something is a choke price. We talked about it earlier.

24 Maybe we just refresh that, how he reached that conclusion.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 578 148

1 question I was going to hopefully clear this up with.

2 THE COURT: I think I'm going to overrule the objection. So you have a record. He is an expert.

4 I do think he can rely on hearsay, their contentions, as long as we understand that's what he's relying on. He's not testifying as to whether or not Mr. Stein is correct. He's saying he's relying on Mr. Stein's statement and, if it is correct, it would indicate to him for whatever reason to reach a price. So I'll consider it; but you have your ruling, too.

11 MR. ALEXANDER: Thank you, Your Honor.

12 FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION QUESTIONS BY MR. SCHAMEL: 14 ■ Q. Now, Dr. Williams, was there anything that you looked at in your review of the documents, especially some of the recently produced documents, that kind of confirmed any of your thoughts about the impact to consumers of Storable's actions?

19 A. Well, I know in the most recently produced tranche of documents from Storable I saw several e-mails to Storable from facilities owners in which the facilities owners were complaining that Storable was cutting off authorized users, including SafeLease. So that's the kind of, you know, disruption/harm to competition in the market for tenant insurance. I think

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 579 151

1 economist. And then in the second column, Your Honor, I have summarized how does this reduce competition in the tenant insurance market. Remember, it is all about -- that's the leveraging. That's the market into which allegedly Storable's monopoly power in the FMS market is being leveraged.

7 So what is the effect or what is the cause of the reduction? So the first one is refusal to deal.

9 The second one is the supra-competitive pricing. You are raising your rivals' cost. The third one, the "50 percent penalty if you take one of ours customers," that's -- in my opinion that's clearly exclusionary conduct. And then the last one, "If you want to sign the API contract with us, you have to promise not to solicit any of our customers," to me that's clearly exclusionary conduct. And the net effect is that -- 17 Q. I'll ask the next question. So for all of the -- for all of these is it your opinion this is evidence of monopoly leveraging?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. ■ And then -- so what is the net effect of this monopoly leveraging?

23 A. So it's -- the net effect is the extension of monopoly power from one market to another; and what I've concluded here is this kind of dangerous probability

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1 that if it's allowed to continue, that there is, I think, a substantial risk that Storable would be successful in leveraging its monopoly power from the FMS market to the tenant insurance market.

5 MR. SCHAMEL: And, Your Honor, before we wrap up, I just wanted to read some exhibits into the record for the API agreements for your reference, if that's all right.

9 THE COURT: Yes, please.

10 MR. SCHAMEL: These are all already admitted. So it's Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, 3 -- I'm sorry. I think it's -- those are pages. Exhibits 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, and 50.

14 Those are all plaintiff exhibits. I'm sorry. I said 3 and 8 and those are pages. It is Exhibits 2 and 5, not 3 and 8.

17 (Counsel sotto voce discussion) 18 MR. SCHAMEL: I was mistaken again, Your Honor. It's Exhibits 2 through 3, Exhibits 5 through 8.

20 THE COURT: So you were reading those into the record for what purpose?

22 MR. SCHAMEL: Just to give you reference to API agreements for what he was relying on, Your Honor.

24 And I think that's all the questions I have, Your Honor.

25 Pass the witness.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 581 177

1 understanding.

2 Q. Or a renter's insurance policy?

3 A. Again, if it meets the requirements that the facility owner puts in place.

5 Q. But let's talk about Extra Space again. If Extra Space started charging its tenants supra-competitive prices for its insurance, it might be able to do so for a time; is that right?

9 A. I have not -- I don't have an opinion. I haven't done any study of Extra Space.

11 Q. But as an economist you would expect that if they -- that if they started charging supra-competitive prices in a competitive market, over time they would lose customers to other storage facilities, right?

15 A. If it was a competitive market.

16 Q. And you have no reason to believe that the self storage business is not a competitive market, right?

18 A. Now you just switched markets. Now you're talking about whether or not the self storage market is competitive.

21 Q. ■ Well, you've not done a study of the number of competitors in the tenant insurance market, have you?

23 A. That is correct. I do not have market shares for firms in the tenant insurance market.

25 Q. ■ Or the tenant protection plan product either?

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 582 178

1 ■ A. That is correct. It's my understanding that Storable is the largest firm in the tenant insurance market.

4 Q. But you can't tell us what share of the market they have, right?

6 A. I don't recall seeing a statement from Storable as to what their market share was in tenant insurance.

8 I do recall seeing a statement from Storable that they were the largest firm in the tenant insurance market.

10 Q. You've seen the statement from SafeLease that they're the largest in tenant insurance and tenant protection, right?

13 A. I think I know what you're referring to. That was a statement in the prior hearing. I think -- as I recall what Mr. Stern was saying was that it was the conjunction that -- the combination of those two things.

17 Q. And you don't know whether that's right or wrong, do you? You haven't done a study of market shares of any of these companies, correct?

20 A. Well, let's be clear. What is correct is I have not done a study of the market shares of firms in the tenant insurance market. That is correct with the proviso that I understand Storable has represented that they are the largest firm in that market.

25 MR. ALEXANDER: I want to inquire what your

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 583 179

1 plan is for the lunch break.

2 THE COURT: And do you mind if I ask a question? I think I heard testimony about Extra Space being the largest firm in the tenant insurance market and then I thought I heard testimony about whether Storable is the largest firm in the tenant insurance market.

8 THE WITNESS: If I said Extra Space was, then I misspoke. I have seen a document from Storable representing that they believe they are the largest firm in the tenant insurance market.

12 THE COURT: I may have made a mistake in my

- notes.

■ Q. (By Mr. Alexander) Just for clarification, but you don't know whether that's 5 percent, 10 percent, or 20 percent?

17 A. That is correct. I have not conducted a study of firms' market shares in the tenant insurance market.

19 Q. So you can't say -- it's not your testimony that they have monopoly power or anything close to it in tenant insurance?

22 A. Well, let's be careful. It certainly is not my opinion -- I have not offered the opinion, because I don't have the data yet, I have not offered the opinion that in terms of indirect evidence that Storable's

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 584 188

1 There's more self storage facilities today than there were a year ago?

3 A. I actually don't specifically recall seeing that. It's possible.

5 Q. If that's true, using a 2024 number for Storable and a 2023 number for the whole market, that would overstate Storable's share?

8 A. If it's true that there are more facilities -- that the denominator is bigger in 2024 than the number that -- the most recently available number to me, then, yeah, Storable's share would be a little bit smaller than I've reported; but, again, you are talking about data that doesn't exist yet.

14 MR. ALEXANDER: I'll object to the responsiveness of what is not available.

16 Q. And isn't it true that the Self Storage Almanac doesn't report anything about how many facilities use the FMS -- of each provider of FMS?

19 A. I believe that's correct.

20 ■

23 - ■ - - ■ KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 585 189

- ■ ■ 5 ■ 6 ■ 7 ■ ■ - 10 ■ ■ - 13 ■ 14 Q. Are you aware of the fact that Storable has never refused to provide SafeLease with an API under any circumstances?

17 A. You know, I don't have a specific opinion on that.

19 Q. So you don't know?

20 A. My understanding is there have been denials of service.

22 Q. That didn't answer my question.

23 A. Again, I'm not a technical expert. My understanding is that -- 25 Q. Excuse me -- go ahead.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 586 221

1 Q. How did you find out about that?

2 A. I received -- well, I logged in -- every Monday morning I log in and go through my numbers, go through my reports, so I can get with my managers. I then received an e-mail from SafeLease letting me know that they had been removed from the system, which sparked a little concern in my eyes just because how do we need to move forward at this point, what do I have to change.

9 So that's how I found out.

10 Q. You mentioned you were concerned when you found out. Can you elaborate on what concerned you about it?

12 A. How do we move forward? If they don't have access, then what do I do? What do I need to change?

14 How do I need to work with my managers differently? Do we need to start pulling reporting to send to you guys?

16 What is going to change?

17 Q. At that time had Storable discussed any of that with you or let you know about how any of that would change?

20 A. Not at that time.

21 Q. Did you have any idea before this that there was an issue with SafeLease being a user on your FMS account?

24 A. I did not.

25 Q. ■ Just speaking at a high level , what has the

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 587 222

1 impact been on MyStorage on your day-to-day since that access was taken away?

3 A. It's just more work for us. We're having to pull the reporting to send over to SafeLease.

sending back reports. - They're Now we're having to go in and manually enter things that -- into our client's -- our tenant accounts. So it's just caused more work, more -- more human touching, which you know when humans get involved there can be a lot of errors made; and the last thing we want is obviously errors when it comes to our clients. We want to make sure our clients are covered and taken care of.

13 ■ Q. Has there been any effect on your tenants or your clients yet?

15 A. ■ Not yet.

16 ■ Q. Are you concerned there might be if we continue on in this manner?

18 A. I won't allow it to happen. I'll make sure my clients are covered one way or the other.

20 Q. Did you end up getting an e-mail from Storable regarding the situation?

22 A. I did not. My managers and my owners did, and one of the owners forwarded it to me.

24 Q. And do you recall who that e-mail was from?

25 A. It's from Storable.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 588 231

1 Q. SiteLink, excuse me, which is one of Storable's three FMS platforms?

3 A. I don't know how much they have.

4 Q. Have you ever heard of ESS or storEDGE?

5 A. I have heard of storEDGE. We actually looked at switching to storEDGE at one point.

7 Q. Are you aware of other FMS providers out there in the industry?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Could you give me some of those names?

11 A. Tenant, Inc., Storage Commander. What is another one I've talked to? Well, those are two.

13 Q. Do you believe there might be others that are out there as well?

15 A. I know there are lots of them. In Vegas at the trade show you meet a lot of these people.

17 WebSelfStorage is another one. There you go.

18 Q. ■ You also told us that you recently met with a number of insurance companies to try to evaluate that as well, right?

21 A. When I was in Vegas I visited with several at their booths.

23 ■ Q. I think you said a lot of people?

■ 24 A. Yeah. There is a ton of people at that - conference.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 589 232

1 ■ Q. Are there a ton of people in your mind that provide the TPP-type coverage that SafeLease provides to you now?

4 ■ A. There probably are.

5 Q. And you testified, I believe, that you compared them and found SafeLease was the better deal?

7 A. That's what I understand, yes. SafeLease has so far offered me a better percentage split.

9 Q. When you say a better percentage split, let's walk through that. Is it the case that the average TPP price per unit per month is about $12?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And of that $12 how much does MyStorage retain percentage-wise?

15 A. I'm not sure -- I know the percentage. I'm not sure that is information that I should divulge of my clients.

18 Q. Okay. So let me just ask this first. I'm going to ask my clients to step out to listen, so that they don't hear that information, and then I'll invite them back in because I respect your right to keep that information confidential.

23 A. Yes.

24 MR. TORGERSON: One moment.

25 THE COURT: Before you answer, so can we

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 590 261

1 Q. Again not wanting to air that dirty laundry, that is not something that Storable might want to splash on a website, fair?

4 A. Fair.

5 ■ Q. You mentioned one of the first things that came to your mind when you learned of this decision to remove SafeLease's access, "How do we move forward." You said, "We started pulling reports to send to SafeLease,"

- right?

■ A. Yes, sir.

■ Q. And you said that some people are involved in that a little more hands on than before, right?

13 ■ A. Yes, sir.

14 ■ Q. And that has continued to work, right?

15 ■ A. It is just more time consuming, but it does

- work.

■- Q. Right. And I believe, to be clear, you said that it has not had any effect, no lapsed insurance, no damage, nothing like that, right?

■- 20 A. No, sir.

21 THE COURT: Do you mind if I ask a question?

23 The process you have now of the reports, you are pulling the reports and sending it on to SafeLease, have you had any claims that have been

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 591 309

1 obviously was send out an e-mail to all of our customers; and I think we felt compelled to do that because we learned that many of the accounts had been de-activated. And, furthermore, we learned that our mutual customers were not informed of that. So we felt an obligation, first and foremost, to communicate to our customers what was going on and how we were going to try to continue to best serve them in this period.

9 Q. Let's look at that communication.

10 MR. HILTON: Can you please pull up Plaintiff's 123, Stacy? Thank you.

12 Q. There are many examples of this e-mail that SafeLease has in the record. This is one of them in evidence.

15 MR. HILTON: Scroll down to the next page,

- please.

■ Q. So that's the e-mail.

forwarded from a customer, correct?

First of all, this was

19 A. ■ Yes, that is a customer.

20 ■ Q. Benjamin Patton forwarded it to you?

■ 21 A. Yes. I believe I was the "reply to" e-mail - address on there. So I received the lion's share of responses to this e-mail.

24 Q. And then if we can go to the next page, he has what is called a colorful, animated response to this

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 592 310

- - e-mail?

■ A. Yes.

■ Q. And then he says, "I'm moving over to Cubby very soon." What does that mean? What is Cubby?

5 ■ A. Cubby is another FMS platform.

6 ■ Q. Was this sentiment from this customer unique?

7 ■ A. Definitely not unique, but we saw kind of a wide range of responses from folks.

9 MR. HILTON: If we can scroll down to the actual -- there we go. We'll start going through that.

11 Q. So you're familiar with this e-mail from SafeLease?

13 A. I am, yes.

14 Q. Did you write this?

15 A. I did not write it, no.

16 Q. But you are familiar with it? Do you agree with its contents?

18 A. I do, yes.

19 Q. What was the purpose of this communication in your view?

21 A. The purpose -- from my perspective my main concern was, obviously, continuing to service our customers and alerting them that the accounts that they had provisions for us had been largely deactivated; and so, again, I felt an obligation -- I think we as a

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 593 319

1 businesses operate is they bill their tenants on the first of the month. It is called monthly billing. Some facilities do what is call anniversary billing.

4 But for monthly billing on the first, we have to transition plans over to SafeLease plans on the first. We have to set up new customers to be able to sell SafeLease plans on the first of the month. And so like if you can think about an account manager's role, they have these spikes in workload at the end of the month and first of the month because there are all these new customer setups and transitions. We need to get reporting to be able to do billing and invoicing. So it is the most critical time of any month.

14 ■ Q. What has it taken for SafeLease to survive without FMS access, particularly since the first temporary injunction -- the first temporary restraining order was lifted and we have been back in this world of no access?

19 A. I think a lot of collaboration with our customers, asking them to do things that, again, they have come to us to do for them. So us trying to handhold them through those tasks and responsibilities.

23 Q. Do you think SafeLease can continue to operate this way indefinitely?

25 ■ A. I mean, we're going to have to hire many more

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 594 320

1 people if so.

2 ■ Q. Hire many more people why?

3 ■ A. Because a lot more kind of manual operations are required, a lot more interactions with customers are required.

6 Q. Has SafeLease lost customers since January 21st because of Storable's actions in this ongoing dispute?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR. HILTON: I would like to pull up Plaintiff's Exhibit 170; but before we do, this hasn't been admitted yet. I think I can admit it with this witness. Looking at this clock, it's probably the last think I'll have time to do today. I apologies. Our time estimates were not accurate, but we're working on that. This has been designated outside/counsel only.

16 So I would ask everyone on Storable's side except outside counsel to leave the courtroom.

18 THE COURT: While they're leaving the courtroom, there is one housekeeping matter I would like to talk about quickly. Earlier there was reference to a video that is Exhibit 177, a testimonial; but that is not one of the pre-admitted exhibits for this hearing.

23 So I wanted to determine whether or not you guys want that to be an admitted exhibit, and we should talk about.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 595 327

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF HARRIS

4 I, Kimberly Kidd, Deputy Court Reporter in and for the Business Court of Texas, Third Division, Travis County, Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted, tendered in an offer of proof or offered into evidence.

17 I further certify that the total cost for te preparation of this Reporter's Record is $2,837.65 and was paid by Defendant.

20 WITNESS my hand this the 12th day of March, 2025.

/s/Kimberly Kidd 23 Kimberly Kidd, Texas CSR No. 2437 Expiration Date: 8/31/26 24 Deputy Court Reporter 1104 Londonderry Avenue 25 Friendswood, Texas 77546 [email protected]

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected]

Exhibit K FILED UNDER SEAL 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD 2 VOLUME 4 OF 7 VOLUMES 3 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 4 APPELLATE CASE NO. 15-25-00020-CV _______________________________________________________________ : SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC : TEXAS BUSINESS COURT : 7 Plaintiff, : : v. : : 9 : DIVISION 3A STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., : (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK SOFTWARE, : LLC, EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC, : BADER CO., AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, : LP : TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 12 Defendants. : _______________________________________________________________ 15 TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING _______________________________________________________________ 18 On the 13th day of February, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in person in Austin, Travis County, Texas.

22 Proceedings reported by stenographic machine shorthand.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. Is any of that licensed outside the company?

4 A. What do you mean by that?

5 Q. License, like a contract that says: User, operator, customer, you are allowed to use this, but subject to these licensing terms, terms of service, for example?

8 A. Like, do we use third parties?

9 Q. No, sir. Does software or any type of intellectual ■- property that has been developed internally at SafeLease, does it in turn license, allow people to use that, subject to certain rules?

13 A. ■ -Yes.

14 Q. ■ And those are operators?

15 A. ■ Yes, storage facilities.

16 Q. ■ You expect -- do those come with terms of service?

17 A. ■ We have agreements that we put in place with facilities.

19 Q. And those agreements lay out the rights and responsibilities of the respective parties, right?

21 A. ■ -Yes.

22 Q. ■ SafeLease owns that intellectual property, right?

23 A. ■ I believe so.

24 Q. ■ And, therefore, they have a right to control and set the rules for how that technology can be used; true?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

■ 1 A. -True.

2 Q. ■ Do you agree with me that Storable is not the only FMS provider that suspended SafeLease's access to its FMS system, true?

5 A. ■ What do you mean by suspended access?

6 Q. ■ You have been blocked by another provider or warned about being blocked by another provider.

8 A. ■ That's true.

9 Q. ■ That's true. Let's look at DX-177, sir.

10 THE COURT: Can I ask a quick question for clarification? Blocked or warned, was it one or the other, - both?

THE WITNESS: I believe warned. I don't know - blocked. My understanding is that tenants, Your Honor, are still able to enroll in SafeLease plans. Existing tenants who have SafeLease insurance policies on this other system are still active. There are still insurance obligations that we must fulfill in the event of a loss.

19 Q. (BY MR. TORGERSON) So, we talked about this a little bit the other day. There is another FMS platform out there called WebSelfStorage or WSS; right?

22 A. ■ -Yes.

23 Q. ■ And that is made available to the public by U-Haul, one of the large big five companies; right?

25 A. Yep.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. And on January 8, 2025, Russ Baldwin at U-Haul emailed the following message: 3 To whom it may concern: A recent audit found that several of our affiliates created user accounts for third-party insurance companies granting them access to WebSelfStorage accounts. Per the agreement, these affiliates have agreed to, quote, not allow any third-party program to hook up to, link with, integrate with, or be connected to any USS alien program, specifically including WSS software.

10 Do you see that?

11 A. ■ -I do.

12 Q. ■ These affiliates, if they choose to participate in third-party programs, such as tenant insurance or tenant protection plans, have been directed to send any data or information needed by said third-party companies by a member of their team. They cannot and should not grant access to WSS directly to third-party companies themselves.

18 Do you see that?

19 A. ■ -I do.

20 Q. ■ We have documented and removed all third-party usernames and passwords associated with these affiliate WSS accounts in an effort to stay in compliance with our user agreement.

24 Do you see that?

25 A. Uh-huh. ■- Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. That's a yes?

2 A. ■ -Yes.

3 Q. ■ SafeLease had usernames and passwords blocked or addressed in this way by WSS, true?

5 A. ■ I believe so, yes.

6 Q. ■ So, to be clear, SafeLease has effectively been blocked or restricted in access to WSS as a result of the reasons that are contained in this email on January 8, 2025, DX-177; right?

10 A. ■ -Yes. This is a very small part of our business.

11 Q. That wasn't my question. My question is: You would agree with me that Storable is not the only FMS provider that has removed, blocked SafeLease's third-party access to its platform; true?

15 A. I don't know that I would agree with how you phrase that, but the user accounts that our customers created for us.

17 Q. Those were deleted by WSS?

18 A. I don't know if they were deleted or deactivated, what the term is; but that is what I'm taking from this email.

20 Q. Let's use the term "removed." We have removed all third-party usernames and passwords, right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And that's exactly what Storable did to you, right?

24 A. I don't know, again, if it's exactly what they did or not.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 THE COURT: This is a good time -- 2 MR. TORGERSON: I'm almost done.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 Q. ■ (BY MR. TORGERSON) You understand that those customers that terminated you, those 12 customers, there are other options for them in the market; right?

7 A. ■ -Sure.

8 Q. ■ All right. And you know that there are other FMS providers out there, right?

10 A. ■ I do, yes.

11 Q. ■ And you agree with me that in some instances SafeLease has been recommending that their customers consider Cubby as a replacement FMS provider, true?

14 A. ■ That is true.

15 Q. ■ All right.

16 A. ■ In the same way that Storable recommends their customers go to one of their insurance companies. I don't see it being any different.

19 Q. Okay. Let's look at DX-348. SafeLease has a head-of-talent job posting, right?

21 A. We do, yes.

22 Q. Does this report to you?

23 A. Does not.

24 Q. You are familiar with this posting?

25 A. I'm familiar with the role. I wouldn't say that I'm Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 you make less money and get reduced service, is that going to sway your customers' concerns about what is going on?

3 MR. TORGERSON: Objection. Calls for speculation as phrased.

5 MR. HILTON: Your Honor, I'm asking based on his understanding as to his communication with his customers, where a proposal like that would be responsive to their concerns.

8 THE COURT: I think there is a little bit of speculation built in there, but I think you can testify about your understanding of the industry and your customers and based on your past experience. So, maybe if we can just rephrase the question a little bit.

13 Q. ■ (BY MR. HILTON) Sure. Let's say that I have kind of laid out the scenario there, reducing services, more work for customers, and you are asking for a reduced revenue share.

16 A. ■ Sounds great. Where do I sign up?

17 No, of course, all of our customers are going to go elsewhere. There are many other providers that can offer the same revenue share. That is not the sole reason why a storage facility works with us. In fact, far from it.

21 Q. There was some discussion about requiring insurance and, you know, some suggestions as to the propriety of that.

23 Are insurance requirements uncommon?

24 A. No. That is not something we created. That is not a SafeLease specific thing. That's been happening for years.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 that Dr. Williams has established that Storable has market power in the FMS market.

3 Q. ■ Has Dr. Williams evaluated competition in the market for insurance?

5 A. ■ He has not.

6 Q. ■ Has Dr. Williams looked at the number of insurers offering their services in the market for insurance?

8 A. ■ He has not.

9 Q. ■ Do you know how many of them there are?

10 A. ■ So, we heard testimony on Tuesday from Mr. Rudkin who was talking about the -- going to Las Vegas for the trade show.

12 He said there were a lot of options. And the information I have is looking at the Storable website, there is -- I think we talked about the website this morning. It lists the number of companies they are integrated with. So, that's a subset of the potential insurers.

17 There is 15 potential companies you can integrate with. Two of them belong to Storable. So, that's 13 plus one. And we know that SafeLease, also. So, at least 15, not to mention those that are in the market, but just not integrated with Storable.

22 MR. ALEXANDER: Mr. Carlock, can you put up Defendants' Exhibit 353? I'm sorry -- 352.

24 Q. (BY MR. ALEXANDER) Did you look at the website for Storable? They are showing their Marketplace integration.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

■ 1 A. -Yes. They have this page called Software Integrations where they list all of the partners that are integrated with the FMS. And if you scroll down, there is an option where you can -- it asks: Find an integration. can filter for risk, which corresponds to insurance. you see there is 15 options that are integrated. -- And you And here

7 MR. ALEXANDER: I'm not clear, Your Honor, whether this is in evidence. We're going to offer this as Defendants' Exhibit 352.

10 MR. YETTER: I don't think it's in evidence.

11 THE COURT: Defendants' Exhibit 352 is admitted.

12 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 352 admitted) 13 Q. (BY MR. ALEXANDER) Has Dr. Williams evaluated the price charged in the insurance market?

15 A. No, he has not.

16 Q. Has he established that Storable has any monopoly power in that market or the ability to affect competition in that market?

19 A. Not really, no.

20 Q. Has Dr. Williams established that -- how many potential customers are in this storage facility -- how many of the potential customers for insurance are in the storage facilities managed by Storable?

24 A. No, he has not looked at the number of units that were managed by Storable.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. In your opinion, does the integration of 13 competing insurers into the Storable FMS products, Store Link and storEDGE, demonstrate that Storable has the ability or has been trying to foreclose competition in that market?

5 A. No, on the contrary. When you have those integrated insurers, it makes it easier for them to be picked by your FMS customers. And so the fact that there is 13 other options that they are integrating with and not just -- you know, they could say: Hey, we're going to have our two products are integrated, but nothing else. So, like, that's an option. Not every ecosystem needs to be opened. Some can be closed. And so here there is 13 additional options for customers to pick from, which seems to be the opposite of foreclosing in that market.

14 Q. So, for you as an economist, what would you understand as the rationale for offering these different alternatives to your own in turn?

17 A. Yeah. So, based on, you know, what I have heard and the descriptions on the website and my knowledge of platforms, is that having third-party vendors or complimenters can make those platforms more valuable. And my understanding is that is part of the SiteLink and storEDGE business to be integrated to make their FMS more valuable.

23 Q. ■ More valuable to whom?

24 A. ■ To the operators who are licensing the FMS.

25 Q. Does that also make it more valuable to Storable?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 A. Is that -- well, if it -- you know, if -- if the FMS platform is more -- creates more value for its users, then it's potentially a way for Storable to recoup some of that value.

4 So, yes.

5 Q. ■ Do you have an understanding of why Storable developed APIs to provide access to loan their platform to third-parties?

8 A. Yes, I understand that there was demand from both the operators and the insurers. The APIs make it easier to get the data access; and, you know, you can kind of configure things in a different way. I know there is some companies that have their kind of specialized APIs where you can say: Hey, I want this API to be different; can you customize it for me? So, yeah, the API is here to make things easier for the insurers and the operators.

16 Q. What are the alternatives to having an API for insurers?

18 A. I understand you can get reports; and that's how, like, for instance, Storable, some of their companies don't have an API; and so the way they run their business is to get access to those reports.

22 Q. Are there -- are there benefits to being integrated beyond just having the data access?

24 A. Yes. So, like, you know, you are part of the -- you know, you are going to be there on the website. Your name is Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 going to be there. You are going to be recognized as a -- kind of a trusted vendor. And you're -- it's a lot -- it's going to be easier for you to set things up in that way. And so that means that if I'm an insurer, if I'm integrated, I'm more likely to get demand for my product than if I'm not integrated with a platform, everything else equal.

7 Q. Have you seen any evidence that the insurers value having API access?

9 A. ■ -Yes.

10 THE COURT: I'm going to interrupt quickly. II want to be careful not to go too far outside of the scope of the expert's expertise. So, just keep that in mind as we are moving forward, especially on our time constraint.

14 Q. (BY MR. ALEXANDER) Does it -- from an economic perspective, does it make sense that Storable would charge for access to an API; and if so, why?

17 A. If the API is providing value to both the operators and insurers, saving them costs, then, yes, that would make -- - sense. demand.

Q.

I'm sorry.

So, yes.

Just saving them costs or increasing

Now, Mr. Williams offered the opinion that prices offered for API access are supracompetitive. Do you agree with that analysis?

24 A. I don't.

25 Q. Can you explain to the Court how you analyzed that Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 API, the benchmark for that should be the Cubby API or the SSM, who are vastly different prices.

3 Q. ■ (BY MR. ALEXANDER) And with respect to the value that comes from an API agreement, would any particular FMS, would factors include quality of the service you are getting; - correct?

A. ■ Q.

Presumably, yes.

■ -Right. What about the number of customers that you are going to potentially be able to get on that platform versus another platform?

11 A. That could matter, too. So, for instance, if you think that there's a fixed cost for integration, because you need your engineers to kind of dibble up something, if you are going to get ten customers with one or a thousand with another one, the fixed cost is not going to be worth as much for the first one. And so you are not going to want to pay as much for the API because you have to incur fixed costs; and so that takes it away from the benefits of it.

19 So, that could be a reason as to why, depending on how big is the customer who you are going to give access to, you could charge -- it would be a different value for APIs.

22 Q. So, would the quality of the prospects that are on that network or that FMS platform, would that affect, to an economist, what an insurance company would want to be willing to pay for that access?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

■ 1 A. -Right. So, I think it's important think that the API -- there seems to be two different aspects of it. - One is purely technical integration in terms of how do I pull data, - right? Like instead of getting the reports, I'm able to get access to the system; and that's cheaper for me.

But one other part is, okay, now you are a part of the platform. turn-key solution.

You are advertised on the website.

It's a lot easier. aspect of that that is related to demand. - It's a And there is some

10 And so those are different services, and so they would have different value, depending on how much is one versus the other on a given platform.

13 Q. So, Dr. Williams criticized the difference between the buck and the buck-fifty. And he said -- I believe he said there wasn't any justification for that. Do you remember that?

16 A. He said there was no cost justification for that.

17 Q. No cost justification. Do you agree with that framework?

19 A. So, as I mentioned earlier, one of my things that I did in grad school was quantity marketing. And I was a TA for a marketing class, and we taught students pricing. And one of the things we taught them was do not do cost-plus pricing.

23 When you do pricing, you need to think about the value that you are providing to the customer. And so I wasn't quite sure why Dr. Williams thought that the only difference in price should Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 Q. Yeah. So, let's just talk about the $1.50 for a minute. You disagreed with Dr. Williams that -- when he said there is no cost -- FMS cost basis for the extra 50 cents or 50 percent; right?

5 A. Yeah, he said there was no cost difference; and so there was no justification for the price difference.

7 Q. Now, of course, you haven't found a cost reason for the extra 50 percent -- 50 cents; have you?

9 A. I have not.

10 Q. And the cost of acquiring the existing insurance customers at Storable is not a cost of the Storable FMS system, is it?

13 A. No, it's not.

14 Q. ■ So, whatever sunk cost they may have in acquiring Storable Insurance customers is no reason for Storable FMS to charge more money for access, is it?

- 17 A. ■ I think that depends. I think the way I think about it is: Are the investments that were made by the insurer, is that increasing the value of those customers to the person that is signing the API? That is the question.

21 Q. Okay. Let's talk about that. So, Storable Insurance, you are saying, has made some investments in getting customers; right?

24 A. ■ That's my understanding, yes.

25 Q. ■ And in a normally competitive world, a company Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 charges a price that tries to recover as much of their sunk cost as competition allows; right?

3 A. I mean that's what you are trying to do, but you are not pricing based on sunk cost.

5 Q. Exactly, because that's the sunk cost fallacy that you told the Judge about; isn't it?

7 A. ■ -Right.

8 Q. ■ Because companies in a competitive marketplace might as well kiss their sunk costs goodbye because you can't -- in a competitive marketplace, you can't price based on how much you spent to get the value; can you?

12 A. Right. But I think here what's important is that when you think about pricing for a company, you are not doing cost-plus pricing. So, you are thinking what value am I providing consumers compared to the competition.

16 Q. Exactly. That's why you call it fallacy, because sunk costs are irrelevant to what value customers -- or what price customers are willing to pay in a competitive marketplace; true?

20 A. Right. I think I'm trying to make a different point is that you would want to consider -- I agree with you the investments are sunk, yes, totally, for sure, sunk cost fallacy, all of this.

24 I think the question is that you will want to consider -- and I don't have an answer to that.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR - I'm just (979) 533-0422

1 saying you would want to consider when Storable is thinking about its pricing, it's not pricing based on costs; right?

3 It's thinking what is different value that is being brought up by the API and by the integration.

5 So, for instance -- and I think that's a really -- that was very interesting in the documents. I understand that there was -- as part of the negotiation, there was a pricing scheme that was differentiating existing customers from new customers.

10 Q. Do you mind if we get to that in just one minute?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Because I have that.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. But let's get back to the point that maybe Storable is charging that extra 50 cents, 50 percent for winning Storable Insurance customers. They are charging that on the FMS side because of some -- they are more valuable customers.

18 Is that what you are trying to say?

19 A. Yes. It may be easier to -- yeah, it may be easier to get access to them. There may be less marketing costs.

21 Q. Do you see any evidence that winning a Storable Insurance customer is somehow easier or more valuable than winning any other insurance customer in the marketplace? Do you see any evidence of that?

25 A. Well, I'm actually talking hypothetically and -- Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 of things. So, that's one way in gaining traction in the industry with a new product.

3 Another way is to offer great pricing, et cetera, to build your business and so on. One of the things that I do know, because I know so many people in the industry, we're friends and we all talk. That is what this industry truly is about, like people helping people.

8 I know that MiniCo has a better price than I do.

9 I know Deans & Homer have a better price than I do. I know all of that. I know that I probably pay a little bit more for my API access fee than what they do.

12 Q. ■ -Okay. Let's talk about that. Do you mind sharing with the Court what you pay to Storable under your API agreement for TPP?

15 A. ■ -Sure. Let me start with where we started at though.

16 Q. ■ -Sure.

17 A. ■ So, where we started was they gave a proposal to me of what the API access was. I had 20 stores at the time or something. So, I mapped it all out in an Excel worksheet to try to figure out what it would cost me based on what their proposal was. At the time, they proposed a percentage of the revenue that I was going to collect.

23 Q. ■ Did that work for you?

24 A. ■ -No. 25 Q. ■ Did you counter them?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ A. I more than countered them. So, the reason it didn't work for me is I would have made no money under Storage Shield.

- So, I mapped it out using MyStorage, using my database and all of that. - ■

16 ■ 17 ■ Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

- ■ ■ 4 ■ 7 Q. ■ And do you pay that willingly?

8 A. ■ -I do.

9 Q. ■ Do you like paying that fee?

10 A. ■ I do not like paying that.

11 Q. ■ Do you wish it were lower?

12 A. ■ I wish it was free, but it's not. But I -- so, let me be clear with you.

14 Q. ■ Do you understand it?

15 A. ■ -I do. And what I understand, because I run similar businesses and, like, if you look at my total platform of StorSuite, technically speaking, my total platform competes exactly, except for the property management software stuff, with Storable platform.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

-- - ■

12 ■ Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

3 ■ 4 ■ 9 Q. What does that mean?

10 A. I can't get ahold of anybody on the phone. I can't get anything fixed that's their problem versus our problem.

12 It's quite the challenge to get somebody on the phone, where I can call Bobby Lish tomorrow and have somebody on my problem just like that. And to me, the difference between my platform and Storable's platform is I'm more of a service-oriented person. So, I go with Storable because they give me service.

17 Case closed.

18 Q. Is there value to you even at the $1.50 level?

19 A. I'm willing to pay more for better service, and I hope that people in our industry would pay me more for better service.

22 Q. Now, do you believe in data privacy and security, especially in light of your recent hack incident?

24 A. I probably do more now than I did just week, but yes.

25 Q. ■ Do you believe that APIs are the way to go?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ A. I would say yes. Like, the biggest thing there is it takes time, energy, effort, money, all the resources on hand to build all of that stuff out. And to me, that's what I'm paying for. I'm paying for the luxury of having that, that I don't have to do it.

6 Q. Do you respect Storable's efforts to protect tenants?

7 A. Yes, a lot. On the Pinnacle search property site, absolutely.

9 Q. At a general level, you understand what this dispute is about?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you think it's reasonable for SafeLease to continue to expect to receive access to these systems for free?

14 A. Not at all.

15 Q. And you mentioned that you own these personal properties. In addition to SiteLink, what other FMS providers have you used over time with regard to your personal properties?

19 A. Me, personally, I have used QuikStor. I've used WebSelfStorage. I've used SiteLink -- were the three ones that I have used in the past.

22 Q. Now, you mentioned the Marketplace -- 23 A. So, I also want to be clear about that. SiteLink by far is the best, in my opinion.

25 Q. ■ Fair enough. Does Storage Shield have full Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 administrative access via its operators' credentials into people's FMS?

3 A. ■ -No. 4 Q. ■ Is the solution to that, from your perspective, an API agreement?

6 A. ■ -Yes. So, obviously, I could have done that myself.

7 If I wanted to skirt the system, I could have done that myself.

8 I don't do that.

- 9 Q. Do you believe that SafeLease is attempting, based on your understanding, is attempting to skirt the system? Does that create risk, in your mind?

12 A. It absolutely -- it creates a risk for the platform for Storable; but it creates a risk for the end user, the consumer. And bluntly, the reason I'm here is because I want to see what's best for the industry.

16 Q. And do you regard Storable's pricing to be some sort of a penalty or somehow anticompetitive, based on your experience in the industry?

19 A. Not at all.

20 Q. Do some in the industry disagree with you and view it another way?

22 A. Yes. So, obviously, I keep my ear to the ground.

23 I'm involved, totally involved in the industry; and I hear all kinds of stuff. I hear things like, you know, that they are creating this big conglomerate and so on. And, you know, I Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 myself. Somebody like myself that has 21 properties, I'm in the top 100 companies in the United States for storage with only 21 properties.

4 Q. From your perspective, Mr. Manes, if somebody doesn't like that Storable is charging for APIs in a TPP or tenant insurance base, what options do they have?

7 A. They can go someplace else.

8 Q. And what other FMS providers are out there, other than the ones you mentioned?

10 A. There is probably 20 or 30 of them. There is Tenant, Inc. There is Self Storage Manager. There is -- so, I do know Storage Commander has a couple now under one platform, like Dominaco, SaraSoft, like there is Canovis. There is Cubby that I mentioned. A bunch of these guys are new in our industry, but there is a whole bunch of them.

16 Q. ■ -Okay. Do you believe also that there are a number of - competitors in the tenant insurance and tenant protection plan space?

19 A. ■ Yeah, there is probably 20 or 30 of those, too.

20 Q. Okay. And so you mentioned the Marketplace. Do you mean the Marketplace that's on the website for Storable?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Is your company listed there?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. What is your understanding of that listing? How do Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 A. Yeah. I don't want to -- I want to be good to people. I wake up every day to try to be a good person.

6 ■ 12 ■ ■ - 20 ■ 22 ■ 23 ■ Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

- 7 ■ ■ - 11 ■ - ■ ■ - 17 ■ 18 ■ 19 ■ 24 ■ 25 ■ Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

■ - 4 ■ ■ ■ ■ -- 11 ■ ■ ■ - - - ■ ■ ■ - 19 ■ 20 ■ 21 ■ 22 ■ 23 ■ Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

■ -Did Storable ever tell you that there was an older 5 Q. ■ grandfathered-in group of insurance providers?

7 A. No. What they -- so, I'll tell what you happened back then, is I created Storage Shield for my own properties in probably 2020 or something like that. And then I sold 14 properties to one of the publicly traded companies and went down to six properties.

12 And at that time, I broke up with one of my business partners; and we took Storage Shield to the Texas Self Storage Association conference; and we started offering it to everybody else at that point because the revenue versus expenses for myself to run it internally disappeared because I

- sold 14 properties.

18 So, we started offering it to the industry. And I offered it to the industry. I sold in September 2021. It ■ was in October of 2021 that I started offering it to the industry, and it was two years later that I signed that API agreement with Storable.

23 So, I was operating out in the public openly for a year, year and a half or something like that, getting very little traction. I didn't really start getting any traction Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS: COUNTY OF AUSTIN: 3 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 4 I, DONNA A. GOREE, Official Court Reporter in and for the Texas Business Court, Division 3A of Austin County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-entitled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were stenographically reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

16 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 11th day of March, 2025. /s/ Donna Goree _______________________________ DONNA A. GOREE, CSR, RPR, CRR 20 Official Court Reporter Texas Business Courts 21 Austin County, Texas 3721 Carmen Avenue 22 Rancho Viejo, Texas 78575 (979) 533-0422 23 Certificate No. 3909 Expiration Date: 07/31/2025 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

Exhibit L FILED UNDER SEAL 1

2 REPORTER'S RECORD 3 VOLUME 5 OF 7 VOLUMES 4 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 5 APPELLATE CASE NO. 15-25-00020-CV _______________________________________________________________ : SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC : TEXAS BUSINESS COURT : 8 Plaintiff, : : v. : : 10 : DIVISION 3A STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., : (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK SOFTWARE, : LLC, EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC, : BADER CO., AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, : LP : TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 13 Defendants. : _______________________________________________________________ 16 TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING _______________________________________________________________ 19 On the 14th day of February, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in person in Austin, Travis County, Texas.

23 Proceedings reported by stenographic machine shorthand.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 62928

1 that the term that you have heard?

2 A. It's not regularly used. I don't think it would be a mischaracterization. Occasionally, one deals on price. But I would like to think it's a combination of reasons why someone would work with us. Of course, price is always important in the insurance world.

7 Q. Do you agree that SafeLease offers highly competitive prices?

9 A. We do, yes.

10 Q. And the term "discount provider," is that, in fact, a term that Storable has called SafeLease in its papers in this litigation?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. ■ About how many of your customers use the Storable product as their FMS?

16 A. ■ I think it's now 1,800 facilities.

17 Q. ■ Do you know about what percentage of your customers use a Storable FMS?

19 A. ■ It's approximately 70 percent.

20 Q. ■ 70 percent?

21 A. ■ That's correct.

22 Q. Do you, SafeLease, ever access the customer's Facility Management Software without their permission?

24 A. Never. We wouldn't be able to. The customer has to create the credentials.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 63045

1 to avoid potential disruption?

2 A. I did, yes.

3 Q. We can see here you wrote as an -- find -- pardon me.

4 You listed a couple of ideas including, one, Storable allow SafeLease to access the Storable APIs; and then the second bullet point where Storable doesn't need SafeLease as an approved vendor. And then you made some requests to get explanation about the planned security changes. Is that fair?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 Q. Did you end up having a conversation with Storable about the price for potential API access?

12 A. We did, yes. There was some emails on that.

13 Q. When it came to these API-related discussions, did you get any proposed terms besides price?

15 A. No. The only thing that was shown to us was price per unit; and there were no terms associated with what calls would be available with an API, whether or not there would be a non-compete, anything like that.

19 MS. ALLEN: We can take down this exhibit.

20 Q. ■ (BY MS. ALLEN) And what were the price terms that Storable proposed?

22 A. They were requesting $1 per every protected unit, unless that protected unit was previously with a Storable insurance company, in which case it would be $1.50; and that's per month -- per unit, per month.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 63148

1 Q. For the charge of $1, would that 20- or 30-percent margin allow you -- of profit allow you to continue to operate SafeLease? Would you be able to continue to keep the lights on?

5 A. No, and in many cases we have less. It depends on the risk of the facility, as to how much that percentage share is; but, no, we would not be in business if we only had 20 cents to work with.

9 Q. Is it fair to say that, under those API price proposals, SafeLease would go out of business?

11 A. That's correct. Those were not serious proposals.

12 They know that we just simply could not accept those.

13 Q. Were you given any API terms, economic even, for ESS access?

15 A. No. ESS doesn't have an API. And so Mr. Lish was clear that they would be making no proposal at all for ESS.

17 Q. ■ I believe we've heard some testimony on this, but does SafeLease have API agreements with other FMS providers besides Storable?

20 A. ■ We do, yes.

21 Q. ■ And who are those agreements with?

22 A. ■ We have Cubby and SSM.

23 Q. And you were here for Dr. Williams' testimony. Those were the two API agreements that he discussed?

25 A. That's correct.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 63294

1 testified under oath that if Storable had signed an API agreement with you at 45 cents, it's likely we would have been able to work something out? Did you say that under oath?

4 A. Again, if they had presented an agreement to -- you are saying if we had signed an agreement. And I'm saying that if we had signed an agreement, we would have an agreement.

7 But again, prices just weren't -- if they would have presented something to us at 45 cents, it's very possible we could have worked out an agreement; but I don't know what other terms. They never presented other terms to us.

11 Q. Mr. Stein, did you previously testify under oath in this case, before it was removed to this Business Court, that if Storable had signed an API agreement with you at 45 cents, it's likely you would have been able to work something out, yes or no? Did you say that previously?

16 A. I don't know exactly those words. It's possible.

17 Q. All right. The record will reflect. We'll cite that later.

19 You know that Storable wanted $1, $1.50; right?

20 A. That is what they signaled.

21 ■ 23 ■ ■ - Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 option to choose another FMS provider, don't they?

2 A. It's very difficult because Storable has also bought a payments company that require a link to use their payment system. And they make that -- they locked down that payment data, which makes it very difficult to migrate.

6 Q. Yeah, Mr. Stein, that wasn't my question.

7 You understand that there are other FMS companies that they can switch to, right?

9 A. Sure.

10 Q. And SafeLease, you heard Mr. Kinet said has been actively encouraging people to go look at Cubby; right?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. All right. Let's look at this document, DX-348, head of talent associate? You testified that this was for some other parent company; is that right?

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. It doesn't say anything about that. This is on SafeLease logo talking about SafeLease only, right?

19 A. Yeah, it was posted to the SafeLease applicant tracking system. But this is a senior role, and they operate at the parent-company level.

22 Q. But it doesn't say that anywhere on this.

23 A. I'm not sure what you mean by "this"; but, no, we're not specifically talking about the various subsidiaries.

25 Q. This says this is a job posting for SafeLease head of Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 A. I think it depends on the bond. But I think in general, the liquidity question, yeah, we've got -- we've got enough for probably a couple of months of payroll. It's not really clear what size bond you're talking about.

5 Q. If an injunction issues in this case, you understand a bond is going to be required, right, in an amount to be determined; fair?

8 A. That's fair.

9 Q. If SafeLease can't pay it because it has no money, can you represent to this Court that you will make sure that it will be caused to be paid by some entity under your control?

12 A. I think, depending on the size of the bond, we could make that representation.

14 MR. TORGERSON: Pass the witness.

15 THE COURT: Before you pass, I do have a few questions. I just want to give you both a chance to ask your questions. I don't want to ask a question you're planning on asking. And then if there is any follow-up, I will let cross complete it; and then it will be fair for redirect.

20 Just a few quick questions. The first one is: Since January 1, have you processed any insurance claims of tenants of mutual customers between SafeLease and Storable?

23 THE WITNESS: We have, yes, Your Honor.

24 Although, I'm sure there are others that are in a pending status which, but for our ability to access information, would Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 have been processed.

2 THE COURT: And that was possible. From your answer, I did think that that -- 4 THE WITNESS: It is, but it requires a lot more work on the facility owner's part to clearly get that information to us.

7 THE COURT: So, there has been a lot of discussion of SafeLease -- I'm not saying using FMS platforms.

9 But to my mind, there is distinction between accessing the data, which maybe belongs to the facility or the tenant, and using the features of the software. And so I'm trying to get a sense in my mind of how much of each of those things is happening.

14 I understand a lot of times we're talking about accessing the data; but it sounds like sometimes we're talking about, say, Lease Editor or maybe using a specific software sent in an email. So, if you could just give me your perspective on how much is accessing the data and how much of it is using, you know, a feature of the software essentially.

20 THE WITNESS: Sure. Yeah, so our customers -- we're essentially a third-party manager that sits behind the counter that are managing leases. We're requested to do that for the insurance aspects of the business.

24 And so while there is a large amount of data then that is getting pulled to operate the insurance piece of Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 We have done more than 15 merger and acquisition transactions, totaling in the billions of dollars. And I have never been in court once.

4 And the reason for that is because we have been extremely reasonable to deal with. We have negotiated in good faith with hundreds of different parties. We have worked out business resolutions on every dispute we've ever had until this situation.

9 Contrast that with Mr. Stein. He is ten years younger than me, and this is the second or third major lawsuit that I know about.

12 Q. ■ Mr. Gordon, let's take a look, if we can, at the timeline that we prepared. This has been shared with counsel.

14 Tell us the story of how Storable came to be. You mentioned -- you mentioned it started in your dorm room. Tell us that, if you would?

17 A. Sure. So, back in 2008, my cofounder Mario Feghali and I started one of our predecessor companies, Sparefoot; and we spent the first ten years of that journey basically building Sparefoot into a comparison shopping website for self-storage facilities. So, think like a booking.com or hotel.com for - storage.

And along that journey we got to know our customers really well. And we understood that they were using in most cases five, six, seven different technology vendors to Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 run their business. And we knew that there was -- there were a lot of pain points in daily operations between all those different vendors and systems; and we thought there could be an opportunity to bring all that together into one comprehensive platform to simplify the daily lives of our customers, make them more efficient and more profitable.

7 So, we knew that to kind of execute that strategy we needed to bring together the FMS platforms, along with other vendors like websites, like insurance, like access control, and many of the other things that we now do today.

11 Q. What does Storable do and what are its various business lines?

13 A. Sure. So, Storable today is a fully integrated technology company that serves self-storage facilities from their software and a variety of other products, to include insurance, to include payments, to include access control, websites, options and more. We also do the same thing in the marina industry and in the RV park and campground industry.

19 Q. Explain, if you would, the brief history of each of the three FMS platforms and how they came under the Storable umbrella?

22 A. Sure. So, in 2018 we acquired SiteLink; and that was our first major transaction. And after we acquired SiteLink is when we rebranded the combined company to Storable. Later that year we acquired storEDGE, and then in 2020 we acquired Easy Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 Storage Solutions.

2 Q. Describe, if you would, the difference between these three platforms and why they remain separate?

4 A. Sure. So, Easy Storage Solutions is our economy product, if you will. It's for the lower end of the storage industry who is typically operating a single facility at a time.

8 You know, mom and pops, smaller facilities, they need less functionality and features. They are not trying to do complicated tasks, generally speaking. And for that, they expect and need a lower price. So, Easy is kind of our stripped down version, if you will.

13 Q. On this timeline, did you have input on its preparation?

15 A. Yes.

16 MR. TORGERSON: Defendants move to admit Defendants' 366.

18 MR. YETTER: No objection.

19 THE COURT: Defendants' Exhibit 366 is admitted.

20 (Defendants` Exhibit No. 366 admitted) 21 Q. (BY MR. TORGERSON) We've talked about ESS. Tell us about SiteLink and storEDGE respectively and how they do.

23 A. Sure. So, SiteLink is our oldest platform; but it is also our most configurable, I'll say. It has 20 plus years of functionality built into it. That means that any way a storage Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 operator can dream up to run their business, SiteLink can be configured to do that. And it is amazing how many different ways people can dream up to run their business.

4 StorEDGE is our more modern product, and it's fully browser based; and it, you know, has some more modern features and functionality that our customers want and expect.

7 But, yeah, SiteLink and storEDGE kind of serve the same segment; but they are just different flavors, if you will.

9 Q. ■ Upon their acquisition or since their acquisition, Mr. Gordon, have these platforms been improved in some sense?

11 A. Yeah. We invest, have invested, and continue to invest more every year tens of millions of dollars in research and development.

14 Q. And specifically -- and we are at a high level -- what kind of improvements are you doing? What are you spending that money on?

17 A. Sure. So, we are investing in everything from new features, new functionality, platform stability, to cybersecurity, and much more.

20 Q. Let's talk about security. Were there issues with these platforms after you acquired them?

22 A. Yes. Cybersecurity is constantly an issue.

23 Q. Right. And were there particular issues, by way of example, with SiteLink about exposing certain data when you acquired it?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 And so the way we treat each other, the way we talk about each other, the way we conduct business means a lot; and that's even true with our competitors.

4 Q. ■ Mr. Gordon, to your knowledge, do some of these FMS providers, in addition to Storable, provide for and enter into API agreements?

7 A. ■ -Yes.

8 Q. ■ And just give us some examples of some that you know do API agreements; and then explain what the range of cost is for those API agreements, that you know of.

11 A. Yeah. So, we have seen several examples here in this case, just a range of API prices for insurance with different FMS providers for SafeLease. But I know that if, for example, like Tenant, Inc., has lots of API agreements with everyone who -- from a website provider to an auction provider to an insurance provider; and they probably have different prices for all of those. That's just one example. Same thing would be true with any of them.

19 Q. ■ Are some offered for free?

20 A. ■ That's my understanding.

21 Q. ■ What is the tradeoff, to your understanding, why they offer for free?

- A. ■ Probably because they are not providing very much value.

25 Q. ■ And are there instances where Storable's insurance Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 products, the companies Bader and StorSmart, do they have APIs with some of these FMS providers?

3 A. ■ -No. 4 Q. ■ What kind of -- do they have any relationship at all?

5 A. ■ There are -- I wouldn't say they have relationships with the other FMS's directly; but we do have customers of our insurance products who use different FMS providers.

8 Q. Oh, that's a fair point. And do you have an API agreement in those instances?

10 A. ■ -No. 11 Q. ■ All right. I apologize. Are there other competitors in the insurance space?

13 A. ■ -Many.

14 Q. Let's go to the next slide. We see Storable here.

- ■ What are some other competitors that we see listed here? And let's be clear on whether it's the tenant insurance or TPP space, to the extent you know.

18 A. Sure. So, in SBOA, it's a tenant insurance competitor. Xercor is tenant insurance. Cornerstone is tenant insurance. MiniCo, I believe, is tenant insurance, as well.

21 Storage Shield is a protection plan. And I'm trying to look around here.

23 Q. And of these listed, are some of them integrated with Storable?

25 A. ■ Most of them are.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. And what does that mean?

2 A. ■ That means they have an API agreement that they have signed with us that governs their access to the platforms.

4 MR. TORGERSON: Can we look at Defendants' Exhibit No. 352?

6 Q. (BY MR. TORGERSON) All right. I'm showing you Defendants' Exhibit 352, which we believe is admitted into evidence. Do you recognize this document?

9 A. ■ Yes, I do.

10 Q. ■ What is it?

11 A. ■ It's a page on our website that lists all of our -- we call The Marketplace. It lists all of the different third parties that integrate with our FMS platforms.

14 Q. ■ And what types of industries do those run across?

15 A. ■ Well, I think there is probably more than a dozen different categories of vendors that we integrate with; but it could be any of ones like I've mentioned so far today, like the access control, the things that we do. But also there is things like call centers and third-party management.

MR. TORGERSON: see other businesses.

Q.

Can we go to the next page?

Keep going. There we go. (BY MR. TORGERSON) We see insurance companies like - You

23 Savvy, MiniCo, and Storage Shield posted here?

24 A. Correct. ■- 25 Q. ■ Mr. Gordon, explain to the Court why Storable, as a Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 company that has tenant insurance and TPP programs, why it would publicly advertise for other companies on its own website, competitors?

4 A. Yeah, it's a great question; and it's really important. Storable -- one of Storable's main value propositions to our customers in the industry is that we provide choice amongst vendors in all these different categories we're talking about.

Our customers want to be able to choose. want to be able to consider their different options. there to be competition. - They They want They want our platform to enable that - choice.

If we were to say you are not allowed to have choice, you have to use our product or you can only use this one or two choices, that would be bad for our business. People would leave. They would go to a different FMS provider who promised them that choice.

18 Q. Does it -- could Storable require that a facility using its FMS products also buy Storable's insurance?

20 A. ■ -No. 21 Q. Can a storage facility require that its tenants take out insurance?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do they do that, in your experience?

25 A. They can require that the tenants are covered by Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 insurance. You can't force them to buy your plan.

2 Q. Got it. And does the opportunities for coverage to tenants also extend to homeowner's and renter's insurance?

4 A. Yes. So, the way it works, which I think has been explained a few times, but for clarity, if you -- if the storage facility requires that you, as a tenant, are covered, can you either provide proof of your own private insurance, which could be from Nationwide or could be from any other big insurance company, or you can buy theirs.

10 Q. ■ In Storable's tenant insurance and TPP business, are there relationships, agreements in place, where you work with a facility that does not even have an FMS platform?

A. ■ Q. - Yes.

And what is the solution? How do you do your job

- ■ there?

16 A. ■ They manually send us reports.

- - 17 Q. ■ Like has been described in this case up to this point?

19 A. ■ Yes.

20 Q. Is that workable?

- ■ 21 A. ■ It is.

22 Q. ■ Is that how the world used to work before these FMS platforms?

24 A. ■ -It is.

25 Q. There have been a lot of discussion in the terms of Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 service about the DEI provision in Section 4.5 and the definition of "user." For the benefit of the Court, would you explain your perspective on reasons that distinguish a legitimate third-party user working for the business of the facility versus what you understand SafeLease to be doing?

6 A. Sure. Generally speaking, just to be clear, this concept of accessing our systems as an authorized user, in my mind, it's a concept made up by SafeLease for this lawsuit. I have never heard any other vendor say this to me before. This is not a commonly accepted thing. It's not real.

11 SafeLease has come up with this idea to get around our terms of service that make it clear that if you are running a third-party business, you have to have an API agreement with us. Everyone in the storage industry understands that. I think we heard that from Mr. Manes earlier.

17 Q. ■ To your knowledge, does any other insurance provider out there have separate administrative level access, to your knowledge, without -- period -- other than SafeLease?

20 A. So, it is possible that there are some -- someone else who has an administrator access account. But to my knowledge, there is nobody else who has built an entire business by creating thousands and thousands of usernames and

- creating an entire computerized system to automate their way in.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. Instead, is it the case that these other insurance company competitors enter into an API agreement to access your platforms?

4 A. ■ Everyone else does that.

5 Q. All right. Have you lost FMS customers in the last year?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. How many?

9 A. Just under 1,000.

10 Q. And why? What reasons?

11 A. So, there is a variety of reasons why we would lose -- sorry. There is a variety of reasons why we would lose an FMS customer, but I would say the most prevalent ones are price. So, maybe they find a better deal on a different FMS competitor.

16 Two, they complain about our product functionality. They say that: I like this other company that is innovating faster or it has XYZ feature that you don't have.

19 And three, even though we try to be really service oriented and I think we do a pretty good job of it, sometimes people complain about service.

22 Q. Mr. Gordon, let's turn to API agreements. Is it the case that -- does Storable have API agreements with other companies at the buck/buck-fifty model?

25 A. We do.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

- ■ ■ ■ - - ■

■ 8 ■ 9 ■ 13 Q. Explain to the Court the value of a Storable insurance customer with regard to this pricing model.

15 A. Sure. So, I think there is a few components to that, and this is important. First is that you have to put yourself in the shoes and mindset of a self-storage owner.

18 Historically, they may not know about the existence of tenant insurance or tenant protection at all.

20 Our team has spent years and years going out to market, talking to our customers, educating them about what this concept is in the first place. Once we convince them that this is a good idea for them to do, then we bring them into our team. We spend time and resources training them up so that their managers can understand so that they can go amend all of Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 their leases to include the language that they need to have.

2 We get that all set up in the system. We then help them get their enrollment rate up. We help them start making more money from this platform.

5 And so generally speaking, a customer that has been on Storable insurance has benefited from all of this investment that we have put in; and, therefore, they are producing more than the average customer and are more valuable to a different insurance company if they were to then take that customer from us.

11 Q. That last point that you made, Mr. Gordon, had we heard evidence from different witnesses in this proceeding about value to them of trying to take Storable's customers?

14 A. ■ -So -- 15 Q. ■ Even at the higher end?

16 A. ■ Yes, Mr. Manes said that he is still willing to pay that because it's worth it.

18 Q. ■ What about for Mr. Kinet?

19 A. ■ So, this is -- Mr. Kinet said that -- and then actually Mr. Stein today also confirmed that 65 to 70 percent of all the new customers they sign up every month are coming from Storable platforms. To me, that's not surprising because the ones that are our customers are more valuable because they are better at selling tenant insurance and they are going to benefit more from this type of offering that they have.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 - And

1 then I think about the fact that Storable only has about 30 percent of our FMS customers using our insurance.

3 Q. ■ Say that again. And what is the importance of that statistic?

5 A. Only 30 percent of Storable's FMS customers use our insurance products; and that's combined, both tenant insurance - and TPP. But yet 65 percent of SafeLease's new sales, 65 to percent are coming from our 30 percent.

Q. Are there costs associated with instituting and maintaining API connections for these competitors out there?

11 A. ■ Absolutely.

12 Q. ■ Tell us about that briefly.

13 A. So, the API is not just a, you know, piece of the software that sits there and takes care of itself. - It is highly used, millions and millions of interactions with it on a daily basis. It is something -- it is a feature or functionality that requires a high level of support.

18 We field questions from third parties who are using our API all the time; and we have to constantly be improving it, adding new features to it, investing in it, and making it more secure.

22 Q. Mr. Gordon, in these various agreements that we've talked about for APIs with your competitors in the tenant insurance and TPP space, have you offered caps?

25 A. ■ We have to, some of them.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. And some of those are in place?

2 A. ■ -Yes.

3 Q. ■ Are those negotiated just depending on the deal?

4 A. Correct. ■- 5 Q. And let's talk about the negotiations specifically with SafeLease. We know that originally the dollar/dollar-fifty model was proposed. Was that the beginning of the process?

9 A. ■ That was the beginning.

- 10 Q. ■ Did you ever say take it or leave it?

11 A. ■ No. 12 Q. At some point did those discussions continue?

- ■ 13 A. ■ Yes.

14 Q. ■ Have they been continuing even recently?

15 A. ■ They have.

16 ■ ■ ■ - -- - Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

3 Q. Is the API only about data access, or are there other factors, other dimensions like, for example, demand generation?

5 A. Yes. So, API access certainly is, in a major way, about access to our systems; but it's also about getting the verified approved-by-Storable stamp of approval. And that's something that our integrated third parties care a lot about

- because customers come to us and they say: Are these other third parties legitimate? Can I work with them? Have you vetted them?

12 Q. ■ In your opinion -- 13 A. ■ And we share them on The Marketplace, of course.

14 Q. ■ In your opinion, are there reasons why your API connections or your API agreements might be more valuable than, say, that of Cubby; and why?

17 A. Yes. So, the amount of work required by a third-party to finish a new integration with an FMS platform is not significantly different, whether it would be integrating with a Cubby or a SiteLink, let's call it.

21 However, with SiteLink and our FMS ecosystem, you are getting exposure to maybe 100 times more facilities by doing the same amount of work. So, it's far more valuable than integrating with Cubby.

25 Q. Why can't ESS have an API connection?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 A. So, we have made the strategic choice -- and this is not a change. This has always been true -- for ESS to not have an API at all because there is significant costs associated with having that API, maintaining it, and supporting the network of third parties; and as a way the keep our costs down on ESS, we have decided to not build that.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. And the reason we're keeping costs down on ESS, to be clear, is so that we can continue to offer the lower price of ESS to our customers.

11 ■ ■ - 14 ■ ■- 16 ■ 17 ■ 19 ■ 20 ■ 23 THE COURT: Can I ask you real quick: Are there any exhibits associated with that?

25 MR. TORGERSON: I'm sorry?

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 customers?

2 A. This email was designed and written specifically to rile up the customer base -- 4 Q. And did it work?

5 A. -- and pit them against Storable.

6 Q. Did it work?

7 A. Yes, it definitely worked.

8 Q. And if you'll just scroll through here, look through here on the first page. Let's look at the bottom half.

10 Just give us some highlights of your reaction to this. Do you think this is -- in sum and substance, do you think this is a true or honest and accurate interpretation of the situation?

14 A. Absolutely not.

15 Q. Give us some examples right here on the first page.

16 A. Storable is violating the rights you have already paid for. That is not true.

18 You have the right to appoint authorized users like SafeLease. That is not true.

20 You own your insurance data and can decide how to use it. We have never done anything that suggests that that's not the case.

23 You have the right to share your insurance data with SafeLease. That's also true, just not through a back door into our system.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. Instead, what is the solution there?

2 A. ■ The solution would be to have an API agreement.

3 Q. ■ Or the operator could do what?

4 A. ■ Or they could email the reports; and SafeLease could tell them: Hey, I need you to go execute XYZ action in the system; and the operator could do it.

7 Q. Go to the next page, if you would. And just at a high level again, these other things about, you know, excuses and demanding a ransom, what was your reaction to these? And point out any false information that you believe exists here.

11 A. Well, expect Storable to make excuses, to me, suggests that they, of course, know that we're going to respond to their false claims. And they are trying to get ahead of that and make us look bad before we even have a chance to defend ourselves. So, that's what that is.

16 Demanding a ransom is ridiculous to me because they know full well that we are not actually charging $1.50 per unit per month to our existing customer base. And that's actually something I did want to mention.

20 Specifically, we heard Mr. Stein earlier say that -- you asked, Your Honor, how many -- what percent of SafeLease's customer base would the $1.50 apply to versus the $1; and he said 70 percent would be $1.50. That is patently not true.

25 We have made it very clear to them that the back Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 MR. TORGERSON: Sure. Yes. Apologies.

2 (Parties enter courtroom.)

3 Q. ■ (BY MR. TORGERSON) Let's go to the end. You had some -- you wanted some options to be laid out in the top half.

We are making the following promises, one, two, three. through that.

A. Sure. So, in this email and also in the many - Walk us

8 subsequent conversations that I had with customers trying to get them to calm down based on what SafeLease had told them, I made it very clear that we are not taking the position that you have to leave SafeLease. You can continue to use SafeLease for as long as you want, and we are totally okay with that. - You just can't continue to let them access our system the same way they have been in the past. You might have to send them some reports manually. You might have to take some actions in your system that they tell you you need to do; but you do not have to stop using SafeLease.

18 Q. You made that abundantly clear in the first one?

19 A. I did. And any conversation I've had with anyone, I've made that abundantly clear, too, to including Mr. Rudkin who was here. I had that explicit conversation with him.

22 Q. And in your conversation with Mr. Rudkin and these other customers, did you convey the importance of maintaining -- the importance of the security of the system?

25 A. Yes. So, the way I did describe it to Mr. Rudkin and Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 others is imagine -- we have learned here in the last few days that SafeLease has thousands of different administrator logins to our system.

4 Imagine that SafeLease was hacked by a bad actor and that hacker now has access to those thousands of administrator passwords in our system. Imagine they figured that out, log into some of Storable's platforms, and cause a massive data breach across all of our customers and their tenants' PII. Well, we have no contract with SafeLease that gives us any kind of contractual liability for that situation.

11 So, we and our customers will be fully left holding the bag if SafeLease is breached.

13 Q. SafeLease has made the accusation that it's being unfairly targeted and singled out. Is there a reason why SafeLease finds itself in the position that it's in?

16 A. Because they have been unwilling to do business with us like the hundreds of other people in the industry who do it the right way.

19 Q. ■ In addition to this response, which we just looked at 207, did Storable generate help articles for each of the three platforms?

22 A. We did. Despite what I would -- you know, they keep claiming we attacked them. I would contend the opposite.

24 But despite the fact that we feel like they are the ones attacking us and trying to pit our customers against Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 us via their email that was extremely defamatory, we still published new help articles that explained how our customers can go out and automate sending a report to SafeLease and generally make it easy for them to continue doing business with - them.

Q. Let's look at DX-228, and let's split the screen with

- ■ 229. This is for Easy Storage as 228, and 229 is SiteLink.

8 Are these the help articles?

9 A. ■ -Yes.

- 10 Q. ■ And then real quick, the DX-230 is the storEDGE help article. What do these do?

12 A. ■ These are new help articles we've put out that helped make it clear to our customers how to leverage the functionality that had already been in place for them, which is they can automate sending in reports to third-party insurance - vendors.

Q. ■ Mr. Gordon, to be clear, even though these were recently published, has this information and this process always been available to operators and to SafeLease?

20 A. ■ -Yes.

21 Q. Let's talk about SafeLease's plea of poverty in this case. In your dealings with Mr. Stein and/or SafeLease, has there been ever a question about their liquidity?

24 A. Not in my mind.

25 Q. And to the contrary, what have you gained or gleaned Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 MR. YETTER: Just take a minute. On page -- let's actually go to Page 12. And one of the things that you report on Page 12 of Defendants' Exhibit 204 -- it's at No. 8.3.10 -- is that customer users do not have -- 8.3.10.

5 You, Storable, report to this agency that your "customer users do not have access to cardholder data in the in-scope system," your FMS system. Did you realize that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So, if they can't get it, then SafeLease can't get it; can they?

11 A. Not supposed to be able to.

12 Q. ■ Now, we have heard more than once that the point of what Storable decided to do over the last three months is to get SafeLease to sign an API contract so SafeLease pays Storable money; right?

16 A. And accesses our systems in the secure and industry standard way.

18 Q. Let's break those two apart. But one of the things you think is that SafeLease should pay you money, right?

20 A. I do.

21 Q. Now, of course, your customers pay you money for the rights to use the FMS systems; don't they?

23 A. They do.

24 Q. And under the terms of those systems, SiteLink and storEDGE, they have the right to name authorized users; don't Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 THE COURT: Okay. So, there was some testimony that storEDGE -- Storable -- sorry -- can change its terms of service at any time. So, have you changed your terms of service at any point since this lawsuit started?

5 THE WITNESS: We have not yet.

6 THE COURT: Okay. That's the end of my questions.

8 MR. YETTER: Can I ask one follow-up -- 9 THE COURT: Yes.

10 MR. YETTER: -- that was related to one of the questions?

12 FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. YETTER: 14 ■ 19 ■ ■ - 21 MR. YETTER: Thank you. Pass the witness.

22 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TORGERSON: 24 Q. Just a few cleanup, if we can. It's true you can change the terms of service tomorrow to limit the number of Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 Q. (BY MS. EOFF) In preparation of your testimony today, did you withdraw some information from the ESS database?

3 A. I instructed someone to, yes.

4 Q. Is that the information that we have on the screen here?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is this a record that was made at or near the time by someone with knowledge?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And this was a record that was kept in the regular course of a regularly conducted business activity?

12 A. Yeah, it's out of our normal database.

13 Q. So, it's excerpted from your normal database?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. And making the record was a regular docketing activity?

17 A. Yes.

18 MS. EOFF: Your Honor, at this time we move to admit this Defendants' Exhibit 362.

20 MR. YETTER: No objection.

21 THE COURT: Defendants' 362 is admitted. There were no objections, and it's admitted.

23 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 362 admitted.)

24 Q. ■ (BY MS. EOFF) Mr. Fritcher, during your time at Storable, have you investigated SafeLease's use and access of Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 Storable's various FMS platforms?

2 A. ■ Yes, I have.

3 Q. ■ Can you please explain briefly for the Judge the first part of that investigation, which related to the architectural changes to the system based on their behavior?

6 A. Sure. So, back in April '24, I was looking for, you know, brand new company, trying to figure out what is going on with the system, why am I hearing reports about a dozen issues; and we came across some bot activity.

10 Bot activity in the system of high percentage of the traffic going into the applications was automated, and we were digging into why that was the case, because normally if you have an application, you want it to be used by your customers, not automation scripts and bots.

15 MS. EOFF: And, Emilio, would you please pull up Defendants' Exhibits 77 and 78 and put them side-by-side.

17 Q. (BY MS. EOFF) When you first noticed SafeLease's activity on the system, did you notice something that said with a big sign, hey, this is SafeLease doing this?

20 A. So, first you see this big spike that looks automated to us; and then we go and we dig into what is behind that spike. Through one big click, we get a big list of IP's off this system and then we looked at the list of IP's in our databases to see which users they were tied to. And all the users that we looked up all had SafeLease email addresses.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ Q. And when we look at Defendants' Exhibit No. 77 in the top left corner, there is a date that says October 24th. Is ■

- that the date of this spike? Oh, excuse me -- the top right corner.

5 A. ■ -Yes.

11 ■ 12 ■ ■ - ■ - 21 ■ 22 ■ 25 ■ Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 ■ ■ ■ - Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

- ■ Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS: TEXAS BUSINESS COURTS: 4 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 5 I, DONNA A. GOREE, Official Court Reporter in and for the Texas Business Courts, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-entitled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were stenographically reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

16 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 12th day of March, 2025. /s/Donna Goree _______________________________ DONNA A. GOREE, CSR, RPR, CRR 20 Official Court Reporter Texas Business Courts 21 3721 Carmen Avenue Rancho Viejo, Texas 78575 22 (979) 533-0422 [email protected] 23 Texas Certification No. 3909 Expiration Date: 07/31/2025 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422

ExhibitM 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Support - (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us

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SUPPORT Except as generally described on our website or as otherwise explicitly agreed by ESS in any applicable Additional Terms, ESS is not obligated to provide you any support for the Services and ESS make no specific service level guarantees. In the event that ESS voluntarily provides you with any support beyond our basic descriptions or that is not explicitly agreed by ESS in any applicable Additional Terms, it shall not be deemed a commitment by ESS to provide you any support in the future, and ESS may choose, in its sole discretion, to discontinue such support at any time and for any reason without any liability to you.

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STORABLE000002 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Support - (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us royalty-nee, ru11y-pa1a-up, non-exc1us1ve, suo11censao1e, transrerao1e 11cense to use, reproauce, moa,ry, aaapt, create derivative works from, publicly perform, publicly display, distribute, make and have made Your Content (in any form and any medium, whether now known or later developed) as necessary to (i) provide access to the Services to you and other users; and (ii) monitor and improve the Services. To the extent you have made Your Content accessible to others within your organization through the Services, you acknowledge and agree that ESS may continue to make Your Content accessible to others within your organization through the Services even after you have deleted your user account or the applicable portion of Your Content from your user account.

Except with respect to Your Content, you acknowledge and agree that, as between you and ESS, ESS owns all rights, title and interest (including all intellectual property rights) in the Services, and all improvements, enhancements or modifications thereto, including all Content and other materials therein. The Services is protected by U.S. and international copyright, trademark, patent and other intellectual property laws and treaties. ESS reserves all rights not expressly granted to you.

As used herein, "Aggregate Data" means Your Content that has been aggregated in a manner that does not reveal any personal information and cannot reasonably be used to identify you, your organization or its customers or vendors as the source of such data. You acknowledge and agree that ESS may collect or generate Aggregate Data in connection with providing you with access to or use of the Services, and, subject to your provision of consent, you hereby grant ESS and its service providers a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, fully-paid-up, non-exclusive, sublicensable, transferable license to use, reproduce, modify, adapt, create derivative works from, publicly perform, publicly display, distribute, make and have made Aggregate Data (in any form and any medium, whether now known or later developed) for any lawful purpose.

Except with respect to Your Content and subject to the limited rights expressly granted to you in Section 2, you may not (i) use, reproduce, modify, adapt, create derivative works from, publicly perform, publicly display, distribute, make, have made, assign, pledge, transfer or otherwise grant rights to the Services; (ii) reverse engineer, disassemble, decompile or translate, or otherwise attempt to derive the source code, architectural framework or data records of any software within or associated with the Services; (iii) frame or utilize any framing technique to enclose any Content; (iv) access the Services for the purpose of developing, marketing, selling or distributing any product or service that competes with or includes features substantially similar to the Services or any products or services offered by ESS; (v) rent, lease, lend, sell or sublicense the Services or otherwise provide access to the Services as part of a service bureau or similar fee-for-service purpose; (vi) remove or obscure any proprietary notice that appears within the Services; or (vii) use the Services in any manner or for any purpose that infringes, misappropriates, or otherwise violates any intellectual property right or other right of any person, or that violates any applicable law.

You acknowledge and agree that we may record calls between you or your agents and us (or between your current or prospective tenants and us) for quality assurance and training purposes, including when a call is placed on hold ("Call Recordings") . Any Call Recordings are our sole and exclusive property and may be retained or destroyed by us at our sole discretion. We may use Call Recordings for any lawful business purpose, in accordance with our Privacy Policy. Unless otherwise required by applicable law, rule, regulation or court order, we have no obligation to provide you with any Call Recordings.

You acknowledge that the Services, these Terms, Call Recordings and any other confidential information provided by us constitutes valuable proprietary information and trade secrets ("Confidential Information"). You agree to preserve the confidential nature of any Confidential Information you receive by retaining and using it in confidence. You may use Confidential Information solely for your internal business use in connection with your use of Services, and you may not provide such Confidential Information to any third party, except with our prior written consent.

USER CONDUCT In connection with your access to or use of the Services, you shall not: impersonate any person or entity, including ESS personnel, or falsely state or otherwise misrepresent your affiliation with any person or entity; forge headers or otherwise manipulate identifiers in order to disguise the origin of any Content transmitted through the Services; act in a manner that negatively affects the ability of other users to access or use the Services; https://www.storageunitsoflware.com/lerms-of-service/ 3/9

STORABLE000003 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Support - (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us mrrastructure; interfere with or disrupt the Services or servers or networks connected to the Services, or disobey any requirements, procedures, policies or regulations of networks connected to the Services; use spiders, crawlers, robots, scrapers, automated tools or any other similar means to access the Services, or substantially download, reproduce or archive any portion of the Services; sell, share, transfer, trade, loan or exploit for any commercial purpose any portion of the Services, including your user account and password; or violate any applicable local, state, provincial, federal or international law or regulation.

FEES You are solely responsible for any data, usage and other charges assessed by mobile, cable, internet or other communications services providers for your access to and use of the Services. Some features of the Services are free to use, but fees may apply for premium features and other components. If there is a fee listed for any portion of the Services, by accessing or using that portion, you agree to pay the fee. Your access to the Services may be suspended or terminated if you do not make payment on time or in full.

For all Services you agree to pay the specified fees and you authorize us to charge you according to the monthly plan level you choose and any other charges you may incur in connection with your use of the Services. A valid credit card or ACH account may be required for you to use the Services on a month-to-month basis. The Services are billed in advance on a monthly basis and such fees are non-refundable. There will be no refunds or credits for partial months, or for months unused with an open account. We reserve the right to change rates upon thirty (30) days' notice. Such notice may be provided at any time by posting the changes to our website or by email.

1. The service period for each of our Services that you have selected to receive will begin on the day your payment method is charged and will continue until the day before your next charge is scheduled. If you do not cancel the applicable Services at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to your next scheduled charge, your payment method will be charged.

TENANT PROTECTION PLANS ESS administers self-storage tenant protection plans ("Tenant Protection Plans") in certain U.S. states. As a condition of providing our Tenant Protection Plans to your tenants, You, the self-storage operator, represent that you require all tenants to maintain insurance or our tenant property protection coverage for stored personal property at your premises during your tenants' rental terms. Tenants may purchase a Tenant Protection Plan from You directly in-person, via the online rental process, or they may be enrolled in the Tenant Protection Plan by You or Your representative(s) or through other services provided by ESS to verify adequate coverage of stored property is maintained by the tenant. As part of enrollment in the Tenant Protection Plan, the tenant shall agree to an addendum to their rental agreement (the "Lease Addendum") outlining a property protection plan under which the self-storage owner/operator assumes limited liability for loss or damage to certain personal property stored by such tenant at the applicable property, as more particularly described in the Lease Addendum. You, the self-storage owner/operator, accept all risks and responsibility associated with direct communications and representations made by You to your tenants regarding the Tenant Protection Plans. Fees for the Tenant Protection Plans will be invoiced periodically on the tenant's account directly in the ESS software. When a tenant pays for the Tenant Protection Plan, that money is considered "collected." You, the self-storage owner/operator, will keep a portion of the "collected" fees, and ESS will deduct the remaining balance of all "collected" fees monthly for the previous month from your account as ESS's compensation for administering the Tenant Protection Plans. You, the self-storage owner/operator, may opt out of or cancel the availability of the Tenant Protection Plans at any time and for any reason by notifying Easy Storage Solutions via email at [email protected] or via phone at 435-673-2979. ESS will, at its own expense and during the term of this agreement, maintain a policy that insures the coverage amount as described in each applicable Lease Addendum. Coverage under the policy is subject to the terms, conditions and limits of the policy. To receive a copy of the policy, please submit a request to Easy Storage Solutions at [email protected].

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STORABLE000004 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Support - (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us

Easy Storage Payments is an optional feature of our Services. Payment processing services on Easy Storage Solutions are fulfilled by our Partner Providers, Stripe and Payrix. Easy Storage Payments is subject to the StriRe Connected Account Agreement which includes the StriRe Terms of Service (collectively, the "Stripe Services Agreement") or Payrix, and are subject to the Payrix Terms of Service. By agreeing to these terms and/or continuing to use the Services in conjunction with Easy Storage Payments, you agree to be bound by the Partner Provider terms, and the same may be modified by our Partner Providers from time to time. As a condition of Easy Storage Solutions enabling payment processing services through a Partner Provider, you agree to provide ESS accurate and complete information about you and your business, and you authorize ESS to share such information and transaction information related to your use of the payment processing services provided by our Partner Providers.

Easy Storage Solutions acknowledges its responsibility for the protection of all cardholder data that it possesses or otherwise stores, processes, or transmits on behalf of our customers. Easy Storage Solutions is in compliance with all requirements of the PCI DSS, and has implemented appropriate data protection measures to ensure a level of security commensurate to the risks.

ACCESS CONTROL Access control equipment is an optional feature of our Services. Easy Storage Solutions is only a distributor of such equipment and does not manufacture or install access control equipment. You should consult with licensed professional contractors with respect to the installation and use of access control equipment. In the event that such equipment is damaged by accident, by gross negligence or during installation, you agree that Easy Storage Solutions shall not be held liable. You represent that you are fully aware of the risks and hazards connected with any and all activities pertaining to the installation of access control systems and that such activities include the risk of injury and even death, and voluntarily assumes full responsibility for any risks of loss, property damage, or personal injury, including death, that may be sustained as a result of such activities to the fullest extent allowed by law.

SUGGESTIONS If you elect to provide or make available to ESS any suggestions, comments, ideas, improvements or other feedback relating to the Services ("Suggestions"), you hereby grant ESS and its service providers a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, fully-paid-up, non-exclusive, sublicensable, transferable license, to use, reproduce, modify, adapt, create derivative works from, publicly perform, publicly display, distribute, make, have made, assign, pledge, transfer or otherwise grant rights in your Suggestions in any form and any medium (whether now known or later developed), without credit or compensation to you .

LINKS AND EXTERNAL MATERIALS The Services may provide links or other connections to other websites or resources. You acknowledge and agree that ESS does not endorse and is not responsible for any content, advertising, products, services or other materials on or available through such sites or resources ("External Materials"). External Materials are subject to different terms of use and privacy policies. You are responsible for reviewing and complying with such terms of use and privacy policies. You further acknowledge and agree that ESS shall not be liable for any damage or loss resulting from or arising out of use of or reliance on any External Materials.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE SERVICES ESS reserves the right to modify, suspend or discontinue the Services or any product or service to which it connects, with or without notice, and ESS shall not be liable to you or to any third party for any such modification, suspension or discontinuance. ESS may at its sole discretion from time to time develop patches, bug fixes, updates, upgrades and other modifications to improve the performance of the Services or related services ("Updates"). ESS may develop Updates that require installation by you before you continue to access or use the Services or related services . Updates may also be automatically installed without providing any additional notice to you or receiving any additional consent from you. The manner in which Updates may be automatically downloaded and installed is determined by settings on your device and its operating system.

https://www.storageunitsoflware.com/lerms-of-service/ 5/9

STORABLE00000S 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Support - (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us . . . . . _.. _____ ._ __ -....---- .............

You shall indemnify, defend and hold ESS and its affiliates, and each of their officers, directors, employees, agents, partners and licensors (collectively, "ESS Parties") harmless from and against any claim, demand, loss, damage, cost, liability and expense, including reasonable attorneys' fees, resulting from or arising out of: (a) Your Content; (b) your violation of these Terms, any law or regulation, or any rights (including intellectual property rights) of another party; or (c) your use of the Services.

DISCLAIMERS YOUR USE OF THE SERVICES IS AT YOUR SOLE RISK. THE SERVICES IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE" BASIS, WITH ALL FAULTS. TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, ESS PARTIES EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED OR ARISING FROM STATUTE, COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE OF TRADE OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, QUALITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NON- INFRINGEMENT. ESS PARTIES MAKE NO WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION THAT: (i) THE SERVICES WILL MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS; (ii) ACCESS TO THE SERVICES WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, TIMELY, SECURE OR ERROR-FREE; (iii) THE INFORMATION, CALCULATIONS AND ANY RESULTS THAT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM ACCESS TO OR USE OF THE SERVICES WILL BE ACCURATE, RELIABLE, CURRENT OR COMPLETE; OR (IV) ANY ACCESS CONTROLS INCLUDED IN THE SERVICES ("ACCESS CONTROLS") MAY NOT BE COMPROMISED OR CIRCUMVENTED OR THAT THE ACCESS CONTROLS WILL PREVENT ANY PROPERTY LOSS. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT YOU ARE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFYING THE ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF ALL CONTENT SUBMITTED TO OR OBTAINED FROM THE SERVICES BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION BASED UPON SUCH CONTENT, INCLUDING MAKING ANY PAYMENTS OR COLLECTING ANY AMOUNTS BASED THEREON . YOU ASSUME ALL RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUITABILITY, INSTALLATION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE ACCESS CONTROLS AND AND OTHER THIRD-PARTY COMPONENTS, HARDWARE, SOFTWARE AND SERVICES THAT YOU SELECT.

Any model contracts, forms or other documents ESS makes available for your use witt h your customers ("Model Contracts") are provided for informational purposes only and should not be relied on as legal advice. Nothing herein constitutes the establishment of an attorney-client relationship between you and ESS or anyone involved in the drafting of the Model Contracts and you should seek the advice of legal counsel prior to use of the Model Contracts. By utilizing the Model Contracts, you: (i) assume full responsibility for any loss, damage, or liability result ing from the use of the Model Contracts; and (ii) release ESS and the authors of the Model Contracts, their contributors, agents, licensees, successors and assigns from any and all known or unknown claims, demands or causes of action that may arise, at any time, out of or relating to your use of any of the Model Contracts.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY THE ESS PARTIES SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST PROFITS OR COST OF COVER, OR INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING DAMAGES ARISING FROM ANY TYPE OR MANNER OF COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS OR FINANCIAL LOSS, EVEN IF THE ESS PARTIES HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE POSSIB ILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES AND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH DAMAGES WERE FORESEEABLE. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ESS PARTIES' TOTAL LIABILITY TO YOU FOR ALL CLAIMS ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO THESE TERMS OR YOUR ACCESS TO OR USE OF (OR INAB ILITY TO ACCESS OR USE) THE SERVICES EXCEED THE GREATER OF FIFTY DOLLARS ($50) OR THE AMOUNT PAID BY YOU TO ESS FOR ACCESS TO THE SERVICES WITHIN THE TWELVE (12) MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DATE ON WHICH THE APPLICABLE CLAIM AROSE.

TERMINATION Subject to the Additional Terms, if you violate these Terms, all rights granted to you under these Terms shall terminate immediately, with or without notice to you. Upon termination of these Terms for any reason: (i) you must immediately uninstall and cease using the Services; (ii) ESS, in its sole discretion, may remove and discard Your Content and delete your user account; (iii) any provision that, by its terms, is intended to survive the expirat,ion or termination of these Terms shall survive such expiration or termination; and (iv) all rights granted to you under these Terms shall immediately terminate, but all other provisions shall survive termination . You are solely responsible for the proper cancellation of your account. You may cancel your account at any time by calling or emailing ESS.

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STORABLE000006 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Support - (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us

These Terms shall be governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to conflict of laws principles. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is specifically excluded from application to these Terms.

BINDING ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTION WAIVER ALL CLAIMS (AS DEFINED IN ABOVE) SHALL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION RATHER THAN IN COURT, EXCEPT THAT YOU MAY ASSERT CLAIMS IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT (DEFINED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THESE TERMS AS A COURT OF LIMITED JURISDICTION THAT MAY ONLY HEAR CLAIMS NOT EXCEEDING $5,000) IF YOUR CLAIMS ARE WITHIN THE COURTS JURISDICTION. THERE IS NO JUDGE OR JURY IN ARBITRATION, AND COURT REVIEW OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD IS LIMITED.

The arbitration shall be conducted by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its then-applicable Commercial Arbitration Rules or, as appropriate, its Consumer Arbitration Rules. The AAA's rules are available at http://www.adr.org/. The arbitrator will, among other things, have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any Claims. Payment of all filing, administration and arbitrator fees shall be governed by the AM's rules . The arbitration shall be conducted in the English language by a single independent and neutral arbitrator. For any hearing conducted in person as part of the arbitration, you agree that such hearing shall be conducted in Austin, Texas or, if the Consumer Arbitration Rules apply, another location reasonably convenient to both parties with due consideration of their ability to travel and other pertinent circumstances, as determined by the arbitrator. The decision of the arbitrator on all matters relating to the Claim shall be final and binding. Judgment on the arbitral award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.

WE EACH AGREE THAT ALL CLAIMS (AS DEFINED ABOVE) SHALL BE RESOLVED ONLY ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND NOT IN A CLASS, COLLECTIVE, CONSOLIDATED OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION, ARBITRATION OR OTHER SIMILAR PROCESS AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO HAVE A CLAIM DETERMINED OR RESOLVED ON A CLASS, COLLECTIVE, CONSOLIDATED OR REPRESENTATIVE BASIS. IF FOR ANY REASON THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRECEDING SENTENCE ARE HELD TO BE INVALID OR UNENFORCEABLE IN A CASE IN WHICH CLASS, COLLECTIVE, CONSOLIDATED OR REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS HAVE BEEN ASSERTED, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION 19 REQUIRING BINDING ARBITRATION SHALL LIKEWISE BE UNENFORCEABLE AND NULL AND VOID. IF FOR ANY REASON A CLAIM PROCEEDS IN COURT RATHER THAN IN ARBITRATION, WE EACH WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND AGREE THAT SUCH CLAIM SHALL BE BROUGHT ONLY IN A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN AUSTIN, TEXAS. YOU HEREBY SUBMIT TO THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF SUCH COURTS AND WAIVE ANY OBJECTION ON THE GROUNDS OF VENUE, FORUM NON-CONVENIENS OR ANY SIMILAR GROUNDS WITH RESPECT TO ANY SUCH CLAIM .

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, you and ESS may seek injunctive relief and any other equitable remedies from any court of competent jurisdiction to protect our intellectual property rights, whether in aid of, pending or independently of the resolution of any dispute pursuant to the arbitration procedures set forth in this Section 19.

If ESS implements any material change to this Section 19, such change shall not apply to any Claim for which you provided written notice to ESS before the implementation of the change

LEGAL COMPLIANCE You represent and warrant that you are not: (a) located in a country that is subject to a U.S. Government embargo or designated by the U.S. Government as a "terrorist supporting" country; and (b) listed on any U.S. Government list of prohibited or res~ricted parties, including the Specially Designated Nationals List.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ENTITIES This section applies to access to or use of the Services by a branch or agency of the United States Government.

The Services includes "commercial computer software" and "commercial computer software documentation" as such terms are used in 48 C.F.R. 12.212 and qualifies as "commercial items" as defined in 48 C.F.R. 2.101.

Such items are provided to the United States Government: (a) for acquisition by or on behalf of civilian https://www.storageunitsoflware.com/lerms-of-service/ 7/9

STORABLE000007 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Suppor (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us or me uepartment or uerense, consistent wItn me po11cIes set ronn m 4~ t,;.t-.t-<. LL! .1zuz--, ana zz1. /ZUZ-J.

The United States Government shall acquire only those rights set forth in these Terms with respect to the such items, and any access to or use of the Services by the United States Government constitutes: (a) agreement by the United States Government that that such items are "commercial computer software" and "commercial computer software documentation" as defined in this section; and (b) acceptance of the rights and obligations herein.

NO THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES You agree that, except for ESS Parties and as otherwise expressly provided in these Terms, there shall be no third-party beneficiaries to these Terms.

QUESTIONS Call (435) 656-1990 or email support@storageunitsoftware with any questions about our Terms .

GENERAL PROVISIONS These Terms (together with the Additional Terms) constitute the entire agreement between you and ESS concerning your access to and use of the Services. It supersedes all prior and contemporaneous oral or written negotiations and agreements between you and ESS with respect to such subject matter. In the event of any conflict between or among these Terms and any Additional Terms to which these Terms refers, the terms and conditions of these Terms shall take precedence and govern. These Terms may not be amended by you except in a writing executed by you and an authorized representative of ESS. For the purposes of these Terms, the words "such as," "include," "includes" and "including" shall be deemed to be followed by the words "without limitation." You may not assign or delegate any right or obligation under these Terms without the prior written consent of ESS. The failure of ESS to exercise or enforce any right or provision of these Terms shall not constitute a waiver of such right or provision . If any provision of these Terms is held to be invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, then such provision shall be construed, limited, modified or, if necessary, severed to the extent necessary to eliminate its invalidity or unenforceability, without in any way affecting the remaining parts of these Terms. Any prevention of or delay in performance by ESS hereunder due to labor disputes, acts of god, governmental restrictions, enemy or hostile governmental action, fire or other casualty or other causes beyond its reasonable control shall excuse the performance of its obligations for a period equal to the duration of any such prevention or delay.

Company Quick Links About U Press Support A ociations Privacy Po icy Partners Terms Of Service Contact Us

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STORABLE000008 1/12/25, 1:12 PM Self Storage Management Software I Easy Storage Solutions Support - (435) 656-1990 I E-mail Us https://www.storageunitsoflware.com/lerms-of-service/ 9/9

STORABLE000009

ExhibitN 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable

SITELINK TERMS OF USE Master Subscription Agreement General Terms and Conditions Effective as of December 31, 2019

This Master Subscription Agreement is comprised of these General Terms and Conditions, Additional Terms of Service, when elected, and the Order Form, all of which are collectively referred to as the "Agreement11 and is a legally binding agreement between Sitelink software, LLC (the "Company") and you.

This Agreement governs your access to and use of the Services. By accepting this Agreement, either by clicking a box indicating your acceptance or by executing an order form that references this Agreement, you agree to the terms of this Agreement. If you are entering into this Agreement on behalf of a company or other legal entity, you represent that you have the authority to bind such legal entity and its affiliates to these terms and conditions. If you do not have such authority, or if you do not agree with these terms and conditions, you must not accept this Agreement and may not use the Services. -------.

Defendant's Definitions. Ex. 2 "Bundled Services" means a combination of Services (each, a "Component") that is licensed as a package.

"Content" means information obtained by us from our content licensors or publicly available sources and provided to you pursuant to an Order Form, as more fully described in the Documentation.

"Documentation" means our online user guides. documentation, and help and training materials, as updated from time to time, accessible via www.sitelink.com/sUP-P-Ort-helP- https://www.storable.com/privacy/sitelink•terms-of-use/ 1/18

STORABLE0000l0 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable "Facilities" means a distinct self-storage facility at a single location which contains individual Units set forth in the Order Form for which the Services relate.

"Fees" means the agreed upon fee the Services or Supplemental Services to be paid by you to us as set forth in an applicable Order Form.

"Malicious Code" means code, files, scripts, agents or programs intended to do harm, including, for example, viruses, worms, time bombs and Trojan horses. Additionally, any file, script, program, browser plug-in, browser helper or extension, or any robot or application designed to scrape and collect data or automate the entry of data into or out of Services.

"Model Contracts" means any model contracts, forms or other agreement provided by the Company to you, for your use with your end users.

"Order Form" means an ordering document specifying the Services to be provided hereunder that is entered into between you and us, including any addenda and supplements thereto. By entering into an Order Form hereunder, an Affiliate agrees to be bound by the terms of this Agreement as if it were an original party hereto.

"Personally Identifiable Information" means any information that can be associated with or traced to any individual, including an individual's name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, credit card information, social security number or other similar specific factual information, regardless of the media on which such information is stored ( e.g., on paper or electronically).

"Services" means any of the Company service offerings described in Section 2 (Services) below and specified in and Order Form either on a subscription basis or otherwise as stated in an Order Form. Services include Supplemental Services and/or Professional Services.

"Supplemental Services" means the non-reoccurring services that are ordered by you, for a fee such as customer specific consulting, configuration, implementation, migration, setup fees, website customization or other professional services as specified in an applicable Order Form.

"Units" means the number of separate rentable self-storage units, parking spaces, storage containers, or lockers set forth in the Order Form for which the Services relate.

Units shall not include Post Office boxes or similar boxes to which mail is delivered by a mail carrier.

"User" means an individual who is authorized by you to use a Service, for whom you have ordered the Service, and to whom you have supplied a user identification and htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 2/18

STORABLE0000ll 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable password. Users may include, for example, your employees, consultants, contractors and agents, and third parties with which you transact business.

"we," "us" or "our" means the Company.

"you" or "your" means the company or other legal entity for which you are accepting this Agreement.

"Your Data" means electronic data and information submitted by or for you to the purchased Services or collected and processed by or for you using the purchased Services, excluding Content and Non-Salesforce.com Applications.

2.1 Services.

We offer the Services listed in Exhibit A through our proprietary software as a service platform that we host for our customers. Products may be added to this Agreement as they become available but only products subscribed to on an Order Form will be available to you. To subscribe for a Service, you must execute an Order Form for that Service. You are only entitled to use the Services for which you have subscribed and paid and your use of the Services is subject to your compliance with all terms and conditions of the Agreement. You acknowledge and agree that we reserve the right to modify the Services (or any part thereof) from time to time and that we shall not be liable to you or to any third party for any modification to the Services.

2.1 Additional Services.

2.1.1. No Fee Customer Support. Provided you have paid all Fees payable by you for the Services under an applicable Order Form, We will use commercially reasonable efforts to provide, at no additional charge to you, technical support services to you and your Users who have subscribed to the Services.

2.1.2. No Fee Training. Provided you have paid all Fees payable by you for the Services under an applicable Order Form, We shall make available our standard training services (by way of remote, live or recorded training sessions) to your designated, named and authorized Users as well as provide tutorials which are accessible via the Marketing Websites at no additional charge.

2.1.3. Expanding the Services. From time to time we may make available on a general release basis additional service offerings. Any such additional service offering would be available on a general release basis, and should you wish to subscribe, access or use htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 3/18

STORABLE000012 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable such service, such will be memorialized in a new applicable Order Form. Nothing in this Section 2.1.3 should be construed to imply or promise that additional functionality, features, products will be available. Rather, in the event that new services are made available, such Services shall be subject to these General Terms of Services and any additional terms and conditions that may specifically apply to such additional Services.

2.1.4 Tenant Protection Plans. The Company administers self-storage tenant protection plans ("Tenant Protection Plans") in certain U.S. states as an Additional Service to self-storage operators. You, the self-storage owner/operator, may elect to offer our Tenant Protection Plans to your tenants after completing an Order Form or specific Tenant Protection Plan Agreement. As a condition of providing our Tenant Protection Plans to your tenants, You represent that you require all tenants to maintain insurance or our tenant property protection coverage for stored personal property at your premises during your tenants' rental terms . Your tenants may purchase a Tenant Protection Plan from You directly in-person, via the online rental process, or they may be enrolled in the Tenant Protection Plan by You or Your representative(s) or through other services and/or technologies provided by the Company to verify adequate coverage of stored property is maintained by the tenant. You represent that you will cooperate with and adhere to the Company's services, technologies, and terms of the Tenant Protection Plan Agreement in the provision of the Company's Tenant Protection Plan to your tenants. As part of enrollment in the Tenant Protection Plan, the tenant shall agree to an addendum to their rental agreement (the "Lease Addendum") outlining a property protection plan under which the self-storage owner/operator assumes limited liability for loss or damage to certain personal property stored by such tenant at the applicable property, as more particularly described in the Lease Addendum. In the event You offer the Company's Tenant Protection Plan after converting from a tenant insurance program or third-party tenant protection plan you previously provided to your tenants storing property at your facilities, and to avoid any lapse of coverage for your tenants, the tenant may be enrolled in our Tenant Protection Plan by a notice process whereby the tenant shall accept and agree to the Lease Addendum by otherwise not providing evidence of valid stored property insurance coverage. The tenant may opt-out of coverage provided under the Company's Tenant Protection Plan at any time by providing evidence of valid stored property insurance coverage to You in an acceptable manner communicated to the tenant. You, the self-storage owner/operator, accept all risks and responsibility associated with direct communications and representations made by You to your tenants regarding the Tenant Protection Plans. Fees for the Tenant Protection Plans will be invoiced periodically on the tenant's account directly in the Sitelink management software. When a tenant pays for the Tenant Protection Plan, that money is considered "collected ." You, the self-storage owner/operator, will keep a portion of the "collected" fees, and We will deduct the remaining balance of all "collected" fees monthly for the previous month from your account as the Company's compensation for htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 4/18

STORABLE000013 1/ 12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable administering the Tenant Protection Plans. You, the self-storage owner/operator, may opt out of or cancel the availability of the Tenant Protection Plans for any reason via written notice provided to the Company at least forty-five (45) days prior to the cancellation date by notifying the Company via email at [email protected] or via phone at 888-611-4778. We will, at our own expense and during the term of this Agreement1 maintain a policy that insures the coverage amount as described in each applicable Lease Addendum. Coverage under the policy is subject to the terms, conditions and limits of the policy. To receive a copy of the policy, please submit a request to the Company at [email protected].

3. Fees.

3.1 Service Fees. You shall pay the Fees for the Services in the amount set forth in the Order Form and according to the billing frequency stated in the Order Form. Service Fees shall be due and payable on the date of the invoice and must be received by us within the payment terms established in the applicable Order Form. Fees may be increased at our discretion after the initial term stated in the applicable Order Form upon notice to you.

3.2 Late Payments. You acknowledge that your failure to pay any fees or charges when due may result in suspension or termination of the Services. If you fail to pay any of the Fees in a timely manner, we will notify you and you will have a thirty (30) day cure period (the ''Payment Cure Period") In which you can bring your account up-to-date. If you fail to bring your account up-to-date (including any late fees) within the Payment Cure Period, we will terminate your access to the Services. If you fail to pay any of the Fees or charges due hereunder, the Company reserves the right to engage a collections agency to collect the fees and charges and you acknowledge and agree that you shall pay all costs incurred by us in connection with the collection of such past due amounts, including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' and collections agencies' fees plus interest in an amount equal to t he lesser of 1.50% per month or the maximum rate permitted by applicable law.

3.3 Taxes. You shall be responsible for all sales tax, use tax, value added taxes, withholding taxes and any other similar taxes and charge of any kind imposed by federa l1 state or local governmental entity on the transactions contemplated by the Agreement. When we have the legal obligation to pay or collect taxes for which you are responsible, pursuant to this Section 3, the appropriate amount shall be invoiced to and thereafter paid by you unless you provide us with a valid tax exemption certificate authorized by the appropriate taxing authority before invoice is sent.

4. Your Rights and Restrictions. https://www.storable.com/privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 5/ 18

STORABLE000014 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable 4.1. Right to Access and Use the Services. Subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement, and upon timely payment of all applicable Fees set forth in an Order Form, we hereby grant to you a non-exclusive, non-transferable, limited right to access and use (and permit your Users to use) the Services to which you have subscribed solely for your internal business purposes.

4.2. Authorized Users. You may designate and authorize as many Users as you wish under the Agreement. You (i) are responsible for your Users' compliance with the Agreement, and (ii) shall use commercially reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized access to or use of the Services and shall notify us immediately of any such unauthorized access or use. It is your responsibility to remove access to the Services if authorized status of a User or designated employee changes.

4.3. Your Responsibilities and Restrictions. You are responsible for all activities that occur under your use of the Services and the use by your Users. You shall: (i) have sole responsibility for the accuracy, quality, integrity, legality, reliability, and appropriateness of all data and content that you submit for your use of the Services; (ii) use commercially reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized control or tampering or any other unauthorized access to, or use of, the Services and notify us promptly of any unauthorized use or security breach; (iii) comply with all applicable local, state, federal, and foreign laws (including laws regarding privacy and protection of personal or consumer information) in using the Services; (iv) to the extent applicable, comply with all applicable rules of credit card associations (including American Express, MasterCard and Visa); and (v) obtain and maintain all computer hardware, software and communications equipment needed to access the Services and pay all access charges (e.g., ISP fees) incurred by you in connection with your use of the Services. You may not, and you shall ensure your Users do not, (i) disassemble, reverse engineer, decompile or otherwise attempt to decipher any code in connection with the Services, or modify, adapt, create derivate works based upon, or translate the Services; (ii) license, sublicense, sell, rent, assign, distribute, time share transfer, lease, loan, resell, distribute or otherwise commercially exploit, grant rights in or make the Services available to any third party; (iii) use the Services except as expressly authorized hereunder or in violation of any applicable laws; (iv) engage in any illegal or deceptive trade practices with respect to the Services; (v) circumvent or disable any security or other technical features or measures of the Services or any other aspect of the Software or, in any manner, attempt to gain or attain unauthorized access to the Services or its related computer systems or networks; (vi) use the Services to transmit infringing, libelous, obscene, threatening, Malicious Code, or otherwise unlawful, unsafe, htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 6/18

STORABLE0000lS 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable abusive or tortious material, or to store or transmit material in violation of third-party privacy rights; (vii) use the Service to store or transmit any Malicious Code or unsolicited messages in violation of applicable laws; or (viii) interfere with or disrupt the integrity or performance of the Services or third-party data contained therein.

4.4. Reservation of Rights. No other rights are granted except as expressly set forth in the Agreement. The Agreement is not a sale and does not convey any rights or ownership in, or to, the Services or any underlying software. We own all right, title, and interest, including all intellectual property rights, in and to the Services and the underlying software and any and all updates, upgrades, modifications, enhancements, Content, improvements or derivative works thereof, and in any idea, know-how, and programs developed by us or our licensors during the course of performance of the Services .

4.5. Data Exchange Interface ("DEi") Rights. The Company provides an advanced DEi exclusively for customer internal use. Any use by a third party, affiliate, agent of customer, or any use to develop a commercial product, requires a separate third-party DEi agreement, which will expressly memorialize the rights and uses thereunder.

4.6. Our Use of Anonymous Data. You agree that the Company may use the data generated by and stored on our servers anonymously, for our own internal business purposes, including but not limited to the development of anonymous marketing and sales collateral materials, statistical analysis of data regarding rental rates, unit availability, traffic sources, vacancy, and other relevant data to construct yield optimization models, and publication solely in an aggregated form of operating data in industry benchmark reports. You shall at all times retain ownership of your data.

5. Term and Termination.

5. 1. Term. The term of the Services varies depending on the Services subscribed to or obtained and shall be set forth on the Order Form.

5.2. Notification of Non-Renewal. Written notice of non-renewal by you must be submitted to the Company at the address in the preamble.

5.3. Termination for Cause. Either party may terminate the Agreement and all Services under an existing Order Form (i) if the other party breaches any of its material obligations under the Agreement and such breach is not cured within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice from the non-breaching party or (ii) if the other party becomes insolvent or bankrupt, liquidated or is dissolved, or ceases substantially all of its htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 7/18

STORABLE000016 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable business. We may terminate the Agreement immediately in the event of a breach of Section 4.3 (Your Responsibilities and Restrictions) above.

5.4. Termination for Convenience. You may terminate the Agreement, all the Services, or any individual Component of a Services Bundle, at any time for any reason, upon fifteen (15) days' written notice to the Company.

5.5. Effect of Termination. Upon a termination of the Agreement or any Service, you will immediately discontinue use of the applicable Services, cease to represent in any form that you are a user of the terminated Services, and destroy all our Confidential Information in your possession. Neither party shall be liable for any damages resulting from a termination of the Agreement or any subscriptions to Services as provided for herein; provided, however, that the termination of the Agreement shall not affect any claim arising prior to such termination.

5.6. Handling of Your Data in the Event of Termination. You acknowledge and agree that following expiration or termination of any of your subscriptions to the Services, we may immediately deactivate all affected and related Services and that we shall have no obligation to continue to store your data during any period of suspension or termination or to permit you to retrieve such data. You further agree that we shall not be liable to you or to any third party for any termination of your access to the Services or deletion of your data pursuant to this Agreement. Following the termination of your right to use the Services for any reason other than termination for cause by us, you shall be entitled to take advantage of any post-termination assistance we may generally make available with respect to the Services, such as data retrieval arrangements we may elect to make available. We may also endeavor to provide you with unique post- suspension or post-termination assistance, but we shall be under no obligation to do so.

5.7. Exemption from Return of Data. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Section 5. (Term and Termination) the Company shall not be required to return to customer or destroy those copies of the customer data or customer Confidential Information which copies were created pursuant to our automatic archiving and backup procedures and the removal of which is not technically reasonable.

6. Downtime and Service Suspensions.

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STORABLE000017 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable In addition to our rights to terminate or suspend our Services (each, a "Service Suspension") to you, you acknowledge that: (i) your access to and use of the Services may be suspended for the duration of any unanticipated, unscheduled, or scheduled downtime or unavailability of any portion or al l of the Services for any reason; and (ii) we shall also be entitled, without any liability to you or related third parties, to suspend access to any portion of the Services at any time. Without limitation, we shall have no liability whatsoever for any damage, liabilities, losses (including any loss of data or profits) or any other consequences that may occur as a result of any Service Suspension. To the extent we are able, we will endeavor to provide you email notice of any Service Suspension and to post updates on our bulletin board regarding resumption of the Services following any such Service Suspension, but we shall have no liability for the manner in which we may do so or if we fail to do so.

7. Representations and Warranties.

7.1. Mutual Representations and Warranties. Each party hereby represents and warrants to the other party that (i) it has all necessary authority to enter into and perform its obligations under the Agreement without the consent of any third party or breach of any contract or agreement with any third party, (ii) all persons performing any obligations hereunder have entered into all necessary agreements in order for it to comply with the terms and conditions of the Agreement, and (iii) it shall comply in all material respects with all laws applicable to the Services.

7 .2. Disclaimer of Warranties.

EXCEPT FOR THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES SET FORTH IN THIS SECTION 7, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, WE MAKE NO OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE, IN LAW OR FROM A COURSE OF DEALING OR USE OF TRADE, AS TO ANY MATTER, INCLUDING THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY, SATISFACTORY QUALITY, TITLE, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. WE DO NOT WARRANT THAT THE SERVICES WILL MEET ALL OF YOUR REQU IREMENTS, INCLUDING ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS, OR THAT THE USE OF THE SERVICES WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR-FREE. THE SERVICES ARE PROVIDED TO YOU ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND YOUR USE OF SERVICES IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, COMPLIANCE WITH ANY LAWS OR REGULATIONS RELATED TO PROPERTY MANAGEMENT. THE PARTIES EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTY CONSTITUTES AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT. WE SHALL HAVE NO OBLIGATION OR OTHER htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 9/18

STORABLE000018 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable LIABILITY WITH REGARD TO ANY ERROR OR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH A WARRANTY THAT IS CAUSED BY YOUR BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT.

WE DISCLAIM ANY REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES THAT YOUR USE OF THE SERVICES WILL SATISFY OR ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ANY LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OR LAWS OR REGULATIONS. THIS DISCLAIMER APPLIES TO BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO ANY FEDERAL OR STATE STATUTES OR REGULATIONS THAT MAY BE APPLICABLE TO YOU. YOU ARE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT YOUR USE OF THE SERVICES IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW.

IF YOU ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE SERVICES OR THIS AGREEMENT, YOUR SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS TO DISCONTINUE USING THE SERVICES.

8. Confidentiality.

8.1. Definition of Confidential Information. "Confidential Information" means all information disclosed by a party ("Disclosing Party") to the other party ("Receiving Party"), whether orally or in writing, that is designated as confidential or that reasonably should be understood to be confidential given the nature of the information and the circumstances of disclosure. Your Confidential Information includes your Data; our Confidential Information includes the Services and Content; and Confidential Information of each party includes the terms and conditions of this Agreement and all Order Forms (including pricing), as well as business and marketing plans, technology and technical information, product plans and designs, and business processes disclosed by such party. However, Confidential Information does not include any information that (i) is or becomes generally known to the public without breach of any obligation owed to the Disclosing Party, (ii) was known to the Receiving Party prior to its disclosure by the Disclosing Party without breach of any obligation owed to the Disclosing Party, (iii) is received from a third party without breach of any obligation owed to the Disclosing Party, or (iv) was independently developed by the Receiving Party.

8.2. Protection of Confidential Information. The Receiving Party will use the same degree of care that it uses to protect the confidentiality of its own confidential information of like kind (but not less than reasonable care) (i) not to use any Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party for any purpose outside the scope of this Agreement, and (ii) except as otherwise authorized by the Disclosing Party in writing, to limit access to Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party to those of its and its Affiliates' employees and contractors who need that access for purposes consistent with this Agreement and who have signed confidentiality agreements with htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 10/18

STORABLE000019 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable the Receiving Party containing protections no less stringent than those herein. Neither party will disclose the terms of this Agreement or any Order Form to any third party other than its Affiliates, legal counsel and accountants without the other party's prior written consent, provided that a party that makes any such disclosure to its Affiliate, legal counsel or accountants will remain responsible for such Affiliate's, legal counsel's or accountant's compliance with this Section 8.2.

8.3. Compelled Disclosure. The Receiving Party may disclose Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party to the extent compelled by law to do so, provided the Receiving Party gives the Disclosing Party prior notice of the compelled disclosure (to the extent legally permitted) and reasonable assistance, at the Disclosing Party's cost, if the Disclosing Party wishes to contest the disclosure. If the Receiving Party is compelled by law to disclose the Disclosing Party's Confidential Information as part of a civil proceeding to which the Disclosing Party is a party, and the Disclosing Party is not contesting the disclosure, the Disclosing Party will reimburse the Receiving Party for its reasonable cost of compiling and providing secure access to that Confidential Information.

9. Indemnification.

9.1. Indemnification for Infringement. Subject to Section 9.4, we shall, at our expense, defend you against any third party claim brought against you which alleges that the Services infringe any US patent issued to a third party as of the Effective Date or infringe any copyright, trademark or trade secret of any third party (collectively referred to as the "Infringing Item"). In the event an injunction is sought or obtained against use of the Infringing Item or in our opinion is likely to be sought or obtained, we shall, at our option and expense, either (i) procure for you and your named Users the right to continue to use the Services, or (ii) replace or modify the Services to make their use non-infringing while being capable of substantially performing the same function. In the event subsections (i) and (ii) above are not commercially practicable, we may terminate the Services and refund any prepaid, but unused Service Fees. We shall not be obligated to defend or be liable for any costs or damages under this Section 9.1 if the alleged infringement arises out of or is in any manner attributable to (i) any unauthorized modification of any Services by you (or any of your Users) or (ii) use of Services in combination with services and products not provided or authorized by the Company if such infringement would have been avoided without such modification or combination or (iii) compliance with your designs or instructions or (iv) a claim that does not state with specificity that the Services are the subject of the claim (each an "Excluded Claim").

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STORABLE000020 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable 9.2. Indemnification for Data Security and Privacy. Subject to Section 9.4, and during the term of your subscription to the Services, we shall, at our expense, defend you against any third party claim brought against you which allege our gross negligence in preventing unauthorized access to, or our willful misconduct in disclosing, Personally Identifiable Information of your customers in our possession or control. This indemnity will not apply to the extent that such claim, arises from or relates to your negligence or willful misconduct or that of your agents or representatives, or to the extent liability is disclaimed or limited by either party under the Agreement. The indemnity obligations set forth in this section are contingent upon your proving our gross negligence or willful misconduct has directly and proximately resulted in the unauthorized access to or disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information of your customers in our possession or control.

9.3. Your Indemnification. You agree to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend us and all our employees, officers, directors and agents from any and all claims, demands, suits, proceedings, investigations, damages, costs, expenses, losses, and any other liabilities (including reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs and expenses) arising out of or relating to (i) your use of the Services, (ii) an Excluded Claim, (iii) any content provided by you, (iv) any actual or alleged breach by you of any representation, warranty, covenant or obligation under the Agreement, (v) your use of the Model Contracts; or (vi) your gross negligence or willful misconduct. Your indemnification obligations under this Section 9.3 shall survive any termination or expiration of the Agreement.

9.4. Notification and Cooperation. The indemnifying party's obligations to the indemnified party under this Section 9 above are conditioned upon (i) indemnified party notifying indemnifying party promptly in writing within 30 days, upon knowledge of any claim, for which it may be entitled to indemnification under the Agreement; (ii) to the extent applicable, indemnified party ceasing use of the claimed infringing Services upon receipt of notice of same; (iii) indemnified party permitting indemnifying party to have the sole right to control the defense and settlement of any such claim (provided that indemnifying party may not settle any claim without the indemnified party's consent unless the settlement unconditionally releases indemnified party from all liability); (iv) indemnified party providing reasonable assistance to indemnifying party, at indemnifying party's expense, in the defense of such claim; (v) indemnified party not entering into any settlement agreement or otherwise settling any such claim without indemnifying party's express prior written consent or request; and (vi) indemnified party complying with any settlement or court order made in connection with the claim (related to the future use of any infringing materials). Indemnified party may participate in the defense or settlement of a claim with counsel of its own choice and at its own expense.

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STORABLE000021 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable 9.5. Exclusive Remedy. This Section 9 states the indemnifying party's sole liability to, and the indemnified party's exclusive remedy against, the other party for any type of claim described in this Section.

10. Limitation on Liability.

10.1 EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO DAMAGES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH A BREACH OF SECTION 4.3 (YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESTRICTIONS) OR 11 (PERSONAL INFORMATION AND PRIVACY STATEMENT), TO THE MAXIUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, IN NO EVENT SHALL EITHER PARTY'S TOTAL CUMULATIVE LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE AGREEMENT EXCEED THE SUM OF THE AMOUNTS PAID BY YOU FOR THE SERVICES GIVING RISE TO THE LIABILITY DURING THE ONE YEAR PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING THE DATE THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE.

10.2. EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO DAMAGES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH A BREACH OF SECTION 4.3 OR 11, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, IN NO EVENT SHALL EITHER PARTY HERETO, ITS LICENSORS OR SUPPLIERS, HAVE ANY LIABILITY TO THE OTHER PARTY FOR ANY LOST PROFITS OR COST OF PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES OR FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, EXEMPLARY OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, HOWEVER CAUSED AND BASED ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), ARISING OUT OF THE AGREEMENT, THE PERFORMANCE OR NONPERFORMANCE BY EITHER PARTY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS HEREUNDER, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

10.3. BECAUSE SOME STATES/JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, THE ABOVE LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU, IN WHICH CASE OUR LIABILITY SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW.

11. Personal Information and Privacy Statement.

You will comply with all applicable privacy and other laws, rules, regulations and guidelines relating to protection, collection, use and distribution of Personally Identifiable Information of any person . You will post a privacy statement on the page where you collect Personally Identifiable Information ("Privacy Statement") that complies with all applicable laws, rules, regulations and guidelines and, at a minimum, notifies users of the Personally Identifiable Information collected, how it will be used and how it will be secured and identifies the collection (via cookies, web beacons and htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 13/18

STORABLE000022 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable other applicable means) and use of information gathered in connection with the Services and obtains prior informed consent (opt-in) before utilizing any tracking technologies, to the extent required by applicable laws and regulations . Such Privacy Statement shall also include technical information related to collection, transmission and storage of Personally Identifiable Information provided by us through the Services.

If required by applicable data protection legislation or other law or regulation, you will inform third parties that you are providing their Personally Identifiable Information to us for processing and will ensure that any required third parties have given their consent to such disclosure and processing. You agree to comply with the descriptions and provisions of the Privacy Statement.

12. Miscellaneous.

12.1. Model Contracts. The Model Contracts are provided for informational purposes only and should not be relied on as legal advice. Nothing herein constitutes the establishment of an attorney-client relationship between you and the Company or anyone involved in the drafting of the Model Contracts. The Company makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of anything contained in the Model Contracts. If you use the Model Contracts, you should seek the advice of legal counsel to develop a contract that meets your specific needs. As state and local laws may differ, any legal questions should be referred to appropriate legal counsel. By utilizing the Model Contracts, you: (i) assume full responsibility for any loss, damage, or liability resulting from the use of the Model Contracts; and (ii) release the Company and the authors of the Model Contracts, their contributors, agents, licensees, successors and assigns from any and all known or unknown claims, demands or causes of action that may arise, at any time, out of or relating to your use of any of the Model Contracts.

12.2. Independent Parties. You and the Company are independent contractors. The Agreement does not create any joint venture, partnership, agency or employment relationship between the parties. You shall be solely responsible for managing your employees and for any and all compensation, taxes, benefits and liabilities to your employees and any of your other representatives or service providers. Neither you nor any of your employees, representatives, or service providers shall make any representations, warranties or guarantees with respect to us, the Agreement or the Services other than as expressly authorized by us in writing.

12.3. Assignment. Neither the Agreement nor any of your rights or obligations under the Agreement may be assigned or transferred, by operation of law or otherwise, without our prior written consent, unless assigned to a successor in interest, or pursuant to a merger, corporate reorganization, or a sale or transfer of all or htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 14/18

STORABLE000023 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable substantially all of your assets of which you provide us notice at least thirty (30) days prior to the consummation of the transaction and such transaction does not involve a competitor of the Company. You and the Company will negotiate the cost of this assignment upon the notification of the change. An assignment by you based on any other circumstances requires our prior consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. We may freely assign this Agreement without your consent provided that the Services continue to operate as outlined in this Agreement. Subject to the foregoing, this Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties, their respective successors and permitted assigns.

12.4. Force Majeure. Neither party will be responsible for any delay, interruption or other failure to perform under the Agreement due to acts beyond the control of the responsible party, but only for so long as such conditions persist. Force majeure events include, but are not limited to: natural disasters (e.g. lightning, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods); wars, riots, terrorist activities, and civil commotions; a local exchange carrier's activities, and other acts of third parties; explosions and fires; embargoes, strikes, and labor disputes; governmental decrees; failures of telecommunications providers or internet service providers; failures of third party suppliers, service providers or vendors; and any other cause beyond the reasonable control of a party.

12.5. Choice of Law. The Agreement and any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Agreement shall be governed by and construed under the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to the principles of conflict of laws. All disputes arising out of or related to the Agreement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the Texas state and federal courts, and the parties consent to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of these courts .

12.6.E-mail and Notices. You further agree that we may provide any and all notices, statements and other communications to you through either e-mail, mail, express delivery service, or delivered by a recognized commercial carrier addressed to the address last designated on the Agreement. You are responsible for providing us with any updated contact information.

12.7. No Waiver; Cumulative Remedies. No failure or delay by either party in exercising any right under this Agreement shall constitute a waiver of that right. Other than as expressly stated herein, the remedies provided herein are in addition to, and not exclusive of, any other remedies of a party at law or in equity.

12.8. Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be contrary to law, the provision shall be modified by the court and interpreted so as best to accomplish the objectives of the original provision to the htlps://www.storable.com1privacy/sitelink-terms-of-use/ 15/18

STORABLE000024 1/12/25, 1:10 PM Sitelink Terms Of Use - Storable fullest extent permitted by law, and the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

12.9. Entire Agreement. To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, this Agreement, together with the documents referenced herein and all Order Forms constitute the entire agreement between the parties as to its subject matter, and supersede all previous and contemporaneous agreements, proposals or representations, written or oral, concerning the subject matter of this Agreement. No representation, undertaking or promise shall be taken to have been given or be implied from anything said or written in negotiations between the parties prior to this Agreement except as expressly stated in this Agreement. Neither party shall have any remedy in respect of any untrue statement made by the other upon which that party relied in entering into this Agreement (unless such untrue statement was made fraudulently) and that party's only remedy in respect of any untrue statement shall be for breach of contract as provided in this Agreement. You acknowledge and agree that Your agreement hereunder is not contingent upon the delivery of any future functionality or features not specified herein or in an Order Form or dependent upon any oral or written, public or private comments made by Us with respect to future functionality or features for the Services. In the event of any conflict between the provisions in these General Terms of Service and any Order Form or Additional Terms of Service, the terms of this Master Service Agreement shall prevail, to the extent of such conflict. No terms or conditions stated in Your purchase order or in any other of Your order documentation shall be incorporated into or form any part of this Agreement, and all such terms or conditions shall be null and void.

12.10. Export. Both parties agree to comply with applicable US export and import laws and regulations. You shall not permit your Users to access or use the Services in violation of any U.S. export embargo, prohibition or restriction.

12.11. Publicity. We reserve the right to name you as a user of Our Services on Our marketing and promotional materials unless you opt out of such disclosure on an applicable Order Form.

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The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ______________________________________________________________________________ Storable’s Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline ______________________________________________________________________________ Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively “Storable”) respectfully move the Court on an emergency basis for a partial stay of the June 13, 2025 production deadline set forth in the Court’s May 28, 2025 Discovery Order as to Storable’s response to Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 10 and would respectfully show the Court as follows.

Summary This Court’s May 28, 2025 Discovery Order requires Storable to produce its FMS customer list by June 13, 2025 in response to Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 10. That list is a trade secret, competitively sensitive, and among the most valuable assets that Storable has. The Court should stay the June 13, 2025 deadline for Storable to respond to Request No. 10 pending this Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on SafeLease’s Attempted Monopolization Claim, scheduled for hearing on July 1, 2025. The customer list is relevant only to SafeLease’s claim for attempted monopolization. Additionally, as the Court knows, there is a pending appeal of the Court’s Amended Order Granting Temporary Injunction which places this Court’s jurisdiction at issue. Either of these rulings would eliminate any reason to produce this trade secret to SafeLease, the disclosure of which would gravely threaten Storable’s business.

Also, importantly, the parties are engaged in ongoing settlement discussions with the assistance of mediator Alan F. Levin, following a mediation on June 4, 2025. If the continued talks resolve this matter, there is no need for the production of a trade secret in a dispute between two competitors.

A stay would not prejudice SafeLease, which has never requested production by any date certain. The parties have not even commenced production of any documents as they are continuing to negotiate the relevant search terms and custodians. With that landscape and a June 2026 trial date, there is no immediate need for the production of a trade secret when forthcoming rulings may remove the need for production. Moreover, Storable’s requested stay would be limited to its response to Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 10, and would not impact the June 13, 2025 deadline as to the other requests at issue in the May 28 Discovery Order.

Relevant Background The May 28, 2025 Discovery Order requires Storable to produce to SafeLease by June 13, 2025 documents sufficient to show the name, city, state, and ZIP code of all self-storage facilities using Storable’s FMS as of December 30, 2024 in response to SafeLease’s Request for Production Number 10. SafeLease has claimed that it needs this FMS customer list to calculate the market share in its alleged FMS services market for purposes of its attempted monopolization claim under the Texas Antitrust Act. SafeLease has not claimed any other need for this list.

Storable respectfully disagrees with the May 28 Discovery Order and believes that more complete briefing and evidence will persuade the Court to revisit its ruling. Accordingly, Storable will be promptly filing a motion to reconsider to ensure that all necessary facts are before the Court

-2- in this dispute over the unnecessary disclosure of one of Storable’s most valuable trade secrets. 1 If the Court declines to reconsider the May 28 Discovery Order, Storable will have to pursue a petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals to protect against disclosure of this highly sensitive trade secret to its competitor.

In the meantime, as the Court is aware, Storable has moved for partial summary judgment on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim, which is the only claim for which SafeLease contends the FMS customer list is relevant. The partial summary judgment motion is set for hearing on July 1, 2025. See Notice of Hearing (Jun. 5, 2025). Storable also has appealed the temporary injunction issued in this matter, which places this Court’s jurisdiction at issue. If this Court grants Storable’s motion for partial traditional summary judgment or the Court of Appeals determines that this Court lacks jurisdiction, there will no longer be any basis for producing the FMS customer list, either because it will no longer be relevant to any remaining claims and therefore not discoverable or because this Court will lack jurisdiction to compel such production.

Further, Storable will also move to reconsider the Court’s April 15, 2025 Order denying its Motion to Modify the Protective Order to exclude Plaintiff’s outside general counsel, Mr. Adam Locke, from accessing Storable’s “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” (“OCEO”) materials—in light of this Court’s recent decision in Westlake Longview Corp. v. Eastman Chemical Co., Cause No. 24–BC11B–0023, Opinion on Motion for Protective Order, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 (May 16, 2025). If

The Court noted in the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order that Storable did not claim that the customer list was a trade secret. Respectfully, Storable’s response to SafeLease’s pre-motion letter was subject to strict length limitations under the local rules. The Court ruled on this discovery dispute based solely on those letters, rather than requesting further briefing. Further briefing would have clarified that Storable’s customer list is a trade secret. Customer lists or similar information are commonly recognized as trade secrets. Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Dolcefino Comm’cns, LLC, 702 S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“Courts generally recognize that customer lists or financial information that can be used to obtain customers or to negotiate pricing or fees to obtain an advantage in the market qualifies as a trade secret.”).

-3- no stay is issued and Storable is otherwise required to produce its FMS customer list, reconsideration of the April 15, 2025 order would prevent Mr. Locke from accessing the list.

Finally, following the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order, the parties conducted a mediation on June 4, 2025. No impasse was declared and settlement discussions are continuing. Since a settlement was not reached at the June 4 mediation itself, however, the June 13, 2025 deadline under the Discovery Order remains operative.

In light of all the above ongoing and forthcoming developments, Storable requests a stay of the June 13, 2025 deadline for production in response to Plaintiff’s Request No. 10 under the May 28 Discovery Order.

Legal Standard A trial court may issue any protective order “in the interest of justice” to protect the movant from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, or annoyance. T EX. R. CIV. P. 192.6(b).

Such limitations may include modifications of the timing of discovery. Id. Similarly, the Court is also permitted to schedule discovery to occur in appropriate phases. T EX. R. CIV. P. 190.4(b)(1)– (2).

Argument and Authorities The May 28 Discovery Order subjects Storable an extraordinary burden and the interests of justice overwhelmingly support a stay. The Court should stay the June 13, 2025 production deadline until the latest of this Court’s ruling on Storable’s motion for partial summary judgment on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim, this Court’s rulings on Defendants’ forthcoming motions to reconsider the Court’s May 28 or April 15 rulings, or the Court of Appeals’ decision and mandate on Storable’s appeal of the temporary injunction.

Undue burden. The Court’s May 28 Discovery Order compels Storable to produce its FMS customer list. This document is a trade secret and its disclosure under any circumstance

-4- represents a substantial threat to Storable—a threat that is especially serious in a case against a hostile competitor. It is settled law that a trade secret is only subject to production in discovery if “the party seeking production [shows] reasonable necessity for the requested materials.” In re Union Pac. R. Co., 294 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tex. 2009). “A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and prevent other persons from disclosing a trade secret.” T EX. R. EVID. 507(a) (emphasis added). Storable’s forthcoming motion to reconsider the May 28 Discovery Order will address the considerations relevant under Texas law for determining whether a trade secret exists; however, as a general matter, “[c]ourts generally recognize that customer lists or financial information that can be used to obtain customers or to negotiate pricing or fees to obtain an advantage in the market qualifies as a trade secret.” Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Dolcefino Comm’cns, LLC, 702 S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

Further, the risk of improper disclosure of Storable’s FMS customer list is material, and neither the Agreed Protective Order nor confidentiality/OCEO designations can address that risk.

Notably, if the Court of Appeals determines that this Court lacks jurisdiction, the Agreed Protective Order will become void—leaving no protection whatsoever in place for the interim period until the case can be remanded and a new protective order entered. This inherent risk of disclosure—due simply to the procedural posture of the case—is undeniable and would inflict even greater undue burden on Storable. And this Court would not be able to prevent that risk in the event that it lacks jurisdiction over this case.

The Court’s May 28 Discovery Order suggested that disclosing the FMS customer list to SafeLease would not be problematic because SafeLease does not compete in the FMS market.

Discovery Order (May 28, 2025) at n. 2. Respectfully, disclosing this list to any competitor would raise significant risks for Storable. Disclosing it to SafeLease in particular raises even greater risks

-5- given SafeLease’s history of misusing and abusing access to Storable’s FMS platforms and data.

While SafeLease does not compete in the FMS space, SafeLease competes to provide tenant insurance to the facilities using Storable’s FMS. According to SafeLease, approximately 70% of its customers use a Storable FMS (see Feb. 14, 2025 Tr. 28:17-21 (Stein)), so providing SafeLease with the Storable’s FMS facility list would give one of Storable’s tenant insurance competitors a rich source for targeting potential customers, including those that use Storable’s tenant insurance products. SafeLease has also been encouraging its tenant insurance customers to switch from Storable’s FMS to Cubby, a different FMS platform (see Feb. 13, 2025 Tr. 82:11-14 (Kinet)), so providing SafeLease with Storable’s FMS customer list could unfairly enable them to target more Storable FMS customers. Accordingly, disclosing the FMS facility list to SafeLease is highly likely to harm Storable’s business.

Interests of justice. The interests of justice support a stay of the June 13 deadline for multiple reasons.

First, if this Court grants Storable’s motion for partial summary judgment on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim or the Court of Appeals determines that this Court lacks jurisdiction, the need for production of the customer list will become moot, either because Storable’s FMS market share—the only issue for which SafeLease’s asserted any need for the customer list—will no longer be at issue or because this Court will no longer have jurisdiction to order discovery. Similarly, if this Court reconsiders the May 28 Discovery Order, that ruling too would obviate the need for disclosure of the list. It would be fundamentally unjust to force Storable to disclose one of its most valuable trade secrets when a ruling in Storable’s favor on any one of these matters would remove the need for disclosure altogether.

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Second, if this Court were to grant Storable’s motion to reconsider its April 15, 2025 Order regarding access to Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only (OCEO) information, that ruling would bar SafeLease’s general counsel, Mr. Locke, from viewing OCEO materials. Thus, to the extent Storable must ultimately produce its FMS customer list (which would, if produced, be considered OCEO), it would be unjust to compel Storable to produce the list before the Court determines whether there are grounds for reconsidering denying Locke access to the list—because Locke would be able to see the list before a potential ruling from the Court barring him from doing so.

Third, the parties are engaged in settlement discussions with the assistance of a mediator.

If those discussions result in a settlement, there will no longer be a need for Storable to produce its FMS customer list in this matter. Staying the June 13, 2025 production deadline would thus not only prevent a potentially needless and irreparable disclosure of Storable’s trade secret—it would also prevent the disclosure of Storable’s trade secret from being improperly used as leverage in settlement negotiations.

Finally, requiring production of the customer list would constitute irreparable harm—i.e., it can never be taken back. A stay should issue to avoid inflicting irreparable harm to Storable.

The Court Should Act on an Emergency Basis Storable would suffer irreparable harm if required to comply with the June 13, 2025 deadline because producing a trade secret to a competitor is irreversible. That result may be entirely unnecessary if this Court or the Court of Appeals rule in Storable’s favor on any of the pending matters discussed above. This Court should act on an expedited basis to stay the June 13 deadline before it expires.

Conclusion Storable respectfully requests that the Court issue a stay of the June 13, 2025 production deadline set forth in its May 28, 2025 Discover Order, and the stay should expire 10 days after the

-7- latest of: a ruling on Storable’s motion for partial summary judgment on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim; a mandate from the Court of Appeals in Storable’s pending appeal; a ruling on Storable’s forthcoming motion to reconsider the Court’s May 28, 2025 Discovery Order; or a ruling on Storable’s forthcoming motion to reconsider the Court’s April 15 Order denying modification of the Protective Order.

Respectfully submitted June 6, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) John Holler (admitted pro hac vice) ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

-8- [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

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Certificate of Conference The Parties conferred regarding the relief requested in the foregoing motion, and counsel for Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff is opposed. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 2,366 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on June 6, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

-10- E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court705 of Texas 6/6/2025 8:10 PM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ______________________________________________________________________________ Storable’s Motion for Reconsideration of The Court’s April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order ______________________________________________________________________________ Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively “Storable”) respectfully submits this Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s April 15, 2025 Order Denying Storable’s Motion to Modify the Protective Order in this case and would respectfully show the Court as follows.

Summary The Court’s April 15, 2025 Order denied Storable’s request to modify the Agreed Protective Order to exclude Plaintiff’s outside general counsel, Mr. Adam Locke (“Locke”), from accessing materials marked “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” (“OCEO”). However, on May 16, 2025, this Court issued an intervening decision in Westlake Longview Corp. v. Eastman Chemical Co., 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 (May 16, 2025) addressing the factors this Court would consider in denying counsel access to Attorneys’ Eyes Only (“AEO”) materials under a protective order—which have equal or greater force regarding materials designated OCEO, which is an ever greater limitation on access to only certain attorneys for a party. Most, if not all, of those factors squarely apply to

Locke. The Court should reconsider its April 15 Order based on the intervening Westlake decision and modify the Protective Order to exclude Locke from reviewing Storable’s OCEO materials.

Legal Standard Motions to reconsider. A trial court “retains continuing control over its interlocutory orders and has the power to set those orders aside at any time before a final judgment is entered.”

Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 83 (Tex. 1993). This control includes the “authority to change or modify any interlocutory order or judgment until the judgment becomes final.” Rush v. Barrios, 56 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] 2001, pet. denied).

Denying access to AEO/OCEO. Whether to grant counsel access to AEO or OCEO designated material “requires balancing of the parties’ competing interests.” Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 14. While the Westlake decision addresses access to such materials by in-house counsel, it acknowledges that “[f]ederal courts have generally held that the same test applies whether the counsel at issue is in house or outside counsel[.]” Id. at n.16; see also Discovery Order (May 28) at 2 n.3 (same). The two factors that the Court considers in balancing the relevant interests include (1) the risk of inadvertent disclosure or misuse; and (2) the need for access. Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 14.

Argument and Authorities The record before the Court proves that there is a potent risk of inadvertent disclosure or misuse if Locke is permitted to access Storable’s OCEO materials and a minimal need for his access under the circumstances. The Court should deny Locke access to those materials.

If, however, Court determines that the existing record is insufficient to make a decision, Storable is prepared to depose Locke regarding this matter and will renew and supplement this motion with that evidence.

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I. Locke’s Access to Storable’s OCEO Materials Poses a Risk of Inadvertent Disclosure or Misuse Locke’s access to Storable’s OCEO materials creates a material risk of inadvertent disclosure or misuse of these materials. Storable is not accusing Locke of contempt. Rather, its concern is what the Court identified in Westlake, which is that even counsel who “actively endeavor to abide by their legal and ethical obligations” can be subject to a “risk of inadvertent disclosure as well as the reality that even if in-house counsel does not disclose information, they may still unconsciously take it into account when providing legal advice on matters outside of this litigation.” Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 14 & n.17 (quoting In re Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is very difficult for the human mind to compartmentalize and selectively suppress information once learned, no matter how well- intentioned the effort may be to do so”)).

Locke’s role and history with SafeLease render him unfit to access Storable’s most confidential and competitive secrets, which are and would be designated as OCEO. Virtually all of the “[e]xamples of evidence that courts have relied on in denying attorney access to AEO information” that the Westlake Court identified are present here, while virtually none of the “examples of evidence that courts have relied on in granting attorney access to AEO information” are present. Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶¶ 17–18.

A. The Types of Evidence Supporting Denial of Access Identified by This Court in Westlake Are Present in This Case The Court’s decision in Westlake identified several types of evidence on which courts have denied counsel access to AEO materials. Many of those same types of evidence are present in this case.

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1. Locke Advises SafeLease on a Gamut of Legal Issues The first type of evidence that this Court identified as supporting denial of access is an attorney’s responsibility for “advising his employer on a gamut of legal issues, including contracts, marketing, and employment.” Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 17 (citing Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992)). Here, Locke has testified that he has “provided legal advice on various issues to SafeLease.” Declaration of A. Locke (Apr. 11, 2025) ¶ 35 (attached as Exhibit A); see also A. Locke Letter to K. Treistman (Mar. 26, 2025) at 2 (attached as Exhibit B) (“since July 2023 . . . I provided general legal advice to my longtime client [SafeLease]”). Locke also admits that he offers a broad range of services to his outside-general- counsel clients like SafeLease: While I handle disputes, I also advise them on a variety of legal issues: e.g., employment and labor issues, regulatory issues, investigations, and commercial agreements. Some of my clients either don’t have the resources to hire in-house counsel or simply appreciate my flexibility, so they rely on me for general legal advice.

SafeLease falls into this category.

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).

2. Locke Has Worn Multiple Hats—Both Business and Legal—For SafeLease The next type of evidence that this Court identified as supporting denial of access is the attorney having served “as both general counsel and outside counsel for the company, ha[ving] served an affiliate in a purely business capacity, played a major role in the company’s core business . . . and [having] worked directly under the company’s owner.” Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus.

19 ¶ 17 (citing ST Sales Tech Hldgs., LLC v. Daimler Chrysler Co., LLC, 2008 WL 5634214, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2008). Locke checks these boxes too.

First, he originally served as outside counsel to SafeLease beginning in 2021. A. Locke --- Decl. (Ex. A). ¶ 13. In April 2022, he joined SafeLease as its General Counsel and Chief

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Operating Officer. Id. He then resigned from SafeLease in July 2023 and moved back into an outside counsel role. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. In other words, Locke has been moving through a revolving door to and from SafeLease for the past four years.

Second, in addition to serving as SafeLease’s Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel, Locke appears to have also served as Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel to Etude Capital, LLC. See Zoominfo: Adam Locke, https://www.zoominfo.com/p/Adam- Locke/2887510203 (screenshot attached as Exhibit C) (“As General Counsel for both SafeLease and Etude Capital, Locke provided legal advisory and guidance. Prior to these roles, they served as Chief Operating Officer & General Counsel for Etude Capital and as Chief Operating Officer for SafeLease, demonstrating applied knowledge of operational strategies.”). Etude Capital is SafeLease’s parent company and LLC manager, and its founder, President, and LLC member- manager is Steven Stein, who is also the founder and CEO of SafeLease. See SafeLease Certificate of Formation (attached as Exhibit D) (listing Etude Insurance Holdings LLC as a manager); Etude Insurance Holdings LLC Certificate of Formation (attached as Exhibit E) (listing Etude Capital as manager); Etude Capital, LLC Certificate of Formation (attached as Exhibit F) (listing Stein as the member-manager).1 Third, Locke played a material role in SafeLease’s business in his roles as outside counsel, inside General Counsel, and Chief Operating Officer. A press release issued by SafeLease when it hired Locke as General Counsel and COO explained that when Locke had previously worked “as an outside advisor,” “he gained expert knowledge of SafeLease’s products, market

See also INSIDE SELF STORAGE, SafeLease Launches Reputation Management Tool for Self Storage, INSIDE SELF STORAGE, Etude Capital Launches Joint Venture to Invest in Self-Storage (Jan. 12, 2024), https://www.insideselfstorage.com/suppliers-products/safelease-launches-reputation-management-tool-for-self- storage (SafeLease is a “subsidiary of Etude Capital”); https://www.insideselfstorage.com/self-storage-investing-real- estate/etude-capital-launches-joint-venture-to-invest-in-self-storage (quoting “Steven Stein, founder and preside of Etude Capital”).

-5- positioning, and the value the company delivers to its customers.” Press Release: SafeLease Hires Adam Locke as Chief Operating Officer (Jul. https://www.safelease.com/resources/safelease-hires-adam-locke-as-chief-operating-officer (attached as Exhibit G) (emphasis added). Then, as General Counsel and COO, Locke was to “focus on ensuring the company’s strategic business objectives are met by increasing operational capabilities and driving efficiencies across all functional departments.” Id. Fourth, Locke would have worked directly under SafeLease’s parent company, Etude Capital, as its General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer and would have been extensively involved in both the business and legal affairs of SafeLease’s controlling entity. And in his roles as General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer of both SafeLease and Etude Capital, Locke would have worked directly under Steven Stein, who is the founder and chief executive of both companies.

3. Locke Has Frequent Contact With SafeLease’s Leadership, and SafeLease Claims this Case is Critical to its Future This next type of evidence that this Court identified as supporting denial of access to AEO materials is the “evidence of the frequency and intensity of interactions between in-house counsel and company leadership and the critical nature of the litigation to the company’s future.” Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 17 (citing Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’Ship v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D. Ill. 2006)). Such evidence is palpably present in this case.

First, Locke was not a low-ranking employee or in-house counsel of SafeLease—he was its General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer. It is axiomatic that an individual in this role would have direct, frequent, and extensive contact with the CEO. Indeed, Locke’s role as General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer of SafeLease’s parent company—which shares the same chief executive as SafeLease, Steven Stein—makes even more clear that Locke was and continues

-6- to be in extremely close contact with Stein. This is no less true after July 2023 when Locke transitioned to being an “outside” general counsel; indeed, by all appearances SafeLease has no in-house attorneys and Locke is its sole general counsel. Cf. id. (“It is one thing to be in-house counsel in a company with several layers of management with whom interaction and involvement may be episodic and may well be topically limited. It is quite another where a company’s two attorneys take their ultimate instructions in the litigation from a single individual, who is, for all intents and purposes, the corporation, and who is intimately involved in every facet of the litigation.”).

Second, SafeLease has repeatedly represented to the Court that this case is not only “critical” to its future—but that it is essential to its very existence. On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff’s Counsel stated on the record that “this case and this dispute is a matter of not just importance to SafeLease but literally existential urgency. It is the company’s future and current existence, and we very much appreciate the court’s attention to this.” Feb. 11, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 83:8–12.2 Locke’s extensive, multi-year history with SafeLease at the highest levels of its business and legal department—and those of its parent company—support denying him access to OCEO materials in this case, given its purported seriousness to SafeLease. Cf. Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’Ship, 237 F.R.D. at 411 (“[I]t is [the attorney’s] unique role in [the plaintiff], his enveloping participation in the litigation, the absence of safeguards resulting from a layered managerial hierarchy, and the criticality of the outcome of the litigation to the possible economic destiny of

See also Jan. 16, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 291:15–21 (“[Plaintiff’s Counsel:] On behalf of my client, respectfully, we don’t want to sue for damages. We want to have a trial where we’re still in business, we’re still able to service our customers, and we have a fair and square trial. If they prove their defenses and their counterclaims, more power to them. If we prove ours, we prevail, but we will not survive until trial, Your Honor, without this protection.”); Feb. 18, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 28:5–7 (“[Plaintiff’s Counsel:] Both our chief revenue officer and our chief executive testified that its just a matter of time before we go out of business.”); id. at 29:2–6 (“[Plaintiff’s Counsel:] Obviously, SafeLease is going to be put out of business; and the innovative low price competitor will be gone.”).

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[the plaintiff] and [the attorney] personally that make it appropriate to restrict in-house counsel’s access to [the defendant’s] confidential customer information.”).

4. Locke Directed Legal and Business Affairs For SafeLease and Was Responsible for Matters Relevant to this Case This next category of evidence that this Court identified as supporting denial of access to AEO materials is evidence “that the attorney was director of legal and business affairs for the company”; was “responsible for supervising its efforts [regarding matters relating to the subject of the case]”; and “reported directly to company’s general counsel, even though she did not handle product development contracts or other corporate matters.” Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 17.

Again, Locke checks all of these boxes and then some.

First, Locke plainly directed legal and business affairs for SafeLease as its Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel from January 2022 through July 2023—a time period which falls within the relevant case time period. See Exhibit L to Defs’ Reply in Support of Mot. to Modify Protective Order at 3 (SafeLease’s discovery requests listing a relevant time period from August 1, 2021 to present).

Second, as Chief Operating Officer, Locke was responsible for supervising matters within SafeLease that are directly relevant to this case. For example, Locke’s emails from 2023 show that he was responding directly to complaints by self-storage facility owners that SafeLease was improperly accessing their facility’s SiteLink FMS system. See TI Hearing DX-47 at 2. His response addresses and demonstrates his knowledge regarding, among other things: SafeLease’s personnel who purportedly access facilities’ FMS; storage of, third-party access to, and disclosure of tenant information; SafeLease’s user passwords; SafeLease’s use of automation when accessing the FMS; and security measures SafeLease purportedly takes when accessing the FMS. Id.

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Third, - - - - Locke did not merely “report directly” to SafeLease’s general counsel—he was the General Counsel, as well as the Chief Operating Officer. Even now, he still concedes that he is SafeLease’s “outside general counsel.” Ex. B (“Mr. Yetter said at the February 11 TI hearing that SafeLease’s ‘outside general counsel is Adam Locke.’ This is true.”).

5. Locke Oversaw and Advised SafeLease’s Leaders on Similar Litigation The final type of evidence that this Court identified as supporting the denial of access to AEO materials is “evidence that an attorney oversaw and advised the company’s business leaders on strategy for litigation of the same type as the pending case, even though the attorney was not involved in pricing, product design, sales, marketing, distribution, or day-to-day operations.”

Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 17 (citing Ecolab Inc. v. IBA, Inc., 2024 WL 3650464, at *1 (D.

Minn. May 19, 2024)). Locke is—again—all of the above and more. Specifically, Locke represents yet another company of which Stein is the President, Capital Storage Holdings, LLC, in the matter Capital Storage Holdings LLC v. Sparebox Self Storage, LLC, cause No. 2022–71323 (151st Jud. Dist., Harris County). See Excepts of Filings from Cause 2022–71323 (attached as Exhibit H) at PDF 14 (Capital Storage Holdings, LLC’s third amended petition at p.7 stating that Stein is its president); id. at PDF 25 (Capital Storage Holdings, LLC’s third amended petition at p.18 listing Locke as its counsel of record). The pleadings and other filings in that case show that Stein and Locke are employing tactics similar to those they have used in this case—i.e., attempting to negotiate a business deal with another party and then proceeding to file suit against the other party when that deal falls apart. See id. at PDF 31–33 (the Defendant’s summary judgment motion at p.1–3). Those tactics were unsuccessful in the Capital Storage case. See id. at PDF 43 (order granting summary judgment for Defendant).

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Locke’s involvement in the Capital Storage case is continuing to this day, see id. at PDF (docket sheet). Indeed, the case was originally filed when Locke was still serving as SafeLease’s Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel, and thus he plainly did have involvement in SafeLease’s day-to-day operations at that time. The Capital Storage case is also still ongoing now and further highlights the depth of the relationship between Locke and Stein, the multiple overlapping hats that Locke wears in connection with Stein’s ventures, and the impossibility of reasonably “walling off” knowledge that Locke would gain from Storable’s OCEO materials.

B. The Types of Evidence Supporting Granting of Access Identified by this Court in Westlake are Not Present in this Case None of the categories of evidence that this Court identified in Westlake as reasons for which an attorney may be granted access to AEO materials are present in this case. These types of evidence include proof that the attorney had no involvement in competitive or business matters and focused on “purely legal issues”; that he “had no financial interest” in the company, past non- legal involvement that was “incidental and largely dated,” and did not provide services involving “competitive decision-making.” See Westlake, 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶ 18. But none of this applies to Locke because he was a C-level business executive for SafeLease during the relevant time period for this case, and his duties were not purely legal in nature.

The Westlake decision also notes that an attorney’s location in a different state from the company’s relevant operations and the events alleged in the case may support granting access.

Here, both Mr. Locke and SafeLease—as well as Storable—are located in Texas.

II. Locke Has No Legitimate Need to Access Storable’s OCEO Materials There is no legitimate reason why SafeLease needs Locke to access OCEO materials—and certainly none that can outweigh the substantial risks that Locke’s access would create. This Court’s decision in Westlake explained that denying counsel’s access to AEO materials would

-10- cause undue hardship in and “extremely complex” case “at an advanced stage” of litigation where outside counsel were newly retained and where the case is “complex” with “highly technical matters” on which the attorney’s counsel’s insights are particularly important. Id. ¶ 19. This is not the case here. First, this case is at an early stage in which SafeLease is represented by two fully capably outside law firms, Yetter Coleman and Stone Hilton, from which many attorneys have already appeared on SafeLease’s behalf.

Second, while this case may have some complexity, Locke does not have, nor does he claim to have, any special experience rendering his insights particularly essential. His background is that of a litigator not unlike SafeLease’s counsel from Yetter Coleman or Stone Hilton. He has never claimed to have any highly technical skills that would be applicable in this type of case.

Rather, he has conceded that he is SafeLease’s outside general counsel who provides it with general legal advice.

III. Other Considerations Support Denying Access Other considerations, in addition to the types of evidence the Court identified in Westlake, further support denying Locke access to Storable’s OCEO materials.

First, most of the Court’s analysis in Westlake involved “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” (AEO) --- materials. But in this case, the Parties agreed to a protective order with an even greater level of protection at the second tier—“Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” (OCEO)—meaning, at minimum, not even all party attorneys would have access to the opposing party’s OCEO documents. The parties could have chosen to agree to an AEO tier instead, but did not do so. The Court’s weighing of the record evidence should be conducted in view of this reality. Indeed, the mere existence of an OCEO tier in the Protective Order presupposes that at least the parties’ general counsels would not be expected not have access to one another’s OCEO documents.

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Second, if Storable had known that Locke would seek to access OCEO materials, it would not have agreed to the Protective Order in its current form. But Storable did not know this, and in fact expected the exact opposite in light of Plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated representations that Locke would be excluded from OCEO materials. See, e.g., Def’s Motion to Modify Protective Order (Apr. 4, 2025) at 1–3; Defs’ Reply In Support Motion to Modify Protective Order (Apr. 14, 2025) at 1–2, . Storable agreed to the protective order with the understanding, provided by Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly in open court, that Locke would be excluded from OCEO. This matters because, without Storable’s agreement, SafeLease would have been required to prove good cause for entry of a protective order over the Storable’s objection. Thus, while Storable has the burden to justify any modification to the Agreed Protective Order, the Court should not alleviate SafeLease’s burden to show that good cause exists for Locke to have access to OCEO materials.

This is especially important here, when SafeLease avoided having to meaningfully comply with this burden in the first instance by securing Storable’s consent to the Agreed Protective Order based on the false pretense that SafeLease was excluding Locke from OCEO materials.

IV. Storable is Prepared to Promptly Notice Locke’s Deposition if the Court Requires Additional Testimony Regarding His Role Finally, while Storable believes that this motion is amply supported by the record and attached evidence, to the extent the Court believes that any further evidence is necessary, Storable will depose Locke regarding his role(s) at or representing SafeLease.

Conclusion Storable respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its April 15, 2025 Order, modify the Agreed Protective Order in this case to exclude Locke from accessing Storable’s OCEO materials, and grant all other relief to which it may justly be entitled. A proposed order accompanies this motion.

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Respectfully submitted June 6, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) John Holler (admitted pro hac vice) ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240

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Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

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Certificate of Conference The Parties conferred regarding the relief requested in the foregoing motion, and counsel for Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff is opposed. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 3,898 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on June 6, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

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Exhibit A

The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DECLARATION OF ADAM LOCKE 1. My name is Adam Locke, and I am over 18 years of age and competent to make this declaration.

2. The facts set forth in this declaration are based on my personal knowledge, and are true and correct.

My Background and Current Practice 3. I have been licensed to practice law in Texas since 2012.

4. I have operated my law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, since founding it in December 2019.

5. Prior to founding Lockelaw, I was a counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP in New York City from 2016 to 2019. Prior to working at Akin Gump, I was an associate in the Kansas City offices of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP and Rouse Hendricks German May PC from 2015 to 2016. Before working at Shook, I was an associate in the Houston office of Susman Godfrey LLP from 2013 to 2015.

6. I served as a law clerk to the Honorable Carolyn Dineen King of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from 2012 to 2013.

7. I graduated from Yale Law School and received my Juris Doctor in 2012.

8. At Lockelaw, my law practice consists of commercial litigation, employment litigation, arbitration, investigations, regulatory advice, and legal due diligence for credit investors.

9. On a limited basis, Lockelaw also offers outside general counsel services. “Outside general counsel services” refers to serving as a first point of contact for my business and investor clients, providing general legal advice on the issues they encounter on a regular basis when possible, and referring specialized work to other outside counsel as needed.

10. I do not offer business advice to my clients or advise on commercial issues, such as the suitability of price terms in agreements.

11. My law firm has represented dozens of clients, including investment managers, startups, public companies, family-owned businesses, and individuals.

My Relationship with SafeLease 12. SafeLease became a client of Lockelaw PLLC in 2021.

13. In April 2022, I joined SafeLease as its General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer.

14. While employed by SafeLease, with SafeLease’s permission, I maintained my law firm and certain clients I had served since founding my law firm.

15. Over the year I was employed with SafeLease, demand for my legal services from outside clients grew, and I could not service these clients while employed with SafeLease.

16. In June 2023, I resigned from SafeLease and no longer had any in-house or business role with SafeLease.

17. Following my resignation from SafeLease, I began to represent SafeLease as outside counsel through Lockelaw PLLC.

18. I remain outside counsel to SafeLease, a role I have had since July 2023.

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19. I do not provide commercial advice to SafeLease, make business decisions for SafeLease, or participate in non-legal, commercial decision-making with SafeLease.

20. I am not involved in SafeLease’s general business operations or discussions, which are operations handled by and discussions maintained by SafeLease’s internal business leaders.

21. I do not participate in SafeLease’s business operations or discussions because my role as outside counsel is to provide legal advice.

22. Lockelaw PLLC is not a business consultancy, and I do not run a business consultancy.

23. In addition, I do not participate in SafeLease’s business operations or discussions because, as SafeLease’s outside counsel, were I to give SafeLease business advice, any claims arising out of such advice would not be covered by my professional malpractice insurance, which exclusively covers claims relating to legal advice.

24. As a small firm owner, I do not and cannot expose myself to risks associated with giving business advice to my law firm clients, which would be outside of my circle of competence.

My Relevant Communications with Storable’s Counsel Before I Filed an Appearance 25. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in SafeLease’s response to Storable’s motion to modify the agreed protective order and to compel disclosure of a list of certain documents that I have reviewed as counsel of record in this action, which response this declaration supports.

26. Storable has known that I am outside counsel to SafeLease since before this case was filed.

27. On December 6, 2024, I had coffee with Neil Verma, Storable’s General Counsel.

During this meeting, Mr. Verma told me that he and Storable’s CEO, Chuck Gordon, understood

-3- that I was independent of SafeLease and was operating an outside law firm. I confirmed to Mr. Verma that I was and had been representing SafeLease as outside counsel through my law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, since the summer of 2023. I explained to Mr. Verma at this meeting high-level details about why I had left SafeLease, the nature of my client base and services, and confirmed that I was outside counsel to SafeLease among many other clients of my firm.

28. Mr. Verma noted that he would like to retain me on behalf of Storable in the future once his department had the resources to do so. Mr. Verma suggested that such an arrangement might not be possible at that time due to potential conflicts, but that the situation could change. I indicated to Mr. Verma that I appreciated the kind words and consideration, but there likely was a conflict.

29. Once this lawsuit was filed, Mr. Verma and I engaged in multiple rounds of settlement discussions. I believe these good faith settlement talks were enabled by my being on equal footing with Mr. Verma, in that I had refrained from filing a notice of appearance and gaining access to discovery materials that he could not view as in-house counsel under a Rule 11 agreement.

30. A 21-minute-long settlement call I had with Mr. Verma on February 3, 2025, was memorable because it was far more negative in tone from our other settlement calls, which were generally polite and constructive.

31. Based on the negative tone of the February 3 call, I informed Mr. Verma that I would file a notice of appearance in the action if settlement talks continued to break down or failed.

Mr. Verma responded for me to “go ahead” and do what I needed to do.

32. On March 7, 2025, Storable’s new lead counsel, Katherine Treistman, called me.

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33. Ms. Treistman knows me from when I began my career in private practice in 2013 at Susman Godfrey LLP, the litigation boutique where Ms. Treistman was then a partner.

34. On the March 7 call, I spoke with Ms. Treistman for twenty minutes. On the call, Ms. Treistman told me she wanted to reconnect with me and discuss her approach towards this litigation. Ms. Treistman told me that she hoped the parties could take a more constructive approach to this litigation, a statement with which I agreed.

35. Ms. Treistman also inquired into my relationship to SafeLease, specifically asking me if I was “in house” counsel. I informed Ms. Treistman that I was not “in house” but had been outside counsel to SafeLease since July 2023. I explained to Ms. Treistman that, like many litigators at private firms, I provided legal advice on various issues to SafeLease, my longtime client, through my firm, Lockelaw PLLC, where I have represented dozens of other clients.

36. Following my explanation, Ms. Treistman said she “got it,” indicating she understood the outside counsel arrangement between me and SafeLease.

37. Also following my explanation, Ms. Treistman told me that all settlement communications from me going forward needed to be directed to her, not Mr. Verma.

38. Now that I could no longer engage in settlement discussions with Mr. Verma, I felt that I no longer had any reason not to file a notice of appearance.

I File an Appearance and Afterward Receive Access to OCO Materials 39. On March 24, Storable indicated that it would seek permanent sealing of dozens of exhibits and hundreds of pages of testimony in this case.

40. To assist with the sealing issue and related briefing, I decided to file an appearance.

Before gaining access to any OCO materials, I reviewed the Protective Order.

41. On March 24, 2025, at 6:25 PM CDT, I filed and served my notice of appearance in this action, becoming counsel of record to SafeLease.

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42. On March 24, 2025, at 6:54 PM CDT, I first received access to OCO materials.

43. Following receipt of the OCO materials, I reviewed some of them.

My Relevant Communications with Storable’s Counsel After I Filed an Appearance 44. On March 25, 2025, I participated in a meet and confer about the parties’ motions to seal.

45. On that call, my co-counsel introduced me as outside counsel to SafeLease.

46. Later on the call, I noted that defendants’ OCO designations appeared overbroad, citing an email defendants produced and marked OCO where Storable executives discussed an email they had received from the parties’ mutual customer. I noted that there was nothing in the email that appeared confidential, certainly nothing that would warrant an OCO designation.

47. At the end of the March 25 call, without prompting or explanation, Storable’s counsel, Andrew Bergman, said the following to me and my co-counsel: “my clients do not accept your characterization of Mr. Locke as outside counsel.”

48. I was surprised by this, given that weeks earlier, I told Ms. Treistman I was outside counsel, and even explained my relationship to SafeLease, and she said that she understood my role and invited me to participate in settlement talks directly with her, outside counsel to outside counsel.

49. I ended the call by saying that Mr. Bergman was entitled to “raise it with the Court.”

50. On March 25, 2025, lead counsel for Storable, Ms. Treistman, sent the first of two letters demanding that I immediately and permanently stop viewing Storable’s OCO materials and disclose what OCO materials I had reviewed.

51. Ms. Treistman reiterated her clients’ demands to me on a March 28 phone call and in a March 31 letter.

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52. Both of Ms. Treistman’s letters mischaracterize my relationship to SafeLease as “not outside counsel” and as someone “extensively involved in Plaintiff’s business” or involved in SafeLease’s “general business activities.”

53. I informed Ms. Treistman in response to her letters that I am outside counsel to SafeLease, have been since July 2023, and am not involved in SafeLease’s business activities.

54. I assured Ms. Treistman in several written responses to her letters and on the March call that I had abided by the Agreed Protective Order in this case and always would do so.

55. On the March 28 phone call, Ms. Treistman said to me that even with no access to OCO materials, I could “do everything that Mr. Yetter could do in the litigation—take depositions, represent [SafeLease] at hearings,” etc. 56. I disagreed with Ms. Treistman and responded that any counsel of record needs full access to discovery materials to zealously represent their clients.

57. Storable’s counsel at Arnold and Porter emailed me on April 3 (at 9:42 pm) and said that, in her March 31 letter, Ms. Treistman had requested to know when I first viewed OCO materials in this case.

58. In this April 3 email, Storable’s counsel alleged that I had failed to respond to Ms. Treistman’s request for the date and time I first accessed OCO materials; however, prior to the April 3 email, Storable’s counsel had never asked me to disclose when I first gained access to OCO materials in this litigation.

My Appearance Benefits SafeLease in this Litigation 59. In this action, the hourly rate I charge SafeLease is the lowest charged by any member of SafeLease’s trial team.

60. Of the members of SafeLease’s trial team, just two have litigated longer than me.

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ExhibitB LDCKELAW 2617 Bissonnet, Ste. 503, Houston, Texas 77005 Tel: 713-832-0242 • Fax: 713-565-4709 Attorney Adam Locke Direct: 713-832-0243 • [email protected]

March 26, 2025 Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002-2755 Via email: [email protected] Re: SafeLease Ins. Servs., LLC v. Storable, Inc., et al., Cause No. 35-BC03A- 0001 (Tex. Bus. Ct. 3d Div.) Dear Katherine: I received a copy of the cease and desist letter you sent yesterday to my co-counsel, Paul Yetter, which demanded action of me and my law firm within 24 hours. The letter, which suggests that I may violate a Court order, reflects a serious misunderstanding of my outside counsel relationship with SafeLease, of my law firm serving dozens of clients, of my ongoing role in the litigation prior to your appearance, and of my own professional ethics, which I believe you know well. I will respond to your letter in some detail in the hope of avoiding another needless dispute in this important litigation.

1. I Have Honored and Will Continue to Honor the Agreed Protective Order.

First and foremost, I’m writing to assure your clients that my appearing as an attorney of record for SafeLease in this matter will not compromise the protections in the Agreed Protective Order. Please be assured that I will faithfully abide by all obligations the Court has imposed on counsel of record relating to materials defendants have designated as Outside Counsel Eyes Only (“OCO”). I have read the Agreed Protective Order, and I acknowledge that my access to OCO materials comes with strict limitations — all of which I will honor. In particular, your clients can rest assured that I will honor the following obligations: • I will use OCO materials only to prepare for, try, and appeal this matter. • I will not use OCO materials to advise SafeLease on business or legal matters. • I will not disclose OCO materials to SafeLease employees, agents, or affiliates.

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 730 March 26, 2025 Page 2 • I will disclose OCO materials, and offer advice based on it, only as permitted by the Protective Order.

I understand that the above obligations are just some of the limitations on my conduct pursuant to the Protective Order. For example, I recognize that accessing OCO materials in this litigation may limit my participation in business dealings or negotiations between the parties if they implicate OCO information. Accordingly, I will ensure that I am walled off from dealings or negotiations between the parties where, for example, my participation or advice may give or appear to give SafeLease an unfair advantage because of knowledge of OCO materials.

In short, I fully understand and take seriously the limitations in the Protective Order. I will protect your clients’ non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information that is designated as OCO. And I will adhere strictly to the limits imposed on me as an attorney of record for SafeLease. These are commitments that I share with all other counsel of record in this case.

2. I Am Outside Counsel for SafeLease and Have Been Since July 2023.

As you know, from our 20-minute phone call on March 7, 2025, which you initiated and I welcomed, I am outside counsel for SafeLease. On that call, you asked if I was “in house” at SafeLease. I replied that I was not. I explained that I had been outside counsel for SafeLease since July 2023, that like many litigators at private firms, I provided general legal advice to my longtime client (which I have represented since 2021), and that through my law firm Lockelaw PLLC, I represent dozens of clients — of which SafeLease was just one.

Following my explanation, you responded that you “got it” and understood I was — like many lawyers in private practice — representing a longtime client in an array of matters, as its de facto “outside general counsel.” To my surprise, your letter suggests you now don’t understand my role. If so, please allow me to further explain my role and history with SafeLease.

I launched my firm in 2020, during the height of the pandemic, with a handful of clients who helped me keep the lights on. SafeLease was not one of them. I did not begin representing SafeLease until 2021. After a year of working with SafeLease, I was invited to join the company as Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel. I accepted this invitation, but even while employed by SafeLease, with SafeLease’s permission, I maintained my firm and a limited roster of loyal clients. By 2023, demand for my services had grown, and I felt a strong pull back to private practice. By June, SafeLease’s CEO, Steven Stein, and I had come to a mutual decision where I would continue to represent SafeLease as outside counsel but would no longer have any in-house role or relationship with SafeLease. My decision had real consequences: as part of my departure and transition, I forfeited a significant amount of company stock and benefits. I did so in order to build an independent firm and serve a broader range of clients as outside counsel.

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 731 March 26, 2025 Page 3

Thankfully, my law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, has done reasonably well. I have represented dozens of clients since mid-2023. They range from individuals and startups to investment funds and public companies. I offer my clients a variety of legal services. While I handle disputes, I also advise them on a variety of legal issues: e.g., employment and labor issues, regulatory issues, investigations, and commercial agreements. Some of my clients either don’t have the resources to hire in-house counsel or simply appreciate my flexibility, so they rely on me for general legal advice. SafeLease falls into this category.

SafeLease’s reliance on me for general legal advice does not transform me into an in-house lawyer for SafeLease. As a simple Google search will show, countless lawyers at large law firms — including your fine firm — serve as “outside general counsel” for their clients, including clients where they previously served in an in-house role. My arrangement is hardly unique, and your letter’s suggestion that my prior operating role with SafeLease somehow disqualifies me from representing SafeLease as its counsel in this action is baseless.

My role for SafeLease is not news to Storable. Storable knew that I operated a law firm independently of SafeLease before this dispute arose in December 2024. Indeed, Storable’s in- house general counsel, Neil Verma, joined me for coffee on the morning of December 6, 2024, before Storable cut off SafeLease’s authorized user accounts. During our coffee meeting, he noted that he and Storable’s CEO Chuck Gordon knew I was working independently of SafeLease, and it would be great for Storable to hire me if it wouldn’t pose a conflict (I politely noted it would).

In short, for Storable to now suggest that I am not independent of SafeLease — and that my past role excludes me from being its outside counsel — is misguided and ignores my recent discussions with both you and Storable.

3. Mr. Yetter’s Comment Does Not Transform Me into an In-House Lawyer.

Finally, your letter notes that Mr. Yetter said at the February 11 TI hearing that SafeLease’s “outside general counsel is Adam Locke.” This is true. My legal services can be more or less categorized as falling under “outside general counsel” services, as I explained above. Your letter then notes that Mr. Yetter said, “when we get into outside/counsel only, we will ask [him] to be excused.” It seems to suggest, incorrectly, that Mr. Yetter’s statement implies that I am not “outside counsel” to SafeLease or cannot become counsel of record in this action.

Simply put, Mr. Yetter’s reference to “outside/counsel only” was a reference to the Protective Order’s distinction between discovery materials designated for counsel of record in this action (i.e., OCO) and materials that all other lawyers, advisors, etc. are able to see (including

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM Katherine Ginzburg Treistman 732 March 26, 2025 Page 4 materials marked as merely “confidential”). At the time of the hearing, I was not counsel of record in this action, as I had not filed an appearance for SafeLease.

While my client felt that a good-faith settlement was possible, I was not counsel of record for SafeLease and did not have access to OCO materials. As such, I was in a position to maintain equal footing with Mr. Verma so that he and I could engage in good faith efforts to resolve this dispute. Regrettably, those efforts failed. And just weeks ago, you told me on our phone call that I was not to direct any further settlement communications to Mr. Verma, but rather to talk only to you — outside counsel to outside counsel — about settlement.

Respectfully, your letter tries to contort Mr. Yetter’s reference to the Protective Order into an admission that I am not outside counsel to SafeLease, despite admitted evidence to the contrary.

Lastly, let me add my hope that your own experience with me and my professional ethics is consistent with the contents and assurances of this letter. A dozen years ago, after clerking for the Fifth Circuit, I started my legal career at a (then-small) commercial litigation boutique where you were a respected partner. As I’ve told you, I always thought highly of you. Recently, on our call, you offered very kind words to me, which I greatly appreciated. Those kind words, and your personal experience with me on which they were based, are at odds with the tone and suggestions of your letter. Based on what you know about me, and on what I have shared with you in this response, I sincerely hope that this much is clear: the demands in your letter are unfounded.

I trust that this resolves any legitimate concerns that Storable may have.

Sincerely,

Adam Locke

LOCKELAW PLLC WWW.LOCKELAW.COM

ExhibitC g zoominfo Product s v Top Compan ies Ou r Data In dustries Pric ing Q. Search Login 734 Contact Sales

Adam Locke Owne r at Synd icase Reliable Data

~ Ema il a•••@syndicase.com I Mobile (***) •••-••••

Reveal Contact Info for Free [ ~ Export ] Biography Company Experience Simi lar Profiles FAQ

Who is Adam Locke Adam Locke Current Workplace Adam Tyler Locke is t he Founder and Managing Member of LockeLaw, representing businesses, invest ors, Syndicase entrepreneurs, inventors, and creators. Thei r background demonstra tes versatile expert ise in lega l and 2020-present (5 years) operational leadersh ip, particularly with in finance and consumer services sectors. Locke is based in Houst on, Texas. Address United States Number of Employees 7 As General Counsel for both SafeLease and Etude Capita l, Locke provided lega l advisory and guidance. Prior to these ro les, they served as Chief Operating Officer & Genera l Counsel for Etude Capital and as Chief Industry Operating Officer for Sa feLease, demonst rat ing applied knowledge of operationa l strateg ies. ( Fina nce) Locke's experience extends to t he investment sector as the Owner of Syndicase, where they focus on investments in legal assets, including litigation, arbitration, and bankruptcy c laims. Their work at Synd icase also encompasses advising fund managers on investments in lega l assets, cont ributing to deal flow w ithin View Colleagues litigation finance.

Earl ier in their career, Locke practiced law at Akin Gump as Counse l, and as an Associate at Shook Hardy & Oscar Garcia Bacon and Susman Godfrey. These assignments have in c luded a foc us on commercial litigation. Locke is an OG Director, Claims ~ Attorney with the State Bar of Texas and holds a law deg ree from Ya le. Read less ""=" ~ Phone ~ Email

ExhibitD Secretary of State Filed in the Office of the P.O. Box 13697 Secretary of State of Texas Austin, TX 78711-3697 Filing#: 803671015 07/02/2020 FAX: 512/463-5709 Document #: 980767350002 Certificate of Formation Image Generated Electronically Filing Fee: $300 Limited Liability Company for Web Filing

Article 1 - Entity Name and Type The filing entity being formed is a limited liability company. The name of the entity is: Safelease Insurance Services LLC Article 2 - Registered Agent and Registered Office r A. The initial registered agent is an organization (cannot be company named above) by the name of: OR P's. The initial registered agent is an individual resident of the state whose name is set forth below: Name: Steven Stein C. The business address of the registered agent and the registered office address is: Street Address: 7204 Avenue B STE 2E Bellaire TX 77401 Consent of Registered Agent r A. A copy of the consent of registered agent is attached.

OR w' B. The consent of the registered agent is maintained by the entity.

Article 3 - Governing Authority wA. The limited liability company is to be managed by managers.

OR rs. The limited liability company will not have managers. Management of the company is reserved to the members.

The names and addresses of the governing persons are set forth below: Etude Insurance Holdings LLC Manager 1: (Business Name) Address: 2802 Timmons Ln. #27600 Houston TX, USA 77227-77227 Article 4 - Purpose The purpose for which the company is organized is for the transaction of any and all lawful business for which limited liability companies may be organized under the Texas Business Organizations Code.

Supplemental Provisions/ Information [The attached addendum, if any, is incorporated herein by reference.]

Organizer The name and address of the organizer are set forth below.

Steven Stein 2802 Timmons Ln #27600 Houston, TX 77227 Effectiveness of Filing WA. This document becomes effective when the document is filed by the secretary of state.

OR rs. This document becomes effective at a later date, which is not more than ninety (90) days from the date of its signing. The delayed effective date is: Execution The undersigned affirms that the person designated as registered agent has consented to the appointment. The undersigned signs this document subject to the penalties imposed by law for the submission of a materially false or fraudulent instrument and certifies under penalty of perjury that the undersigned is authorized under the provisions of law governing the entity to execute the filing instrument.

Steven Stein Signature of Organizer FILING OFFICE COPY

EXHIBIT E Secretary of State Filed in the Office of the P.O. Box 13697 Secretary of State of Texas Austin, TX 78711-3697 Filing #: 803667980 06/30/2020 FAX: 512/463-5709 Document #: 980235460003 Certificate of Formation Image Generated Electronically Filing Fee: $300 Limited Liability Company for Web Filing

Article 1 - Entity Name and Type The filing entity being formed is a limited liability company. The name of the entity is: Etude Insurance Holdings LLC Article 2 - Registered Agent and Registered Office WA. The initial registered agent is an organization (cannot be company named above) by the name of: Etude Capital LLC OR rs. The initial registered agent is an individual resident of the state whose name is set forth below: C. The business address of the registered agent and the registered office address is: Street Address: 2802 Timmons Ln #27600 Houston TX 77227 Consent of Registered Agent rA. A copy of the consent of registered agent is attached.

OR P's. The consent of the registered agent is maintained by the entity.

Article 3 - Governing Authority P' A. The limited liability company is to be managed by managers.

OR rs. The limited liability company will not have managers. Management of the company is reserved to the members.

The names and addresses of the governing persons are set forth below: Etude Capital LLC Manager 1: (Business Name) Address: 2802 Timmons Ln #27600 Houston TX, USA 77227 Article 4 - Purpose The purpose for which the company is organized is for the transaction of any and all lawful business for which limited liability companies may be organized under the Texas Business Organizations Code.

Supplemental Provisions/ Information [The attached addendum, if any, is incorporated herein by reference.]

Organizer The name and address of the organizer are set forth below.

Steven Stein 2802 Timmons Ln #27600 Houston, TX 77227 Effectiveness of Filing WA. This document becomes effective when the document is filed by the secretary of state.

OR rs. This document becomes effective at a later date, which is not more than ninety (90) days from the date of its signing. The delayed effective date is: Execution The undersigned affirms that the person designated as registered agent has consented to the appointment. The undersigned signs this document subject to the penalties imposed by law for the submission of a materially false or fraudulent instrument and certifies under penalty of perjury that the undersigned is authorized under the provisions of law governing the entity to execute the filing instrument.

Steven Stein Signature of Organizer FILING OFFICE COPY

EXHIBIT F Secretary of State Filed in the Office of the P.O. Box 13697 Secretary of State of Texas Austin, TX 78711-3697 Filing#: 801708199 12/28/2012 FAX: 512/463-5709 Document#:459173780002 Certificate of Formation Image Generated Electronically Filing Fee: $300 Limited Liability Company for Web Filing

Article 1 - Entity Name and Type The filing entity being formed is a limited liability company. The name of the entity is: Etude Capital LLC Article 2 - Registered Agent and Registered Office r A. The initial registered agent is an organization (cannot be company named above) by the name of: OR P's. The initial registered agent is an individual resident of the state whose name is set forth below: Name: Steven Isaac Stein C. The business address of the registered agent and the registered office address is: Street Address: 7204 Avenue B.

Suite 2E Bellaire TX 77401 Consent of Registered Agent r A. A copy of the consent of registered agent is attached.

OR w' B. The consent of the registered agent is maintained by the entity.

Article 3 - Governing Authority r A. The limited liability company is to be managed by managers.

OR P's. The limited liability company will not have managers. Management of the company is reserved to the members.

The names and addresses of the governing persons are set forth below: Managing Member 1: Steven Isaac Stein Title: Managing Member Address: 7204 Avenue B. Bellaire TX, USA 77401 Article 4 - Purpose The purpose for which the company is organized is for the transaction of any and all lawful business for which limited liability companies may be organized under the Texas Business Organizations Code.

Supplemental Provisions/ Information [The attached addendum, if any, is incorporated herein by reference.]

Organizer The name and address of the organizer are set forth below.

Steven Isaac Stein 7204 Avenue B. Bellaire, TX 77401 Effectiveness of Filing WA. This document becomes effective when the document is filed by the secretary of state.

OR rs. This document becomes effective at a later date, which is not more than ninety (90) days from the date of its signing. The delayed effective date is: Execution The undersigned affirms that the person designated as registered agent has consented to the appointment. The undersigned signs this document subject to the penalties imposed by law for the submission of a materially false or fraudulent instrument and certifies under penalty of perjury that the undersigned is authorized under the provisions of law governing the entity to execute the filing instrument.

Steven Isaac Stein Signature of Organizer FILING OFFICE COPY

EXHIBIT G 6/5/25, 1:41 PM SafeLease Facility Login Products Company Resources Contact (~_____,,) File Claim

July 20, 2022 PRESS RELEASE SafeLease Hires Adam Locke as Chief Operating Officer

Experienced leader will focus on operational efficiencies, risk management, and ongoing compliance to accelerate company growth • Locke has a strong track record of driving efficiencies and managing complex processes at law firms and early-stage companies • His experience as an outside general counsel and corporate attorney brings a new perspective to the SafeLease leadership team and positions the company to effectively manage risk AUSTIN, July 20,2022 – SafeLease, the leader in self-storage tenant protection, is pleased to announce the appointment of Adam Locke as the company’s Chief Operating Officer. Locke will focus on ensuring the company’s strategic business objectives are met by increasing operational capabilities and driving efficiencies across all functional departments.

Locke worked with SafeLease as an outside advisor prior to joining the company as its COO. During that time, he gained expert knowledge of SafeLease’s products, market positioning, and the value the company delivers to its customers.

“SafeLease is excited to bring Adam on board to spearhead new operational initiatives,” says Steven Stein, Founder and CEO at SafeLease. “His deep regulatory acumen and https://www.safelease.com/resources/safelease-hires-adam-locke-as-chief-operating-officer 1/3 6/5/25, 1:41 PM SafeLease cross-functional strengths complement our fast-growing product, sales, and marketing functions.”

“SafeLease is well-positioned to redefine risk management solutions for the commercial real estate industry,” says Locke. “The space SafeLease is innovating in is ripe for disruption. With such a talented team and tremendous market opportunity, I was thrilled to join. I look forward to working with my new colleagues to ensure the company reaches its full potential.”

Prior to joining SafeLease, Locke owned and ran a boutique law firm where he was outside general counsel to tech startups, commercial real estate firms, and investment managers. Locke also owned and operated an advisory firm focused on legal assets. He has advised on transactions totaling over $200 million.

Locke began his career as a litigator and advisor at corporate law firms and clerked for a federal appellate judge. He earned a law degree from Yale.

Click here to read the press release on Cision PR Newswire.

https://www.safelease.com/resources/safelease-hires-adam-locke-as-chief-operating-officer 2/3 6/5/25, 1:41 PM SafeLease

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EXHIBIT H 6/6/25, 2:31 PM Office of Harris County District Clerk - Marilyn Burgess HCDistrictclerk.com CAPITAL STORAGE HOLDINGS LLC vs. SPAREBOX 6/6/2025 SELF STORAGE LLC Cause: 202271323 CDI: 7 Court: 151 APPEALS No Appeals found.

COST STATMENTS No Cost Statments found.

TRANSFERS No Transfers found.

POST TRIAL WRITS No Post Trial Writs found.

ABSTRACTS No Abstracts found.

SERVICE No Service found.

NOTICES No Notices found.

SUMMARY CASE DETAILS CURRENT PRESIDING JUDGE File Date 10131/2022 Court 151 st Case (Cause) Location Address 201 CAROLINE (Floor: 11) HOUSTON, TX 77002 Case (Cause) Status Disposed (Final) Phone:8329272455 Case (Cause) Type FRAUD JudgeName ERICA R. HUGHES Next/Last Setting Date NIA Court Type Civil Judgment For FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SIGNED Judgment Date 711212024 Jury Fee Paid Date NIA

ACTIVE PARTIES Name Type Post Attorney Jdgm CAPITAL STORAGE HOLDINGS LLC PLAINTIFF - CIVIL PETERSON, DAVID MICHAEL CAPITAL STORAGE HOLDINGS LLC CROSS DEFENDANT PETERSON, DAVID MICHAEL https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/pub1ic/CaseDetailsPrinting.aspx?Get=2EKSRVJyraTgP/MR5YdmK3Jubycxs6MgiA9n+yvH+GvHBYOT1K58+f.. . 1/22 6/6/25, 2:31 PM Office of Harris County District Clerk - Marilyn Burgess SPAREBOX SELF STORAGE LLC DEFENDANT - CIVIL FIELDING, JEREMY SPAREBOX SELF STORAGE LLC CROSS PLAINTIFF FIELDING, JEREMY DAVIDSON KEMPNER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT DEFENDANT - CIVIL PORTER, LP CHRISTOPHER D.

DAVIDSON KEMPNER AFFILIATED ENTITY 1 DEFENDANT - CIVIL PORTER, CHRISTOPHER D.

THE DAVIDSON KEMPNER-APPOINTED DEFENDANT - CIVIL PORTER, SPAREBOX BOARD MEMBERS CHRISTOPHER D.

BROWN, JUDSON PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY 1301 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, N.W., WASHINGTON, DC NEWMAN, DEBORAH PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY MADISON AVENUE, 22ND FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10010 FINESTONE, BENJAMIN I. PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY MADISON AVENUE, 22ND FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10010 HOWARD, STEVEN C. MEDIATOR HOWARD, STEVENC.

MCGLYNN, MEGAN L. PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY 1301 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20004 SIMPSON, RICHARD PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY 1301 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20004 YOO, SAHNG-AH PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY 1301 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20004 MCCARRICK, TERENCE JOHN PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY 1301 PENNSYLVANIAAVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20004

INACTIVE PARTIES No inactive parties found.

JUDGMENT/EVENTS Date Description Order Post Pgs Volume Filing Person Signed Jdgm /Page Attorney Filing 5/21/2025 ORD SIGNED GRANTING 5/21/2025 FINDINGS OF FACT/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5/9/2025 ORDER SIGNED AWARDING 5/9/2025 ATTORNEY FEES 2/13/2025 ORDER SIGNED SETTING ASIDE 2/ 13/2025 ORDER 2/ 13/2025 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 2/ 13/2025 NEW TRIAL IN PART SIGNED SEE ORDR https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/pub1ic/CaseDetailsPrinting.aspx?Get=2EKSRVJyraTgP/MR5YdmK3Jubycxs6MgiA9n+yvH+GvHBYOT1K58+f.. . 2/22 6/6/25, 2:31 PM Office of Harris County District Clerk - Marilyn Burgess 1/8/2025 MOTION NEW TRIAL 0 PETERSON, DAVID CAPITAL STORAGE MICHAEL HOLDINGS LLC 12/9/2024 ORDER SIGNED GRANTING 12/9/2024 2 PARTIAL ATTORNEY FEES SEE ORDER 12/5/2024 HEARING HELD FOR ANOTHER 0 COURT 11/18/2024 HEARING HELD FOR ANOTHER 0 COURT 7/12/2024 NO COSTS ALLOCATED 0 7/12/2024 FINAL SUMMARY nJDGMENT 7/ 12/2024 2 SIGNED 7/10/2024 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 7/ 10/2024 TAKE nJDICIAL NOTICE SIGNED 7/7/2024 ORDER SIGNED DENYING 7/7/2024 1 EXCLUSION OF EXPERTS OPINIONS 7/7/2024 ORDER SIGNED GRANTING IN 7/7/2024 2 PART EXCLUSION OF EXPERTS OPINIONS 7/7/2024 ORDER SIGNED DENYING 7/7/2024 3 MOTION TO STRIKE PLEADING 7/7/2024 ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY 7/7/2024 2 SUMMARY JUDGMENT SIGNED 7/3/2024 ORDER GRANTING APPEARANCE 7/3/2024 3 PRO HAC VICE SIGNED 6/15/2024 DOCKET CONTROL/PRETRIAL 6/15/2024 6 ORDER SIGNED 5/ 16/2024 ORDER GRANTING APPEARANCE 5/ 16/2024 2 PRO HAC VICE SIGNED 3/25/2024 DOCKET CONTROL/PRETRIAL 3/25/2024 3 ORDER SIGNED 3/6/2024 ORDER SIGNED GRANTING 3/6/2024 2 PREFERENTIAL TRIAL SETTING 2/5/2024 ANSWER COUNTERCLAIM 0 PETERSON, DAVID CAPITAL STORAGE MICHAEL HOLDINGS LLC 1/23/2024 ORDER GRANTING APPEARANCE 1/23/2024 1 PRO HAC VICE SIGNED 1/22/2024 ORDER GRANTING APPEARANCE 1/22/2024 2 PRO HAC VICE SIGNED 1/12/2024 COUNTER CLAIM 0 FIELDING, JEREMY SPAREBOX SELF STORAGELLC 1/12/2024 AMENDED ANSWER THIRD 0 FIELDING, JEREMY SPAREBOX SELF AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION STORAGELLC 11/29/2023 ORDER SIGNED RESETTING 11/29/2023 6 TRIAL 11/28/2023 DOCKET CONTROL/PRETRIAL 11/28/2023 2 ORDER SIGNED /28/2023 ORDER SIGNED GRANTING 11/28/2023 2 TRIAL CONTINUANCE https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/pub1ic/CaseDetailsPrinting.aspx?Get=2EKSRVJyraTgP/MR5YdmK3Jubycxs6MgiA9n+yvH+GvHBYOT1K58+f... 3/22 6/6/25, 2:31 PM Office of Harris County District Clerk - Marilyn Burgess 10/ 18/2023 ORDER SIGNED GRANTING 10/ 18/2023 2 REFERRAL TO MEDIATION 10/2/2023 ORD SGN GRNTNG PROTECTION 10/2/2023 9 FROM DISCOVERY REQUEST 10/2/2023 ORDER SIGNED CONFIDENTIAL 10/2/2023 9 AGREEMENT 10/2/2023 THIRD AMENDED ORIGINAL 0 PETERSON, DAVID CAPITAL STORAGE PETITION MICHAEL HOLDINGS LLC 7/ 18/2023 ORDER SIGNED GRANTING 7/ 18/2023 2 SPECIAL APPEARANCE 7/18/2023 PARTIAL DISMISSAL ON 7/ 18/2023 2 DEFENDANT'S MOTION 7/ 11/2023 ORDER GRANTING APPEARANCE 7/ 11 /2023 2 PRO HAC VICE SIGNED 7/ 10/2023 ORDER GRANTING APPEARANCE 7/ 10/2023 2 PRO HAC VICE SIGNED 7/3/2023 SECOND AMENDED ANSWER 0 PORTER, DAVIDSON SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL CHRISTOPHER D. KEMPNER PETITION AFFILIATED ENTITY

7/3/2023 SECOND AMENDED ANSWER 0 FIELDING, JEREMY SPAREBOX SELF SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL STORAGELLC PETITION 7/3/2023 SECOND AMENDED ANSWER 0 PORTER DAVIDSON SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL CHRISTOPHER D. KEMPNER CAPITAL PETITION MANAGEMENT LP 7/3/2023 SECOND AMENDED ANSWER 0 PORTER THE DAVIDSON SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL CHRISTOPHER D. KEMPNER- PETITION APPOINTED SPAREBOX BOARD MEMBERS 6/26/2023 ORDER SIGNED DENYING 6/26/2023 2 MOTION TO STRIKE PLEADING 6/26/2023 ORDER SIGNED DENYING FINAL 6/26/2023 2 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6/7/2023 SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL 0 MAYER, ERIC J. CAPITAL STORAGE PETITION HOLDINGS LLC 3/24/2023 FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL 0 MAYER, ERIC J. CAPITAL STORAGE PETITION HOLDINGS LLC 3/13/2023 ORD SGN DENYING PROTECTION 3/ 13/2023 2 FROM DISCOVERY REQUEST 1/31/2023 ORDER SIGNED GRANTING 1/31/2023 2 MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART SEE D/S 1/31/2023 PARTIAL DISMISSAL ON 1/31/2023 2 DEFENDANT'S MOTION 12/6/2022 ORDER GRANTING APPEARANCE 12/6/2022 2 PRO HAC VICE SIGNED 11/30/2022 DESIGNATED TRIAL READY 0 11/30/2022 DOCKETCONTROL~RETRIAL 11/30/2022 3 ORDER SIGNED https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/pub1ic/CaseDetailsPrinting.aspx?Get=2EKSRVJyraTgP/MR5YdmK3Jubycxs6MgiA9n+yvH+GvHBYOT1K58+f.. . 4/22 6/6/25, 2:31 PM Office of Harris County District Clerk - Marilyn Burgess 11/28/2022 ANSWER ORIGINAL PETITION 0 PORTER, DAVIDSON CHRISTOPHER D. KEMPNER AFFILIATED ENTITY

11/28/2022 ANSWER ORIGINAL PETITION 0 PORTER, THE DAVIDSON CHRISTOPHER D. KEMPNER- APPOINTED SPAREBOX BOARD MEMBERS 11/28/2022 ANSWER ORIGINAL PETITION 0 FIELDING, JEREMY SPAREBOX SELF STORAGELLC 11/28/2022 ANSWER ORIGINAL PETITION 0 PORTER, DAVIDSON CHRISTOPHER D. KEMPNER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LP 10/31/2022 ORIGINAL PETITION 0 MAYER, ERIC J. CAPITAL STORAGE HOLDINGS LLC

SETTINGS Date Court Post Docket Type Reason Results Comments Requesting Jdgm Party 1/30/2023 151 Submission Docket DISMISS (MOTION TO) Granted In OS 1/31/23 FIELDING, 08:00AM (Local Rule 12) Part JEREMY 3/13/2023 151 Submission Docket PROTECTION FROM Denied OS 3/13/23 PORTER, 08:00AM (Local Rule 12) DISCOVERY REQUEST CHRISTOPHER D. (MOTION FOR) 3/13/2023 151 Law Day Docket SPECIAL APPEARANCE Passed PER NTC TO PASS PORTER, 10:00AM (MOTION FOR)(TRCP HEARING 3/ 1/23 CHRISTOPHER D.

120A) 3/27/2023 151 Submission Docket SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Passed PASSED BY FIELDING, 08:00AM (Local Rule 12) FINAL (MOTION FOR) KARYN COOPER JEREMY (TRCP 166A) 3/25/2023 6/ 12/2023 151 Submission Docket SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Denied OS 6/26/23 08:00AM (Local Rule 12) FINAL (MOTION FOR) (TRCP 166A) 6/ 12/2023 151 Law Day Docket SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Re-Set PERCRT.DKT FIELDING, :30AM FINAL (MOTION FOR) CANCELED. MVD JEREMY (TRCP 166A) 2AMDKT 6/26/2023 151 Submission Docket STRIKE PLEADING Denied OS 6/26/23 FIELDING, :00AM (Local Rule 12) (MOTION TO) (TRCP 168) JEREMY 7/ 17/2023 151 Law Day Docket SPECIAL APPEARANCE Granted OS 7/18/23 PORTER, 10:30AM (MOTION FOR)(TRCP CHRISTOPHER D.

120A) 12/08/2023 151 Trial Coordinators DOCKET CALL (MOTION Passed 09:00AM Docket FOR) 1/01/2024 151 Trial Setting TRIAL ON MERITS Continuance O/S 11-28-23 09:00AM (MOTION FOR) Granted 6/27/2024 151 Law Day Docket EXCLUDE EXPERTS Denied OS 7/7/24 10:00AM OPINIONS (MOTION TO) 6/27/2024 151 Law Day Docket STRIKE PLEADING Denied OS 7/7/24 10:00AM (MOTION TO) (TRCP 168) 6/27/2024 151 Law Day Docket EXCLUDE EXPERTS Granted In OS 7/7/24 10:00AM OPINIONS (MOTION TO) Part https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/pub1ic/CaseDetailsPrinting.aspx?Get=2EKSRVJyraTgP/MR5YdmK3Jubycxs6MgiA9n+yvH+GvHBYOT1K58+f.. . 5/22 6/6/25, 2:31 PM Office of Harris County District Clerk - Marilyn Burgess 6/27/2024 151 Law Day Docket SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Granted OS 7/ 12/24 10:00AM FINAL (MOTION FOR) (TRCP 166A) 6/27/2024 151 Law Day Docket SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Granted OS 7/7/24 10:00AM PARTIAL (MOTION FOR) (TRCP 166A) 6/27/2024 151 Law Day Docket SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Granted OS 7/7/24 10:00AM PARTIAL (MOTION FOR) (TRCP 166A) 7/01/2024 151 Submission Docket TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE Re-Set PERAMDNTC PETERSON, DAVID :00AM (Local Rule 12) (MOTION TO) FILED 6/25/24 MICHAEL 7/08/2024 151 Submission Docket TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE Granted OS 7/10/24 PETERSON, DAVID 08:00AM (Local Rule 12) (MOTION TO) MICHAEL 7/ 15/2024 151 Trial Setting TRIAL ON MERITS Passed DISPOSED (FINAL) 09:00AM (MOTION FOR) 11/11/2024 151 Law Day Docket ATTORNEYS FEES Re-Set RESETTING TO FIELDING, 09:00AM (MOTION FOR) ll/ 18/24AT 3:30PM JEREMY 11/18/2024 151 Law Day Docket ATTORNEYS FEES Granted In OS 12/9/24 FIELDING, 03:30 PM (MOTION FOR) Part JEREMY 12/05/2024 151 Law Day Docket STATUS CONFERENCE Hearing FIELDING, 02:00PM (MOTION FOR) Held JEREMY 2/ 12/2025 151 Law Day Docket NEW TRIAL (MOTION Denied HALEPOTA, 11:30AM FOR) SHAHMEER 5/07/2025 151 Law Day Docket NEW TRIAL (MOTION Granted In FIELDING, 10:00AM FOR) Part JEREMY

DOCUMENTS Number Document Post Date Pgs Jdgm 120873907 Letter to Judge Hughes on Complying with Rule 298 06/03/2025 3 120876818 Defendant Sparebox Self Storage, LLC's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 06/03/2025 15 Law on its Motion for Entry of an Attorney's Fee Award 120663285 Plaintiff's Request For Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 05/21/2025 4 120684645 ORD SIGNED GRANTING FINDINGS OF FACT/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 05/21/2025 120473530 ORDER SIGNED AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 05/09/2025 120414310 [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant Sparebox Self Storage, Lies Motion For Entry Of 05/07/2025 3 An Attorneys Fees Award 120421265 Proposed Order On Defendant Sparebox Self Storage, Lies Motion For Entry Of An 05/07/2025 Attorneys Fees Award 120363673 Plaintiff's Supplemental Declaration of Kelsi Stayart White 05/05/2025 8 120384347 Defendant Sparebox Self Storage, LLC's Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for 05/05/2025 Entry of Attorney's Fees Award ·> 120384348 Exhibit 1 05/05/2025 28 ·> 120384349 Exhibit 2 05/05/2025 3 119065905 151 Notice of Hearing (In-Person) 02/20/2025 119106678 Joint Notice of Hearing 02/20/2025 5 118950863 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN PART SIGNED SEE ORDR 02/ 13/2025 ORDER SIGNED SETTING ASIDE ORDER 02/ 13/2025 https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/pub1ic/CaseDetailsPrinting.aspx?Get=2EKSRVJyraTgP/MR5YdmK3Jubycxs6MgiA9n+yvH+GvHBYOT1K58+f.. . 6/22 10/2/2023 5:17 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 80169452 By: Keeley Hodgins Filed: 10/2/2023 5:17 PM CAUSE NO. 2022-71323 CAPITAL STORAGE HOLDINGS LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Plaintiff, § § v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS k § ler SPAREBOX SELF STORAGE, LLC § § tC Defendant. § 151st JUDICIAL DISTRICT ric Third Amended Petition ist sD Plaintiff Capital Storage Holdings LLC makes the following allegations against Defendant es SpareBox Self Storage, LLC:

rg Parties Bu 1. Capital Storage Holdings LLC (“Capital Storage”) is a Delaware limited liability company n ily with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. ar M

2. SpareBox Self Storage, LLC (“SpareBox”) is a Delaware limited liability company with of its principal place of business in Denver, Colorado. e ffic

Discovery Level and Rule 47 Statement O

3. Capital Storage requests that this case be treated as a Level 2 case (TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3) y op for discovery purposes. C

4. Pursuant to Rule 47, Capital Storage states that it seeks monetary relief that exceeds ial fic

$1,000,000 and that the maximum amount claimed is $240,000,000 exclusive of costs, expenses, of interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Un

Jurisdiction and Venue 5. Jurisdiction is proper because the amount in controversy exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court.

6. Venue is proper against SpareBox because Section 17.8 of the signed Purchase and Sale Agreement (“Agreement”) that is the basis of Capital Storage’s claims against SpareBox provides for exclusive venue in the state courts of Harris County, Texas: THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE CONSTRUED, PERFORMED AND ENFORCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF k ler TEXAS. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT ANY ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE BROUGHT AND MAINTAINED IN tC THE STATE COURTS IN HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, AND THE PARTIES HEREBY CONSENT AND AGREE TO THE JURISDICTION OF SUCH ric COURTS.

ist 7. Because the parties agreed that the state courts of Harris County, Texas are the exclusive sD venue for “any action in connection with this agreement,” this case is not removable to federal es rg court.

Bu 8. In addition, four of the self-storage businesses that SpareBox contracted to purchase from n ily Capital Storage are located in Harris County, Texas. ar

9. In addition, the Agreement constitutes a “major transaction” under TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. M of

C. § 15.020 because it is evidenced by a written agreement under which SpareBox is obligated to e ffic pay and Capital Storage is entitled to receive consideration with an aggregate stated value equal to O or greater than $1 million. As described above, the parties to the “major transaction” at issue y op agreed in writing that a suit arising from the transaction shall be brought in Harris County, Texas. C

As a result, this action is subject to “Mandatory Venue” under Subchapter B of Section 15 of the ial

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Because Capital Storage’s claims arise from the same fic of transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and at least one of the claims is Un governed by the mandatory venue provisions of Subchapter B, the mandatory venue provisions apply to all claims in this suit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. C. § 15.004.

Waiver of Jury Trial 10. The parties to the Agreement waived their right to jury trial under Section 17.14: “THE PARTIES HERETO KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND INTENTIONALLY WAIVE, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, ANY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY k ler OF ANY DISPUTE ARISING UNDER OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT AND AGREE tC THAT ANY SUCH DISPUTE SHALL BE TRIED BEFORE A JUDGE SITTING WITHOUT A ric JURY.”

ist sD Facts Capital Storage Marketed Its Self-Storage Businesses for Sale to Potential Buyers.

es rg 11. Capital Storage owns self-storage businesses across the country. These self-storage Bu businesses typically rent storage units to tenants, including individuals and businesses. The tenants n ily pay fees to the self-storage business in exchange for a secure space to store items and possessions. ar M

12. In late 2021 and early 2022, Capital Storage began exploring a potential sale of twenty- of two of its self-storage businesses located in Texas, Florida, and Oklahoma. In January 2022, e ffic

Capital Storage entered into a listing agreement with Cushman & Wakefield (“Cushman”), O whereby Cushman would engage in a sophisticated marketing process of Capital Storage’s self- y op storage businesses to potential buyers. Cushman led the bidding and marketing process, and C

Capital Storage received the final round of letters of intent from interested buyers on March 25, ial fic

2022. Numerous potential buyers submitted letters of intent with competitive deal terms. of

SpareBox Submitted a Letter of Intent Touting Its “Dedicated Equity and a Committed Debt Un

Facility” and Ability to Close Quickly.

13. SpareBox submitted a letter of intent to Capital Storage. On its website, SpareBox holds itself out as “[s]ponsored by Rizk Ventures and led by industry veterans Steve Treadwell and Chuck James.”

14. SpareBox knew that Capital Storage would be selecting from among several competitive offers submitted by capable buyers. As a result, SpareBox not only offered compelling deal terms—purchase price and closing deadline—but also included information and arguments to persuade and convince Capital Storage to select SpareBox instead of the competing bidders.

k ler 15. SpareBox’s March 25 letter of intent offered $321,000,000 for Capital Storage’s self- tC storage businesses, with closing taking place no more than thirty days after the end of the ric inspection period. In its offer, SpareBox boasted that “SpareBox is the best buyer” for Capital ist sD Storage’s businesses because “[w]e have dedicated equity and a committed debt facility that allows us to move quickly with acquisitions.”

es rg 16. SpareBox’s financial representations were, unsurprisingly, extremely important (and Bu enticing) to Capital Storage from a seller’s perspective: SpareBox represented that SpareBox had n ily control of an undisclosed amount of cash to use in the transaction (i.e., “[w]e [SpareBox] have ar M dedicated equity”) and that SpareBox controlled a “committed debt facility” of “$500 million,” of which was more than 1.5 times the entire proposed purchase price. And Capital Storage was e ffic obviously very interested in the benefit that SpareBox touted from its “dedicated equity” and O

“committed debt facility”: that SpareBox could “move quickly with acquisitions.” y op

17. SpareBox’s offer letter went on to describe SpareBox’s “sponsor”—Rizk Ventures—and C its track record. SpareBox also noted that “SpareBox has acquired all of its assets with the same ial fic equity and debt source,” again emphasizing its committed financing for the Capital Storage deal. of

Indeed, SpareBox noted it “has a $500 million acquisition facility through JP Morgan” that would Un be utilized to fund the deal. The offer letter made a single passing reference to an investor in SpareBox—“SpareBox was founded in August of 2020 via joint venture between Rizk Ventures,

SpareBox’s sponsor, and a multi-billion-dollar asset manager”—but otherwise focused exclusively on Rizk Ventures and SpareBox’s management team.

18. And to avoid any doubt about the deal closing, SpareBox described its history of acquisitions: “Combined, SpareBox’s team has acquired over a thousand self-storage properties, k ler and together at SpareBox, the team has acquired over one hundred properties. To date, SpareBox tC has yet to have a failed deal or a re-trade of a seller.”

ric 19. Further emphasizing the import of the SpareBox “management team” as the ist sD decisionmakers and leaders of the proposed deal, SpareBox claimed that “SpareBox’s management team has significant economic upside in the performance of its properties, and hence, es rg is committed to thoughtfully managing its properties.”

Bu 20. As part of its buyer selection process, Capital Storage performed its diligence on SpareBox, n ily the SpareBox decisionmakers and “management team” identified in its letter of intent—Chief ar M

Executive Officer Steve Treadwell, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Investment Officer Kate of

Matheny, and Chief Operating Officer Chuck James—as well as SpareBox’s “sponsor” Rizk e ffic

Ventures and its founder and Chief Executive Officer Thomas Rizk. Unsurprisingly, Capital O

Storage performed no due diligence on the “multi-billion-dollar asset manager” mentioned in y op passing in SpareBox’s letter: the identity of this “asset manager” was not disclosed to Capital C

Storage, and SpareBox’s representations to Capital Storage were clear regarding SpareBox’s ial fic ability to act, SpareBox’s available financing, and the identity of the SpareBox decisionmakers. of

21. Specifically, and further confirming SpareBox’s representations regarding the identity of Un its decisionmakers, Capital Storage requested a standard buyer interview with SpareBox’s proffered decisionmakers. That call was held on March 29, 2022, with SpareBox being represented by Steve Treadwell, Kate Matheny, and Thomas Rizk. As is typical in a buyer interview, Capital

Storage’s Steven Stein asked SpareBox about the financing it uses to close deals, the executive team’s biographies and experience, and the decisionmakers’ relative roles regarding SpareBox’s transactions. Among other things, SpareBox responded that their way of closing was to use its committed financing line with JP Morgan and later transition from the revolver to permanent k ler financing. The SpareBox call participants were represented to be in complete control of the tC counterparty to the transaction.

ric 22. On March 29, 2022, Capital Storage requested that SpareBox submit another letter of intent ist sD at $323,000,000, which SpareBox did on March 30, 2022.

Capital Storage Chose SpareBox and the Parties Signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

es rg 23. SpareBox’s attempts to persuade Capital Storage were successful: The combination of the Bu deal terms offered by SpareBox along with its arguments and representations regarding its n ily “dedicated equity” and “committed debt facility” and the experience of SpareBox’s ar decisionmakers led Capital Storage to select SpareBox’s offer instead of the other potential buyers’ M of offers, including a competing offer at very close to the same price ($321 million). e ffic

24. SpareBox and JP Morgan—the provider of SpareBox’s “committed” “$500 million O acquisition facility”—performed their buyer-side due diligence by inspecting the books, records, y op and properties of the twenty-two self-storage businesses being sold by Capital Storage. During C this time, SpareBox and Capital Storage continued to negotiate a final purchase and sale agreement ial to govern SpareBox’s purchase of Capital Storage’s self-storage businesses. During those fic of negotiations, Capital Storage negotiated with the SpareBox management team identified in Un

SpareBox’s letter of intent.

25. One negotiated aspect of the purchase and sale agreement was remedies for default. In its letter of intent, which it used to secure binding exclusivity with respect to the transaction, SpareBox proposed that Capital Storage would receive a $10,000,000 deposit as liquidated damages if SpareBox defaulted by failing to close. Believing that this amount would be adequate security for the counterparty and failure-to-close risk, Capital Storage signed the letter of intent and granted exclusivity to SpareBox. The $10,000,000 deposit was an agreed default remedy until May 10, 2022. On that day, SpareBox Chief Executive Officer Steve Treadwell and Chief k ler Financial and Investment Officer Kate Matheny called Capital Storage’s President, Steven Stein.

tC SpareBox’s executives told Mr. Stein that SpareBox could not get the necessary approvals from ric its investors, including the “multi-billion-dollar asset manager” later revealed to be Davidson ist sD Kempner Capital Management LP (“Davidson Kempner”), to move forward with the deal unless Capital Storage agreed to reduce the agreed-upon $10,000,000 deposit amount. Mr. Treadwell es rg specified on that call that SpareBox’s equity sponsors would authorize SpareBox to move forward Bu with the deal with full authority to close if Capital Storage agreed to reduce the deposit that would n ily be available to Capital Storage upon a failure to close by SpareBox. Relying on those ar M representations from SpareBox, especially (but not only) the assurances that SpareBox would have of full authority to close the transaction without needing further approvals, Mr. Stein re-negotiated e ffic the previously agreed-to deposit amount, reducing it to $3,000,000 in a draft purchase and sale O agreement delivered on May 13, 2022. y op

26. In getting Capital Storage to agree to reduce the deposit, SpareBox falsely assured Capital C

Storage that SpareBox had received final and unequivocal approval from all necessary parties to ial fic enter into the Agreement and close the transaction and complete the sale — and thus was Capital of

Storage’s true counterparty, one ready, willing, and able to close. In reliance on SpareBox’s false Un representations of fact, and believing it could properly assess its counterparty risk, Capital Storage agreed to a reduced $3,000,000 deposit that could serve as liquidated damages for SpareBox’s failure to close. If SpareBox had not falsely represented to Capital Storage that it had all the necessary financing and final and unequivocal approvals to close the transaction — namely, if SpareBox had not falsely presented itself as Capital Storage’s sole and serious counterparty — Capital Storage would not have accepted any deposit less than $10,000,000 as liquidated damages for SpareBox’s failure to close. Indeed, if SpareBox had been truthful about the actual k ler counterparties and the continuing ability of a non-contractual party to control SpareBox and its tC abilities to perform under the parties’ contract, Capital Storage would have done additional ric diligence into the actual counterparties, weighed the very different risk profile than what had been ist sD presented, and likely moved onto one of the other interested bidders at a similar or identical price to SpareBox’s offer.

es rg 27. As the parties finalized the terms of the Agreement, SpareBox’s Chief Financial and Bu Investment Officer Kate Matheny told Capital Storage on May 14, 2022 that SpareBox would need n ily both its sponsor (Rizk Ventures) and its investor (Davidson Kempner) to formally approve the ar M

PSA to SpareBox before execution: “Rizk [Ventures] is signed off on your PSA and I’ve been of tracking down DK [Davidson Kempner] for their sign off.” Both prior to execution and, as e ffic described below, in the Agreement itself, SpareBox represented to Capital Storage that it had O obtained final and unequivocal approval from all of the necessary parties for SpareBox to execute y op and perform the agreement. And Capital Storage understood that those approvals were obtained C by Capital Storage’s agreement to reduce the deposit amount, as described above. ial fic

28. Capital Storage and SpareBox each executed the Agreement, with an effective date of May of

17, 2022. Specifically, Capital Storage was bound to the Agreement by its managing member, Un

Capital Storage Partners LLC; and SpareBox was bound to the Agreement by its managing member, Rizk Ventures Self Storage, LLC. In exchange for SpareBox’s purchase price of

$323,000,000, Capital Storage agreed to sell to SpareBox all of the issued and outstanding membership interests in twenty-two self-storage businesses: • 51st STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; • 71st STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; k ler • DESSAU STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; tC • DOLLAR STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ric • EAGLE’S NEST STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ist sD • FM1460 STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; es • FM2978 STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; rg • FM471 STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; Bu n • FULTON STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ily

• GATLIN STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ar M

• HWY41 STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; of e

• HWY66 STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ffic

• JUNCTION STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; O

• LITTLE YORK STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; y op

• MCHARD STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; C ial

• N MAIN STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; fic

• NW FREEWAY STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; of Un

• NW27 STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; • SABO STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; • SHELL STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; • SUMMERFIELD STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; and

• WALZEM STORAGE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company.

29. In Section 8.1, Capital Storage made twenty-six detailed representations and warranties regarding each of the self-storage businesses that it was selling to SpareBox.

30. In Section 8.2, SpareBox made just six representations and warranties to Capital Storage.

k ler 31. In Section 8.2(b) (“Authority”), SpareBox represented and warranted to Capital Storage tC that “The execution and delivery of this Agreement and the performance of Purchaser’s obligations ric hereunder have been (or shall be as of the Closing) duly authorized by all necessary action on the ist sD part of the Purchaser and this Agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of es Purchaser, enforceable against Purchaser in accordance with its terms, except as such rg enforceability may be limited by general equitable principles and principles governing creditors’ Bu rights generally. To Purchaser’s knowledge, no authorization, consent, or approval of any n ily Authority or any other person or entity is required for the execution and delivery by Purchaser ar M of this Agreement or the performance of its obligations hereunder.” (emphases added). of

32. Similarly, in Section 8.2(e) (“Consents”), SpareBox represented to Capital Storage that e ffic

“No consent, waiver, approval or authorization is required from any person or entity (that has O not already been obtained) in connection with the execution and delivery of this Agreement by y op

Purchaser or, subject to Section 5.4 [Inspection Period], the performance by Purchaser of the C transactions contemplated hereby.” (emphases added). SpareBox’s valid and binding ial fic representations were consistent with what Capital Storage had previously been told: all necessary of approvals had been obtained from Rizk Ventures and Davidson Kempner.

Un

On the Eve of Closing, SpareBox Told Capital Storage that It Would Not Close the Deal Because SpareBox’s Investor—Davidson Kempner—No Longer Liked the Terms.

33. Closing under the Agreement was set to occur on Monday, July 18, 2022. Both parties appeared to be heading towards the Closing without issue. Capital Storage took numerous steps in reliance on the parties’ agreement to have the self-storage businesses ready to transfer at Closing to SpareBox, including terminating certain management agreements and making disruptive personnel and operational adjustments. And SpareBox continued to assure Capital Storage that not only was SpareBox prepared for Closing by accessing its dedicated and committed financing k ler but that its enthusiasm for the deal had only grown as Closing approached.

tC 34. But on the eve of Closing, SpareBox indicated for the first time that it would not close the ric transaction as the parties had agreed. Less than 24 hours before the scheduled Closing, SpareBox ist sD informed Cushman that its “95% outside investor” would be having a special investment committee meeting at which this investor was expected to rescind approval of the deal and prevent es rg SpareBox from performing the Closing.

Bu 35. On July 18, SpareBox failed to show at Closing and went silent. That evening, Steven n ily Stein, the President of Capital Storage’s managing member, emailed SpareBox’s Chief Financial ar M and Investment Officer, Kate Matheny (the “Purchaser’s Representative” under the Agreement): of

“Hi Kate, What’s going on?” e ffic

36. SpareBox’s CFO responded that same night: “I’m trying to figure it out myself. I was out O of the country last week and things seemed to have gone totally sideways while I was gone.” y op

Matheny then explained: “Our 95% investor [Davidson Kempner] is struggling with our debt terms C as it relates to our going in cap rate.” Matheny described the self-storage businesses as “killing it” ial fic

(i.e., doing extremely well). But despite that fact, Matheny stated that “they [Davidson Kempner] of believe the debt pricing has changed so much that we could be overpaying.” (emphasis added).

Un

Matheny claimed that SpareBox was working with JP Morgan—the provider of SpareBox’s oft- touted “$500 million acquisition facility”—“on different ideas to bring down the costs/spread” and that Davidson Kempner was somehow intervening to “elevate things at JPM today in hopes of getting these terms settled” for SpareBox.

37. After the agreed-upon Closing deadline had lapsed – in breach of the Agreement – Capital Storage learned that Davidson Kempner’s investment committee held a meeting the morning of k ler July 18 and voted against allowing SpareBox to proceed with the required Closing under the tC Agreement. Upon information and belief, SpareBox followed Davidson Kempner’s command and ric did not close the transaction despite the parties’ previous agreement.

ist sD 38. Capital Storage did not understand how Davidson Kempner—which was (1) not a party to the Agreement; (2) not the “sponsor” of SpareBox, which was and is held out to be Rizk Ventures; es rg (3) not the “managing member” of SpareBox, which was and is held out to be Rizk Ventures; (4) Bu not one of the parties that negotiated with Capital Storage; and (5) not granted the right or ability n ily to interfere with SpareBox’s promises and obligations—could prevent SpareBox from closing a ar M deal that SpareBox had entered into and whose own executives insisted that they still wanted to of close. Capital Storage’s confusion at Davidson Kempner’s veto was compounded by the fact that e ffic

SpareBox had represented—both prior to the execution of the Agreement and expressly in the O

Agreement itself—that it had already obtained all required consents and approvals to close the y op parties’ transaction. C

39. In the wake of July 18, the parties entered a stalemate, with SpareBox providing little ial fic information to Capital Storage other than that SpareBox was at the whim of its “investor” and was of not being allowed to close. Finally, on July 22, 2022, Capital Storage instructed its counsel to Un send a letter to SpareBox stating that Capital Storage expected SpareBox to stand by its agreement and close the deal, outlining the potential consequences to SpareBox and Davidson Kempner for not closing the deal, and requesting confirmation by 5:00pm on July 26, 2022 that SpareBox intended to proceed with the transaction.

40. July 26 came and went with no response from SpareBox. Finally, on July 28, 2022, Capital Storage received a letter from counsel for SpareBox. This letter was striking for numerous reasons, k ler including: (1) SpareBox claiming that its CFO’s representations in writing to Capital Storage on tC July 18 regarding its “investor’s” struggles with the debt terms and belief that SpareBox would be ric overpaying—quoted verbatim from the email—were not true; (2) SpareBox claiming that its prior ist sD representations that SpareBox wanted to close the transaction but that it was being prevented from doing so by Davidson Kempner were entirely false; (3) SpareBox claiming that “[b]efore closing, es rg however, SpareBox itself decided not to close the transaction” despite all prior representations to Bu the contrary; (4) SpareBox claiming that it still has all consents and approvals necessary to close n ily the transaction, despite Davidson Kempner’s veto being the precise stated reason for its failure to ar M close; (5) SpareBox now reframing Davidson Kempner’s involvement in killing the deal as limited of and indirect, namely: “[a] Davidson Kempner affiliated entity owns 95% of SpareBox and, e ffic accordingly, has the right to appoint a majority of directors of SpareBox’s board”; and O

(6) threatening that SpareBox will counterclaim “numerous breaches of the parties’ Agreement” y op by Capital Storage, which were all based on patently false and verifiably incorrect allegations. C

41. Following receipt of SpareBox’s letter, the parties’ inability to resolve this dispute through ial fic commercial negotiations, and SpareBox’s continued refusal to abide by the clear terms of the of

Purchase and Sale Agreement that the parties signed, Capital Storage was left with no choice but Un to protect its rights through litigation.

42. All conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred.

Claims Count One: Fraudulent Inducement and Fraud 43. Capital Storage re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above.

44. SpareBox made material misrepresentations to Capital Storage in order to induce Capital k ler Storage to sign the Agreement. And SpareBox continued to make material misrepresentations tC after signing the Agreement. Among other things, SpareBox represented that its performance ric under the Agreement had been duly authorized; that SpareBox needed no additional authorization, ist sD consent, or approval or any other person or entity to perform its obligations under the Agreement; and that SpareBox did not need to obtain any consent, waiver, approval, or authorization (that had es rg not already been received) from any person or entity to perform the transactions contemplated by Bu the Agreement. SpareBox also misrepresented its financing and the role that Davidson Kempner n ily plays in SpareBox’s decision-making, control, and ability to act. As part of getting Capital Storage ar M to enter into the Agreement, SpareBox misrepresented itself as the sole and serious counterparty of to Capital Storage in the transaction under the Agreement. e ffic

45. SpareBox’s misrepresentations were made with knowledge of their falsity. O

46. SpareBox made its misrepresentations with the intention that Capital Storage should rely y op on or act upon the misrepresentations. C

47. Capital Storage relied on SpareBox’s misrepresentations, including but not limited to ial fic initially selecting SpareBox’s offer from the other competitive bids; continuing to negotiate with of

SpareBox exclusively rather than re-engaging with other competitive bidders; entering into the Un

Agreement with SpareBox; negotiating and including certain terms in the agreement with SpareBox (including but not limited to the amount of SpareBox’s deposit under Section 4.1,

Section 13.1, Section 13.2, Section 13.3, and Section 17.13); and Capital Storage’s own substantial performance under the Agreement.

48. Capital Storage entered into a binding agreement—the Purchase and Sale Agreement— based on SpareBox’s misrepresentations.

k ler 49. SpareBox continued its misrepresentations throughout Capital Storage’s performance tC under the Agreement, including that SpareBox had the authority and ability to perform the Closing, ric that SpareBox had access to sufficient financing to perform the Closing, and that SpareBox ist sD intended to perform the Closing.

50. Capital Storage performed under the Agreement based on these continued es rg misrepresentations.

Bu 51. Capital Storage has been damaged by SpareBox’s misrepresentations. n ily Count Two: Declaratory Judgment ar M

52. Capital Storage re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above. of

53. As described above, SpareBox committed fraud specifically targeted towards the e ffic

Agreement’s liquidated damages provision in Section 13.2 and its amount in Section 4.1. O

54. The liquidated damages provision in the Agreement was the result of fraud. y op

55. Capital Storage seeks a Declaratory Judgment that the liquidated damages provision in the C

Agreement was the result of fraud and that, as a result, SpareBox cannot rely on or enforce the ial fic liquidated damages provision (including Section 13.2 and its amount in Section 4.1) against of

Capital Storage.

Un

Count Three: Breach of Contract 52. Capital Storage re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above.

53. Capital Storage and SpareBox entered into a valid, enforceable Agreement.

54. Capital Storage has honored the terms of and has fully performed its obligations under the Agreement from the date of execution through the present day.

55. SpareBox breached its contractual obligations to Capital Storage by failing to perform the Closing (in Schedule 1.1, defined as “the consummation of the purchase and sale of the Acquired k ler Interests contemplated by this Agreement, as provided for in Article X.”), including but not limited tC to SpareBox’s obligation to pay $323,000,000 for Capital Storage’s twenty-two self-storage ric businesses.

ist sD 56. SpareBox’s representations and warranties in Sections 8.2(b) and 8.2(e) were false. The performance of SpareBox’s obligations was not “duly authorized,” and SpareBox required the es rg “authorization, consent, or approval” of another person or entity to perform its obligations.

Bu Similarly, SpareBox required the “consent, waiver, approval or authorization” from another person n ily or entity to perform the transactions contemplated by the Agreement, including but not limited to ar M the Closing. of

57. Capital Storage has been damaged by SpareBox’s failure to perform the Closing as required e ffic by the Agreement and SpareBox’s breach of its representations and warranties. O

58. Capital Storage acknowledges that this Court has held that Section 13.2 contains a y op liquidated damages provision that forecloses a breach a of contract claim. However, as described C above, Capital Storage seeks a Declaratory Judgment that the liquidated damages provision was ial fic the result of fraud and cannot, therefore, be enforced or relied upon by SpareBox. Capital of

Storage’s breach of contract claim is premised upon the liquidated damages provision being found Un to be the result of fraud.

Attorney’s Fees/Court Costs 59. Capital Storage has been required to retain Susman Godfrey, LLP and Adam Locke to pursue its claims against the defendants in this lawsuit. Accordingly, and pursuant to Chapters 37 and 38 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, Section 17.2 of the Agreement, and any other k ler applicable statutes and common law, Capital Storage requests an award of its reasonable attorneys’ tC fees, expenses, and costs of court.

ric Prayer For Relief ist sD 60. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Capital Storage prays that SpareBox be cited to answer and appear and that upon final hearing, Capital Storage have and recover judgment es rg against SpareBox for: Bu • Actual damages; n ily • A declaratory judgment that the liquidated damages provision in the Agreement was the ar result of fraud and that, as a result, SpareBox cannot rely on or enforce the liquidated damages provision (including Section 13.2 and its amount in Section 4.1) against Capital M

Storage; of e

• Pre-judgment interest at the highest, lawful rate; ffic

• Post-judgment interest at the highest, lawful rate; O

• Court costs; y op

• Reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses; and C ial

• All other relief to which it may show itself entitled under law or equity. fic

Respectfully submitted, of Un

SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.

By: /s/ David M. Peterson Eric J. Mayer State Bar No. 13274675 Shawn L. Raymond State Bar No. 24009236

David M. Peterson State Bar No. 24056123 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 77002-5096 Telephone: (713) 653-7873 Fax: (713) 654-6666 [email protected] k ler Adam T. Locke State Bar No. 24083184 tC 2617 Bissonnet Street, Ste. 503 Houston, Texas 77005 ric Telephone: (713) 832-0243 ist Fax: (713) 565-4709 sD [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff Capital Storage Holdings es LLC rg Bu n ily ar M of e ffic y O op C ial fic of Un

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on October 2, 2023 a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument was properly forwarded to all counsel of record through e-filing in accordance with Rule 21 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

k ler /s/ David M. Peterson David M. Peterson tC ric ist sD es rg Bu n ily ar M of e ffic y O op C ial fic of Un

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Michael Leone on behalf of David Peterson Bar No. 24056123 [email protected] k ler Envelope ID: 80169452 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing tC Filing Description: Third Amended Petition Status as of 10/3/2023 8:28 AM CST ric ist Case Contacts sD Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status es Eric JMayer [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT rg Shawn Raymond [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT David Peterson Bu [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT n Michael ALeone [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT ily ar

Karyn Cooper [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT M

Deborah Newman [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT of

Benjamin Finestone [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT e

Cameron Kelly [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT ffic

Daniel Myerson [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT O

Elise Miller [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT y

Adam Locke [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT op

Megan McGlynn [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT C

Judson Brown [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT ial

Jeremy Fielding [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT fic of

Aysha MSpencer [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT Un

Richie Simpson [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT Daniel Hopper [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM ERROR Rusty Edgington [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT Christopher Porter [email protected] 10/2/2023 5:17:53 PM SENT 2/27/2023 6:16 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 73164811 By: Keeley Hodgins Filed: 2/27/2023 6:16 PM CAUSE NO. 2022-71323 CAPITAL STORAGE HOLDINGS LLC, § § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF, Plaintiff, § § v. § § SPAREBOX SELF STORAGE, LLC; § DAVIDSON KEMPNER CAPITAL § MANAGEMENT LP; HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS § DAVIDSON KEMPNER AFFILIATED § ENTITY 1; AND § THE DAVIDSON KEMPNER-APPOINTED § SPAREBOX BOARD MEMBERS, § § Defendants.

§ 151st JUDICIAL DISTRICT § DEFENDANT SPAREBOX SELF STORAGE, LLC’S MOTION FOR TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................2 LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................................................3 SUPPORTING EVIDENCE .........................................................................................................4 ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................4 PRAYER .........................................................................................................................................8

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019)......................................................................................................5 Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2019)..................................................................................................7, 8 Cohen v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 106 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) .....................................3, 4, 7 Debes v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 2014 WL 3384679 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 10, 2014, no pet.)..........................................3 Gonzales v. American Title Co. of Houston, 104 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) ...................................4, 5 Great Hans, LLC v. Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2019 WL 1219110 (Tex. App.–Dallas Mar. 15, 2019, no pet.) .................................................8 Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Lufkin Indus., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. 2019)......................................................................................................4 Munoz v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Indiana, 2016 WL 4898271 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2016) ..........................................................................7 North Presidio, LLC v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 808 F. App’x 275 (5th Cir. 2020) ..............................................................................................8 Rules Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a .....................................................................................................................3, 4

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INTRODUCTION This is a straightforward contract dispute that can be resolved solely on the basis of an agreed limitation-of-liability provision in a Purchase and Sale Agreement (the “Agreement”) between SpareBox Self Storage, LLC (“SpareBox”) and Capital Storage Holdings LLC (“Capital Storage”). In the Agreement, the parties specifically agreed that Capital Storage’s “sole and exclusive remedy” would be SpareBox’s $3 million escrow deposit “in the event the Closing of the transaction provided for herein does not occur … by reason of any default of” SpareBox.

Ex. 1-A, Agreement § 13.2. And the parties expressly “waive[d] any right to sue the other for incidental, special, exemplary, consequential, or punitive damages for matters arising under the Agreement.” Id. § 13.3. Under Texas law, the Agreement provided SpareBox the option to close the transaction and purchase 22 self-storage businesses from Capital Storage, or not to close and forfeit its $3 million escrow deposit to Capital Storage. SpareBox ultimately opted not to close the transaction. Instead of claiming the negotiated remedy, however, Capital Storage sued SpareBox for breach, fraud, and conspiracy. And despite the agreed-upon damages cap and waivers in the Agreement, Capital Storage seeks its alleged benefit-of-the-bargain, consequential, and exemplary damages.

This Court dismissed Capital Storage’s contract claims in light of the Agreement’s sole- and-exclusive-remedy provision. Although the Court did not dismiss Capital Storage’s fraud and conspiracy claims, the Court at that time was limited to the facts alleged in the petition and the parties’ Agreement. SpareBox now seeks summary judgment based on undisputed evidence that it has unconditionally tendered the $3 million escrow deposit to Capital Storage. Accordingly, Capital Storage has access to the full amount the parties agreed would be its “sole and exclusive remedy” if the “Closing … does not occur.” And under well-settled Texas law, the Agreement’s

Copy from re:SearchTX express terms bar Capital Storage from seeking any further damages for its fraud and conspiracy claims, including the benefit-of-the-bargain, consequential, and exemplary damages it requests.

BACKGROUND On May 18, 2022, the parties executed the Agreement, under which SpareBox put forward a $3 million deposit in exchange for the option to buy 22 of Capital Storage’s self-storage businesses for $323 million. Ex. 1, Decl. of S. Treadwell, CEO, Rizk Ventures Self Storage, LLC (“Treadwell Decl.”) ¶ 5-6. The Agreement set out each party’s remedies in the event the sale did not close as a result of the other party’s default. See Ex. 1-A, Agreement. Relevant here, § 4.1 of the Agreement required SpareBox to deposit $3 million in escrow with First American Title Insurance Company (“First American”). Section 13.2 then provided that if the closing did not occur: by reason of any default of Purchaser, and if such default is not cured within three (3) Business Days from written notice thereof from Seller to Purchaser, Seller may, as Seller’s sole and exclusive remedy, terminate this Agreement and receive the Deposit as liquidated damages, and thereafter, Seller and Purchaser have no further rights or obligations hereunder, except with respect to the Termination Surviving Obligations.

Id. § 13.2 (emphasis added). SpareBox subsequently deposited $3 million with First American.

Treadwell Decl. ¶ 8; see also Ex. 1-C, May 18, 2022 Receipt for Deposit.

The parties continued to perform their due diligence, but SpareBox ultimately decided not to close the deal. Treadwell Decl. ¶ 10. At that point, SpareBox forfeited its $3 million deposit.

And to avoid any ambiguity, on February 20, 2023 SpareBox wrote to Capital Storage, copying the title company, First American, to “confirm” that, although Capital Storage had yet to claim the deposit, “the $3 million deposit is still in the escrow account at First American, … the deposit is available to [Capital Storage] to obtain at [its] convenience, and … SpareBox unequivocally

Copy from re:SearchTX releases the full amount to [Capital Storage].” Ex. 1-B, Feb. 20, 2023 Letter from S. Treadwell to S. Stein, President, Capital Storage.

Instead of simply claiming the deposit it had negotiated as part of the Agreement, Capital Storage filed this lawsuit seeking additional remedies. As to SpareBox, Capital Storage alleged breach of contract (Count One); fraudulent inducement and fraud (Count Two); and fraud conspiracy (Count Six). Capital Storage also requested a declaratory judgment concerning the remedies available under the Agreement (Count Three). 1 Based only on Capital Storage’s petition and the parties’ Agreement, this Court on January 31, 2023, dismissed Capital Storage’s breach-of-contract and declaratory-judgment claims. See 1/31/2023 Order at 1. The Court permitted only the fraud and related conspiracy claims to proceed against SpareBox. At the time, the Court could not and did not consider evidence establishing that SpareBox had unequivocally relinquished any claim to its $3 million deposit.

LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A defendant can establish it is entitled to summary judgment by “disprov[ing] at least one element of the plaintiff’s theory of recovery.” Debes v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 2014 WL 3384679, at *2 (Tex. App.— Beaumont July 10, 2014, no pet.). “When a movant conclusively negates a necessary element of the nonmovant’s claim, the nonmovant, to avoid summary judgment, must then introduce evidence

Capital Storage also sued Davidson Kempner, SpareBox Investor, and SpareBox Board members Andrew Shore and Jigar Shah, alleging tortious interference (Count Four) and conspiracy to tortiously interfere (Count Five). On November 28, 2022, Davidson Kempner, SpareBox Investor, Shore, and Shah entered a special appearance contesting this Court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. See Defendants Davidson Kempner, SpareBox Investor, Andrew Shore, and Jigar Shah’s Special Appearance and General Denial.

Copy from re:SearchTX that raises a fact issue on the element the movant is trying to negate.” Cohen v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 106 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). “If the nonmovant fails to introduce such evidence, i.e., if the summary judgment evidence establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact, then summary judgment is proper.” Id. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(d), SpareBox gives notice of its intent to use the following evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment. Attached to this motion are: • Exhibit 1: Declaration of Steve Treadwell, CEO, Rizk Ventures Self Storage, LLC • Exhibit 1-A: May 2022 Purchase and Sale Agreement, attached to Treadwell Declaration as Exhibit A.

• Exhibit 1-B: May 18, 2022 Receipt for Deposit, attached to Treadwell Declaration as Exhibit B.

• Exhibit 1-C: Letter from Steve Treadwell, CEO, Rizk Ventures Self Storage, to Steven Stein, President, Capital Storage (Feb. 20, 2023), attached to Treadwell Declaration as Exhibit C.

• Exhibit 1-D: February 3, 2023 First American File Balance Sheet, attached to Treadwell Declaration as Exhibit D.

• Exhibit 2: Capital Storage’s Initial Disclosures ARGUMENT SpareBox is entitled to summary judgment on its tort claims—for fraud and conspiracy— because Capital Storage cannot establish it suffered any injury. To establish its fraud claim, Capital Storage must prove, inter alia, that SpareBox’s alleged misrepresentations “caused injury.”

Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Lufkin Indus., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex. 2019). Capital Storage’s conspiracy claim turns on a similar showing because “civil conspiracy is a derivative action premised on an underlying tort.” Gonzales v. American Title Co. of Houston, 104 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); see also id. (“The borrowers’ failure

Copy from re:SearchTX to offer summary judgment evidence of any underlying tort … causes their claim of conspiracy to fail.”); Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019) (“Civil conspiracy requires an underlying tort that has caused damages.”). In short, both of Capital Storage’s remaining claims against SpareBox require it to prove damages. Capital Storage, however, cannot make that showing. SpareBox has already tendered to Capital Storage its maximum possible remedy under the Agreement: the $3 million escrow deposit.

The Agreement expressly limits Capital Storage to recovering only SpareBox’s deposit.

Section 13.2 provides that the deposit is Capital Storage’s “sole and exclusive remedy” “[i]n the event the Closing of the transaction provided for herein does not occur as herein provided by reason of any default” by SpareBox. And § 13.3 bars both parties from seeking “incidental, special, exemplary, consequential or punitive damages for matters arising under this Agreement.” These provisions limit Capital Storage’s recovery, including for the fraud and conspiracy claims it has pled, to the escrow deposit that SpareBox has tendered to Capital Storage.

Through these tort claims, Capital Storage unquestionably seeks benefit-of-the-bargain and consequential damages that allegedly arise because “the Closing of the transaction provided for herein d[id] not occur” due to SpareBox’s “default”—i.e., its failure to close in accordance with the provisions in Article X. Ex. 1-A, Agreement § 13.2. Capital Storage’s petition makes this plain. It alleges that SpareBox represented that “SpareBox had the authority and ability to perform the Closing, that SpareBox had access to sufficient financing to perform the Closing, and that SpareBox intended to perform the Closing.” Pet. ¶ 54 (emphases added). And the prayer for relief seeks actual and exemplary damages resulting from SpareBox’s failure to close and, alternatively, specific performance of the Agreement. See id. ¶ 81. In short, Capital Storage’s tort claims derive

Copy from re:SearchTX from the Agreement and SpareBox’s failure to close—which is why Capital Storage tellingly seeks in tort the same contract damages it sought for SpareBox’s failure to close.

Capital Storage’s initial disclosures—served after this Court’s decision dismissing the contract claims—confirm its chosen remedy is based on SpareBox’s failure to close. Those disclosures make clear that Capital Storage’s tort claims and dismissed contract claims rely on the very same theory of harm: that Capital Storage suffered injury because “SpareBox failed to perform Closing.” Ex. 2, Capital Storage’s Initial Disclosures, at 3. In those disclosures, Capital Storage identified two “amounts and methods of calculating economic damages” for its fraud and conspiracy claims against SpareBox. The first “method” seeks benefit-of-the-bargain damages for “SpareBox’s fail[ure] to perform Closing”—specifically, the alleged $50 million difference between the Agreement price and the alleged market value of the self-storage businesses “at the time that SpareBox failed to perform Closing.” Id. The second “method” seeks $74 million in consequential damages representing the difference between the alleged market value of the self- storage businesses at present and the alleged purchase price Capital Storage “would have” obtained from “other buyers” had Capital Storage known SpareBox’s representation regarding their “authority and ability to perform the closing” were, according to Capital Storage, false. Id.; Pet.

¶ 54.

Capital Storage’s “methods and amounts” of tort damages sought are prohibited by the Agreement. They exceed the agreed $3 million escrow deposit that § 13.2 mandates is the cap on Capital Storage’s recovery “in the event the Closing of the transaction … does not occur.” Ex 1- A, Agreement § 13.2. And they run afoul of § 13.3’s express prohibition on exemplary and consequential damages. Id. § 13.3. The undisputed evidence confirms that SpareBox has made the $3 million escrow deposit, SpareBox has unequivocally relinquished any claim to that deposit,

Copy from re:SearchTX and the deposit is available to Capital Storage whenever it chooses to obtain those funds. See Ex. 1-B, Feb. 20, 2023 Letter from S. Treadwell to S. Stein. As a result, Capital Storage cannot establish any injury that entitles it to damages beyond the amount it may already claim in the form of SpareBox’s deposit. See, e.g., Munoz v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Indiana, 2016 WL 4898271, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2016) (granting summary judgment, in part because certain claims were not “actionable as a matter of law” where the plaintiff could not establish damages beyond amount that had already been satisfied). SpareBox, therefore, is entitled to summary judgment. See also Cohen, 106 S.W.3d at 307 (summary judgment appropriate where there was no fact issue “as to the existence and amount of damages … incurred with respect to the fraud claim”).

It is no answer to argue that a contractual limitation-of-liability provision cannot limit tort liability. Texas courts recognize that such provisions limit claims sounding in both contract and tort (including fraud) because there is a “strongly embedded public policy favoring freedom of contract” and “courts must respect and enforce the terms of a contract that parties have freely and voluntarily made.” Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213, 230, 232 (Tex. 2019). The Texas Supreme Court has “never held … that fraud vitiates a limitation-of-liability clause” and has instead held that parties may contract to limit any recovery from a claim of fraud. Id. at 232; see also id. at 233 (“[T]he parties bargained to limit punitive damages, and we must hold them to that bargain.”).

In Bombardier, the Texas Supreme Court explained that it made no sense to allow the plaintiffs to seek damages based on a contract while simultaneously allowing them to circumvent that contract’s limitation-of-liability provision. The Bombardier plaintiffs chose not to “seek[] recission of the [relevant contracts] based on [the defendant’s] fraudulent conduct” and instead “tried to enforce the [contracts], seeking an award of actual damages, while at the same time

Copy from re:SearchTX seeking to strike the limitation-of-liability clauses” to receive an additional award beyond what the contracts permitted. Id. at 232. The Texas Supreme Court rejected that gambit. It held that “the plaintiffs cannot both have the contract” as a basis for seeking their claimed damages “and defeat it too.” Id. (alteration adopted and quotations omitted). “[T]he valid limitation-of-liability clauses,” it ruled, “must stand.” Id. Other courts have followed suit, recognizing that provisions limiting damages in a purchase and sale agreement are valid and enforceable notwithstanding allegations of fraud. See, e.g., North Presidio, LLC v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 808 F. App’x 275, 275 (5th Cir. 2020) (summary judgment appropriate where sale agreement limited recovery as to contract, fraud, and other “non- contractual claims”); Great Hans, LLC v. Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2019 WL 1219110, at *9 (Tex. App.–Dallas Mar. 15, 2019, no pet.) (holding that a “damages-limitation clause” in a purchase and sale agreement is “valid and enforceable”).

Here too the parties’ “valid limitation-of-liability clauses must stand.” Bombardier, 572 S.W.3d at 232. As in Bombardier, Capital Storage may not seek damages from SpareBox’s failure to close while simultaneously seeking to “strike the limitation-of-liability clauses.” Id. Put differently, Capital Storage “cannot both have the contract and defeat it too.” Id. (alteration adopted and quotations omitted). Sections 13.2 and 13.3 apply with full force to limit Capital Storage’s recovery to, at most, $3 million. And because SpareBox relinquished its $3 million deposit as soon as it decided not to close, Capital Storage is already entitled to that maximum possible damages award. Capital Storage therefore cannot establish any injury—a necessary element of its remaining claims—and SpareBox is entitled to summary judgment.

PRAYER Though discovery has only just commenced in this case, Capital Storage’s remaining claims are ripe for judgment now—saving the parties and the Court time, money and resources

Copy from re:SearchTX that will not change the outcome of these claims. Both claims fail as a result of a straightforward legal question that turns on the plain language of the Agreement and the undisputed facts.

SpareBox respectfully asks this Court to grant summary judgment in favor of SpareBox on Capital Storage’s remaining claims against SpareBox for fraud and conspiracy.

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DATED: February 27, 2023 Respectfully submitted, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP /s/ Jeremy A. Fielding Jeremy A. Fielding, P.C.

State Bar No. 24040895 [email protected] Aysha M. Spencer State Bar No. 24132584 [email protected] 4550 Travis Street Dallas, Texas 75205 Tel: (214) 972-1770 Fax: (214) 972-1771 AND Judson Brown, P.C. (pro hac vice) [email protected] 1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Tel: (202) 389-5000 Fax: (202) 389-5200 Attorneys for SpareBox Self Storage, LLC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 27, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon all parties via eFile in accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

/s/ Jeremy Fielding Jeremy Fielding

Copy from re:SearchTX Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Karyn Cooper on behalf of Jeremy Fielding Bar No. 24040895 [email protected] Envelope ID: 73164811 Status as of 2/28/2023 8:13 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeremy Fielding [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Eric JMayer [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Shawn Raymond [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT David Peterson [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Michael ALeone [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Karyn Cooper [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Aysha MSpencer [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Daniel Hopper [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Deborah Newman [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Richie Simpson [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Benjamin Finestone [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Rusty Edgington [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT Christopher Porter [email protected] 2/27/2023 6:16:38 PM SENT

Copy from re:SearchTX 5/15/2024 10:15 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 87796814 By: Keeley Hodgins Filed: 5/15/2024 10:15 PM Pgs-2 CAUSE NO. 2022-71323 NCA § 7 CAPITAL STORAGE HOLDINGS LLC, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Plaintiff, § § HARRISCOUNTY,TEXAS v. k § ler SPAREBOX SELF STORAGE, LLC § § tC Defendant. § 151st JUDICIAL DISTRICT ric § § ist sD fPftOr o~~D] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT SPAREBOX SELF STORAGE, LLC'S es TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT rg Having considered Defendant SpareBox Self Storage, LLC's ("SpareBox's") Traditional Bu and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Capital Storage Holdings LLC n ily ("Capital Storage"), all responses and replies, and the applicable authorities and evidence, the ar M

Court GRANTS the Motion. Capital Storage's claims for fraud and fraudulent inducement (Count of

I), breach of contract (Count II), and declaratory judgment (Count III) are therefore DISMISSED e ffic

WITH PREJUDICE. O

SO ORDERED. y

Signed:~/~ op

7/12/2024 Dated: C ial

Judge Presiding fic of

** The Court does not believe that Plaintiff has adduced more than a scintilla of evidence of: Un

(1) Justifiable reliance given that Sparebox always had the right to not close and to forfeit its $3 million; (2) causation of its benefit of the bargain measure of damages as articulated in its briefing and summary judgment evidence; or (3) a proper measure of "value presented" as being the full purchase prices as opposed to some other value that contemplated the $3 million escrow forfeiture option in the contract.

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

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Karyn Cooper on behalf of Jeremy Fielding Bar No. 24040895 [email protected] k ler Envelope ID: 87796814 Filing Code Description: Motion (No Fee) tC Filing Description: SpareBox Self Storage, LLC's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment ric Status as of 5/16/2024 8: 15 AM CST ist sD Case Contacts es Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status rg Karyn Cooper [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Eric JMayer Bu [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT n Shawn Raymond [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT ily David Peterson d peterso [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT ar

Michael Aleone [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT M

Rachel Solis [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT of e

Deborah Newman [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT ffic

Benjamin Finestone [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT O

Cameron Kelly [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT y

Elise Miller [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT op

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Jeremy Fielding [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT fic

Aysha MSpencer [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT of

Richie Simpson rich [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Un

Kimberly Chervenak [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Megan McGlynn [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Judson Brown [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Daniel Hopper [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM ERROR Rusty Edgington [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Christopher Porter [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Daniel Myerson [email protected] 5/15/2024 10:15:59 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101745753 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Storable's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order Status as of 6/9/2025 8:23 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

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Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101745753 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Storable's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order Status as of 6/9/2025 8:23 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT John Holler [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/6/2025 8:10:39 PM SENT

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ______________________________________________________________________________ Storable’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order ______________________________________________________________________________ Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively, “Storable”) respectfully move the Court for partial reconsideration of its May 28, 2025 Discovery Order (“Discovery Order”), specifically regarding Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 10, and would show as follows.

Summary The Court’s Discovery Order compels Storable to produce its FMS customer list. This document is highly confidential, a trade secret, and among Storable’s most valuable assets. This Court should reconsider its ruling in accordance with applicable law on the protection of trade secrets, which requires SafeLease to prove it has a specific need for the list. It cannot do that. And SafeLease’s purported needs for the list would be fully satisfied by the reasonable alternatives that Storable offered and SafeLease inexplicably refused. Moreover, Storable has moved for partial summary judgment on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim, the only claim for which SafeLease contends that Storable’s FMS customer list is needed. If the Court grants summary judgment, it will obviate any need that SafeLease has for Storable’s FMS customer list. No discovery of this list is necessary to grant summary judgment for Defendants on that claim.

Compelling production of a trade secret that is not reasonably needed is an abuse of discretion, and the Court should reconsider its ruling to avoid committing such an error in this case.

Relevant Background SafeLease’s Request for Production No. 10 requested Storable’s FMS customer list, including the addresses for each customer. Storable objected. Counsel for the parties conferred regarding this and other requests on May 7, 2025. SafeLease’s only purported need for the list is to analyze market power in its alleged FMS market—specifically, to calculate Storable’s market share in that alleged market. To meet that stated need, Storable offered to provide the total number of its FMS customers, including a breakdown by state. However, SafeLease insisted that its experts needed the full list, including customers’ addresses, in order to “verify” the entries.

To address SafeLease’s “verification” concerns, Storable offered three alternatives: (1) providing certification from a Storable executive that the list is complete and accurate; (2) giving a neutral, secure third party temporary access to the list to confirm its accuracy; or (3) arranging for SafeLease’s expert to review the list while it remains in Storable’s possession. SafeLease rejected these alternatives but did not meaningfully explain why. Instead, SafeLease sought relief from the Court.

In SafeLease’s pre-motion letter, it restated the purported need to “verify” the number of FMS customers. A. Locke Letter to Court (May 16, 2025) at 1. The letter went on to explain that production of the list was “relevant and proportional to the needs of the case” and “critical for defining the relevant antitrust market and assessing Storable’s market power and competitive impact of its conduct.” Id. The letter did not explain, however, why the list was “critical” for any of these purposes or why SafeLease rejected Storable’s offers. See id.

-2-

On May 28, 2025, the Court issued its Discovery Order requiring Storable to produce its FMS customer list by June 13, 2025. The Discovery Order was based only on the parties’ pre- motion letters; no other briefing or evidence was submitted. Regarding the customer list, the Court reasoned that the agreed protective order would be adequate to protect Storable’s interests.

Discovery Order at 2.

On June 2, 2025, Storable filed a motion for partial summary judgment on SafeLease’s claim for attempted monopolization. That motion demonstrates that Storable has no dangerous probability of monopolizing the tenant insurance market as a matter of law. Defs’ Mot. for Partial Sum. Jmt. (Jun. 2, 2025) at 11–14. It also demonstrates that Storable has not harmed competition in the tenant insurance market as a matter of law, that its conduct is neither anticompetitive nor predatory, and that Storable does not have specific intent to monopolize the tenant insurance market. Id. at 14–24. Summary judgment on any of these grounds would be fatal to SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim—yet none of them implicate Storable’s share of the alleged FMS market. In other words, neither Storable’s FMS customer list nor any “verification” of that list will help SafeLease survive Storable’s partial motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment motion is set for hearing on July 1, 2025.

On June 4, 2025, the parties conducted a mediation with the assistance of mediator Alan F. Levin. A settlement was not reached, but no impasse was declared and the parties are continuing to discuss possible settlement of this case. Because a resolution is unlikely to be reached prior to the June 13 production deadline, Storable now files this motion for partial reconsideration of the Discovery Order. Storable has also filed an emergency motion to stay the June 13, 2025 deadline.

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Legal Standard Motions to reconsider. A trial court “retains continuing control over its interlocutory orders and has the power to set those orders aside at any time before a final judgment is entered.”

Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 83 (Tex. 1993).

Disclosure of a trade secret. “A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons from disclosing a trade secret owned by that person, unless the court finds that non- disclosure will tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.” T EX. R. EVID. 507(a). “Trial courts should apply Rule 507 as follows: First, the party resisting discovery must establish that the information is a trade secret. The burden then shifts to the requesting party to establish that the information is necessary for a fair adjudication of its claims.” In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). “If the information is a trade secret and the requesting parties do not need it, an order that requires disclosure is a clear abuse of discretion.”

In re Union Pac. R. Co., 294 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).

Argument and Authorities The Court should reconsider its ruling compelling production of Storable’s FMS customer list and instead adopt one or more of Storable’s proposed alternatives to full disclosure.

I. Storable’s FMS Customer List is a Trade Secret Storable’s FMS customer list is plainly a trade secret. Under Texas law, a trade secret means: [A]ll forms and types of information, including … any … list of actual or potential customers or suppliers, … , and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if: (A) the owner of the trade secret has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to keep the information secret; and

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(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainably through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(6) (emphasis added).

A customer list is expressly listed among the types of documents eligible for trade secret protection. Storable’s FMS customer list satisfies both of the requirements to be considered a trade secret. “Courts generally recognize that customer lists or financial information that can be used to obtain customers or to negotiate pricing or fees to obtain an advantage in the market qualifies as a trade secret.” Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Dolcefino Commc’ns, LLC, 702 S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

A. Storable Takes Reasonable Measures to Keep the List a Secret Storable takes reasonable measures to keep its FMS customer list a secret. In the declaration attached as Exhibit A, Storable’s CEO Chuck Gordon explains in detail Storable’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of its FMS customer list. This list does not exist as a standalone document and only select few Storable employees have the ability to aggregate the data underlying the list. Ex. A ¶ 5. This list exists only in electronic format; no hard copies are created, and electronic versions of the list are not created for any other purposes and thus are not disseminated outside of Storable. Id. Storable maintains strict privacy and security policies for its employees to protect trade secrets and other proprietary materials, including those in electronic format such as customer lists.

Id. ¶ 6; Ex. A-1. For example, Storable provides all of its staff with securely configured company laptops. Ex. A-1 at 27. Storable’s employees are required to use their company-issued laptops for their work and are strictly prohibited from conducting company business on personal computers. Id.

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While Storable allows employees to use personal smartphones to access email and other business applications when they are not able to use their company-issued laptops, employees are prohibited from saving confidential company information on those personal devices. Id. Storable provides its employees with guidelines to ensure that their use of those devices for work is secure.

Id. at 27–28.

Storable takes security awareness among its employees seriously. Staff members are required to undergo security awareness training at least twice each year, and new hires are trained promptly upon starting. Id. at 28. Storable also conducts simulated “phishing” exercises to raise awareness among employees regarding security practices; any employee who fails the exercise is required to undergo remedial training. Id. Storable also regularly publishes a security awareness newsletter. Id. These measures are reasonably adequate to maintain the secrecy of the Storable’s trade secrets, including its customer lists. See, e.g., Reilly v. Premier Polymers, LLC, 2020 WL 7074253, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 3, 2020, pet. dism’d) (trade secret found where party exercised information security practices including password protection and access limitations).

B. The List Derives Independent Economic Value from its Secrecy Storable’s FMS customer list is extremely value to Storable as a general matter and because the information it contains is neither generally known nor readily ascertainable. The list is among the most competitively sensitive items in Storable’s possession. Ex. A ¶ 7. Its disclosure would threaten Storable’s business—both its core FMS business and its businesses for tenant insurance and other products it sells to its FMS customers.

First, - - - Storable’s FMS customer list covers all its FMS customers—thousands of facilities— and is the core of an FMS business that Storable has spent years to build and maintain. This list has been built from countless hours of sales, marketing, and support and millions of dollars of

-6- building, updating, and continually improving its FMS platforms. Id. It is also valuable due to its secrecy. Storable made significant effort and investment to identify these facilities and to successfully win and maintain them as FMS customers. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Storable’s competitors did not do this work or make these investments. Id. If a competitor obtained the list, it would unfairly be able to use Storable’s labor to steal Storable’s customers. The list would provide a treasure trove of potential customer leads, insight into Storable’s presence in different geographic regions, and a wealth of information that SafeLease could unfairly use to its advantage. Id. ¶¶ 9–11.

Without this list, the competitor may not otherwise know that a facility is a Storable customer or be able to leverage that information in its negotiations with potential customers. See id. This is precisely why “[c]ourts generally recognize that customer lists . . . that can be used to obtain customers . . . qualif[y] as a trade secret.” Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc., 702 S.W.3d at 690.

Second, production of the list to SafeLease illustrates both the value of the list and the threat to Storable’s business if it is disclosed. While SafeLease does not compete against Storable directly in the FMS market, it draws approximately 70% of its insurance customers from Storable’s FMS customer pool. Feb. 14 Tr. 28:17-21. SafeLease and Storable do compete for tenant insurance customers, so giving SafeLease access to Storable’s FMS customer list would directly enable SafeLease to target Storable customers. See Ex. A ¶¶ 8, 10. Further, SafeLease has admitted that it is actively encouraging its current and prospective insurance customers that are also Storable FMS customers to switch from Storable’s FMS to other competitors’ FMS platforms.

Feb. 13 Tr. 82:11-14.1 Providing SafeLease with this list would unfairly enable them to further that current, ongoing effort.

The prospect of Storable’s FMS customers switching to other FMS providers is a real one: Storable lost almost 1,000 FMS customers in the last year alone. Feb. 14 Tr. 151:5–21; see also Jan. 16 Tr. 134:24–135:10.

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II. SafeLease Has No Legitimate Need for Storable’s FMS Customer List SafeLease has not met its burden of showing that it needs the FMS customer list for this case. Cont’l Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at 613. To meet that burden, SafeLease “cannot merely assert unfairness but must demonstrate with specificity exactly how the lack of the information will impair the presentation of the case on the merits to the point that an unjust result is a real, rather than a merely possible, threat.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 732–33 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). SafeLease’s purported “need” for the list is inadequate for several reasons.

First, SafeLease has not articulated any legitimate basis why it needs the name and address of each facility served by Storable’s FMS, rather than the total number of facilities served, which Storable offered to provide and SafeLease rejected. SafeLease’s counsel claim that SafeLease’s economic expert wants to “verify” the accuracy of the entries in the list to determine Storable’s FMS market share. But it is entirely unclear why this “verification” is necessary. At the prior TI hearings, SafeLease’s economics expert calculated market share using an estimate of the total number of facilities served by Storable’s FMS without complaint. Jan. 16 Tr. 221:1–7; Feb. 11 Tr. 120:3–16. He did this even though Storable had produced a more specific calculation of facilities using its FMS as of December 2024. See DX–198. It is thus a mystery as to “exactly how” the lack of the list will impair SafeLease’s case on the merits. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., S.W.3d at 732–33.

Second, it is unclear what any supposed “verification” of the list would entail unless SafeLease contacts thousands of facilities and asks them what FMS platform they use, which the facility owners obviously have no obligation to disclose. Unless SafeLease plans to issue subpoenas to myriad storage facilities that would at best reveal information harmful to SafeLease’s

-8- case (i.e., that a facility was mistakenly included on the list and does not count toward Storable’s market share), the purported need for “verification” is questionable at best.

Third, Storable’s partial motion for summary judgment—which challenges SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim on grounds unrelated to Storable’s alleged FMS market share— further renders production of Storable’s FMS customer list unnecessary.

Fourth, Storable offered SafeLease multiple, alternative verification methods. See supra at 2. Any of these methods would fully satisfy SafeLease’s purported need to verify the list.

III. The May 28 Order’s Reasons for Compelling Production of the List Were in Error Respectfully, the reasons for compelling production of Storable’s FMS customer list were in error and the Court should reconsider them on a fuller presentation of the issues.

First, the Court explained that the agreed protective order in this case would protect Storable’s confidentiality interest in the FMS customer list. Discovery Order at 2. Unfortunately, it does not. Trade secrets are privileged against disclosure. TEX. R. EVID. 507. Disclosure under a protective order would violate the privilege.2 Also, the protective order would be void if the Court of Appeals holds that this Court lacks jurisdiction in the pending appeal.

Second, the Court noted in the Discovery Order that Storable did not assert that the information in the list is a trade secret. Discovery Order at 2 n.1. While Storable’s response to SafeLease’s pre-motion letter did not use the term “trade secret,” further briefing beyond the pre- motion letters would have clarified the precise nature of Storable’s confidentiality interest in its FMS customer list—which is why Storable has filed this motion to reconsider.

Finally, the Court also suggested in the Discovery Order that disclosure of the FMS customer list to SafeLease would be appropriate because “SafeLease does not compete in the FMS

The ongoing dispute over the adequacy of the protective order in this case is another reason why the Court should not compel production of Storable’s trade secret.

-9- market.” Discovery Order at 2 n.2. Respectfully, that fact does not render Storable’s trade secret discoverable. Moreover, as described above, disclosure of the list to SafeLease would likely harm Storable’s business in the tenant insurance space where it competes with SafeLease and in the FMS space in light of SafeLease’s efforts to get Storable’s FMS customers to switch to competing FMS providers.

Conclusion Storable requests that the Court reconsider the May 28 Discovery Order and order that Storable may respond to SafeLease’s Request for Production No. 10 by providing the total number of its FMS facility customers with a breakdown by state and any other relief to which it may lawfully be entitled.

Respectfully submitted June 9, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) John Holler (admitted pro hac vice) ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar

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State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

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Certificate of Conference The Parties conferred regarding the relief requested in the foregoing motion, and counsel for Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff is opposed. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 2,910 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on June 9, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

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Exhibit A Docusign Envelope ID: 511404A7-7FB6-4F2E-A1EB-79F743A17E8C

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DECLARATION OF CHARLES GORDON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S MAY 28, 2025 DISCOVERY ORDER 1. My name is Charles (“Chuck”) Gordon, my date of birth is February 23, 1987, and my business address is 10900 Research Blvd Ste 160C PMB 3099, Austin, Texas 78759. I submit this declaration in support of Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider the Court’s May 28, 2025 Discovery Order. I am of sound mind and competent to make the statements in this declaration.

2. I am CEO of Defendant Storable, Inc. (“Storable”), which is the parent company of the other named Defendants in this action. I have served as CEO of Storable since its formation.

As part of my job responsibilities, I am familiar with the types of information that Storable keeps confidential and which, if made public, could harm Storable’s business or ability to compete in the marketplace.

3. I understand that Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 10 in Plaintiff’s First Set of RFPs requests documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that use Storable’s facility management software (“FMS”), including the addresses for those facilities (“Storable Facility List” or “List”). In response to RFP No. 10, Storable proposed providing SafeLease with the total number of facilities using Storable’s FMS, broken down by state. Storable also proposed mechanisms to verify the accuracy of these facility counts.

4. I further understand that the Court has ordered the production of documents sufficient to show the name, city, state, and ZIP code of all self-storage facilities using Storable’s FMS platforms as of December 30, 2024.

5. The Storable Facility List that Plaintiff requests in RFP No. 10 and the Court has ordered to be produced is a commercially sensitive trade secret owned by Storable. Storable has taken reasonable measures to maintain the confidentiality of this List. The List is not publicly known or available and cannot be ascertained from other generally available sources. The List is not a standalone document but rather pulled from Storable’s data. Only a very limited number of employees within Storable are permitted to aggregate the data from which the List is created. The Docusign Envelope ID: 511404A7-7FB6-4F2E-A1EB-79F743A17E8C

List could be created in electronic format only; no hard copies of it exist and or would ever be otherwise disseminated outside of Storable.

6. Storable maintains strict information privacy and security practices and policies for its employees in order to protect trade secret and other proprietary materials. These practices and policies are set forth in more detail in the Storable Employee Handbook, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A-1.

7. The Storable Facility List is one of the most commercially sensitive pieces of information in Storable’s possession and one of the most valuable assets that Storable owns and goes to the heart of its business.

8. The List covers all facilities that use Storable’s FMS platforms and therefore it contains thousands of entries. The risks to Storable of disclosing this List to a competitor are significant and could lead to significant competitive harm to Storable. Giving this List to a competitor is like giving the competitor the keys to our company. For example, disclosure of this list could enable Storable’s competitors to identify, target, and attempt to steal Storable’s FMS customers, as well as Storable’s non-FMS business with those customers. Disclosure of this List could harm Storable’s goodwill with its customers and the valuation of the company as a whole.

9. Much of the List’s value derives from the fact that the collective information it contains is not publicly known or accessible. Storable has made extensive efforts to build and expand its FMS customer base over the years. If Storable’s competitors obtained the List, they would unfairly be able to use the List to harm Storable’s business. The List would provide Storable’s competitors with thousands of potential customer leads, information regarding Storable’s presence in different geographic areas, and other competitive intelligence. For example, the List would identify Storable FMS customers that a FMS competitor could try to steal. Without the List, this FMS competitor would otherwise not even know that certain customers use Storable’s FMS and not be able to leverage that inside information in negotiating with these potential customers.

10. The risks of disclosing this List to SafeLease in particular are even greater. The risk that SafeLease will misuse the information in this List is material. SafeLease has obtained and abused its unauthorized access to Storable’s platform for years, so the threat that SafeLease will use this trade secret to harm Storable’s business is serious. If SafeLease obtained this List, it could use it to attempt to poach tenant insurance and tenant protection customers that use Storable FMS platforms.

11. Even if SafeLease’s counsel properly maintained the confidentiality of this List, the risk of an inadvertent disclosure and the magnitude of harm from any such disclosure are significant. This is particularly true given that there are less risky alternatives that would provide SafeLease with the information they are purportedly seeking. Even an inadvertent disclosure of all or part of this List could threaten the core of Storable’s business.

Docusign Envelope ID: 511404A7-7FB6-4F2E-A1EB-79F743A17E8C

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Austin, Texas, on the 9th day of June, 2025.

U OocuSigned by:

~ s btJV'tf>'A, 9921 BB50FAAA469 ...

Charles “Chuck” Gordon

Exhibit A-1

Storable Employee Handbook 2024 Table of Contents Core Policies.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 04 1.0 Welcome................................................................................................................................................................................................. 04 ■ 1.1 A Welcome Letter from Chuck Gordon, CEO.............................................................................................................................. 04 1.2 Storable’s Commitment to Sustainability................................................................................................................................. 05 1.3 Storable’s Commitment to DEIB.................................................................................................................................................. 05 2.0 Introductory Language and Policies................................................................................................................................................ 06 ■ 2.1 At-Will Employment........................................................................................................................................................................ 06 2.2 Ethics Code...................................................................................................................................................................................... 06 2.3 Vision & Values............................................................................................................................................................................... 07 3.0 Hiring and Orientation Policies........................................................................................................................................................ 08 ■ 3.1 EEO Statement and Non-harassment Policy............................................................................................................................ 08 3.2 Disability Accommodation........................................................................................................................................................... 11 3.3 Religious Accommodation........................................................................................................................................................... 12 3.4 Conflicts of Interest....................................................................................................................................................................... 12 3.5 Employment of Relatives............................................................................................................................................................. 12 3.6 Romance in the Work.................................................................................................................................................................... 13 3.7 Employee Referrals........................................................................................................................................................................ 13 3.8 Background Check Policy............................................................................................................................................................. 14 4.0 Wage and Hour Policies...................................................................................................................................................................... 15 ■ 4.1 Attendance Policy........................................................................................................................................................................... 15 4.2 Overtime........................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 4.3 Pay Periods and Pay Dates........................................................................................................................................................... 15 4.4 Paycheck Deductions.................................................................................................................................................................... 16 4.5 Recording Time............................................................................................................................................................................... 16 4.6 Job Abandonment.......................................................................................................................................................................... 17 4.7 Death Benefit................................................................................................................................................................................... 17 4.8 Support for Nursing Mothers...................................................................................................................................................... 17 4.9 Travel Expenses.............................................................................................................................................................................. 18 4.10 Out of State Travel Expense Policy........................................................................................................................................... 19 4.11 Life Happens Loan Program....................................................................................................................................................... 20 5.0 Conduct, Performance and Discipline............................................................................................................................................. 21 ■ 5.1 Outside Employment..................................................................................................................................................................... 21 5.2 Standards of Conduct.................................................................................................................................................................... 21 5.3 Criminal Activity/Arrests.............................................................................................................................................................. 22 5.4 Disciplinary Process....................................................................................................................................................................... 23 5.5 Post-Employment Reference Policy........................................................................................................................................... 23 6.0 General Policies.................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 ■ 6.1 Acceptable Use Policy.................................................................................................................................................................... 24 6.2 Computer Security and Copying of Software.......................................................................................................................... 29 6.3 Non-solicitation Non-smoking/No distribution Policy........................................................................................................ 30 6.4 Personal Appearance.................................................................................................................................................................... 30 6.5 Social Media Policy........................................................................................................................................................................ 31 6.6 Artificial Intelligence Usage Policy............................................................................................................................................. 33 7.0 Benefits................................................................................................................................................................................................... 34 ■ 7.1 Paid Time Off.................................................................................................................................................................................... 34 7.1.2 Unlimited Flex Time Off............................................................................................................................................................ 35 7.1.3 Volunteer Time Off.................................................................................................................................................................... 35 7.1.3 Rest, Relax and Recharge Time Off....................................................................................................................................... 35 7.1.4 Entering Time Off....................................................................................................................................................................... 35 7.2 Holidays............................................................................................................................................................................................ 35 7.3 Leaves of Absence.......................................................................................................................................................................... 36 7.3.1 FMLA.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 36 7.3.2 Family Care Leave...................................................................................................................................................................... 40 7.3.3 Jury Duty Leave.......................................................................................................................................................................... 41 7.3.4 Voting and Election Leave....................................................................................................................................................... 41 7.3.5 Witness Leave............................................................................................................................................................................ 41 7.3.6 Bereavement Leave.................................................................................................................................................................. 42 7.3.7 Witness and Victim of Crimes and Domestic Violence Leave......................................................................................... 42 7.3.8 Personal Leave........................................................................................................................................................................... 43 7.3.10 Other Statutory Leaves.......................................................................................................................................................... 44 7.4 Temporary Personnel.................................................................................................................................................................... 44 7.5 Unemployment Compensation Insurance Policy................................................................................................................... 44 7.6 Workers’ Compensation Insurance Policy................................................................................................................................ 44 7.7 COBRA................................................................................................................................................................................................ 45 7.8 Military Leave (USERRA)................................................................................................................................................................ 45 ■ 8.0 Safety and Hazards.............................................................................................................................................................................. 46 8.1 General Safety Policy..................................................................................................................................................................... 46 8.2 Policy Against Workplace Violence............................................................................................................................................ 46 8.3 Weapons Policy............................................................................................................................................................................... 47 8.4 Illegal Drug Policy.......................................................................................................................................................................... 48 8.5 Alcohol Policy.................................................................................................................................................................................. 49 ■ 9.0 Trade Secrets and Inventions........................................................................................................................................................... 50 9.1 Confidentiality and Nondisclosure of Trade Secrets............................................................................................................. 50 Acknowledgment of Receipt and Review....................................................................................................................................... 51 Core Policies 814 1.0 Welcome

1.1 A Welcome Letter from Chuck Gordon, CEO What’s up STORABLE!

Welcome and congratulations!

You are a part of a high-performance, Consult the State Posters on the Warehouse for fun-loving organization where we love to win. the state in which you reside for information on I hope (and know) that your time with Storable any such policy variance. will be personally rewarding and professionally You should know that this handbook challenging. I take a lot of pride in what we supersedes any previously issued handbooks have built over the years and am eager to see or policy statements and all inconsistent oral how you’re going to make an impact to help us or written statements dealing with the subjects achieve our vision of being the #1 tech brand in discussed herein. The Organization reserves the storage and marinas. right to interpret, modify, or supplement the We have Storriors all across the United States provisions of this handbook at any time. The and Storable complies with all federal and Handbook is available on the Company Intranet state employment laws, which is reflected in and we will notify Storriors of amendments this handbook. The Organization also complies to the policies, but it is your responsibility to with any applicable local laws, although there familiarize yourself with the handbook. Neither may not be an express written policy regarding this handbook nor any other communication by those laws contained in the handbook. a management representative or other, whether oral or written, is intended in any way to create The employment policies and benefits a contract of employment. summaries in this handbook are for all team members. State law may provide for policy variances under circumstances other than those outlined in this handbook.

Seriously – please take the time now to read this handbook carefully.

Once you’re done, sign the acknowledgement at the end to show that you have read, understood, and agree to the contents of this handbook, which sets out the basic rules and guidelines concerning your time with us.

I know you understand that no employee handbook can address every possible situation in the workplace – but that’s why we’ve selected responsible and conscientious team members. We expect you to use sound judgment and act with integrity in all that you do.

Thanks again for deciding to be a part of a great team!

All the best, Chuck Gordon, CEO Storable

@ - - - - - - - -- - 4

1.2 Storable’s Commitment to Sustainability Storable believes in a future where everyone Our key drivers are fostering openness, can Do More and Be More and we know that the sustainable thinking and respect. We value future won’t create itself. That’s why we’ve set a everyone and strive to work as one team. vision for sustainable corporate citizenship that We invest significantly in our people and forms the basis of our decisions by focusing our working environment by creating and on environmental awareness, business ethics, maintaining a psychologically safe and healthy diversity, equity, inclusion, belonging and workplace and ensuring ongoing professional community involvement. and personal development.

1.3 Storable’s Commitment to DEIB ,1,, <@> Vision Strategic Objectives "1' At Storable, we prioritize our culture of C) Diversity - Ensure the Storrior ecosystem inclusion, respect and care, intended to reflects our diverse world and celebrate that enhance the lives of our employees, customers diversity and communities, and reflect the diverse world Equity - Ensure every Storrior has fair we inhabit. access to the opportunities and resources Our commitment is to encourage diverging necessary to develop and achieve their own perspectives, equitable opportunities, and unique career path inclusive environments. Enabling every Storrior Inclusion & Belonging - Foster a culture of to be more of who they are, feel valued as their belonging, where every Storrior is accepted authentic selves, and that they belong. and valued as their authentic self, and is empowered to do their best work

@ - - - - - - - - - - - -- - 5 2.0 Introductory Language and Policies

2.1 At-Will Employment Your employment with us is on an “at-will” To be crystal clear, nothing in this handbook basis. This means your employment may be or any other Organization document should terminated at any time, with or without notice be understood as creating a contract, and with or without cause. We’re all about guaranteed or continued employment, a right reciprocity, so we also respect your right to to termination only “for cause,” or any other leave us at any time, with or without notice and guarantee of continued benefits with or without cause. or employment.

2.2 Ethics Code Storable will conduct business honestly and Violation of the Code of Ethics can result in ethically wherever operations are maintained. discipline, up to and including termination We strive to improve the quality of our of employment. The degree of discipline services, products, and operations and will imposed may be influenced by the existence maintain a reputation for honesty, fairness, of voluntary disclosure of any ethical violation respect, responsibility, integrity, trust and and whether or not the violator cooperated in sound business judgment. Our managers and any subsequent investigation. team members are expected to adhere to high standards of business and personal integrity as a representation of our business practices.

We expect that officers, directors and team members will not knowingly misrepresent the Organization and will not speak on behalf of the Organization unless specifically authorized.

The confidentiality of trade secrets, proprietary information, and similar confidential commercially-sensitive information (i.e. financial or sales records/reports, marketing or business strategies/plans, product development, customer lists, patents, trademarks, etc.) about the Organization or operations, or that of our customers or partners, is to be treated with discretion and only disseminated on a need-to-know basis (see policies relating to privacy).

2.3 Vision & Values Our Vision - To be the number one technology brand in storage and marinas.

Our Core Purpose and why we exist - We help Storage and Marina Operators run better businesses.

What we do - As the undisputed industry leader, we offer the only all-in-one, fully integrated suite of storage technology products that include software, marketing services, payment processing, insurance and access control. We are constantly innovating and improving our current products while creating new offerings and pursuing additional verticals.

Our Values - We… play well with others, embrace change, are driven and have a whole-hearted customer focus.

We play well with others by… We are driven by… Exemplifying team before self, being quick to Having a bias for action, relentlessly pursuing praise and slow to gloat, valuing and embracing the betterment of our customers, the company different perspectives, being someone people and ourselves, having a “game-time” mentality, enjoy working with. having a passion to win.

We embrace change by… We have a wholehearted customer focus by… Looking forward instead of dwelling on the Having a customer first mentality across past, being up for a new challenge no matter the entire business, delivering a world class how daunting, constantly adapting to win. customer experience, always being there for our customers.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 7 3.0 Hiring and Orientation Policies

3.1 EEO Statement and Non-harassment Policy

~ Equal Opportunity Statement Storable is committed to the principles of equal We will conduct a prompt and thorough employment. We are committed to complying investigation of all allegations of with all federal, state, and local laws providing discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, equal employment opportunities and all other or any violation of the Equal Employment employment laws and regulations. Opportunity Policy in a confidential manner, to the extent possible. The Organization will Storable has a strict policy against all types take appropriate corrective action, if and of workplace harassment, including sexual where warranted. harassment and other forms of workplace harassment based upon an individual’s sex The Organization prohibits retaliation against (including pregnancy, childbirth, or related team members who provide information about, medical conditions), gender, gender expression, complain about, or assist in the investigation of ethnicity, race, religion, creed, color, national any complaint of discrimination or violation of origin or ancestry, citizenship status, physical the Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. or mental disability, genetic information, We are all responsible for upholding this marital status, age, sexual orientation, AIDS/HIV policy. You may discuss questions regarding status, military service, veteran status, caste, or equal employment opportunity with your any other status protected by federal, state, or manager, any member of management, or local laws.

People Operations.

Policy Against Workplace Harassment No employee will discriminate against or harass any individual, or allow discrimination or harassment to go unreported.

Storable has a strict policy against all types of workplace harassment, including sexual harassment and other forms of workplace harassment based upon an individual’s sex (including pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions), gender, gender expression, ethnicity, race, religion, creed, color, national origin or ancestry, citizenship status, physical or mental disability, genetic information, marital status, age, sexual orientation, AIDS/HIV status, military service, veteran status, caste, or any other status protected by federal, state, or local laws.

All forms of harassment of, or by, team members, vendors, visitors, customers and clients are strictly prohibited and will not be tolerated.

Sexual Harassment Sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when

•1 Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly as a term or condition of an individual’s employment;

•2 Submission to, or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or

•3 Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.

While it is not possible to identify every act that constitutes or may constitute sexual harassment, the following are some examples of sexual harassment: Unwelcome requests for sexual favors; Retaliating against another for refusing a sexual advance or reporting an incident Lewd or derogatory comments or jokes; of possible sexual harassment to the Comments regarding sexual behavior or the Organization or any government agency; body of another; Offering or providing favors or employment Sexual innuendo and other vocal activity benefits such as promotions, favorable such as catcalls or whistles; evaluations, favorable assigned duties or Obscene letters, notes, emails, invitations, shifts, etc., in exchange for sexual photographs, cartoons, articles, or other favors; and written or pictorial materials of a sexual Any unwanted physical touching or assaults nature; or blocking or impeding movements.

Repeated requests for dates after being informed that interest is unwelcome;

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Other Harassment Storable has a strict policy against all types of workplace harassment, including sexual harassment and other forms of workplace harassment based upon an individual’s sex (including pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions), gender, gender expression, ethnicity, race, religion, creed, color, national origin or ancestry, citizenship status, physical or mental disability, genetic information, marital status, age, sexual orientation, AIDS/HIV status, military service, veteran status, caste, or any other status protected by federal, state, or local laws.

Again, while it is not possible to list all the circumstances that may constitute other forms of workplace harassment, the following are some examples of conduct that may constitute workplace harassment: The use of disparaging or abusive words A display of symbols, slogans, or items that or phrases, slurs, negative stereotyping, are associated with hate or intolerance or threatening, intimidating, or hostile towards any select group. acts that relate to the above protected categories; Written or graphic material that insults, stereotypes, or shows aversion or hostility towards an individual or group because of one of the above protected categories and that is placed on walls, bulletin boards, email, voicemail, or elsewhere on our premises, or circulated in the workplace; and

Reporting Discrimination and Harassment If you feel that you have witnessed or have Discipline for violation of this policy may been subjected to any form of discrimination include, but is not limited to, reprimand, or harassment, immediately notify your suspension, demotion and termination. If the manager, any member of management, or Organization determines that harassment or People Operations. discrimination occurred, corrective action will be taken to effectively end the harassment. As The Organization prohibits retaliation against necessary, the Organization may monitor any team members who, based on a reasonable incident of harassment or discrimination to belief, provide information about, complain, or assure the inappropriate behavior has stopped. assist in the investigation of any complaint of In all cases, the Organization will follow up harassment or discrimination. as necessary to ensure that no individual is We will promptly and thoroughly investigate retaliated against for making a complaint or any claim and take appropriate action where cooperating with an investigation we find a claim has merit. To the extent possible, we will retain the confidentiality of those who report suspected or alleged violations of the harassment policy.

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3.2 Disability Accommodation Storable complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act and all other applicable state and local fair employment practices laws, and is committed to providing, subject to the provisions of such laws, equal employment opportunities to qualified individuals with disabilities, including disabilities related to pregnancy, childbirth and related conditions.

Consistent with this commitment, we will provide reasonable accommodation to otherwise qualified individuals where appropriate to allow the individual to perform the essential functions of the job unless doing so would create an undue hardship on the business.

Accommodation Process If you are requesting accommodation because We encourage you to suggest specific of your disability, it is your responsibility to reasonable accommodations that you believe notify your manager, department leader or would allow you to perform your job. However, People Operations. we aren’t required to make the specific accommodation requested by you and may Employees who request accommodations may provide an alternative accommodation, to the be asked to have a physician complete an ADA extent any reasonable accommodation can be Medical Provider Report Form. made without imposing an undue hardship After receiving your request, we will actively on us. engage in an interactive dialogue with you Determinations regarding accommodations to determine the precise limitations of your are made jointly by People Operations and disability, examine the essential functions of your Manager/Department Leader. your job and explore potential reasonable Such determinations are made on a accommodations that could overcome those case-by-case basis. limitations. Where appropriate, we may need to obtain additional information from your If leave is provided as a reasonable medical provider. All medical information accommodation, such leave may run received in connection with a request for concurrently with leave under the federal accommodation will be treated as confidential. Family and Medical Leave Act and/or any other In addition, Storable may ask employees to leave where permitted by state and federal law. provide information about their educational The Organization will not discriminate or qualifications and work experience if their retaliate against team members for requesting reassignment to another position is considered an accommodation. as an accommodation.

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3.3 Religious Accommodation We are dedicated to treating team members law. Some, but not all, of the factors that equally and with respect and we recognize will be considered are cost, the effect that the diversity of their religious beliefs. All an accommodation will have on current team members may request accommodation established policies and the burden on when their religious beliefs cause a deviation operations — including other team members from our dress code or the individual’s — when determining whether to provide an schedule, basic job duties, or other aspects accommodation. At no time will we question of employment. We will consider the request, the validity of a person’s belief. but reserve the right to offer our own If you require religious accommodation, speak accommodation to the extent permitted by with your manager or People Operations.

3.4 Conflicts of Interest We are concerned with conflicts of interest that If an actual or potential conflict of interest is create actual or potential job-related concerns, determined to exist, we will take such steps as especially in the areas of confidentiality, we deem necessary to reduce or eliminate customer relations, safety, security and morale. this conflict.

If there is any actual, potential, or perceived conflict of interest between you and a competitor, supplier, distributor, or contractor, you must disclose it to your manager, or department leader.

3.5 Employment of Relatives To avoid nepotism, we will not hire, promote or Family members or significant others who are in transfer family members or significant others the same reporting line or department through into the same department, enterprise-wide. an acquisition will be allowed to remain Department is defined as anyone reporting in-place, but may not be transferred, promoted into a single VP. For the purposes of this or otherwise moved into another role which policy, family members are defined as: spouse, may be in violation of this policy. partner, significant other, mother, father, son, It is the responsibility of each employee to daughter, sister, brother, grandparent, aunt, contact their manager or People Operations uncle, cousin, nephew or niece and any step or with any potential or existing personal in-law variations therein. relationship which falls under the definitions Given Storable’s growth through acquisition, provided so the Company can decide how the Company excludes acquisitions from the best to address the situation. If you have any definition of ‘hire’ or ‘transfer’ above. questions about this policy or whether or not a referral may fall under it, please reach out to your People Operations Business Partner.

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3.6 Romance at Work We understand that true love is true love Of course, if there is ever any kind of intimate and there is nothing anyone can do about relationship between a Storable leader and it. However, please try not to engage in a their direct or indirect report, that is obviously romantic relationship with your coworkers. It not okay, and situations like this will be has the potential to create unnecessary drama resolved very quickly as it is absolutely a and distraction which leads to a messy work terminable offense. Please don’t make that situation. If you decide to be in a relationship mistake; it won’t be fun for anyone. with another employee, you must report the relationship to People Operations.

3.7 Employee Referrals We think you’re great and we’re willing to bet If the candidate applies, they must indicate your referrals are great too. We encourage you you as their referral source on their primary to refer qualified candidates to open positions. employment application. The bonus does not Given our nepotism policy, if you refer a family apply to part-time roles member you must [email protected] or internships. for awareness.

Passive referrals are for when you connect your If you refer a candidate who is subsequently social network(s) in the ATS to share jobs and hired and completes 90 days of regular, active someone applies using that link and is hired. service, you will receive Storabills You don’t need to know them and you’ll still. (see structure below). get a referral bonus.

To be eligible for an active referral, you must To be eligible for the bonus, your referral personally know the candidate and upload must be hired and have completed 90 days the candidate into our ATS (applicant tracking of successful employment with Storable and system) where you’ll answer a few questions both of you must be employees at the time about them. of the payout. Your bonus will be paid out via Storabills in Bucketlist.

Referral Bonus Structure: For passive referrals (via social postings): 500 Storabills For the majority of roles + active referral: 1500 Storabills For Engineering, Product, Director or above + active referral: 2500 Storabills

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3.8 Background Check Policy All offers of employment (full-time, part-time and seasonal) at Storable are contingent upon clear results of a thorough background check. Background checks will be conducted on all final candidates and on all employees who are promoted, as deemed necessary.

Background checks will include: Social Security Number Trace: validates the applicant’s Social Security number, date of birth and former addresses.

Nationwide Criminal Database Search Sex Offender Registry Search County and Federal Criminal Court Search: includes review of criminal convictions and probation.

The following factors will be considered for applicants with a criminal history: The nature of the crime and its relationship to the position.

The time since the conduct, conviction and/or completion of the sentence.

The number (if more than one) of convictions.

Any mitigating factors.

The following additional background searches will be required if applicable to the position: Credit History: confirms candidate’s credit history. This search will be run for positions that involve management of Storable funds and/or handling of cash or credit cards.

Procedure People Operations will order the background If a decision not to hire or promote a candidate check upon receipt of the signed offer letter is made based on the results of a background and required authorization and an employment check, there may be certain additional screening service will conduct the checks. A Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) or state designated People Operations representative requirements that will be handled by People will review all results. Operations in conjunction with the employment screening service (if applicable).

The People Operations representative will notify the hiring manager regarding the results All background check information will be kept of the check. In instances where negative confidential. Background check information or incomplete information is obtained, the will be maintained in a file separate from appropriate management and the Chief People employees’ personnel files for a minimum of Officer will assess the potential risks and five years. Storable complies with all applicable liabilities related to the job’s requirements federal, state, and local laws regarding and determine whether the individual should background checks. be hired. The candidate will be contacted and Storable reserves the right to modify this policy offered the opportunity to provide at any time without notice. additional information.

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4.1 Attendance Policy Stuff happens. We get it. If you know ahead Failure to provide reasonable notice or of time that you will be absent or late, you adhere to the attendance policy and maintain must provide reasonable advance notice to consistent and sustained attendance may result your manager. You may be required to provide in discipline, up to and including termination. documentation of any medical or other excuses Absences resulting from approved leave or for being absent or late where permitted by approved accommodations are exceptions to applicable law. the policy.

4.2 Overtime Our workweek is Sunday at 12:00 am - Saturday Failure to work overtime when requested or at 11:59 pm. If you are nonexempt, you will be working unauthorized overtime may result in paid overtime in accordance with federal and discipline, up to and including termination state law. All overtime must be approved in Unless otherwise required or exempted by advance, in writing, by your manager. law, overtime pay of one and one-half times At certain times we may require you to work your regular rate of pay is paid for any hours overtime. We will attempt to give as much worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. notice as possible in these instances. However, Holiday Pay, Vacation days/PTO and other advance notice may not always be possible. absences do not count as time worked for computing overtime.

4.3 Pay Periods and Pay Dates The standard pay period is semi-monthly for Review your paycheck for accuracy. If you all team members. Pay dates are on the 5th find an issue, report it to your manager or and the 20th of the month, but are subject department leader immediately. to change. If a payday falls on a Saturday or a holiday (unless the holiday is a Sunday), you will be paid on the preceding workday. If payday falls on a Sunday, you will be paid on the next workday.

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4.4 Paycheck Deductions Storable is required by law to make certain We will not make deductions to your pay that deductions from your pay each pay period. This are prohibited by federal, state, or local law. If includes income and unemployment taxes, you have any questions about deductions from Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) your pay, contact your manager or department contributions (Social Security and Medicare) leader. You will be reimbursed in full for any and any other deductions required under isolated, inadvertent, or improper deductions, law or by court order for wage garnishments. as defined by law. If an error is found, there will The amount of your tax deductions will be an adjustment, which will be paid no later depend on your earnings and the number of than your next regular payday. exemptions you list on your federal Form W-4 and applicable state withholding form. You may also authorize voluntary deductions from your paycheck, including contributions for insurance premiums, retirement plans, spending accounts, or other services. Your deductions will be in your wage statement.

4.5 Recording Time All nonexempt team members are required to In other words, working “off the clock” is strictly report their hours accurately. It is a condition prohibited. No one in the Organization has the of employment that all nonexempt team authority to ask, or encourage, or suggest that members record every minute of their time you should work “off the clock.” If at any point worked. You must “clock in” when you are ready you believe you are being pressured to work to commence work, “clock out” when you leave “off the clock” by anyone at Storable, please work for lunch, clock in when you return ready notify People Operations or the Chief Executive for work, and clock out when you finish work Officer immediately. for the day. You are required to notify your Falsification of time records or recording manager or the payroll department of any pay time for other team members may result in discrepancies, unrecorded or misrecorded work discipline up to and including termination hours, or involuntary missed meal or break of employment. periods within 30 days.

No work shall be performed prior to clocking in at the start of the work day, during a lunch break while clocked out, or after clocking out at the end of the work day.

4.6 Job Abandonment If you fail to show up for work or call in with an acceptable reason for the absence for a period of three consecutive days, you may be considered to have abandoned your job and voluntarily resigned from the Organization.

4.7 Death Benefit Peace of mind is important at Storable. For that reason, we’ve decided to provide a Death Benefit to all eligible Storriors. Even if you have life insurance, it can take time for the paperwork to process and for payments to be issued, and in that interim your family may still have financial needs. So, in the event of your death and as soon as administratively practicable, your primary beneficiary will be eligible to receive a one-time payment equivalent to one month of your pay or salary, absent any applicable withholdings or deductions. This is above and outside of any Life Insurance you may have or be eligible for.

4.8 Support for Nursing Mothers Storable recognizes the health advantages of breastfeeding for infants and mothers. To show our support in the workplace, we provide a supportive environment to enable breastfeeding employees to express their milk during work hours. This includes a company-wide lactation support program.

We subscribe to the following support policy. Storable is committed to prohibiting retaliation against employees requesting to take break time under this policy

Storable Responsibilities All breastfeeding employees who choose to continue providing their milk for their infants after returning to work will receive:

Milk Expression Breaks Eligible employees may take a reasonable If you use an unpaid meal break or additional amount of break time to accommodate the non-working time to express breast milk, employee’s need to express breast milk for your generally such time will be unpaid unless nursing child. You can work with your manager required by applicable law. Employees who are on a schedule that allows you the time needed required to record time must clock in and out for milk expression while still accomplishing for their lactation breaks in accordance with your daily work. Storable’s timekeeping policy.

Employees who use their regular paid rest Exempt employees may be provided break time breaks as their lactation breaks are paid during with pay when necessary to comply with state the rest breaks. and federal wage and hour laws.

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Breastfeeding Equipment Storable’s insurance carrier pays 100% for a new breast pump if the employee selects an in network provider. For any breastfeeding parents, Storable will reimburse the employee up to $50 for a hands-free breast pump to provide the opportunity for every breastfeeding parent to receive a hands-free pump at no cost. For more information please contact People Operations.

ce AA Education Communication with Managers Please contact Cigna and enroll in the Healthy If you wish to breastfeed or express milk Pregnancies Healthy Babies (HPHB) program during the workday, please work with your for support. This extensive program is a manager on a schedule that allows you the comprehensive management program that time needed for milk expression so that you provides support throughout your pregnancy. can still accomplish your work.

4.9 Travel Expenses Travel expenses are the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by team members when traveling on approved Storable business trips.

The guidelines below are an abbreviated version of the full Travel & Expense policy. For more information see the full Travel & Expense Policy.

Travel Expenses Air Travel The Organization pays the actual amounts Storable pays for economy or tourist class incurred for appropriate expenses when airfares when traveling domestically or you are on travel assignments. Examples of on Organization business. If an employee typical expenses include the following: wishes to fly in any other class, they will be Airline tickets responsible for the difference in fare.

Meals and lodging For international travel, see the complete Car rental, taxi fare or rideshare charges travel policy.

Business supplies and services Hotels Associated gratuities Neither in-room movies nor refreshment Other expenses necessary to achieve the bars are approved Organization expenses. business purposes Family Members Team members may be permitted to bring guests along with them on work travel provided Storable does not incur any additional expense as a result and team member productivity and work product are not impacted.

@,_____ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ 18 Rental Cars Reporting You are to use rental firms having existing Report approved expenses and include a relationships with the Organization and, description of the expense, its business where feasible, have negotiated discount purpose, date, place and the participants. rates. Available reasonable transportation Receipts are required for all expenses in is to be used. excess of $75.00.

Personal Vehicles Travel Reservations When using your own vehicle for business Airline travel, rental cars and hotels must be purposes, you must maintain insurance booked through the corporate designated coverage as required by law. Travel travel agency in order to be reimbursed. between your home and a local office is not considered to be business travel. You may not use your personal vehicle for business travel without authorization. You will be reimbursed for vehicle use at the standard IRS mileage rate.

4.10 Out of State Travel Expense Policy Storable recognizes that there might be occasions when a Storrior, or the partner or family member of a Storrior (“Family Member”), needs access to health care that is not provided within the state in which they reside.

This policy is intended to support and provide financial assistance to Storriors who must travel out of state in order to obtain necessary health care services.

Financial Support Eligible Storriors may receive reimbursement Storriors can apply for such financial support of expenses incurred in traveling to a location by filling out the Storable Healthcare Travel where necessary health care services may be Reimbursement Program Application found obtained. Such reimbursements will not exceed on the Warehouse, indicating only the amount $5,000.00 in the aggregate, over the course of of money spent for the above purposes. Such an employee’s career. Storable will reimburse applications will be treated confidentially, and expenses under this policy for: no questions will be asked concerning the health care treatment sought (nor should any Travel to and from the location where such information be provided voluntarily to necessary health care services are provided Storable). While Storable relies on its Storriors (including travel costs for a companion for to use this policy in good faith, abuse of this the employee’s own health care services) policy will result in disciplinary action, up to Accommodation near the location of the and including termination of employment. services Child care services needed when seeking access to health care Receipts must be provided

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Time Off Eligibility Storriors are able to use Flexible Vacation Storriors will be eligible for the benefits while accessing these services. This includes under this policy if: ability to take up to 5 days off for travel, They must travel out of state in order to preparation for and receipt of health care obtain health care services for their own services, and recovery time. If more than 5 medical condition, and the Storrior is days is needed, leave may be available under enrolled in Storable medical plans another Storable policy.

Their family member must travel out Leave requests related to the need to access of state in order to obtain health care health care or to assist a family member services for a family member’s medical in accessing health care will be approved condition, and the family member is without question and treated confidentially. enrolled in Storable medical plans All receipts are available

4.11 Life Happens Loan Program Overview Details Whether it’s a busted water heater, an To keep the program open and accessible, unexpected vet bill or something else that you may only have one LHLP out at any results in a significant, unexpected financial time. After repaying your commitment, you hit - you shouldn’t have to worry about become eligible to use the LHLP again. paying interest charges on a credit card, Should you leave Storable prior to repaying or wondering how you’ll pay for it at all. your full obligation, the balance would be That’s why Storriors have access to the Life deducted from your last paycheck.

Happens Loan Program (LHLP).

The purpose of the program is to help With the LHLP you can be reimbursed with unforeseen expenses as a result of for eligible expenses (up to $1,500.00) catastrophic loss or accidents, not for and agree to repay the borrowed amount routine purchases, planned expenses directly from your paycheck over the next or gifts.

12 months, on a schedule and payment plan that you will agree to.

Eligibility and Application To be eligible for the LHLP Storriors must have at least one year of service and must be in good standing, which means not in an active Performance Improvement Plan or in an active step of Discipline.

To apply for the LHLP contact your People Operations Business Partner or send an email to [email protected], you will be asked to provide documentation of the expense and sign an agreement regarding your borrowed amount and repayment terms. If you have any questions about the Program or your eligibility for it, please contact your People Operations Business Partner.

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5.1 Outside Employment Outside employment that creates a conflict of interest or that affects the quality or quantity of your work performance or availability at Storable is prohibited.

We understand that you may seek additional employment during off-hours, but in all cases, we expect that Storable remains your only full time job or any outside employment will not affect your job performance, work hours, or availability, or otherwise adversely affect your ability to effectively perform your duties. Any conflicts should be reported to your manager or department leader. Failure to adhere to this policy may result in discipline up to and including termination.

5.2 Standards of Conduct We want to create a work environment While it is impossible to list everything that that promotes job satisfaction, respect, could be considered misconduct in the responsibility, and integrity for all our team workplace, what is outlined here is a list of members, clients, customers and other common-sense infractions that could result stakeholders. We all share in the responsibility in discipline, up to and including immediate of maintaining and improving the quality of our termination of employment. This policy is work environment. By deciding to work here, not intended to limit our right to discipline you agree to follow our rules. or termination team members for any reason permitted by law.

Examples of inappropriate conduct include: Violation of the policies and procedures set forth in this handbook.

Possessing, using, distributing, selling, or negotiating the sale of illegal drugs or other controlled substances.

Being under the influence of illegal drugs during working hours on Organization property (including in Organization vehicles), or on Organization business.

Inaccurate reporting of the hours worked by you or any other team members.

Providing knowingly inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading information when speaking on behalf of the Organization or in the preparation of any employment-related documents including, but not limited to, job applications, personnel files, employment review documents, intra-company communications, or expense records.

Taking or destroying Organization property.

Possession of potentially hazardous or dangerous property (where not permitted) such as firearms, weapons, chemicals, etc., without prior authorization.

Fighting with, or harassment of any fellow employee, vendor, or customer.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 21 Disclosure of Organization trade secrets and proprietary and confidential commercially-sensitive information (i.e. financial or sales records/reports, marketing or business strategies/plans, product development information, customer lists, patents, trademarks, etc.) of the Organization or its customers, contractors, suppliers, or vendors.

Refusal or failure to follow directions or to perform a requested or required job task.

Refusal or failure to follow safety rules and procedures.

Excessive tardiness or absences.

Unprofessional on-camera behavior (smoking, vaping, failure to dress according to the policy, etc.) Working unauthorized overtime.

Solicitation of fellow employees during working time.

Failure to dress according to Organization policy.

Use of obscene or harassing language in the workplace.

Engaging in outside employment that interferes with your ability to perform your job at this Organization.

Refusal or failure to cooperate in an internal investigation.

Lending keys or key cards to Organization property to unauthorized persons.

Nothing in this policy is intended to limit your rights under the National Labor Relations Act, or to modify the at-will employment status where at-will is not prohibited by state law.

5.3 Criminal Activity/Arrests Involvement in criminal activity during You are expected to be on the job, ready to employment, whether on or off Storable work, when scheduled. Inability to report to property, may result in disciplinary action work as scheduled as a result of an arrest may including suspension or termination of lead to disciplinary action, up to and including employment. Disciplinary action depends termination of employment. upon a review of all factors involved, including Any disciplinary action taken will be based whether or not the action was work-related, on information reasonably available. This the nature of the act, or circumstances that information may come from witnesses, police, adversely affect attendance, performance or any other source as long as management has or public trust in the Organization. Any reason to view the source as credible. disciplinary action is not dependent upon the disposition of any case in court.

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5.4 Disciplinary Process The Organization encourages a system of there may be particular situations in which the progressive discipline depending on the type seriousness of an offense justifies bypassing of prohibited conduct. one or more of the steps of discipline summarized herein.

The Discipline Policy applies to all Storable team members. Under the Discipline Policy, Disciplinary actions may take place in several progressive discipline steps will be followed forms. The forms of disciplinary action in employee disciplinary matters except in provided under this policy are: Oral/Verbal matters the Organization, its representatives, Reminder; Written Reminder; Final Reminder/ or its management determine need to be Decision-Making Leave; and Termination. addressed outside the progressive system.

People Operations must be consulted Appropriate action will be determined based beforehand when disciplinary action with an on factors such as severity, frequency and employee is necessary. In certain cases, merit degree of deviation from expectations. Because reviews and economic adjustments may be of the great variety of situations that may arise, affected for employees in a formal step the Company may need to make decisions of discipline. related to employment in a manner other than as provided in this policy. Importantly,

5.5 Post-Employment Reference Policy Storable policy is to confirm dates of employment and job title only. With written authorization, the Organization will confirm compensation. Forward any requests for employment verification to our People Operations Shared Services team at [email protected].

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6.1 Acceptable Use Policy Overview Computer systems are provided to Storable It is not the intention of this policy to staff in order to allow them to perform their impose restrictions that are contrary to the job responsibilities quickly and efficiently. Organization’s established culture of openness, However, the use of these systems also trust and integrity. Rather, this policy is introduces risks to the business if they are intended to protect employees, partners and not used in accordance with established the Company itself from illegal or damaging Company policies. actions by individuals, either knowingly or unknowingly.

Scope This policy applies to the use of information, corporate information, electronic devices, and electronic and computing devices, and network resources in accordance with Company network resources to conduct Company policies, standards, and all applicable laws and business or interact with internal networks regulations. This policy applies to employees, and business systems, whether owned or contractors, consultants, temporaries, and leased by Storable, the employee, or a third other workers at Storable, including all party. All employees, contractors, consultants, personnel affiliated with third parties. It also temporary, and other workers at Storable and applies to all data and equipment that is its subsidiaries are responsible for exercising owned or leased by Storable and good judgment regarding appropriate use of its subsidiaries.

Policy All Company computer resources, including Effective security is a team effort involving the but not limited to desktops, laptops, software, participation and support of every employee operating systems, storage media, emails, files who deals with electronic information and/ and data are the property of Storable. These or information systems. It is the responsibility systems are to be used for business purposes of every computer user to read, understand in serving the interests of the Company, its and abide by this policy, and to conduct their clients, and customers in the course of normal activities accordingly. Specific guidance for business operations. end user acceptable use may be found in the standards established for this policy.

Standards When using Company computer resources, Staff may not install any unauthorized users are expected to respect the rights of programs or software on any Storable other users, protect the confidentiality and computer without the explicit permission integrity of Company data, use computer of the ITOps department. resources only for purposes related to the Staff are responsible for exercising good business, and observe all relevant laws and judgment regarding the personal use of regulations. The use of Company systems, Company computer systems. Excessive personal equipment and networks for any illegal activity use of Company resources is not permitted is strictly prohibited. and should be kept to a minimum. Individual Users are responsible for safeguarding departments are responsible for creating systems and the confidentiality, integrity and guidelines concerning the acceptability of availability of information within their control. personal use of the Internet and email during Before leaving the area of a workstation where work hours. In the absence of such policies, a user is logged in, the user must either log out and if there is any uncertainty, employees of the workstation or lock the screen. should err on the side of professional conduct and business-use of Company Users must promptly report any unexpected assets and resources. system behavior or irregularities noticed in any computer system to the ITOps Help Desk. Staff are expected to protect Company Additionally, users must report any suspected computing resources and take precautions or actual system intrusion, hack, malware, or to prevent situations that may result in the other computer security incident. damage or loss of any computer system. This includes always keeping Company laptops and Copyright protections must be observed at all other mobile devices in the user’s possession times including for photographs, videos, books or in a secured location, not using them in a and software. Hardware and software installed way that increases the risk of damage to the on any Storable computer or network must be system, and not allowing them to be used licensed to the Company, and must be used by unauthorized individuals (e.g. children, in accordance with licensing agreements and spouses, friends).

Storable policies.

~ Data Protection Company information that is non-public must be protected at all times. Non-public information is classified as confidential and must be protected from disclosure, modification, and access by unauthorized individuals. All data that is created, stored or maintained by Storable is considered confidential unless it has been explicitly made available for public consumption through authorized channels. Refer to the Storable Data Protection and Classification Policy for details.

Under no circumstances are staff allowed to transmit unprotected cardholder data, including PANs (credit card numbers), by end user messaging technologies such as email, instant messaging, SMS, or chat. Additionally, staff may not copy or move cardholder data onto their local hard drive or removable storage unless explicitly authorized by their supervisor for a defined business need.

Staff may not share confidential information outside of the Company without written approval from the Vice President, Technology.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 25 Staff must notify their manager and ITOps To prevent the inadvertent access and display of immediately in the event that: potentially confidential information by 3rd party

•1 They become aware of, or suspect, that confidential information has been lost, stolen or otherwise disclosed in a apps, smart devices or more, staff should NOT:

•1 Create or edit Storable calendar invites for Storable events to include personal manner that violates this policy. (non-business related) calendars or those

•2 They become aware of, or suspect, that a Company computer system has been lost or stolen. •2 of spouses and significant others.

Forward business emails from their Storable email account to their personal

•3 They become aware of, or suspect that an access token, key card or other device used to access a Storable office email account.

facility has been lost or stolen.

Privacy and Monitoring For security, quality control and network Storable’s right to monitor extends to all maintenance purposes, authorized individuals Company-managed property, including, but not within the Organization may monitor and limited to laptops, desktops, tablets, facsimiles, inspect Company equipment, systems, and and telecommunication systems. This includes network traffic at any time. Users are prohibited ‘private’, 1-on-1 direct chat or email messages from taking any action to tamper with or sent using the Organization’s property or circumvent security or monitoring systems, systems. Deleted information may be kept on damage or alter any computing or network back-up media and recovered for any purpose resource, gain or seek to gain unauthorized at a later date. access to any computing and network resource, Storable has the right and sole discretion or engage in any type of spoofing activity. to monitor, identify and block access to The voicemail, email, internal chat, office any internet sites on Company-managed internet circuits, and all data transmitted or systems, including, but not limited to sites received through these systems, is the exclusive containing sexually explicit or other material property of the Organization. Staff should not deemed inappropriate by the Company. The have any expectation of privacy when using Organization also has the right and sole Storable computing resources (including cloud- discretion to determine whether the use of based applications such as email, chat, video computer resources is appropriate and to conference, and phone), and the Organization restrict access to Company computer resources may restrict the use of, and access to, any at any time. computing resources at any time.

By accessing and/or using Storable computer The Organization reserves the right to access, resources, users expressly waive any and all monitor, intercept, and/or review all data rights of privacy in anything they create, store, transmitted, received, or downloaded over its send, or receive. systems or network. Any individual who is given access to the Organization’s computer systems or network is hereby given notice that the Organization will exercise this right periodically, without prior notice and without prior consent.

The interests of the Organization in monitoring and intercepting data include, but are not limited to: Protection of Organization trade secrets, proprietary, and similar confidential commercially -sensitive information (e.g. financial or sales records/reports, marketing or business strategies/ plans, product development, customer lists, patents, trademarks, etc.).

Managing the use of the computer systems.

Monitoring and prohibiting behavior in violation of this and other policies.

Assisting team members in the management of electronic data during periods of absence.

Personal Computing Devices Storable provides all staff with a Company Staff may use personal computing devices -managed laptop or workstation that may be such as a smartphone to access email, chat used when at one of Storable’s office locations, and other business applications when they are or when working remotely. These laptops have not able to use their Company-issued laptop been securely configured and are managed by for such access. Under no circumstances are ITOps so that they remain in a secure state. staff allowed to save confidential company Staff are expected to utilize their Company information, especially credit card data or -issued laptop when conducting Company personally identifiable information on their business and should refrain from using personal device. personal computing equipment, even when working from home.

Situations that could result in confidential information being saved to a personal device include: • Clicking on a link in a Slack message to open a document • Clicking on an attachment or a link in an email In the event that a personal computing device is used to conduct Storable business, staff are expected to follow the below guidelines with respect to the configuration of the device: Configure all personal computing devices with a password, passcode, PIN, fingerprint scan, facial recognition or other form of authentication.

Report the loss of any personal computing device used to access Storable data or applications to the ITOps team so that user credentials can be reset as needed.

Prior to replacing or discarding any personal computing device used to access Storable data or applications, perform a factory reset of the device, wipe the hard disk of all data, or physically destroy the hard disk as appropriate.

Configure devices to automatically lock the screen after 15 minutes (or less) of inactivity.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 27 Ensure that disk encryption is enabled on all personal computing devices used to access Storable data or applications:

Smartphones Laptops/Desktop iPhone - Modern versions of the Apple Windows - It is beyond the scope of this iPhone are encrypted by default when a document for a complete discussion of passcode is set. Confirm your device is disk encryption for Windows devices. encrypted by scrolling to the bottom of There are a variety of ways to encrypt your the Settings > Touch ID & Passcode screen. Windows device. One of the most common You should see the “Data protection is is with Bitlocker which comes installed on enabled” message. Note that the menu Pro and Enterprise versions of Windows may be slightly different depending on the 7 or later, but is not available on Home version of IOS installed. editions of Windows. If running a Home edition of Windows 10, you may be able Android - Most smartphones running to use Windows device encryption, but Android 5.0 or higher that have a PIN code only if your system meets the hardware assigned will be encrypted. Confirm your requirements. There are also third-party device is encrypted by going to Settings tools that can be used for disk encryption > Security > Advanced > Encryption and on Windows. The best option is to use your Credentials. Note that the menu may be Storable laptop when conducting Storable slightly different depending on the version business which is already encrypted. of Android installed.

Apple - Your Apple laptop/desktop includes a utility called FileVault that can be used for disk encryption. This can be done by going to System Preferences > Security & Privacy > FileVault. The best option is to use your Storable laptop when conducting Storable business which is already encrypted.

Security Awareness Information security is the responsibility of all staff at Storable. As such, the company will provide staff with security training designed to teach them how to detect and avoid common cyber threats.

The awareness program will include the following at a minimum: Staff will undergo security awareness training at least twice per calendar year which must be completed within 30 days of being assigned.

All new hires will be assigned security awareness training which must be completed within 30 days of their start date.

At least six times per calendar year staff will undergo simulated phishing exercises which are not announced in advance. Any staff who fails the simulated phishing exercise will be provided remedial training on how to detect and avoid phishing emails.

A security awareness newsletter will be created and shared with all Storable staff at least six times per calendar year.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 28

Violations Any team members who violate this policy will be subject to corrective action, up to and including termination of employment. If necessary, the Organization will also advise law enforcement officials of any illegal conduct.

6.2 Computer Security and Copying of Software Software programs purchased and provided You may not illegally duplicate any licensed by Storable are to be used only for creating, software or related documentation. researching and processing materials for Unauthorized duplication of software may Organization use. By using Organization subject you and/or the Organization to both hardware, software, and networking systems civil and criminal penalties under the United you assume personal responsibility for their States Copyright Act. To purchase software, use and agree to comply with this policy and obtain your manager’s approval. All software other applicable Organization policies, as well acquired by the Organization must be as city, state and federal laws and regulations purchased through Information Technology Operations.

All software acquired for or on behalf of the Organization, or developed by Organization You may not duplicate, copy, or give software team members or contract personnel on behalf to any outsiders including clients, contractors, of the Organization, is and will be deemed customers and others. You may use software Organization property. It is the policy of the on local area networks or on multiple machines Organization to respect all computer software only in accordance with applicable license rights and to adhere to the terms of all agreements entered into by the Organization. software licenses to which the Organization is For additional information and details around a party. The Director of Information Technology the organization’s expectations around our Operations is responsible for enforcing electronic systems, networks, data security these guidelines. or acceptable use of the above refer to the Security and Compliance space on Confluence.

@ - - - - - -- - 29

6.3 Non Solicitation/No Distribution Policy To avoid disruption of business operations Electronic distribution of materials is or disturbance of team members, visitors, prohibited during work time. Literature that and others, Storable has implemented a violates the company’s equal employment Non Solicitation/No Distribution Policy. For opportunity (EEO) and non harassment policies purposes of this policy, “solicitation” includes, (including threats of violence), or is knowingly but is not limited to, selling items or services, and recklessly false, is never permitted. requesting contributions and soliciting or This policy is not intended to restrict the seeking to obtain membership in or support statutory rights of team members, including for any organization. Solicitation performed the right to discuss terms and conditions through verbal, written, or electronic means of employment. is covered by the Non Solicitation/No Distribution Policy. Violations of this policy should be reported to your manager or department leader.

You are prohibited from soliciting other team members during your assigned working time.

For this purpose, working time means the time during which either you or the team members who are the object of the solicitation are expected to be actively engaged with assigned work. You may conduct solicitations during your lunch period or other authorized non I I I I working time, so long as you do so when the '---"" .¥· ' ®.

other team members are also on non-working time.

6.4 Personal Appearance Your personal appearance reflects on the reputation, integrity and public image of Storable. All team members are required to report to work neatly groomed and dressed. You are expected to maintain personal hygiene habits that are generally accepted in the community, including clean clothing, good grooming and personal hygiene and appropriate attire for the workplace and the work being performed. Use common sense and good judgment in determining what to wear to work.

The Organization will make every effort to reasonably accommodate team members with disabilities or with religious beliefs that make it difficult for them to comply fully with the personal appearance policy. Contact your manager or People Operations to request a reasonable accommodation.

Failure to comply with the personal appearance standards may result in being asked to leave meetings to take corrective action. Repeated violations may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.

6.5 Social Media Policy At Storable, we recognize that technology provides unique opportunities to participate in interactive discussions and share information using a wide variety of social media. However, use of social media also presents certain risks and carries with it certain responsibilities. To minimize risks to the Organization, you are expected to follow our guidelines for appropriate use of social media.

This policy applies to all team members who work for the Organization.

Guidelines For purposes of this policy, social media Organization principles, guidelines, and policies includes all means of communicating or apply to online activities just as they apply to posting information or content of any sort on other areas of work. Ultimately, you are solely the Internet, including to your own or someone responsible for what you communicate on else’s blog, personal website, Twitch or Youtube social media. channel, social networking or affinity website, You may be personally responsible for any forum, message board or a Slack channel, litigation that may arise should you make whether associated or affiliated with the unlawful defamatory, slanderous, or libelous Organization, as well as any other form of statements against any customer, manager, electronic communication. owner, or team members of the Organization.

e - - Know and Follow the Rules Ensure your postings are consistent with these guidelines. Postings that include unlawful discriminatory remarks, harassment, and threats of violence or other unlawful conduct will not be tolerated and may subject you to disciplinary action up to and including termination.

Be Respectful The Organization cannot force or mandate Examples of such conduct might include respectful and courteous activity by team defamatory or slanderous posts meant to members on social media during non working harm someone’s reputation or posts that could time. If you decide to post complaints or contribute to a hostile work environment on criticism, avoid using statements, photographs, the basis of race, sex, disability, age, national video, or audio that reasonably could be origin, religion, veteran status, or any other viewed as unlawful, slanderous, threatening, status or class protected by law or or that might constitute unlawful harassment. Organization policy.

@ - - - - - -- - 31

Maintain Accuracy and Confidentiality When posting information: Maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets, intellectual property, and confidential commercially- sensitive information (i.e. financial or sales records/reports, marketing or business strategies/ plans, product development, customer lists, patents, trademarks, etc.) related to the Organization.

If posting photos or videos from inside a Storable office or meeting, ensure you’re not unknowingly violating the point above (whiteboards, screens, dashboards, etc).

Do not create a link from your personal blog, website, or other social networking sites to an Organization website that identifies you as speaking on behalf of the Organization.

Never represent yourself as a spokesperson for the Organization. If the Organization is a subject of the content you are creating, do not represent yourself as speaking on behalf of the Organization.

Make it clear in your social media activity that you are speaking on your own behalf.

Respect copyright, trademark, third-party rights and similar laws and use such protected information in compliance with applicable legal standards.

0 Media Contacts If you are not authorized to speak on behalf of the Organization, do not speak to the media on behalf of the Organization. Direct all media inquiries for official Organization responses to Marketing or People Operations.

Retaliation and Your Rights Retaliation or any other negative action Nothing in this policy is designed to interfere is prohibited against anyone who, based with, restrain, or prevent team members from on a reasonable belief, reports a possible communications regarding wages, hours, or deviation from this policy or cooperates in other terms and conditions of employment, an investigation. Those who retaliate against or to restrain team members in exercising any others for reporting a possible deviation other right protected by law. All team members from this policy or for cooperating in an have the right to engage in or refrain from investigation will be subject to disciplinary such activities. action, up to and including termination.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 32

6.6 Artificial Intelligence Usage Policy The increasing popularity of artificial Data Sharing and Third Parties: When intelligence tools has provided unique sharing data with third-party AI providers opportunities to adopt new technologies that or collaborators, employees must, prior to aid our mission and increase our productivity their use, ensure appropriate data protection when possible. We understand it also presents measures are in place. Contracts or agreements risks and we want to ensure responsible use to should clearly define the purpose, scope, and protect employees, clients, customers and the security measures for data sharing, and third company. -party compliance with data privacy regulations The use of generative AI chatbots and other AI must be verified prior to engagement. technologies will generally be allowed while Evaluation of AI Tools: Employees should use performing work for Storable. To minimize risks only reputable and approved AI tools and to the Organization, you are expected to follow be cautious when using tools developed by our guidelines for appropriate and ethical use individuals or companies without established of AI technologies. reputations. Any AI tool used by employees This policy applies to all Storable employees, must meet our security and data protection contractors, and third parties of the business standards. Prior to the implementation or use who use or have access to Storable data and/or of any AI tool, a request must be submitted to information systems. the ITOps help desk ([email protected]).

Such requests will include a review of the All employees are expected to adhere to the tool’s security features, terms of service, and following best practices when using AI tools: privacy policy.

Privacy and Data Security: Employees must Lawful and Ethical Use: All individuals utilizing prioritize the protection of personal and AI tools must comply with applicable laws, confidential data when using AI tools, and regulations, ethical guidelines, and Company must take appropriate measures to safeguard Employee Handbook. AI usage should not data from unauthorized access, disclosure, infringe upon the rights of individuals, alteration, or destruction, or use of such discriminate against any group, or engage in information for the purpose of improving the any illegal or unethical activities.

AI platform (unless appropriately deidentified).

Be sure to exercise discretion when sharing With the ubiquity of note-taking tools information. Sensitive or confidential and AI assistants, it’s smart to assume company data must not be shared with any conversations are being documented. If AI tool without prior approval from the VP you’re not comfortable with this, then of Technology. Finally, any data collected, please be sure to note this at the start of processed, or shared with any AI tool must the meeting. adhere to privacy laws and regulations. When sending AI Companion meeting Accountability and Human Oversight: While notes out, you must review content for AI tools can assist decision-making, ultimate accuracy to avoid misunderstandings and responsibility and accountability for decisions misrepresentation of what was discussed. lie with you. Individuals must exercise critical For the full policy, please see the AI Tool judgment and use AI as a tool to enhance their Usage Policy. work, rather than relying solely on automated Violations of this policy may result in outputs. Regular human oversight is essential disciplinary action, up to and including to identify and rectify potential biases or errors termination of employment. in AI-generated results.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 33 7.0 Benefits

7.1 Paid Time Off ~ Unlimited Flexible Time Off r.D We champion the philosophy of trusting full Under this policy, time off is considered -time team members to take the time off they scheduled or unscheduled. Scheduled FTO need with the expectation that what they need is pre-planned and pre-approved, excused is “reasonable” and balances individual needs, absences. Unscheduled FTO is when an team needs and the needs of the business. employee needs to be out of the office To that end, the Company has adopted a unexpectedly with no notice. The amount flexible policy, in which each regular, full-time of scheduled FTO found to be reasonable is employee is afforded the flexibility to take time greater than the amount of unscheduled FTO off for personal vacation, leisure time, or for found to be reasonable. personal or family illnesses and appointments that fall outside of FMLA, ADA, or Personal Leave reasons.

With that said, the Company does have some guidelines and expectations: Every employee should be taking a minimum of 3 weeks of Flexible Time Off each year, not including Company Holidays. We want to encourage time away to rest and recharge as it’s important for our personal and mental well-being.

Employees are expected to give the Company as much notice as possible under the circumstances.

When an employee needs to be out of the office unexpectedly, they must call in on workdays as soon as they are aware of the need. Excessive unscheduled FTO may result in requests being declined or considered unexcused.

Time off requests must be submitted in ADP and each manager has the right and is expected to communicate to you what is reasonable and how they will evaluate your time off requests.

A manager has the right to decline a time off request if it may put our business goals at risk or unfairly burden the remainder of the team.

Employees are expected to be productive during the time they spend working, to meet and exceed established goals and to refrain from abusing this policy.

The maximum length of any single period Employees do not “accrue” flexible time off of paid time off under this policy is two or other paid time off days as in traditional weeks unless otherwise pre-approved by the PTO plans; therefore, employees will not be employee’s manager and People Operations. If compensated for “unused” flexible time off or an employee wishes to take off more than two unscheduled time off upon termination under consecutive weeks, the employee must follow this policy. the Leave of Absence policy below and any such leave may be unpaid.

Volunteer Time-Off Rest, Relax & Recharge (RRR) Storable believes strongly in supporting Time-Off team members who want to Do More in their Mental health is important at Storable and communities. For that reason, every regular, we believe in taking time away to engage in full-time employee is eligible to take up to self-care. All regular, full-time employees are hours of paid time off to volunteer in their eligible to take up to 8 hours of Rest, Relax community or for a non-profit organization of and Recharge paid time off. To encourage their choice. This time may be broken up and their regular use, these hours do not rollover used as smaller, 4-hour increments if desired. year over year and must be used within the Volunteer hours do not roll over at the end of calendar year. Use them on your birthday, a the year and may not be combined with other random Wednesday, or whenever you just forms of time-off without explicit approval need to take a break from it all. of management.

Of course, all time-off requests must be Of course, all time-off requests must be submitted in ADP as soon as practicable for submitted in ADP for approval and business approval and business needs will ultimately needs will ultimately dictate availability of dictate availability of time-off. time-off.

Entering Time-Off All time-off should be entered in the ADP WorkforceNow platform. For any time off, employees are expected to obtain prior approval from their manager. The length of notice required may vary depending on your department and the way your work is scheduled, so be sure to visit with your manager to make sure you know what’s expected.

7.2 Holidays Storable US team offers the following paid holidays each year: New Year’s Day Labor Day Martin Luther King Jr Day Thanksgiving Day Memorial Day Friday after Thanksgiving Juneteenth Christmas Eve Independence Day Christmas Day For the majority of our teams whose regular work schedule is Monday through Friday, when a holiday falls on a Saturday, it is observed the preceding Friday. Holidays falling on a Sunday will be observed the following Monday.

Given our desire to support our clients seven days a week, the Client Support team observes holidays on the actual dates on which they fall.

If you are a non-exempt employee and you are asked to work on a Company Holiday, you will be eligible to earn pay at 1.5x your regular rate in addition to your regular Holiday pay.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 35

7.3 Leaves of Absence Leaves of Absence in General The following guidelines are applicable to all Employees who do not initiate a request types of leaves of absence: within the first five days of being out will be considered as having voluntarily resigned Leaves of absence may be requested by and will be notified in writing by their all regular, full-time employees or regular manager and People Operations. part-time employees.

No holiday pay will be paid for holidays Employees must give at least a 30-day falling within a leave of absence. notice to their manager of the employee’s intent to take a leave of absence for With the exception of military leave, foreseeable events. employees who do not report back to work or contact the Company within two Thirty (30) days notice is not required in all (2) working days following the expiration cases, as with a premature birth, sudden of an approved leave of absence will be changes in a medical condition or the considered as having voluntarily resigned availability of a child for adoption, death of and will be notified in writing by their a family member, etc. In cases such as manager with a copy of the notification these, the employee must give as much letter going to People Operations. notice as is practicable.

People Operations is responsible for Requests for medical leaves of absence are tracking the amount of time taken for any submitted to our third party partner and leave of absence during a calendar year, should indicate the type of leave being including intermittent leave as provided by applied for, the duration of the leave, the FMLA. and should be accompanied by the required documents. The Company prohibits employees from engaging in outside employment while Employees who take a sudden leave of on leave. absence prior to receiving approval for a leave are required to submit a request for leave within five business days of their first day out.

FMLA (Family Medical Leave Act) Leave The Company recognizes that it is important for Accordingly, as required by law and if the employees to have leave for serious medical Company is a “covered employer” as defined conditions, to participate in early child care, under the Family and Medical Leave Act of to care for family members who have serious 1933 (“FMLA”), the Company will permit eligible health conditions, for situations relating to employees to take family or medical leave, in the military deployment of an employee’s accordance with the terms of this policy and family members, and to care for certain family the FMLA. members who have suffered injuries or illness as a result of their military service.

@ - - - - - - - - -- - 36 Eligibility To qualify for FMLA leave, you must:

•• Have worked for the Company for at least 12 months, though it need not be consecutive; Worked at least 1,250 hours in the last 12 months; and

• Be employed at a worksite that has 50 or more employees within 75 miles.

If you have any questions about your eligibility for FMLA leave, please contact People Operations.

Basic FMLA Leave An eligible employee shall be entitled to take up to twelve (12) weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve (12) month period for any of the following reasons: To care for a newborn child or the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care; To care for spouse, child, or parent of the employee who has a serious health condition; and Because of the employee’s own serious health condition, which renders an employee unable to perform the essential functions of his/her position.

An employee’s annual twelve (12) week entitlement to Basic FMLA leave will be calculated using a rolling calendar method. This means that the Company will measure backward twelve (12) months from the date the employee uses Basic FMLA leave to determine the amount of leave to which the employee will be entitled, up to a maximum of twelve (12) weeks in any twelve (12) month period.

Leave due to the birth of a child or placement of a child in your home for adoption or foster care can be taken in one continuous twelve (12) week segment within twelve (12) months of the birth or placement of the child or the the bonding time can be taken as intermittent leave within twelve (12) months of the birth or placement of the child.

For employees requesting leave to care for an immediate family member with a serious health condition, the Company may require the employee to submit proof of the familial relationship, such as a birth certificate or marriage license. Any such document will be promptly returned to the employee after it has been reviewed.

Military Family Leave In addition to the Basic FMLA Leave described An eligible employee may alternatively be above, eligible employees may be entitled to entitled to take up to 26 weeks of unpaid take unpaid leave related to military service. leave in a single 12-month period to care for An eligible employee may be entitled to take their ill or injured spouse, child, parent or up to twelve (12) weeks of unpaid leave if the next of kin (closest blood relative), who is a employee’s spouse, son, daughter, or parent is covered servicemember a member of the National Guard, Reserves, or The federal and state laws and regulations a regular component of the Armed forces, and governing military leave and military family on covered active duty or called to covered leave change frequently. If you have any active duty. military related leave request, please check with People Operations to determine eligibility under the then current applicable rules.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 37 Notice of Leave If your need for FMLA leave is foreseeable, you FMLA requests are to be submitted to the third must give the Company at least 30 days prior party partner and the employee is expected to written notice. If this is not possible, you must furnish all requested information to the third at least give notice as soon as practicable party in order to review and approve or deny (within one to two business days of learning the request. Additionally, if you are planning of your need for leave). Failure to provide a medical treatment or a series of treatments, such notice may be grounds for delaying FMLA you must consult with the Company first covered leave, depending on the particular regarding the dates of such treatment to work facts and circumstances. out a mutually agreeable schedule.

Certification of Need for Leave If an employee requests medical leave based The Company may require subsequent upon his/her own serious health condition, medical recertification. Failure to provide or the serious health condition of a spouse, requested certification within 15 days, if such child or parent, the Company may require, is practicable, may result in a delay of further in its discretion, that the employee submit a leave until it is provided. medical certification, in a form approved by In addition, the Company will require the Company, which must be completed by the employees to submit periodic recertifications employee’s or family member’s health care of the serious health condition. These provider, as appropriate, regarding the serious recertifications will be required every thirty health condition. (30) days or until the minimum duration of When you request leave, the Company will the last certification has elapsed, whichever notify you of the requirement for medical period is longer. Any medical certification must certification and when it is due (at least 15 days be returned by the employee within 15 days or after you request leave). If you provide at least the Company may delay the commencement or days’ notice of medical leave, you should continuation of the leave until the certification also provide the medical certification before is submitted. leave begins. Failure to provide requested The Company also reserves the right to require medical certification in a timely manner may certification from a covered military member’s result in denial of FMLA-covered leave until it health care provider if you are requesting is provided. military caregiver leave and certification in The Company, at its expense, may require an connection with military exigency leave. examination by a second health care provider designated by the Company. If the second health care provider’s opinion conflicts with the original medical certification, the Company, at its expense, may require a third, mutually agreeable, health care provider to conduct an examination and provide a final and binding opinion.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 38 Designation of Leave; Leave Unpaid Reporting While on Leave FMLA leave is unpaid. The Company reserves If you take leave because of your own serious the right to designate any FMLA eligible leave health condition or to care for a covered as FMLA leave. relation, you must contact the Company every thirty (30) days regarding the status of Absences that exceed two (2) weeks and the condition and your intention to return qualify as FMLA leave under this policy shall to work. In addition, you must give notice as be designated by the Company as FMLA leave, soon as practicable (within two business days and shall be unpaid, unless the employee is if feasible) if the dates of leave change or are eligible for pay pursuant to the Company’s extended or initially were unknown.

Family Care Leave Policy.

Medical and Other Benefits During approved FMLA leave, the Company will maintain your health benefits as if you continued to be actively employed and will pay for the premiums during an unpaid leave. You must pay the Company back your portion of the premium upon returning to work through a repayment plan established between you and People Operations. If you elect not to return to work for at least calendar days at the end of the leave period, you will be required to reimburse the Company for the cost of the health benefit premiums paid by the Company for maintaining coverage during your unpaid leave, unless you cannot return to work because of a serious health condition or other circumstances beyond your control.

Intermittent and Reduced Schedule Leave If medically necessary, FMLA leave taken The Company will reduce your salary based for a serious health condition may be taken on the amount of time actually worked. In intermittently (in separate blocks of time due addition, while you are on an intermittent to a serious health condition) or on a reduced or reduced schedule leave, the Company leave schedule (reducing the usual number may temporarily transfer you to an available of hours you work per workweek or workday). alternative position that better accommodates FMLA leave may also be taken intermittently or your leave schedule and has equivalent pay on a reduced leave schedule for a qualifying and benefits. exigency relating to covered military service.

Moreover, the Company reserves the right to Employees must make reasonable efforts to temporarily transfer an employee requesting schedule leave for planned medical treatment intermittent or reduced schedule leave so as not to unduly disrupt the Company’s to an alternative position which better operations. Leave due to qualifying exigencies accommodates the recurring periods of leave, may also be taken on an intermittent basis. with no decrease in pay or benefits.

Returning From Leave; Restoration to Employment If you take leave because of your own serious health condition (except if you are taking intermittent leave), you are required, as are all employees returning from other types of medical leave, to provide medical certification that you are fit to resume work. Otherwise, you will not be permitted to resume work until it is provided.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 39 An employee who takes family or medical leave in accordance with this policy shall have the right to return to the position he/she held prior to the leave or, in the discretion of the Company, to an equivalent position with the same pay, benefits and terms and conditions of employment. However, in certain cases, “key employees” of the Company may be denied restoration when the Company determines that restoration will result in substantial and grievous economic harm to the Company.

A “key employee” is a salaried employee who is among the highest paid 10 percent of all the Company’s employees within 75 miles of the employee’s worksite.

Family Care Leave Storable wants to help relieve some of the All such leaves of absence will run concurrently sources of stress that can accompany becoming with FMLA where applicable and are subject a parent or caring for aging family members. to the same documentation requirements and Therefore, our full time employees are eligible approval process. for one fully-paid Family Care Leave per year for the birth or adoption of a child, the placement If you need to apply for a Family Care Leave of a child with the employee for foster care, or have a question, comment or suggestion, as well as for the care of an elderly parent please feel free to reach out to People or dependent. Operations.

After returning to work from a Family Care Leave, all team members are once again eligible to take reasonable Flex Time Off in accordance with the company’s time off policy.

Paid Parental Leave For the birth or adoption of a child or the Storable also offers a Ramp Back Program to placement of a child with the employee for ease the transition back to full time work. The foster care, eligible employees will receive paid Ramp Back Program allows employees to work leave to enable the employee to care for and part-time at 100% pay for up to four weeks bond with a newborn or a newly adopted or after your return to work date. newly placed child. Under this policy, primary Nursing mothers are also supported by caregivers will qualify for up to 12 weeks of fully Storable. For more information, please check paid parental leave and secondary caregivers out our Breastfeeding Support Policy. will qualify for up to six weeks of fully-paid parental leave.

This time can be taken anytime within one year of the date of your child’s birth or adoption.

Paid Caregiver Leave If an employee has a need to serve as the primary caregiver for an aging parent or other loved one, eligible employees will receive up to four weeks of paid caregiver leave.

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Jury Duty Leave Storable encourages team members to fulfill their civic duties related to jury duty. If you are summoned for jury duty, notify your manager or department leader as soon as possible to make scheduling arrangements.

You will not incur any deduction in pay for a partial week’s absence due to jury duty. Time taken for Jury Duty should be entered and approved in advance by your manager through the ADP WorkforceNow platform.

The Organization reserves the right to require team members to provide proof of jury duty service to the extent authorized by law.

The Organization will not retaliate against team members who request or take leave in accordance with this policy.

Voting and Election Official Leave We believe in being good citizens!

Employees who serve as appointed members Employees who are eligible to vote in any of a local electoral board, as election judges, municipal, county, state, or federal political as assistant general registrars, or as officers of party primary or general election, any special election may take the necessary paid time off election, or in any state election where to serve at a polling place on election day or propositions are submitted to a popular vote, at a meeting of the electoral board following may take a reasonable time of paid time off the election to ascertain the results of such to vote on election day if they do not have election. sufficient time outside of working hours to vote. The time when you can go to vote will be at the discretion of your manager or department leader, consistent with applicable legal requirements.

I <ff> Witness Leave " I ' Storable realizes that, on occasion, team The Organization reserves the right to require members may be subpoenaed to appear in team members to provide proof of the need for a civil, criminal, legislative, or administrative leave to the extent authorized by law. proceeding. In such cases, you will be provided The Organization will not retaliate against leave to attend. Notify your manager or team members who request or take leave in department leader as soon as possible to accordance with this policy. make scheduling arrangements. Time taken for Witness Leave should be entered and approved in advance by your manager through the ADP WorkforceNow platform.

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Bereavement Leave We understand that employees may need This policy is also intended to cover time off in the event of a death in the family. bereavement or loss as a result of miscarriage, This policy is intended to promote a common an unsuccessful round of intrauterine understanding and application of time off for insemination or of an assisted reproductive bereavement purposes so that employees can technology procedure, a failed adoption assist with necessary arrangements, attend match, or a diagnosis that negatively impacts funeral services, or handle other affairs pregnancy or fertility. immediately associated with the event.

Employees are expected to notify their In the event of a death in your immediate manager or manager of any need for time off family (spouse, mother, father, son, daughter, in accordance with normal absence request brother, sister, grandparent, grandchild, procedures. Time taken for Bereavement stepparent, stepchild, or your spouse’s should be entered and approved in advance by mother, father, son, daughter, brother, sister, your manager through the ADP WorkforceNow grandparent, grandchild, stepparent or platform. stepchild), regular, full-time employees may Additional time off, or the use of other leave, receive up to five days (40 hours), or more may be granted with appropriate notice and in accordance with state law, of normally approval by your manager. scheduled work-time off with full pay and benefits for the above-mentioned bereavement Time off taken under this policy does not run purposes. concurrently with FMLA. Employees must use available Bereavement Leave until exhausted.

Witness and Victim of Crimes and Domestic Violence Leave Storable will grant you 10 days of leave, or more in accordance with state law, if you have an obligation to participate in criminal legal proceedings either as a victim, a witness or because you or a close family member were victimized by a criminal act, or if you or a close family member is a victim of a crime of domestic violence, sexual violence, stallking or abuse.

Storable will pay for 10 days of leave and additional approved time off per state law that exceeds days under this policy will be unpaid. Under certain circumstances under this policy, you may be eligible to apply for Short Term Disability and/or FMLA.

Time off under this policy can be taken for the reasons indicated below.

Crime Victim: Obtain or attempt to obtain an order of protection, an injunction against harassment, or any other injunctive relief to help ensure the health, safety, or welfare of the victim or their child; Appear in court or attend any proceedings related to the crime or delinquent act; Consult with the district attorney regarding the underlying crime; Participate in a police investigation related to the underlying crime; or Exercise the victim’s rights under applicable law.

Domestic Violence: Seek legal assistance in addressing issues arising from the violence or prepare for and attend and prepare for court related proceedings arising from that crime.

Attend court-related proceedings arising from the violence Seek medical attention or treatment for injuries caused by the Qualifying Crime; Receive applicable victim support services; Take steps to increase their safety from future Qualifying Crimes, including by securing temporary or permanent relocation; If your need for leave is foreseeable, you For purposes of this policy, “family member” must give Storable seven days notice of your means a spouse, domestic partner, child, need for leave. If your need for leave is not stepchild, child of registered domestic partner foreseeable, you must notify your supervisor as or spouse, sibling, step-sibling, parent/ soon as practicable. Storable reserves the right guardian/or custodian of the victim, step- to require you to provide proof of the need to parent, grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, attend the criminal proceedings to the extent niece, nephew, sibling-in-law, parent-in-law, authorized by law. child-in-law, or any other person related to the victim by consanguinity or affinity within To the extent permitted under law, Storable will the third degree. For purposes of this policy, treat all information related to an employee’s a “legal representative” is an individual leave pursuant to this policy as confidential. designated to represent the victim’s interests Storable will not discriminate or retaliate by either the victim themselves or a court in against employees for requesting or taking which the crime is being or could leave in compliance with this policy. be prosecuted.

Personal Leave Leaves of absence may also be granted for A personal leave of absence is granted at the compelling personal reasons (i.e., necessary sole discretion of the Company and provides and immediate personal business which cannot the Company with the means to allow an be handled outside of normal work hours). employee to be reinstated with past service Personal leave may be granted on a case-by- credit. It is important to remember that re- case basis by a VP level or above member of employment after a personal leave of absence People Operations and may not exceed three is not guaranteed. (3) weeks unless otherwise approved by a VP level or above member of People Operations.

Absences that exceed two (2) weeks under this policy will be unpaid.

In granting such leaves, consideration is given to whether the Company can spare the services of the requesting employee and still achieve a satisfactory work schedule, whether the employee’s work performance is satisfactory and proper advance notice has been provided.

Other Statutory Leaves The Company complies with all federal and state laws regarding leaves of absences. Accordingly, employees may also be eligible for leave in accordance with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Any such leave may run concurrently with other leave where permitted by state and federal law.

Additionally, state law may provide for leaves of absence under circumstances other than those outlined above. Consult the state posters for the state in which you reside for information on any such leave.

Please contact People Operations if you would like more information regarding taking such a leave.

7.4 Temporary Personnel Temporary team members are hired for a specific period or specific work project, not to exceed months in duration. Storable reserves the right to extend the duration of temporary employment where necessary. Temporary team members are not eligible for benefits unless specified otherwise in this handbook or in the benefit plan summaries or specifically required by law.

7.5 Unemployment Compensation Insurance Policy Unemployment compensation insurance is paid for by Storable and provides temporary income for team members who have lost their job under certain circumstances. Eligibility for unemployment compensation will, in part, be determined by the reasons for your separation from the Organization.

7.6 Workers’ Compensation Insurance Policy Workers’ compensation is a no-fault system designed to provide benefits to all team members for work-related injuries. Workers’ compensation insurance coverage is paid for by employers and governed by state law. The workers’ compensation system provides for coverage of medical treatment and expenses, occupational disability leave, and rehabilitation services, as well as payment for lost wages due to work-related injuries. If you are injured on the job while working at Storable, no matter how slightly, you are to report the incident immediately to your manager or department leader.

Consistent with applicable state law, failure to report an injury within a reasonable period of time could jeopardize your claim for benefits.

To receive workers’ compensation benefits, notify your manager or department leader immediately of your claim. If your injury is the result of an on-the-job accident, you must complete a statement and participate in any follow-up investigation. You will be required to submit a medical release before you can return to work.

7.7 COBRA The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) provides the opportunity for eligible Storable team members and their beneficiaries to continue health insurance coverage under the Organization health plan when a “qualifying event” could result in the loss of eligibility. Qualifying events include resignation, termination of employment, death of an employee, reduction in hours, a leave of absence, divorce or legal separation, entitlement to Medicare, or where a dependent child no longer meets eligibility requirements.

Contact People Operations to learn more about your COBRA rights.

7.8 Military Leave (USERRA) Storable complies with applicable federal and state law regarding military leave and re-employment rights. Unpaid military leave of absence will be granted to members of the uniformed services in accordance with the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA; with amendments) and all applicable state law. You must submit documentation of the need for leave to People Operations. When returning from military leave of absence, you will be reinstated to your previous position or a similar position, in accordance with state and federal law. You must notify your manager or department leader of your intent to return to employment based on requirements of the law. For more information regarding status, compensation, benefits, and reinstatement upon return from military leave, contact People Operations.

@ - - - - - - - -- - 45 8.0 Safety and Hazards

8.1 General Safety Policy It is the responsibility of all team members to maintain a healthy and safe work environment. Report all safety hazards and occupational illnesses or injuries to your manager or department leader as soon as reasonably possible and complete a statement or injury report as needed. Failure to follow our health and safety rules may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.

8.2 Policy Against Workplace Violence As the safety and security of our team members, vendors, contractors, and the general public are in the best interests of Storable, we are committed to working with our team members to provide a work environment free from violence, intimidation, bullying and other disruptive behavior.

Violence & Threats of Violence Prohibited Conduct We will not tolerate acts or threats of Prohibited conduct includes, but is not violence, harassment, intimidation, and other limited to: disruptive behavior, either physical or verbal, Physically injuring another person. that occurs in the workplace or other areas.

Threatening to injure a person or damage This applies to management, co-workers, property by any means, including verbal, team members, and non-employees such as written, direct, indirect, or electronic contractors, customers and visitors. means.

Workplace violence can include oral or Taking any action to place a person in written statements, gestures, or expressions reasonable fear of imminent harm or that communicate a direct or indirect threat offensive contact. of physical harm, damage to property, or any intentional behavior that may cause a person Possessing, brandishing, or using a to feel threatened. firearm on Organization property or while performing Organization business except as permitted by state law.

Violating a restraining order, order of protection, injunction against harassment, or other court order.

violently tossing or throwing company property.

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Reporting Incidents of Violence Report to your manager or People Operations, in accordance with this policy, any behavior that compromises our ability to maintain a safe work environment. All reports will be investigated immediately and kept confidential, except where there is a legitimate need to know. You are expected to cooperate in any investigation of workplace violence.

Violations Violating this policy may subject you to criminal charges as well as discipline up to and including immediate termination of employment.

Retaliation Victims and witnesses of workplace violence will not be retaliated against in any manner. In addition, you will not be subject to discipline for, based on a reasonable belief, reporting a threat or for cooperating in an investigation.

If you initiate, participate, are involved in retaliation, or obstruct an investigation into conduct prohibited by this policy, you will be subject to discipline up to and including termination.

If you believe you have been wrongfully retaliated against, immediately report the matter to People Operations.

8.3 Weapons Policy To ensure that Storable maintains a workplace Regardless of whether an employee possesses safe and free of violence for all team members, a concealed weapons permit (CCW) or is the Organization prohibits the possession or allowed by law to possess a weapon, weapons use of dangerous weapons on organization are prohibited on any company property. They property, including anywhere that company are also banned in any location in which the business is conducted, such as customer employee represents the company for business locations, client locations, trade shows, purposes, including those listed above. restaurants, company event venues and Possession of a weapon can be authorized by so forth. the company’s CEO to allow security personnel All Storable team members are subject to this or a trained employee to have a weapon on provision, as well as contract workers and company property when this possession is temporary employees as well as visitors and determined necessary to secure the safety and customers on company property. security of company employees. Only the CEO, or his designee, may authorize the carrying of Weapons include, but are not limited to, guns, or use of a weapon. knives or swords with blades over four inches in length, explosives and any chemical whose Any employee in violation of this policy will purpose is to cause harm to another person. be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination.

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8.4 Illegal Drug Policy Storable considers drug abuse a serious matter We also caution against the use of prescribed that will not be tolerated. The Organization or over-the-counter medication, which absolutely prohibits team members from can affect your ability to perform your job using, selling, possessing, or being under safely, or the use of prescribed or over-the- the influence of illegal drugs, or a controlled counter medication in a manner violating the substance or prescription drug not medically recommended dosage or instructions from the authorized while at their job, on Organization doctor. You must have a valid prescription for property, or while on work time. any prescription medication used while working for the Organization. Inform your manager or Therefore, it is our policy that:

•1 You may not report to work under the influence of illegal drugs, or any controlled substance or prescription drug not department leader prior to working under the influence of a prescribed or over-the-counter medication that may affect your ability to perform your job safely. If the Organization medically authorized. determines that the prescribed or over-the

•2 You may not possess or use illegal drugs, or any controlled substance or prescription drug not medically authorized while -counter medication does not pose a safety risk, you will be allowed to work.

Failure to comply with these guidelines on company property or on concerning prescription or over-the-counter company business. medication may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.

For Cause/Reasonable Suspicion Testing A drug and alcohol test will be conducted where there is reason to believe that an employee may be in violation of the Company’s Drug or Alcohol policies. All for cause/reasonable suspicion tests should be performed as soon as practicable from the determination of the need to test.

Failure on the part of an employee to provide a sample, or otherwise submit to a drug and alcohol test, after being notified, will subject the employee to termination.

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8.5 Alcohol Policy Whether or not to drink alcoholic beverages If an employee chooses to drink alcohol on is entirely a personal decision. No employee approved occasions while conducting company is expected to drink because alcohol is served business, he or she is expected to do so at an Organization event or function, nor is responsibly. employment conditional upon your decision to An employee’s decision to drink alcoholic drink alcoholic beverages. In all situations, an beverages at a company-related function employee’s conduct when consuming alcoholic includes an obligation to get home safely. It is beverages is solely their responsibility. every employee’s responsibility to be sure they The company is not in a position to alter are able to drive safely. If there are any doubts, the consequences, legal or otherwise, of arrange alternative transportation. irresponsible alcohol consumption.

Failure to adhere to the alcohol policy, All employees must ensure that their including driving a vehicle while impaired after performance at work and their judgment are consuming alcohol at a Company event, may not impaired by alcohol. It is unacceptable for be grounds for discipline up to and including employees to report to work or perform their termination. job impaired or intoxicated by alcohol.

@ - - - -- - 49 9.0 Trade Secrets and Inventions

9.1 Confidentiality and Nondisclosure of Trade Secrets As a condition of employment, you are required to sign an Employee Proprietary information Agreement to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets, proprietary information, and confidential commercially-sensitive information (i.e. financial or sales records/reports, marketing or business strategies/plans, product development, customer lists, patents, trademarks, etc.) related to the Organization.

Access to this information should be limited to a “need to know” basis and should not be used for personal benefit, disclosed, or released without prior authorization from management. If you have information that leads you to suspect that team members or competitors are obtaining such information, you are required to inform your manager, department leader or People Operations.

Violation of this policy may result in discipline or termination and may subject the violator to civil liability.

Acknowledgment of Receipt and Review

By signing below, I acknowledge that I have I understand that neither this handbook nor received a copy of the Storable Employee any other communication by a management Handbook (handbook) and that I have read representative or other, whether oral or written, it, understand it and agree to comply with it. is intended in any way to create a contract of I understand that the Organization has the employment. I further understand that, unless maximum discretion permitted by law to I have a written employment agreement signed interpret, administer, change, modify, or by an authorized Organization representative, I delete the rules, regulations, procedures, am employed “at-will” (to the extent permitted and benefits contained in the handbook at by law) and this handbook does not modify my any time without notice. “at-will” employment status. This handbook supersedes any previous handbook or policy No statement or representation by a manager, statements, whether written or oral, issued department leader, or any other employee, by Storable. whether oral or written, can supplement or modify this handbook. Changes can only be If I have any questions about the content or made if approved in writing by the Chief People interpretation of this handbook, I will contact Officer of the Organization. I also understand People Operations. that any delay or failure by the Organization to enforce any rule, regulation, or procedure contained in the handbook does not constitute a waiver on behalf of the Organization or affect the right of the Organization to enforce such rule, regulation, or procedure in the future.

~ El Date Signature

Print Name

@ - - - - - - - -- - 51 Summary of Changes to 2024 Storable 862 Universal Handbook

•1 Edited Chuck’s welcome letter - Pg 5 - Indicated we have State posters to view for information about state policy variances

•2 Edited Chuck’s welcome letter - Pg 5 - Included where the Handbook can be found and articulated it’s the employee’s responsibility to familiarize themselves with the handbook and monitor communications about amendments; this update enables us to make changes to the handbook without annual acknowledgements by Storriors

•3 Disability Accommodation - Pg 12 - Added that Storable complies with the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

•• Disability Accommodation - Pg 12 - Updated the Accommodation Request Process Pay Periods and Pay Dates - Pg 16 - Changed Pay Dates to the 5th and 20th of the month.

• 6 Privacy and Monitoring - Pg 27 - Clarified the right of the company to monitor user communications when using company systems and applications (including chat and email).

•• 7 Artificial Intelligence Usage Policy - Pg 34 - Added new policy Unlimited Flexible Time Off - Pg 35 - Specified that our unlimited time off policy is intended for vacation and occasional illness, not to be counted towards LOAs.

• Unlimited Flexible Time Off - Pg 35 - Provided more distinction between Scheduled Time Off and Unscheduled Time Off under the Unlimited Policy

• Unlimited Flexible Time Off - Pg 35 - Reworded the guidelines slightly and changed the 3-4 week guideline to “every employee should be taking a minimum of 3 weeks of Flexible Time Off each year” to further encourage taking time off

• Rest, Relax & Recharge (RRR) Time-Off - Pg 37 - Removed the 90 day service eligibility requirement

• Paid Parental Leave - Pg 43 - Added more detail around the Ramp Back program and specified what this program can look like for all Storriors; it allows employees to work part-time at 100% pay for up to four weeks upon return to work

•• Voting Leave - Pg 43 - Expanded to include Voting and Election Leave Bereavement Leave - Pg 44 - Expanded what qualifies for a bereavement leave, clarified that time off taken under this policy does not run concurrently with FMLA, and added to view the State Posters for variances.

• Witness and Victim of Crimes and Domestic Violence Leave - Pg 45 - Added new policy

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The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 STORABLE, INC., et al., § Defendants. § ═══════════════════════════════════════ Notices of Written Submission and Briefing Schedules ═══════════════════════════════════════ Motion for Partial Stay. Storable’s Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline is set for written submission on Thursday, June 12, 2025, at 2 p.m. Any response should be filed by the submission deadline.

Motion for Reconsideration of April 15 Order. Storable’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order is set for written submission on Thursday, June 19, 2025, at 2 p.m.

Any response should be filed by Monday, June 16, 2025, and any reply should be filed by the submission deadline.

Motion for Reconsideration of May 28 Order. Storable’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order is set for written submission on Monday, June 23, 2025. Any response should be filed by Thursday, June 19, 2025, and any reply should be filed by the submission deadline.

Date signed: June 10, 2025

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division

E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court 865of Texas 6/12/2025 10:48 AM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Numoer: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § V. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PRODUCTION DEADLINE Defendants hope to avoid their production deadline for key evidence. On May 28, the Court ordered them to produce by tomorrow documents sufficient to show names and addresses of self- storage facilities using Storable's FMS platforms. A week later, they returned with a self-created "emergency," new arguments, and a request to stay the order. Defendants simply want delay. For months, they have stalled on merits discovery, waiting weeks to be available to confer, refusing to produce documents in response to targeted requests, delaying search term negotiations, and filing a bevy of motions asking the Court to reconsider decided issues despite no changed circumstances.

The motion to stay is more of the same. It aligns with Defendants' ongoing efforts to delay and evade their discovery obligations. The Court should deny the motion.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND After extended conferrals, Defendants refused to produce material called for by RFP 10, which asks for a list of their FMS self-storage customers. On May 16, SafeLease filed its discovery letter noting that the information is "critical for defining the relevant antitrust market and assessing Storable's market power and competitive impact of its conduct-all core issues." Pltfs Disc.

Letter at 1. Defendants responded on May 23 and didn't budge. See Defs' Disc. Letter at 1. At no point did they argue that documents responsive to RFP 10 were or had trade secrets - not in their Responses and Objections, the meet and confers, many emails between counsel, or their letter to the Court. Indeed, they never said or wrote the words "trade secret." Ex. 1 (Defs' R&Os); Ex. 2 (email exchange).

On May 28, the Court ordered Defendants to produce by June 13 documents sufficient to show the name/addresses of facilities using Storable's FMS platforms as of December 30, 2024.

On June 2, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on SafeLease's attempted monopolization claim. Notably, they claim SafeLease has no proof of the competitive impact of their conduct. "There is no evidence ... that Storable's conduct had any market-wide effect-and no farther discovery could show this." Defs' Mot. Partial Summ. J. at 15 (emph. added).

On June 6, a week before their production deadline and two weeks before SafeLease's MSJ response is due, Defendants sought emergency relief to stay their June 13 deadline for RFP 10. At the same time, they moved for reconsideration of the Court's April 15 ruling on the protective order. On June 9, they moved for reconsideration of the Court's May 28 order to produce.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS "Trial courts have broad discretion to decide whether to permit or deny discovery" and "abuse that discretion only if their decision is 'so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law."' In re Dream Dallas, LLC, 2024 WL 1154139, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 18, 2024, no pet.) (cite omitted).

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES Defendants' efforts to avoid their production duties are baseless for at least five reasons. (1) The existing Protective Order fully protects sensitive documents. (2) Defendants did not argue, waived, and have no basis now to claim that the documents are trade secrets. (3) SafeLease would

-2- be prejudiced by delay, especially given the pending MSJ. (4) Staying the deadline because of the parties' recent mediation, which Defendants pushed for, would be counterproductive and would discourage mediation. (5) The Court already confirmed that all outside counsel can view Outside- Counsel' s-Eyes-Only (OCEO) documents.

1. The Protective Order Properly Protects Highly Confidential Documents.

The Protective Order properly safeguards the parties' confidentiality interests by allowing information to be produced as Confidential or OCEO. Producing documents as OCEO provides extra protection and ensures that especially sensitive documents will not be seen by employees of the opposing party. This includes "trades secrets." Prot. Order 13 (OCEO information "includes trade secrets or other non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information.").

Contra Mot. at 5-7 (alleging, without basis, that SafeLease may misuse the information). In fact, in ordering Defendants to produce documents responsive to RFP 10, the Court noted: "The agreed protective order in this case contains 'confidential' and 'outside counsel's eyes only' (OCEO) designations, both available to Storable to protect its confidential information as appropriate."

Disc. Order (May 28, 2025) at 2.

Defendants erect a strawman: the Protective Order might be voided, "leaving no protection whatsoever in place for the interim period until the case can be remanded and a new protective order entered." Mot. at 5. In addition to being wrong, this position goes too far. It undermines the Court's power to make any ruling in this case. The Court already considered and denied the motion to remand. See Order (Feb. 10, 2025). Invoking the possibility that at some future point there might be a remand hardly entitles a party to avoid future discovery, much less ignore all other orders issued by the Court. Indeed, the statute allowing for an interlocutory appeal on a temporary injunction expressly does not grant a stay of ongoing trial court proceedings. Rather, it

-3- contemplates that all pretrial proceedings-like discovery-go forward during the appeal, just as the Court ordered here. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §51.014(a)(4), (b).

Regardless, Defendants' appellate argument about the remand issue is off base. As noted in SafeLease's appellee brief, no statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal of a remand denial, which is reviewed before final judgment only through a mandamus petition. ETC Field Servs., LLC v. Terna Oil & Gas Co., 710 S.W.3d 379, 380-81 (Tex. App.-Austin [15th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) ("No statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal of a remand order from the business court," so review of a remand order can be obtained only by a petition for writ of mandamus.). Defendants never filed for mandamus, briefed those standards, or invoked original appellate jurisdiction. As such, there is no legitimate concern that the protective order will be voided.

Finally, there is ample backup protection. The parties earlier signed a Rule 11 agreement substantively identical as to the designation and treatment of Confidential and OCEO documents.

Ex. 3 (email exchange where parties "agree to abide by the protections of the PO for documents designated Confidential or Outside Counsel's Eyes Only"). They signed the agreement during proceedings in the District Court, and they proceeded under it through the temporary injunction hearing here. Ex. 4 (2/11/25 Tr. 234:4-6 (defense counsel recognizing an exhibit "has been designated by [SafeLease] under the Rule 11 agreement, which is acting like a protective order") (emph. added). The parties then filed that signed agreement with this Court, including all relevant OCEO and Confidential designation restrictions and protections. See 2120/25 Prop. Agreed Prot.

Order. Defendants never mention this agreement.

No concerns regarding the Protective Order justify staying Defendants' deadline.

2. Defendants Waived the Argument that the Documents Are Trade Secrets.

Defendants waived their new argument that documents responsive to RFP 10 are trade secrets.

-4-

"An objection that is not made within the time required ... is waived unless the court excuses the waiver for good cause shown." Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.2(e). Moreover, a party "seeking protection of information by a claim of privilege has the burden to plead and prove the applicable privilege." In re Cauley, 437 S.W.3d 650,655 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2014, no pet.); see also Macy v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 638,651 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reconsider ruling where "movant cites no additional evidence 'beyond that available to him"' at the time of the original ruling).

Here, Defendants made not a peep about trade secrets until this motion to stay. They did not claim the documents are trade secrets in their Objections and Responses to SafeLease's RFPs; nor during multiple conferrals among counsel; nor during the exchange of multiple emails between counsel on the topic of RFP 1O; nor in their discovery response letter to the Court. See Ex. 1; Ex. 2. Not once. Remarkably, Defendants blame their failure, in part, on the Court and its "strict length limitations" for discovery letters. Mot. at 3 n.1. But, to state the obvious, it takes only six words to say, "The requested documents are trade secrets." Had Defendants truly refused production on those grounds, they could and should have said so before this motion.

Defendants now claim they were just about to say those six words. "Further briefing would have clarified that Storable's customer list is a trade secret." Mot. at 3 n.1. Every litigant can say that its omitted point was coming next. But the Business Court rules are clear that after discovery letters are filed, the Court may "issue an order if the Court, in its discretion, determines no further briefing is necessary." L.R. 4(d)(4). Defendants were not entitled to further briefing, did not ask for further briefing, and were on notice prior that the Court may decide the dispute based solely on

-5- the letters. In fact, Defendants did not make a trade-secret claim because this information is not a trade secret. Regardless, they waived the point as a matter of established procedure and law. 1 Defendants seek a second bite at the apple on arguments they chose not to make timely.

3. SafeLease Will Be Prejudiced by Delay.

Defendants rely on their own discovery delay to justify further discovery delay. They argue that delay will not prejudice SafeLease because the "parties have not even commenced production of any documents as they are continuing to negotiate the relevant search terms and custodians."

Mot. at 2. But SafeLease provided its proposed search terms over a month ago for Defendants to use to search its documents and followed up several times. Defendants have yet to respond to the terms substantively, instead rejecting them as "facially overbroad" without elaboration on all but two terms. See Ex. 5. Delay does not justify more delay, especially with an MSJ pending.

Moreover, SafeLease made a production this week, including its own list of customers by name, state, and number of occupied units. Defendants' RFP 15 asks for "Documents sufficient to show Your existing Customers as of January 21, 2025." SafeLease agreed to produce the data. Ex. at 7. Importantly, this data relates to the market in which the parties actively compete-the insurance market. Production of SafeLease's customer list is even more sensitive than the FMS information that Defendants must produce because the parties compete in the insurance market while only Defendants compete in the FMS market.

Lastly, the irony of Storable moving for summary judgment on no evidence grounds, while trying to avoid its document production deadline, is stark. See Mot. at 1 (admitting "The customer list is relevant only to SafeLease's claim for attempted monopolization"). Five days after the May order, Defendants filed their MSJ in part on no-evidence grounds. See, e.g., Defs' Mot. Partial

Defendants raise their substantive trade-secret argument in their pending motion to reconsider, and SafeLease will address this argument in response to that motion.

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Summ. J. at 15 ("There is no evidence that the many other tenant insurance providers are not competitive or that Storable's conduct had any market-wide effect-and no further discovery could show this."). As SafeLease said in its May 16 discovery letter, it seeks documents responsive to RFP 10 because "It is critical for defining the relevant antitrust market and assessing Storable's market power and competitive impact of its conduct-all core issues." Pltfs Disc. Letter at 1.

SafeLease will be prejudiced if it has to defend against the MSJ while Defendants refuse to produce documents relevant to the claims they seek to dismiss. The production deadline of June will allow SafeLease to have the documents responsive to RFP 10 for one week before its MSJ response brief deadline. Delay will prejudice SafeLease because it further shortens the window in which it can analyze, or at least reference, this important information.

4. Staying Production because of Mediation Would Discourage Mediation.

Storable boldly invokes recent mediation discussions in support of delay. Granting a stay on those grounds would both punish SafeLease for its good faith efforts to resolve this case through mediation and dissuade future litigants from engaging in alternative dispute resolution.

Defendants justify delay based on the parties' settlement discussions following a June 4, 2025 mediation. Mot. at 2. The parties have not agreed to a stay, and SafeLease does not want one.

Staying Defendants' deadline would unfairly punish SafeLease for agreeing to settlement discussions and be contrary to public policy, which encourages parties to peaceably resolve disputes. See LaLonde v. Gosnell, 593 S.W.3d 212, 225-26 (Tex. 2019) (noting "the state's strong public policy favoring the peaceable resolution of disputes" and "encourage[ing]" mediation); In re Vinson, 632 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2019, no pet.) ("It is the policy of this state to

-7- encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes and the early settlement of pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures."). 2 Moreover, in invoking the status of the mediation to this Court, Defendants violated the rules of that mediation, in which they promised to "maintain the confidentiality of the mediation" and to not "rely on, or introduce as evidence" any "views expressed or suggestions made by another party with respect to a possible settlement of the dispute." Mediation Attorney Agreement.

Allowing one side to invoke the existence of settlement discussions to get a one-sided stay would undercut the effectiveness of mediation and cast suspicion on the "good faith" nature of any such discussions going forward. The Court should reject this excuse by Defendants.

5. Outside Counsel Properly May View OCEO Documents.

As is clear in the Protective Order and already confirmed, all outside counsel of record are entitled to view documents produced as OCEO. See Prot. Order ,r,r 3, 5-6; Order Denying Mot. to Modify (Apr. 15, 2025). Defendants also ask the Court to reconsider its April 15 Order and to stay Defendants' production deadline until after it rules on the motion for reconsideration. "If no stay is issued and Storable is otherwise required to produce its FMS customer list, reconsideration of the April 15, 2025 order would prevent Mr. Locke from accessing the list." Mot. at 3-4. But the motion for reconsideration raises no intervening facts about Adam Locke nor intervening binding precedent. Instead, Defendants rely solely on Westlake Longview Corp. v. Eastman Chemical Co., 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 (May 16, 2025), a non-binding opinion by this Court sitting by designation on

See also Cooper Notification, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., 2010 WL 5149351, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 13, 2010) ("The Court is troubled by Defendants' attempt to use settlement discussions as a sword to defeat [Plaintiffs] desire to proceed with litigation rather than succumb to a stay. There is a strong and long- standing public policy favoring settlement and Defendants' use of settlement efforts in this manner is in direct tension with this policy."); Worldcom Network Servs., Inc. v. Metro Access, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 136, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The law is clear that settlement discussions do not suspend discovery or excuse compliance with an explicit court order.").

-8- a sister court. It does not alter Locke's status as outside counsel or attorney of record, nor does it affect the propriety of his access to OCEO documents.

No stay is warranted by Defendants re-arguing already decided issues.

CONCLUSION The Court should deny the Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay.

Date: June 12, 2025 Respectfully submitted, Isl R. Paul Yetter Judd E. Stone II R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24087727 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] [email protected] Alexander M. Dvorscak Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24120461 State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] [email protected] STONE HILTON PLLC Shannon N. Smith Congress Ave. State Bar No. 24110378 Austin, Texas 78748 [email protected] (737) 465-3897 Julia C. Risley State Bar No. 24132932 Adam T. Locke [email protected] State Bar No. 24083184 YETTER COLEMAN LLP [email protected] 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 LOCKELAW PLLC Houston, Texas 77002 2617 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 (713) 632-8000 Houston, Texas 77005 (713) 832-0243 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via the Court e- filing service and/or by email, on June 12, 2025.

Isl Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 2425 words, not including the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates.

Isl Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

- 10 -

Exhibit 1

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 V. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC'S FIRST MERITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc.; SiteLink: Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP ("Storable" or "Defendants") hereby submit the following objections and responses to the First Set of Merits Requests for Production served by Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC ("SafeLease" or "Plaintiff'). These responses will be amended and/or supplemented in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS 1. Storable objects to each of SafeLease's Definitions as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent that SafeLease seeks information outside the scope of discovery or otherwise purports to impose discovery obligations beyond those set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Storable will therefore construe these requests as seeking non-privileged information within the bounds of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Storable objects to the Definition of "API" as vague and ambiguous.

3. Storable objects to the Definition of "Authorized User" as inaccurate and argumentative.

4. Storable objects to the Definitions of "Defendants," ''you," and "your" as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent SafeLease seeks information in the possession, custody, or control of any third-party or all/any employees. Storable further objects to these definitions to the extent they include Storable's attorneys, agents, consultants, representatives, and advisors, whether past or present, who have facilitated or provided legal advice to Storable. Storable will therefore construe the requests as seeking non-privileged, responsive documents in the possession, custody, or control of Storable.

5. Storable objects to the Defmitions of "Document," and/or "Documents," to the extent such Definitions cause any request to seek irrelevant information, render any request overbroad, unduly burdensome, or disproportionate to the needs of this case, are duplicative, or purport to require the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, or other applicable immunities.

Storable will construe requests employing these defmitions as seeking non-privileged information, reasonably giving words their ordinary meaning consistent with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Storable objects to the Definition of "Facility management software" in that it improperly characterizes facility management software as covering only products offered by Defendants.

7. Storable objects to the Defmition of"Facility management software market" as calling for a legal conclusion.

8. Storable objects to the Definition of "Tenant insurance" as vague and ambiguous.

9. Storable objects to the Defmition of "Tenant insurance market" as vague and ambiguous and calling for a legal conclusion.

OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS 1. Storable objects to each of SafeLease's Instructions as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent that SafeLease seeks information outside the scope of discovery or otherwise purports to impose discovery obligations beyond those set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, including with respect to the production of native documents. Storable will therefore construe these requests as seeking non-privileged information within the bounds of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Storable objects to SafeLease's Instructions to the extent that it seeks information that is not in Storable's possession, custody, or control.

RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Request for Production No. 1: All documents that reflect communications with any customer, tenant, or other third-party (including consultants and the like) regarding SafeLease. This includes complaints or feedback regarding SafeLease's access to your facility management software, discussions about purported performance or security issues caused by SafeLease's access to your facility management software, discussions about any technical restrictions put in place to limit SafeLease's access to your facility management software, and discussions about switching from your tenant insurance products or offerings to SafeLease' s tenant insurance products or offerings.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase "communications ... regarding SafeLease" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 2: All documents reflecting your internal communications regarding SafeLease. This includes communications regarding SafeLease' s access to your facility management software, competition with SafeLease over tenant insurance customers, any competitive analysis of SafeLease, any antitrust implications of restricting SafeLease' s access to your facility management software, discussions incident to any business negotiations between you and SafeLease (including API access negotiations and discussion of any potential acquisition), and any performance or security issues caused by SafeLease's access to your facility management software.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase "communications regarding SafeLease" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 3: All documents reflecting your communications with SafeLease regarding access to your facility management software, including any performance, stability, privacy, or security issues allegedly caused by the same.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks information that is already in the possession of SafeLease.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 4: All documents reflecting your communications with board members, investors, or senior management regarding SafeLease. This includes reports submitted to a director, investor, or senior management regarding SafeLease, any approvals or directives issued by a board member regarding your dealings with SafeLease, and any communications your employees or agents had with a director, investor, or senior management regarding SafeLease.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase "communications ... regarding SafeLease" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects that this Request is duplicative and cumulative of

Request No. 2. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 5: All documents reflecting communications with board members, investors, or senior management regarding your market share in the facility management software market or tenant insurance market.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the phrase "communications ... regarding your market share" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 6: All documents reflecting analysis or documentation of your market share in the tenant insurance market or facility management software market.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 7: All documents relating to your business plans, strategies, initiatives, or analyses concerning your market share in the tenant insurance market, including about acquiring Third-Party Insurance Vendors, restricting Third-Party Insurance Vendors from accessing your facility management software, and establishing fees for API access to your facility management software for Third- Party Insurance Vendors.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to everything after "including" as cumulative.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 8: All documents relating to your business plans, strategies, initiatives, or analyses concerning how to gain or maintain your market share in the facility management software market, including cross- selling of facility management software with any other product and restricting or controlling access to any other product or service offered by you.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 9: All documents concerning your strategy, decision making, business plans, or analyses concerning API access pricing for Third-Party Insurance Vendors or SafeLease.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term "API access pricing" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 10: Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that use your facility management software, including addresses for those facilities.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as seeking irrelevant information, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case, as well as on the basis that it seeks confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable's possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will not produce documents in response to this Request.

Request for Production No. 11: Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that you contend constitute the relevant market for purposes of this dispute.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term "relevant market" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to this Request as calling for a legal conclusion. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable's possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 12: Documents sufficient to show all Authorized Users on your storEDGE and SiteLink facility management software during the relevant time period.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as seeking irrelevant information, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case, as well as on the basis that it seeks confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable's possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will not produce documents in response to this Request.

Request for Production No. 13: All documents reflecting any efforts by you to acquire customers from SafeLease, including any business plans or strategies regarding the same.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects to the phrase "efforts by you to acquire customers" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 14: All documents reflecting your policies and procedures for granting, maintaining, tracking, or terminating Authorized User access to your facility management software applicable at any point during the relevant time period.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the terms "tracking" and "access" as vague and ambiguous.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 15: All documents relating to the planned, actual, or potential removal or restriction of SafeLease or any Third-Party Insurance Vendor from accessing your facility management software as an Authorized User or otherwise, including plans, strategies, and reasoning for any such removal or restriction.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term "accessing" as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 16: All documents regarding your decision to remove the third-party producer option or custom insurance module from the SiteLink marketplace.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the undefined terms "third-party producer option" and "custom insurance model" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 17: Documents sufficient to show each Third-Party Insurance Vendor with access to the SiteLink custom third-party insurance module at any time during the relevant time period, along with the dates such access was available.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the undefined term "SiteLink custom third-party insurance module" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the term "access" as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information ofnon- parties to this lawsuit.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable responds that it will produce non-privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 18: Documents sufficient to show each Third-Party Insurance Vendor with access to your Easy Storage Solutions facility management software at any time during the relevant time period, along with the dates such access was available.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term "access" as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 19: All documents relating to identification, diagnosis, analysis, or consideration of any purported security, privacy, performance, stability, or related issue caused by SafeLease's access to your facility management software.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable objects to the term "related issue" as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 20: All documents evidencing any technical security measures implemented by you to manage, disable, limit, restrict, or block SafeLease's access to your facility management software.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case, as well as on the basis that it seeks confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will not produce documents in response to this Request.

Request for Production No. 21: Documents sufficient to show the occurrence of and reason for any system outage, interruption, slowdown, or other material performance issue on your facility management software from 2021 to present.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to this Request as overbroad in time to the extent it seeks documents prior to August 1, 2021. Storable further objects to this Request as overbroad in scope to the extent it seeks documents on "any system outage, interruption, [or] slowdown," regardless of materiality.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 22: Documents sufficient to show the capabilities of the storEDGE and SiteLink: APis, including the customer data available to Third-Party Insurance Vendors who access storEDGE and SiteLink: via API and the reports Third-Party Insurance Vendors are able to generate through access to storEDGE and SiteLink: via API.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term "capabilities" as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks to require Storable to create documents not in existence.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 23: All documents related to your negotiations with SafeLease for API access to your facility management software, including pricing proposals, fee schedules, and communications with any person reflecting the pricing structure offered to SafeLease.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks information that is already in the possession of SafeLease. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 24: All documents regarding the restoration or restriction of SafeLease's access to your facility management software in response to the issuance or expiration of any court order.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term "access" as vague and ambiguous.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 25: All documents related to any communications with any journalist, reporter, media outlet, or website regarding SafeLease or this dispute.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to this Request as duplicative of Request No. 1.

Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Respectfully submitted April 21, 2025.

Isl Mikaila Skaroff Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002-2755 Tel.: (713) 576-2400 Fax: (713) 576-2499 Katherine. [email protected] [email protected] Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) Colorado Bar No. 60688 ARNOLD & PORTER KA YE SCHOLER LLP 1144 Fifteenth St, Suite 3100 Denver, Colorado 80202 Tel.: (303) 863-1000 Fax: (303) 863-2301 [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002

Tel.: (713) 226-6000 Fax: (713) 226-6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320-7240 Fax:(512)320-7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record on April 21, 2025.

Isl Mikaila Skaroff Mikaila Skaroff

Exhibit 2 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

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Re: Safelease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production From Adam Locke <[email protected]> Date Wed 5/14/2025 6:04 PM To Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]> Cc Risley, Julia <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected]>; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney < [email protected] >; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg < [email protected] >; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Carolyn Reed <[email protected]> ; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza " Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected] >; [email protected] < [email protected] >; [email protected] < [email protected] >

External Sender - From: (Adam Locke <[email protected]>) Learn More This message came from outside your organization.

Counsel, Storable's account of the May 7 call is selective and incomplete, especially as to the grounds Safelease gave for its challenged RFPs.

In addition, Storable's view on its discovery obligations - including what constitutes a business record - is mistaken.

As for Storable's position on Safelease's RFP 20: it appears that Storable is proposing to produce a subset of what was requested in Safelease's narrowed request. This will not suffice.

Safelease made good fa ith efforts to narrow its requests, which were rejected, and unfortunately the parties are at an impasse. Safelease will move to compel on its RFPs 10, 12, and 20.

As for Storable's position on Messrs. Kumar and Post, will Storable represent that neither director has a Storable email address?

Regards, Adam about: blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 1/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

On Wed, May 14, 2025 at 5:01 PM Skaroff, Mikaila < [email protected] > wrote: Counsel,

We write to respond to Safelease's proposed modifications to its RFPs, provide additional information, and request additional information from Safelease.

Storable's Responses and Objections to Safelease's First Set of RFPs

Re~uest No. 10 (list of all facilities served by Storable FMS)

On the May 7 meet and confer, Safelease provided only two bases for requesting a full list of facilities served by Storable's FMS and the full addresses for those facilities. First, Safelease stated that it needed the facility list to calculate Defendants' FMS market share. Second, Safelease stated that it needed the location of Defendants' FMS customers to assess Defendants' defense that the Texas Antitrust Act only allows Safelease to seek an injunction as to customers or business wholly located in Texas.

Given the stated relevance of Request No. 10, Storable offered to produce: 1) the total number of facilities served by Storable's FMS; and 2) a breakdown of the number of facilities served by state.

As we described on the meet and confer, Storable's proposal provides all necessary information related to Safelease's two stated bases for this request. The total number of facilities will enable Safelease to calculate Defendants' FMS market share. And the state-level breakdown will enable Safelease to determine the number of facilities that would be covered by an injunction on the antitrust claim limited to Texas (if such an injunction were to issue).

Safelease has not claimed that Storable's proposal does not satisfy the stated relevance for this request. Instead, on the meet and confer, Safelease claimed that it needed the full facility list with addresses to verify the accuracy of Defendants' facility counts. To address this point, Storable stated that a Storable employee would likely be willing to certify the accuracy of the figures. Alternatively, Storable proposed providing the full list to a third party that could verify the figures' accuracy. Either of these proposals would fully address Safelease's claimed need to verify the figures, but Safelease appears to have rejected both proposals.

about: blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 2/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Safelease's proposed modifications to Request No. 10 continue to request overbroad information irrelevant and not proportional to Safelease's stated bases for this request. Storable's original proposal still provides Safelease with all the information necessary to the stated relevance of this request. Safelease has not explained the relevance or need for documents "sufficient to show" all facilities served by Storable's FMS, when the total facility count suffices for market share calculations, and Defendants have offered multiple ways to verify the facility count. And Safelease has provided no legitimate basis for continuing to seek city and ZIP code information for each facility.

Accordingly, in response to Request No. 10 as modified, Storable reiterates its willingness to produce documents sufficient to show: 1) the total number of facilities served by Storable's FMS; and 2) a breakdown of the number of facilities served by state. Storable also reiterates its willingness to consider the verification methods previously described. Additionally, Storable is willing to provide Safelease's outside economists with temporary, restricted access to its full facility list, on an outside-economist-only basis, to enable them to verify the accuracy of Storable's facility counts. This full facility list could not be provided to or otherwise shared, in whole or in part, with Safelease's inside or outside counsel or any other Safelease employee or representative. The facility list would remain at all times in Storable's possession.

Reguest No. 12 (list of all Storable authorized users)

On the May 7 meet and confer, Safelease stated that it needs the full list of all Storable authorized users to determine whether "Safelease is being singled out" by Storable. As Storable explained on the meet and confer, if this is the stated relevance of the request, it is vastly overbroad. We also explained that it is unclear how having an authorized user list enables Safelease to determine whether Safelease is allegedly being singled out, or whether any authorized user was ever removed.

Given the stated relevance of Request No. 12, Storable offered to produce: 1) the total number of authorized users on its FMS platforms; and 2) information showing whether other tenant insurance companies have authorized users. Storable's proposal satisfies Safelease's stated relevance for this Request.

Safelease's proposed modification to Request No. 12 - namely, requesting documents showing "all third-party" authorized users, instead of "all" authorized users - is vague and ambiguous.

Safelease does not define "third party"; in theory, it could refer to all FMS customers, in which case it would not meaningfully limit the request. Request No. 12 as modified also continues to be overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to Safelease's stated need, and it continues to seek irrelevant information. Storable does not have a way to determine the full universe of users that are "third parties," so the request would require Storable to create a document that does not exist and may not be capable of being created. about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 3/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

On further discussion with our client, we understand that Storable does not maintain lists of authorized users. While it may be possible for Storable to pull a list of all authorized users from its FMS systems, we understand that has not been done, nor does it need to be done in response to a request for production. Thus, Storable intends to amend its response to Request No. 12 to reflect that it does not possess such documents in the ordinary course of business. However, in the interest of cooperation and in response to Request No. 12 as modified, Storable reiterates its willingness to produce documents sufficient to show: 1) the total number of authorized users on its FMS platforms; and 2) information showing whether other tenant insurance companies have authorized users.

Reguest No. 20 (Storable's technical security measures)

As described on our May 7 meet and confer, Storable is willing to produce certain responsive documents in response to this request. In response to the specific questions you raised on our meet and confer, Storable can confirm that it has and is willing to produce documents showing when it took specific security measures that affected Safelease.

Safelease's Responses and Objections to Storable's First Set of RFPs

Reguest No. 34 (non-necessary customer data accessed by Safelease)

For purposes of this request, Storable proposes the following definition of "access": "Access" means the full definition of access according to Merriam-Webster: httP-s:llwww.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/access#dictiona ry-entry..:2, including "to get at : to gain access to: such as ... to be able to use, enter, or get near (something)." This definition encompasses, inter alia, data that Safelease either pulls or is able to view when utilizing Storable's FMS systems.

Given this clarification, please confirm whether Safelease will amend its response to this request and produce any responsive documents.

Reguest No. 41 (how Safelease uses access to Storable's FMS to market/sell its products)

We do not recall agreeing to propose a definition of "access" for this request but are amenable to doing so and would propose the same definition of "access" listed above for Request No. 34.

about: blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 4/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Further, as noted below, Storable clarified at the May 7 meet and confer that this request would cover documents where, e.g., Safelease represents to prospective customers that it is connected to or can readily integrate with FMS systems.

Please confirm whether Safelease will produce documents responsive to this request.

Reguest No. 4 (competition in relevant markets alleged by Safelease)

As explained on the meet and confer, Safelease's attempted monopolization claim put competition in the alleged tenant insurance and FMS markets squarely at issue. An RFP requesting documents related to competition in both of those alleged markets is highly relevant and proportional to the needs of this case, not overbroad.

Notwithstanding, to address Safelease's concern about breadth, Storable proposes using the following search terms for this request:

• (compet* OR win* OR los* OR gain* OR steal* OR beat* OR kill* OR crush* OR wreck* OR annihilat* OR destroy* OR fight* OR shift* OR switch* OR chang* OR leverag*) AND ((tenant w/5 insurance) OR (tenant w/5 protect*) OR TPP OR Alchemy OR Aon OR "Deans & Homer" OR Deans OR Homer OR MiniCo OR Safelease OR "Safe Lease*" OR SafeStor OR Savvy OR SnapNsure OR "Storage Protectors" OR "Storage Shield" OR Tripemco OR "World Insurance" OR Xercor OR FMS OR "facilities management software" OR "facility management software" OR Storable OR storEDGE OR Sitelink OR "Easy Storage Solutions" OR ESS OR CCStorage OR Cubby OR lnnago OR Kinnovis OR Monument OR RentPost OR "Self Storage Manager" OR "Storage Commander" OR "Tenant Inc" OR "Unit Trac" OR WebSelfStorage OR Yardi)

Please let us know if you agree to these search terms for this request.

Reguest No. 16 (Safelease's prospective/new customers as of 1/21/25)

Storable is amenable to Safelease's proposal to produce documents sufficient to show its current customers as of the present. Notwithstanding this agreement, Storable reserves the right to evaluate the sufficiency and responsiveness of Safelease's production in response to the request as written.

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Reguests Nos. 20 and 21 (how and when Safelease accessed Storable's FMS)

Please confirm whether Safelease is willing to produce generalized/high-level documents and a summary of dates/times that Safelease accessed Storable's FMS.

We are available to further meet and confer on any of the above requests. Additionally, Storable requests a meet and confer on Safelease's Responses and Objections to Storable Requests Nos. and 37, which we did not get a chance to discuss on May 7, as well as Requests Nos. 5, 7, 8, 11, 22, 35, 36, and 42. Please let us know when you are available to meet and confer this week or early next.

Search Terms and Custodians for Safelease's Requests

With regard to the separate discussion about search terms, to clarify, while Storable represented that we were planning to use search terms, we did not represent that we had prepared finalized terms that we were ready to share. We are continuing to collect documents and are running iterations of search terms against them, including Safelease's proposed terms. While we believe Safelease's proposed terms are facially overbroad, we are continuing to evaluate them as well as our draft proposed terms in good faith.

However, Storable agrees to proceed with eight of the ten custodians proposed by Safelease.

Arvindh Kumar and David Post are not Storable employees, and Storable does not have possession, custody, or control over their documents such that they are not proper custodians.

Thanks, Mikaila

Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 6/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldP.orter.com I Linkedln

From: Skaroff, Mikaila Sent: Friday, May 9, 2025 4:13 PM To: Risley, Julia <[email protected]>; Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected] .com>; Schamel, Luke <lschamel@yettercoleman .com >; Smith, Shannon <ssmith@yettercoleman .com>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M . Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] > Cc: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] >; zzz.External [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected] >; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <jsu m [email protected]>; zzz.Extern a I.Dale.Wai nwrigb1@g!;law.com <Dale.Wainwrig.b1@g!;law.com >; [email protected]!;law.com <bernsteinj.!J.@g!;law.com >; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected] > Subject: RE: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production

Counsel,

IThank you for your response. Due to scheduling conflicts, we will respond by Wednesday, May 14.

Thanks, Mikaila about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 7/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio

1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldRorter.com I Linkedln

From: Risley, Julia <jrisley_@_v.ettercoleman.com> Sent: Thursday, May 8, 2025 8:52 PM To: Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]>; Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Vetter, Paul <P-.v.etter@_v.ettercoleman .com>; Allen, Susanna <sallen@_v.ettercoleman .com>; Schamel, Luke <lschamel@_v.ettercoleman.com >; Smith, Shannon <ssmith@_v.ettercoleman .com>; Smith, Alyssa <asmith@_v.ettercoleman.com>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <bonnie@stonehilton .com>; Smith, Courtney <csmith@_v.ettercoleman .com > Cc: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <jsu m [email protected]>; zzz. Extern a I.Dale.Wai nwright@g1;law.com <Dale.Wainwright@g1;law.com>; zzz.External.bernsteinjy_@g1;law.com <bernsteinjy_@g1;law.com>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected] > Subject: RE: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production

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Counsel, about: blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 8/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Thank you for yesterday's meet and confer and for your email. We write to propose modifications to Plaintiff's requests 10, 12, and 20, to provide additional information regarding Safelease's responses to Defendants' requests, as well as to clarify some information in your email below.

Plaintiff's Reguest 10: As we said on yesterday's call, Safelease does not agree to Defendants' proposal to provide only the total number of facilities and a breakdown by state. But Safelease is willing to, without waiver, amend this request to: Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that use your facility management software, including the City, State, ZIP, and FMS for those facilities, as of December 30, 2024.

Please let us know by Monday, May 12, whether Defendants will produce documents responsive to this amended request.

Plaintiff's Reguest 12: We discussed with our client Defendants' proposal to produce a subset of the requested data as well as the total number of authorized users. Safelease is willing to, without waiver, amend this request to: Documents sufficient to show all third- party Authorized Users on your facility management software as of December 30, 2024. Please let us know by Monday, May 12, whether Defendants will produce documents responsive to this amended request.

Plaintiff's Reguest 20: Defendants agreed to produce some responsive documents, such as high-level documents (i.e., documents such as logs, emails, and chat messages showing what was done, when it was done, by whom, and how it was done), but would not agree to produce things like responsive computer code. We stated that we would discuss your proposal with our client. Safelease is willing to agree at this time that Defendants do not need to produce computer code in response to this request. Please let us know by Monday, May 12, whether Defendants are willing to produce responsive documents sought by this request, given Safelease's agreement that computer code need not be produced. If there are any particular categories of documents, other than code, that Defendants are unwilling to produce in response to this request, please let us know.

Defendants' Reguest 41: As discussed on the call, please provide a proposed definition of "access" so that Plaintiff can better understand what documents may be responsive to Defendants' framing of this request.

Defendants' Reguest 4: We appreciate Defendants' agreement to provide search terms for this request. However, Safelease notes that although it is willing to consider Defendants' search terms, it maintains that this request is overbroad. about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 9/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Defendants' Re~uest 16: Safelease will produce documents sufficient to show its current customers.

Thank you, Julia

Julia C. Risley I Associate I Yetter Coleman LLP Main Street, Suite 4100, Houston, Texas 77002 (D) 713.632.8006 I (M) 508.272.5088 I [email protected]

From: Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, May 8, 2025 4:57 PM To: Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected]>; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <bonnie@stonehilton .com>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] .com>; Risley, Julia <[email protected]> Cc: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] >; [email protected]; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected] >; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]>; Dale.Wainwright@g1;law.com; bernsteinj.Y..@g1;law.com; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]> Subject: RE: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production

Counsel,

Thank you for the productive meet and confer yesterday. This email serves to memorialize the discussion.

about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 10/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Storable's Responses and Objections 1. Request No. 10 (list of all facilities served by Storable FMS) a. Storable proposed the production of the total number of facilities nationally and a breakdown by state if needed. Storable also proposed possible verification mechanisms, whether by Storable or through a third party. b. SafeLease agreed to bring Storable's proposals back to its client. Storable agreed to rediscuss with its client possible verification mechanisms.

2. Request No. 12 (list of all Storable authorized users) a. Storable proposed the production of the total number of authorized users and information showing whether other tenant insurance companies have authorized users. b. SafeLease agreed to bring Storable's proposal back to its client.

3. Request No. 20 (Storable's technical security measures) a. Storable proposed the production of documents sufficient to show types of security measures that have been used to block SafeLease's access to Storable's FMS. b. SafeLease asked if Storable has a) documents showing when it took specific actions to block SafeLease orb) audit logs of security measures taken, and whether it would be willing to produce those documents. c. SafeLease agreed to bring Storable's proposal back to its client. Storable agreed to bring back SafeLease's questions as to those two categories of documents to its client.

Safelease's Responses and Objections 1. Request No. 34 (non-necessary customer data accessed by SafeLease) a. SafeLease interpreted "access" to mean the data it pulled from Storable's FMS systems but would be willing to entertain a different definition/framing of the request. b. Storable agreed to send SafeLease a proposed definition of "access" for purposes of just this RFP.

2. Request No. 41 (how SafeLease uses access to Storable's FMS to market/sell its products) a. Storable clarified that the request is intended to cover documents where, e.g., SafeLease represents to prospective customers that it is connected to or can readily integrate with FMS systems. b. SafeLease agreed to go back to its client, indicating that with this clarification, there likely are documents that it will produce.

3. Request No. 4 (competition in relevant markets alleged by SafeLease) a. Storable agreed to propose search terms for this request.

4. Request No. 16 (SafeLease's prospective/new customers as of 1/21/25) a. SafeLease agreed to ask its client about ways to narrow the request, including potentially limiting its prospective relations claim to mutual Storable and SafeLease customers or a specific list of customers, which would then allow Storable to tailor the request.

5. Requests Nos. 20 and 21 (how and when SafeLease accessed Storable's FMS) a. SafeLease agreed to go back to its client to confirm whether it would be able to produce generalized/high-level documents and a summary of dates/times that SafeLease accessed Storable's FMS, as a starting point. about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 11/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Search Terms 1. Safelease agreed to send Storable proposed search terms for Safelease's requests later this week. Storable agreed to send proposed search terms back to make sure that the parties are in agreement under the ESI protocol.

Finally, while Storable maintains that the positions it offered on the meet and confer are reasonable and sufficient, we will discuss with our client the issues raised by Safelease to determine if there are ways the parties can reach a compromise on these RFPs. We expect that Safelease will do the same.

We look forward to discussing these issues with you further sometime next week.

Thanks, Mikaila

Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio

1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldQorter.com I Linkedln

From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, May 6, 2025 7:57 AM To: Skaroff, Mikaila <Mikaila [email protected] > Cc: Yetter, Paul <[email protected] >; Allen, Susanna <[email protected] .com >; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <ssmith@yettercoleman .com >; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 12/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. .. <[email protected] >; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected] >; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >; Risley, Julia <[email protected]>; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected] >; Bergman, Andrew D.<[email protected] >; [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]>; zzz.Externa1 .Da1e.Wainwright@g1;law.com <Da1e.Wainwright@g1;law.com >; zzz.Externa1.bernsteinj.Y.@g1;law.com <bernsteinj.Y.@g1;law.com>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]> Subject: Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production

External E-mail

Thanks, Mikaila. Very helpful. Look forward to discussing tomorrow.

From: Skaroff, Mikaila < [email protected] > Date: Tuesday, May 6, 2025 at 8:40 AM To: Adam Locke <[email protected] > Cc: Yetter, Paul < [email protected] >, Allen, Susanna <[email protected] >, Schamel, Luke < [email protected] >, Smith, Shannon <[email protected] >, Smith, Alyssa <[email protected] >, Chris Hilton <[email protected] >, Judd E. Stone <[email protected] >, Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected] >, Bonnie Chester <[email protected] >, Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >, Risley, Julia <jrisley-®.Y.ettercoleman.com >, Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected] >, Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] >, [email protected] <[email protected] >, Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >, Dolores Brunelle <[email protected] >, Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff < [email protected] >, Jonna N. Summers <[email protected] >, [email protected] < [email protected] >, [email protected] <[email protected] >, Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected] > about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 13/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Subject: RE: Safelease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production Adam,

On tomorrow's call, Storable would primarily like to discuss Safelease's responses and objections to Storable's requests for production nos. 4, 16, 20, 21, 30, 34, 37, and 41. We may also ask high- level questions about Safelease's responses and objections to other requests for production.

Thanks, Mikaila

Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio

1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldRorter.com I Linkedln

From: Adam Locke <[email protected] > Sent: Monday, May 5, 2025 11:43 AM To: Skaroff, Mikaila <Mikaila [email protected]> Cc: Yetter, Paul <P-,[email protected] >; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >; Risley, Julia <[email protected]>; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected] >; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <jsu m [email protected]>; zzz. Extern aI.Dale.Wai nwright@g!law.com about: blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 14/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. .. <Dale.Wainwright@gl;law.com>; zzz.External.bernsteinj.Y.@gl;law.com <bernsteinj.Y.@gl;law.com>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Safelease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production

External E-mail

Thanks, Mikaila. We'll do our best to discuss your clients' concerns. It would help if they disclosed what those concerns are as soon as possible. If we learn what the issues are Wed morning, that won't optimize for a productive call - agree?

I trust that the two weeks your clients have had to think about their R&O to plaintiffs RFPs is more than enough time, such that they'll be prepared to adopt a definitive position on whether they'll produce, or offer a reasonable compromise.

On Mon, May 5, 2025 at 12:22 PM Skaroff, Mikaila < [email protected] > wrote: Storable will be prepared to discuss its responses and objections to Safelease's requests for production nos. 10, 12, and 20. We also expect to discuss Safelease's responses and objections to Storable's first set of requests for production. Please confirm you agree to do so on this call. We will send the specific requests we would like to discuss in advance of the call.

Thanks, Mikaila

Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 15/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldP.orter.com I Linkedln

From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, May 5, 2025 7:03 AM To: Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]> Cc: Yetter, Paul <R.v.etter@_v.ettercoleman.com>; Allen, Susanna <sallen@_v.ettercoleman.com>; Schamel, Luke <lschamel@_v.ettercoleman.com>; Smith, Shannon <ssmith@_v.ettercoleman .com >; Smith, Alyssa <asmith@_v.ettercoleman .com>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <csmith@_v.ettercoleman.com >; Risley, Julia <jrisley_@_v.ettercoleman.com>; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] >; [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]>; zzz.External .Dale.Wainwright@g!law.com <Dale.Wainwright@g!law.com>; zzz.External.bernsteinj.Y.@g!law.com <bernsteinj.Y.@g!law.com>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]> Subject: Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production

External E-mail

Counsel, let's please confirm the scope of this meet and confer. My client will be raising your clients' refusal to commit to producing documents responsive to plaintiff's RFPs 10, 12, and 20. My client expects that your clients will ensure counsel on the call are prepared to discuss those RFPs. Please confirm this will be the case. If your clients do not intend to confer Wednesday on plaintiff's RFPs 10, 12, and 20, please let me know now. Absent a response, we'll go into the M&C expecting to discuss these RFPs. If it turns out that your clients' position on the call is to refuse to discuss them until after about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 16/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. .. our planned mediation, my client will note this refusal to confer in good faith when we move to compel.

Thanks.

From: Adam Locke <[email protected] > Date: Monday, May 5, 2025 at 7:24 AM To: Skaroff, Mikaila < [email protected] > Cc: Yetter, Paul < p_y:etter@y:ettercoleman.com >, Allen, Susanna <[email protected] >, Schamel, Luke < lschamel@y:ettercoleman.com >, Smith, Shannon <[email protected] >, Smith, Alyssa <[email protected] >, Chris Hilton <[email protected] >, Judd E. Stone <[email protected] >, Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected] >, Bonnie Chester <[email protected] >, Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >, Risley, Julia <[email protected] >, Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg < [email protected] >, Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] >, [email protected] < [email protected] >, Carolyn Reed < [email protected] >, Dolores Brunelle <[email protected] >, Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff < [email protected] >, Jonna N. Summers <[email protected] >, Dale.Wai [email protected] < Dale.Wai [email protected] >, [email protected] <[email protected] >, Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected] > Subject: Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production Let's do Wednesday at 12. Thanks.

On Mon, May 5, 2025 at 7:18 AM Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected] > wrote: about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 17/18 6/12/25, 8:45 AM Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Meet and Confer Regarding Defendants' R&Os to Plaintiff's First Merits Requests for Production - Smit. ..

Counsel,

Counsel for Storable is available to meet and confer on Wednesday 12-1 or 2-4 CT and Thursday 1:30-3 CT.

Thanks, Mikaila

Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio

1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldRorter.com I Linkedln

From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, May about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane1 18/18

Exhibit 3 Allen, Susanna From: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2025 8:10 AM To: Allen, Susanna Cc: Smith, Shannon; Torgerson, Ray T.; Vetter, Paul; Schamel, Luke; Smith, Alyssa; Alexander, Ken; Summers, Jonna N.; Kumar, Lex N.; Brunelle, Dolores; [email protected]; [email protected]; Smith, Shannon; Torgerson, Ray T.; Vetter, Paul; Schamel, Luke; Smith, Alyssa; Alexander, Ken; Summers, Jonna N.; Kumar, Lex N.; Brunelle, Dolores Subject: Re: Letter Ruling D-1 -GN-24-010233 Attachments: image001.png; Agreed Protective Order(1189825.1 ).docx

External Sender- From: ("Eoff, Elizabeth F." Learn More <[email protected]>) This message came from outside your organization.

Yes, confirmed.

On Jan 16, 2025, at 7:59 AM, Allen, Susanna <[email protected]> wrote:

Hi Liza , can you please confirm that you are signed off on the Protective Orde ~? If so, we can upload for the Court this morning as a proposed order.

Thanks, Susanna -Susanna Yetter Coleman LLP 713.632.8009 (office) 662.801.9185 (mobile) From: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, January 12, 2025 9:06 AM To: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T.<[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected]>; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N.<[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE : Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233 Liza, See attached.

Thanks, Shannon Shannon Smith I Associate I Yetter Coleman LLP Main Street, Suite 4100, Houston, Texas 77002 (D) 713.632.8066 I (M) 281.770.2697 I (0) 713.632.8000 I www.yettercoleman.com

From: Eoff, Elizabeth F.<[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 8:52 PM To: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected] >; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected] >; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected] >; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N.<[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected] >; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233

Shannon, Y'all have suggested the last few rounds of edits. Please send us a clean and we can sign off.

Thanks.

Elizabeth F Eoff I Associate Porter Hedges LLP

1000 Main St, 36th Floor I Houston, TX 77002 t 713.226.6732 C 281.630.6388 e [email protected] Bio • Web • V-Card

From: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 8:46 PM To: Eoff, Elizabeth F.< [email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected] >; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected] >; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected] > Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected] >; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N.<[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected] >; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233 Thank you, Liza. We agree. Please send us a clean copy of the PO, and we will review and affix a signature on our end.

Thanks!

Shannon Shannon Smith I Associate I Yetter Coleman LLP Main Street, Suite 4100, Houston, Texas 77002 (D) 713.632.8066 I (M) 281.770.2697 I (0) 713.632.8000 I www.yettercoleman.com

From: Eoff, Elizabeth F.<[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 8:38 PM To: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected] >; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected] >; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected] >; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N.<[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233

Shannon, These changes are acceptable to us.

e agree to abide by the protections of the PO for documents designated Confidential or Outside Counsel's Eyes Only. Please confirm you agree.

Best, Liza Elizabeth F Eoff I Associate Porter Hedges LLP

1000 Main St, 36th Floor I Houston, TX 77002 t 713.226.6732 C 281.630.6388 e [email protected] Bio • Web • V-Card

From: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 6:39 PM To: Eoff, Elizabeth F.< [email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected] >; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected] >; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected] > Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected] >; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N.<[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected] >; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233 Thanks for the quick response, Liza. The attached red line adds our requested changes to paragraph 24. The rest of the red lines are the same as the last version I circulated. Please confirm that these additional changes are acceptable.

Thanks!

Shannon

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASEINSURANCESERVICES, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § STORABLE, INC., RED NOVA LABS, § INC. (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVISCOUNTY,TEXAS [PROPOSED) AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER In order to expedite the flow of discovery material, facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality, adequately protect material entitled to be kept confidential, and ensure that protection is afforded only to material so entitled, entry of this Agreed Protective Order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6 is merited. This Protective Order applies to materials produced in advance of the Temporary Injunction hearing and functions as the operative Protective Order for this matter until such time as this Order is amended or replaced.

It is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information and Outside Counsel's Eyes Only Information produced or exchanged by the parties in the course of this litigation, including information produced by third parties/non-parties, shall be used solely for the purpose of preparation, trial, and appeal of this litigation and for no other purpose whatsoever, and shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms hereof.

2. "Confidential Information" as used herein means any information of any type, kind, or character which is designated as "Confidential" by any of the supplying or receiving parties, including third parties/non-parties supplying said information, whether it be a document, information contained in a document, discovery materials, information or testimony revealed during a deposition, or otherwise.

3. "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only Information" as used herein means any information that is "Confidential" as described herein and additionally may not be disclosed to anyone except the Qualified Persons described in Paragraph 6, infra. "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only Information" includes trade secrets or other non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information. More specifically, an "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" designation means that the materials so denoted may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or a subsequent Order by this Court.

4. In designating information as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes only," a party or third party/non-party supplying information will make such designation only as to that information that it in good faith believes contains ''Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information. Information or material which is available to the public, including industry materials, advertising materials, and the like shall not be classified as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only."

5. "Qualified Persons" as used herein for "Confidential Information" means: (a) Attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees and/or agents of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the information be shown for purposes of this litigation; (b) Actual or potential independent experts or consultants (and their administrative or clerical staff) engaged in connection with this litigation (which shall not include the current employees, officers, members, or agents of the parties or affiliates of the parties) who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (c) The parties and their respective in-house counsel, paralegals, legal staff or experts; (d) The Court and its staff, including court reporters; (e) Vendors engaged by the parties or the parties' respective counsel, including independent copy services, printers, or illustrators, and court reporters for the purpose of this litigation who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (f) The authors and original recipients of the documents or information unless any such person no longer has a right to access or possess any such documents or information by virtue of a change in employment, position, or other circumstance; (g) The designated corporate representative for the party that produced the documents or information as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only"; or (h) By agreement of the parties, or if this Court so elects, any other person designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all the parties and hearing.

6. For "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only Information," "Qualified Persons" includes (a),

(b), and (d) - (h).

7. Documents produced in this action may be designated by any party or parties or by any third party and/or non-party producing said documents as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information by marking each page of the document(s) with the word(s) "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only." However, for documents produced in electronic native form, such as Excel spreadsheets, the designation may be affixed to the drive, disk, or other medium on which the documents or materials are produced or in the file names without marking each page of the documents or materials "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only."

8. In lieu of marking the original of a document, if the original is not produced, the designating party may mark the copies that are produced or exchanged.

9. Information disclosed at (a) the deposition of a party or one of its present or former officers, directors, employees, agents or independent experts retained by counsel for the purpose of this litigation, or (b) the deposition of a third party (which information pertains to a party) may be designated by any party, including a third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed, as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information by indicating on the record at the deposition that the testimony is "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" and is subject to the provisions of this Order.

10. Any party or third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed may also designate said information disclosed at such deposition as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" by notifying all of the parties, in writing within 30 days of receipt of the transcript, of the specific pages and lines of the transcript which should be treated as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" thereafter. Each party shall attach a copy of such written notice or notices to the face of the transcript and each copy thereof in his possession, custody or control. All deposition transcripts shall be treated as "Confidential" for a period of 30 days after the receipt of the transcript, apart from any portions designated on the record as "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only," which portions shall be treated as Attorneys' Eyes Only.

11. To the extent possible, the court reporter shall segregate into separate transcripts information designated as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" with blank, consecutively-numbered pages being provided in a non-designated main transcript. The separate transcript containing "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information shall have page numbers that correspond to the blank pages in the main transcript.

12. "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information shall not be disclosed or made available by the receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons as delineated above. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Protective Order restricts the ability of a party and/or third party/non-party to review, disclose, or disseminate its own documents or information as it sees fit.

13. Documents produced prior to entry of this Protective Order may be retroactively designated "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" by notice in writing of the designated class of each document by Bates number within 30 days of the entry of this Protective Order. Documents unintentionally produced without designation as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" may be retroactively designated in the same manner and shall be treated appropriately from the date written notice of the designation is provided to the receiving party. The burden shall be on the party claiming confidentiality to prove the confidential nature of the documents.

14. Documents to be inspected shall be treated as "Confidential" during inspection. At the time of copying for the receiving parties, such inspected documents shall be marked or stamped prominently "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" by the producing party.

15. If a receiving party learns of any unauthorized disclosure of "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only," the party shall immediately upon learning of such disclosure inform the producing party of all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure and shall make all reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure by each unauthorized person who received such information.

16. Nothing herein shall prevent disclosure beyond the terms of this Protective Order if each party or third party/non-party designating the information as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" consents in writing to such disclosure or, ifthe Court orders such disclosure.

Nor shall anything herein prevent any counsel of record from utilizing "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information in the examination or cross-examination of any person who is indicated on the document as being an author, source or recipient of the "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information, or if counsel has a reasonable belief that such person was an author, source or recipient of"Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information irrespective of which party or third party/non-party produced such information.

17. A party shall not be obligated to challenge the propriety of a designation as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" at the time made, and a failure to do so shall not preclude a subsequent challenge thereto. In the event that any party to this litigation disagrees at any stage of these proceedings with the designation by the designating party of any information as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" or the designation of any person as a Qualified Person, the parties shall first try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an informal basis, such as production of redacted copies. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the objecting party may invoke this Protective Order by objecting in writing to the party or third party/non-party who has designated the document or information as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" or designated any person as a Qualified Person. The designating party shall be required to move the Court for an order preserving the designated status of such information or person within 30 business days of receipt of the written objection. The disputed information shall remain "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" unless and until the Court orders otherwise. Failure to move for an order shall constitute a termination of the restricted status of such item unless the parties otherwise agree. The party or third party/non-party objecting to disclosure bears the burden of proof to establish the confidentiality of the document.

18. The parties may, by stipulation, provide for exceptions to this Protective Order, and any party may seek an order of this Court modifying this Protective Order.

19. Nothing shall be regarded as "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" information if it is information that either: (a) is in the public domain at the time of disclosure supported by appropriate evidence; or (b) becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the other party, as supported by appropriate evidence.

20. To the extent documents containing "Confidential" Information or "Outside

Counsel's Eyes Only" Information are filed before trial, in this or any other Court, or the substance of "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" Information is revealed in papers filed in this or any other Court, or in the transcript of any proceedings, those documents, materials, or transcripts shall be filed in camera in an envelope marked "CONFIDENTIAL," and this Order serves as a temporary sealing order, sealing such "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" Information under Rule 76a without the need for a separate motion or order. The temporary sealing order provided for under this paragraph will expire thirty days following the filing of the "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" Information unless the Designating Party moves for an order permanently sealing such material in accordance with Rule 76a prior to the expiration of such thirty-day period and thereafter complies with the permanent sealing requirements of Rule 76a. The party filing such materials in camera shall include the Bates Numbers of the specific documents used in the pleading filed and served to ensure the other parties will know which "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eye Only" materials are being filed in camera. Any pleading or attachment filed in camera shall be served on Counsel by email.

21. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the Court, all proceedings involving or relating to "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" documents or information shall be subject to the provisions of this Protective Order.

22. After the conclusion of this litigation and any appeal thereof, any "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" documents and all copies or reproductions of such documents produced by a party or third party/non-party in the possession of any of the "Qualified Persons" shall be returned to the producing party or third party/non-party within 60 days of receipt of a timely written request by said producing party or third party/non-party, except as this Court may otherwise order or to the extent such information was used as evidence at the trial. As far as the provisions of any protective orders entered in this action restrict the communication and use of the documents produced thereunder, such orders shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this litigation, except (a) that there shall be no restriction on documents that are used as exhibits in open court, and (b) that a party may seek the written permission of the producing party or order of the Court with respect to dissolution or modification of such protective orders. Alternatively, at the conclusion of this litigation, in lieu of the actual physical return of "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" documents, counsel for each party may provide a certification certifying that (1) all experts and any other person(s) receiving ''Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" documents have been instructed to delete or destroy all documents; and (2) all "Confidential" or "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" documents in the possession of counsel have been deleted or destroyed.

23. Any party designating any person as a "Qualified Person" shall have the duty to reasonably ensure that such person observes the terms of this Protective Order.

24. For purposes of the Temporary Injunction hearing currently scheduled to take place on January 16, 2025, or any subsequent hearing in the case, if any party intends to discuss or offer a document or information marked as "Outside Counsel's Eyes Only," the offering party must alert opposing counsel and the Court of its intent to discuss or offer the document or information, and all persons who are not authorized under this Order to view the document will be excused during any discussion of such document or information. For purposes of any trial before a jury, the parties will propose to the Court an appropriate protocol for handling of such document or information.

Signed this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _~ 2025.

Judge Presiding

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND ENTRY REQUESTED: Isl Ray T. Torgerson Ray T. Torgerson SBN: 24003067 N. Kenneth Alexander SBN: 00996600 Jonna N. Summers SBN: 24060649 Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff SBN: 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar SBN: 24144581 Porter Hedges LLP 1000 Main Street, 36Th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 713-226-6650 713-226-6250 (fax) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

Isl R. Paul Yetter R. Paul Yetter SBN: 22154200 Susanna R. Allen SBN: 24126616 Luke A. Schamel SBN: 24106403 ShannonN. Smith SBN: 24110378 Yetter Coleman LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 713-632-8000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASEINSURANCESERVICES, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § STORABLE, INC., RED NOVA LABS, § INC. (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVISCOUNTY,TEXAS

EXHIBIT A AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY TERMS OF PROTECTIVE ORDER My name is, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, my date of birth is _______, and my address is, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. I have read and am familiar with the terms of the Protective Order concerning the records and testimony produced by the respective parties in this case, and I agree to abide by all terms of said Protective Order and not to reveal or otherwise communicate any of the information disclosed to me pursuant thereto to anyone except in accordance with the terms of said Protective Order. I agree not to make any use of that information or materials other than for the purpose of this litigation.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in ____ County, State of _ __ Date:

Exhibit 4 930 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD 2 VOLUME 3 OF 13 VOLUMES CAUSE NO. 15-25-00020-CV 4 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 5 Sitting at Austin, Texas STORABLE, INC.; REDNOVA LABS, INC. (D/B/A STOREDGE); SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC; EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC; BADER CO.; AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP 9 V. 10 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC 12 REPORTER'S RECORD 13 FEBRUARY 11, 2025 On the 11th day of February, 2025, the hearing on Discovery Motions and a Temporary Injunction came on to be heard in the above-entitled and -numbered cause; and the following proceedings were had before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in Austin, Travis County, Texas: 19 Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype machine; Reporter's Record produced by computer-assisted transcription.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 931 74

1 the hearing or just you looked around and no one else was in there?

3 MR. YETTER: No, the hearing, itself, was not closed. It was a public hearing; but certain aspects of testimony, because they were marked Outside Attorney's Eyes Only, the party representatives that couldn't hear it had to step out. The court -- I don't think the court ever said that "The courtroom is now sealed," but I think there were no other representatives in the courtroom but the parties. So we knew who was there.

12 MR. TORGERSON: I would agree with that characterization. I will say that I'm not sure that the judge ever -- Mangrum ever actually signed the protective order and there were several loose ends left in Travis County, as the court was aware.

17 MR. YETTER: On that point, Your Honor, just by way of further explanation, the parties conferred about a protective order. We agreed on one.

20 We both signed it and we submitted it; but counsel is correct, it was never entered. As far as we know it was never entered by the court.

23 So it is probably on your docket. At some point the court should consider it; and if you have any questions, we can answer them. But we have been acting

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 932 75

1 and producing discovery pursuant to that as a rule -- essentially a Rule 11 agreement.

3 THE COURT: Sure. And I want to conform to that as much as I can. I'm just a little bit concerned about -- especially with respect to judicial notice. I don't want to take judicial notice of something. That's going to make it a record in this proceeding and there is no sealing order and that could be problematic for you guys. 76(a) is pretty stringent and requires a lot that hasn't happened yet.

11 MR. TORGERSON: If I may, that was defendants' request; and what we will do is confer and get back to you.

14 THE COURT: So you guys talk about it, and I'll probably do it however is best suited to your needs for the case.

17 Are you ready for plaintiff's?

18 MS. ALLEN: Yes. My apologies again for misplacing my papers. So plaintiff moves to admit Exhibit Nos. 1 through 20, Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 through 40, Plaintiff's Exhibit 42 through 71, Plaintiff's Exhibit 93 through 101, Plaintiff's Exhibit 103 through 144, Plaintiff's Exhibit 147 through 171, Plaintiff's Exhibit 173 through 175, and Plaintiff's Exhibits 181 and 182. And they're not

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 933 234

1 MR. TORGERSON: Well, in particular the contract is in evidence and I would like to show it to him, just to confirm the percentage split. He signed it, and it's been produced in this case. It has been designated by them under the Rule 11 agreement, which is acting like a protective order.

7 And to be clear there are really sort of two issues that I hear Mr. Hilton raising. His company's internal confidential information, I'm not going there at all. This is commercial information between the plaintiff Safelease and MyStorage.

12 MR. HILTON: If he's going to talk about an exhibit that's in evidence that is subject to the protective order, no issue.

15 THE COURT: I think maybe to get started, because that way you don't feel like you're on the spot and having to decide these control issues for the first time.

19 THE WITNESS: Okay.

20 THE COURT: Since it's already in evidence, we'll go at it that way and make everybody most comfortable.

23 MR. TORGERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

24 (Whereupon, after those people falling under the rule left the courtroom, the following

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected]

Exhibit 5 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith , Alyssa - Outlook • Outlook

RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians From Schamel, Luke <[email protected]> Date Thu 6/5/2025 10:31 AM To Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]>; Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]> ; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected]> ; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]> ; Smith, Courtney <[email protected]>; Risley, Julia <[email protected]> Cc Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] >; [email protected] < [email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected]> ; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]> ; [email protected] < [email protected] >; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]>

Thank you for sending these proposed search terms. Unfortunately, they are clearly underinclusive. There are at least three major problems with them. First, the terms used do not appear to cover all our RFPs. For example, it is highly unlikely that your proposed terms would capture documents responsive to SafeLease's RFPs 4, 14, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, or 30. Second, they fail to capture responsive documents that we already know exist based on discovery for the Tl hearings. We ran the terms against the documents you already produced , and these terms do not capture, for example: • multiple customer communications about SafeLease (RFP 1), such as Storable000459, -0609, -1281, and -1297; • virtually any of the dozens of technical and related documents regarding alleged SafeLease-caused security, privacy, performance, stability, or related issues (RFP 19), such as Storable000423, -0440, -0442, -0602, -0604, -0606, -0618, -0635, -0640, -0649, -0652, -0655, -0657, -0667, or-0670; and • several slide decks on your plans to remove Safelease's or other insurance vendors' FMS access (RFP 15), such as Storable000519, and -0526.

These are just examples of responsive documents that your terms don't capture. Terms that don't capture such clearly responsive documents are insufficient, and that these obviously relevant documents are not captured suggests that you did not test your proposed terms to see whether they effectively capture responsive documents.

Third, one of your search strings returns no results because it has a syntax error (e.g., too many or misplaced parentheses). This also suggests that you did not test these terms to see if they are reasonable and effective before proposing them.

We therefore can't agree to these terms as sufficient. These terms also appear to be limited only to SafeLease's first RFPs-were these intended to capture documents for only that set of RFPs? We think it is reasonable and more efficient to have the terms the parties agree to use cover both SafeLease's first and second set of RFPs.

The proposed terms we sent you on May 9th covered both sets of RFPs. It doesn't appear as if you have attempted to incorporate any of those proposed terms in yours-e.g., you appear to have completely excluded any of our search terms related to competition/antitrust issues. Although you stated generally that you believe our proposed terms are overbroad, you have not addressed almost any of the terms individually to explain why you have apparently rejected them, other than pointing out that you believe that one "OR" search string is overbroad and that another string would effectively cover all board materials. As an initial matter, that any of these search strings might capture documents with, as you say, "no relevance to this case" is no reason to reject them wholesale. Many good and targeted search terms will inevitably capture some irrelevant documents, which you will of course have the opportunity to filter out through your own internal review before producing. And if your concern about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 1/8 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith, Alyssa - Outlook it. is that the terms are severely overbroad, we would gladly consider a narrowed alternative if you would propose But rejecting the terms without offering any alternative to capture the same types of responsive documents is effectively refusing to produce those documents, which is unwarranted. In any event, we don't believe our terms are overbroad. For any terms on which you disagree, please point them out and explain why you disagree so that we can work together productively to come to an agreement.

You have now had our proposed terms for nearly a month; please send back your edits and comments on our proposed terms promptly. If you are claiming that any are overbroad and burdensome, include any hit counts and other burden-related analysis you conducted. If we can quickly reach an agreement to use either the terms we proposed or terms substantially like them, that will moot the issues discussed above with your underinclusive proposed terms.

In the meantime, even without agreed-upon search terms, you can begin sending us your productions in response to our requests where we sought only "documents sufficient to show ... ." This includes RFPs 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 21, 22, 32, and 33. For some of these RFPs, search terms may be helpful, but they aren't needed to begin collecting and producing responsive documents. Please promptly start making productions of those responsive documents.

Thanks.

Best, Luke

From: Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, May 23, 2025 6:02 PM To: Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected]>; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected]>; Risley, Julia <[email protected]> Cc: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]>; [email protected]; Carolyn Reed <[email protected]>; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]> Subject: RE : SafeLease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians

External Sender - From: .("Skaroff, Mikaila" Learn More <[email protected]>).

This message came from outside your organization.

Counsel, Attached are Storable's proposed search terms for Safelease's First Set of Requests for Production ("RFPs"). Storable reserves the right to adjust these terms as necessary as we continue to collect and process documents.

Thanks, Mikaila Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 2/8 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith, Alyssa - Outlook Arnold&Porter 1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldQorter.com I Linkedln

From: Skaroff, Mikaila Sent: Monday, May 19, 2025 7:22 PM To: Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <chris@stonehilton .com>; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >; Risley, Julia <[email protected]> Cc: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected] >; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]>; zzz.External [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]> Subject: RE : SafeLease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians Counsel, "Facially overbroad" means that the overbreadth of Safelease's proposed terms is clear and obvious from the terms themselves without further investigation. For instance, Safelease proposed the string "unauthorized OR unsupported OR misus! OR hijack! OR non-approv! OR unapprov!," which would capture any document containing the word "unsupported," "misuse," or "hijack," etc. regardless of the context. Safelease also included a string that would effectively cover all board materials. These requests are clearly overbroad as they would cover many documents with no relevance or relation to this case. Similar issues arise with the majority of Safelease's proposed terms.

As to your question on the proposed custodians, Arvindh Kumar and David Post do not have Storable email addresses.

Thanks, Mikaila Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio

Arnold&Porter 1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldQorter.com I Linkedln

From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, May 16, 2025 8:18 PM To: Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] > Cc: Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 3/8 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith , Alyssa - Outlook <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected] >; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >; Risley, Julia <[email protected]>; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected] >; [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]>; zzz.External.Dale.Wainwright@g!;law.com <[email protected]>; zzz.External.bernsteinj.Y..@g!;law.com <bernsteinj.Y..@g!;law.com >; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]>; Holler, John <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians IExternal E-mail I Counsel, What does "facially overbroad" mean? What about Safelease's terms is overbroad? Please offer examples so we can try to get aligned and avoid delaying progress in this case. Note: we've agreed to Storable's terms for its RFP 4, which were no less broad than what we proposed .

Not opposed to Holler's application.

Thanks for checking on the directors.

Best, Adam

On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 8:31 PM Bergman, Andrew D.<[email protected]> wrote: Counsel, Storable does not agree to Safelease's proposed terms for Safelease's RFPs as they are facially overbroad. However, as noted, Storable is continuing to evaluate them as well as our draft proposed terms in good faith. We expect to be in a position to share our proposed terms for Safelease's RFPs next week. As we have not yet aligned on search terms, we cannot provide a time frame on when we expect to start producing documents. Further, after we align on terms, it will take us some time to review documents for responsiveness and privilege and prepare productions. We plan to make rolling productions as our review progresses, as permitted under the parties' ESI protocol.

As to your question on the proposed custodians, we are still confirming with our client whether Arvindh Kumar or David Post have Storable email addresses.

Finally, please let us know if Safelease is unopposed to the filing of John Holler's pro hac vice application.

Regards, Andrew Andrew D. Bergman Senior Associate I Bio about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 4/8 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith, Alyssa - Outlook Arnold&Porter Louisiana Street I Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002-2755 T: +1 713.576.2430 [email protected] www.arnoldRorter.com I Linkedln

From: Schamel, Luke <lschamel@yettercoleman .com > Sent: Thursday, May 15, 2025 5:08 PM To: Adam Locke <[email protected] >; Skaroff, Mikaila <Mikaila [email protected]> Cc: Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <chris@stonehilton .com>; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected] >; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >; Risley, Julia <jrisley.@_v.ettercoleman.com>; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D.<[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected] >; zzz.External [email protected] <[email protected]>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]>; Holler, John <[email protected]> Subject: RE: SafeLease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians IExternal E-mail I You responded on a separate thread on Wednesday: With regard to the separate discussion about search terms, to clarify, while Storable represented that we were planning to use search terms, we did not represent that we had prepared finalized terms that we were ready to share. We are continuing to collect documents and are running iterations of search terms against them, including SafeLease's proposed terms. While we believe SafeLease's proposed terms are facially overbroad, we are continuing to evaluate them as well as our draft proposed terms in good faith.

However, Storable agrees to proceed with eight of the ten custodians proposed by SafeLease. Arvindh Kumar and David Post are not Storable employees, and Storable does not have possession, custody, or control over their documents such that they are not proper custodians.

For the custodians, Adam asked whether Mr. Kumar and Mr. Post have Storable email addresses; can you please confirm this one way or the other?

As for the terms, can you please confirm whether your response means that you agree to the proposed terms we sent last Friday? And can you please share the terms you've already prepared and are already running, plus any others that you propose? We understand that the terms you created may not be "final," but under the ESI protocol, we need to agree upon the terms so that they can be finalized. You said more than a week ago that you had already come up with some terms, yet have not shared any with us.

Please also let us know when you expect to start producing documents responsive to our March 21, 2025 requests. We understand that the production may be rolling. Thanks.

Best, Luke about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 5/8 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith, Alyssa - Outlook From: Schamel, Luke Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2025 3:09 PM To: Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Skaroff, Mikaila <Mikaila.Skaroff@arnold1:;1orter.com> Cc: Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected]>; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M . Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >; Risley, Julia <[email protected]>; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <katherine.treistman@arnold1:;1orter.com>; Bergman, Andrew D.<Andrew.Bergman@arnold1:;1orter.com>; rtorgerson@1:;1orterhedges.com; Carolyn Reed <creed@1:;1orterhedges.com >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]:;1orterhedges.com>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <leoff@1:;1orterhedges.com>; Jonna N. Summers <jsummers@1:;1orterhedges.com>; Dale.Wainwright@g1;law.com : bernsteinJy_@g1;law.com : Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]>; john [email protected] Subject: RE: SafeLease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians Following up on the below. Apologies if I missed it, but I haven't seen a response . Thanks.

Best, Luke

From: Schamel, Luke Sent: Monday, May 12, 2025 3:05 PM To: Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Skaroff, Mikaila <Mikaila .Skaroff@arnold1:;1orter.com> Cc: Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected]>; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] .com >; Risley, Julia <[email protected]>; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <katherine.treistman@arnold1:;1orter.com>; Bergman, Andrew D. <Andrew.Bergman@arnold1:;1orter.com>; rtorgerson@1:;1orterhedges.com; Carolyn Reed <creed@1:;1orterhedges.com >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <jsummers@1:;1orterhedges.com>; Dale.Wainwright@g1;law.com; bernsteinjy_@g1;law.com; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: RE: SafeLease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians Following up on my Friday email. Can you please share with us the search terms you've already prepared and let us know whether you agree to the terms and custodians we proposed? Thanks.

Best, Luke

From: Adam Locke <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, May 9, 2025 6:54 PM To: Skaroff, Mikaila <Mikai1a.Skaroff@arnold1:;1orter.com> Cc: Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected] .com >; Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M. Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <[email protected]>; Smith, Courtney <[email protected] >; Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <Andrew.Bergman@arnold1:;1orter.com >; [email protected]; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected]>; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected]:;1orterhedges.com>; [email protected] ; about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 6/8 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith , Alyssa - Outlook [email protected] ; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected] >; [email protected] Subject: Re: SafeLease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians

Counsel, I am certain I heard that Storable had "prepared search terms" at the M&C. Apparently those terms were not finalized.

We need to work in good faith to keep discovery on track and not delay. This is what the Court will expect. As for finalized terms, Storable should commit to a date early next week.

Thanks, Adam

On Fri, May 9, 2025 at 5:21 PM Skaroff, Mikaila <[email protected]> wrote: Counsel,

Thank you for sending these. At the meet and confer, we stated that we plan to run search terms to identify responsive documents, not that we had already final ized our proposed terms. We will send our proposed terms to you as soon as practicable.

Thank you, Mikaila

Mikaila Skaroff Associate I Bio

Arnold&Porter 1144 Fifteenth Street I Suite 3100 Denver, CO 80202-2848 T: +1 303.863.2310 [email protected] www.arnoldRorter.com I Linkedln

From: Schamel, Luke <[email protected] > Sent: Friday, May 9, 2025 11:59 AM about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 7/8 6/12/25, 8:49 AM RE: Safelease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians - Smith, Alyssa - Outlook To: Treistman, Katherine Ginzburg <[email protected]>; Bergman, Andrew D. <[email protected] >; zzz.External [email protected] <[email protected] >; Carolyn Reed <[email protected] >; Dolores Brunelle <[email protected] >; Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff <[email protected]>; Jonna N. Summers <[email protected] >; zzz.External.Dale.Wainwright@g1;law.com <[email protected]>; zzz.Externa1.bernsteinjY.@g1;law.com <[email protected]>; Lakshmi N. Kumar <[email protected]>; Skaroff, Mikaila <Mikaila [email protected]> Cc: Adam Locke <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Smith, Shannon <[email protected] .com>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]>; Chris Hilton <[email protected] >; Judd E. Stone <[email protected]>; Alexander M . Dvorscak <[email protected]>; Bonnie Chester <bonnie@stonehilton .com >; Smith, Courtney <[email protected]> Subject: SafeLease v. Storable - Proposed Search Terms and Custodians IExternal E-mail I Counsel, Attached are proposed custodians and search terms for Safelease's first merits RFPs. Please let us know if you have any edits or need to discuss. Also, on our meet and confer Wednesday you said that you had already prepared some search terms-can you please share those with us today? Thanks.

Best, Luke Luke A. Schamel I Associate I Yetter Coleman LLP Main Street, Suite 4100, Houston, Texas 77002 (0) 713.632.8072 I (M) 585.201.2818 I [email protected]

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For more information about Arnold & Porter, click here: httP.://www.arnoldP.orter.com about:blank?windowld=SecondaryReadingPane2 8/8

Exhibit 6

The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § V. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' FIRSTREQUESTFORPRODUCTION TO: All defendants through their counsel, Katherine Treistman, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, 700 Louisiana St., Suite 4000, Houston, Texas 77002; Ray T. Torgerson, Porter Hedges LLP, 1000 Main St., 36th floor, Houston, Texas 77002; Dale Wainwright, Greenberg Traurig LLP, 300 W. 6th St., Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701.

Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 196, Plaintiff SafeLease responds to Defendant Storable, Inc. 's First Request for Production. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement and/or amend the below objections and responses consistent with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and to supplement its production in response to each of the below requests throughout the litigation as additional documents may be located.

OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 1. Plaintiff objects to the definition of "Plaintiff," "You," and "Your" as vague and overbroad because the definition includes "its agents, representatives, ... partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with them or under their control, whether directly or indirectly." Plaintiff will interpret "Plaintiff," "You," and "Your" to mean SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC and its officers, directors, and employees.

2. Plaintiff objects to the definition of "Customer" and "Customers" as overbroad because it includes all self-storage owners and operators whether a business relationship exists with that owner or operator or not. Plaintiff will interpret "Customer" or "Customers" to mean self-storage owners or operators with whom Plaintiff has contracted to provide tenant insurance or protection plans.

3. Plaintiff objects to the definition of "Communication" as vague and confusing because it includes the "transmittal," "sending," "receipt," or "exchange" of information rather than just the information that was transmitted, sent, received, or exchanged. Plaintiff also objects to "Communication" as vague and confusing because it includes "nods of the head or other signal."

Plaintiff will produce responsive documents as they are defined under Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 192.3(b) and the parties' Agreed Proposed ESI Protocol, including letters, faxes, emails, and other types of instant messaging.

4. Plaintiff objects to the definition of "Person" as overly broad and confusing because it includes "all predecessors or successor in interest."

5. Plaintiff objects to the definition of "concerning," "reflecting," "referencing," and "relating to" as overly broad and confusing because it seeks to define these words by using the words themselves. Plaintiff interprets the meanings of these words consistently with how it has defined similar words ("refer," "relate," "pertain," and "concern") in its own definitions.

RESPONSES TO FIRST REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 1. All Documents reflecting any business plan, strategic plan, pncmg strategy, marketing plan, compensation plan, or competitive analysis relating to Your business or Your alleged markets for FMS and tenant insurance or any products or competitors therein.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and vague because what the scope of documents "reflecting" a, e.g., business or strategic plan includes is unclear.

Plaintiff will construe "reflecting" to mean "concerning." Plaintiff further objects to this request as overly broad and vague because it appears to include any strategy or planning document in Plaintiff's possession whether relevant to any claim or issue in this case or not. Plaintiff objects to "compensation plan" as vague because it is unclear whether it refers to the compensation of SafeLease employees or the compensation to customers in connection with tenant participation in a SafeLease plan. Plaintiff also objects to this request as compound, and therefore vague and confusing, because it seeks various plans and analyses and is unclear what it seeks regarding "Your alleged markets for FMS and tenant insurance or any products or competitors therein." Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show its pricing strategy for tenant insurance and tenant protection, its marketing of tenant insurance and tenant protection, and its business plan, to the extent such documents exist.

Plaintiff will also produce responsive, non-privileged competitive analyses relating to the markets for FMS and tenant insurance in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist. Plaintiff is willing to meet and confer regarding the remainder of this request, including for any plans relating to the "alleged markets for FMS and tenant insurance or any products or competitors therein."

2. All Documents supporting Your alleged tenant insurance market, including both the product and geographic components of that alleged market.

Response: Plaintiff objects to the extent this request asks it to marshal its evidence prior to discovery completion. Plaintiff objects that this request seeks expert discovery, which Plaintiff will produce in accordance with the applicable scheduling order entered in this case. Plaintiff objects to this request as duplicative of request 1. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-

-2- work product privileges. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged, non-expert documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

3. All Documents relating to market shares in Your alleged markets for FMS and tenant insurance.

Response: Plaintiff objects to the extent this request asks it to marshal its evidence prior to discovery completion. Plaintiff objects that this request seeks expert discovery, which Plaintiff will produce in accordance with the applicable scheduling order entered in this case. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged, non-expert documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

4. All Documents relating to competition in the United States for tenant insurance products, tenant protection products, and FMS, as those terms are used in the Second Amended Petition.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to the extent this request asks it to marshal its evidence prior to discovery completion. Plaintiff objects that this request seeks expert discovery, which Plaintiff will produce in accordance with the applicable scheduling order entered in this case. Plaintiff objects to this request as overbroad and vague as to what it seeks because it includes "all documents relating to competition" without defming or limiting "competition." Plaintiff objects to this request as vague as to what it seeks when it says "as those terms are used in the Second Amended Petition." Not all the preceding phrases are included in the Second Amended Petition.

Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds: Given the confusing and seemingly overbroad nature of this request, Plaintiff is unsure what the request is seeking, but is willing to meet and confer to try to understand what types of documents Defendants are trying to discover.

5. All Documents supporting Your allegations that Defendants' conduct has harmed competition in Your alleged tenant insurance market, including all Documents indicating that Defendants' conduct has excluded any competitor from accessing that alleged market.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to the extent this request asks it to marshal its evidence prior to discovery completion. Plaintiff objects that this request seeks expert discovery, which Plaintiff will produce in accordance with the applicable scheduling order entered in this case. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague and confusing because it seeks information regarding how Defendants' conduct has excluded any competitor from accessing that alleged market, though it is unclear how Defendants are defining a "competitor" given that such a firm would appear to not yet compete with Defendants. Plaintiff interprets this portion of Defendants' request as seeking documents indicating that Defendants' conduct has excluded potential competitors from

-3- accessing the tenant insurance market. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged, non-expert documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

6. All Documents relating to Your ability to serve Customers that use one of Defendants' FMS platforms without authorized user access from those Customers or Defendants.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects that this request is overly broad and vague as to what it seeks when it requests "[a]ll Documents relating to Your ability to serve Customers." Plaintiff interprets this request as seeking documents sufficient to show how, if at all, Plaintiff acquires the information needed to provide tenant insurance or tenant protection plans to a customer's tenants if that customer uses one of Defendants' FMS platforms but Plaintiff is unable to access the FMS platform as an authorized user. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

7. All Documents relating to You directly or indirectly accessing or using any FMS platform operated by any FMS provider other than Defendants, including any Communications, agreements, terms or conditions, or costs associated with such access or use.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague because it appears to seek all documents relating to every customer, every communication, and every agreement related to a non- Storable FMS, as well as all documents related to every instance of Plaintiffs accessing a non-Storable FMS. This request is overbroad because it is unclear what documents related to non-Storable FMSs and to customers who use non-Storable FMSs wouldn't fall under this request. All such documents are not relevant to this case, and collecting all such materials would be unduly burdensome and costly. Plaintiff therefore interprets this request to be seeking API or similar access agreements between Plaintiff and non-Storable FMS providers, and related documents and communications. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

8. All Documents relating to any software plans or other efforts made by any FMS provider other than Defendants to require that You access their FMS platform(s) via an API, including any concerns that any such FMS provider expressed about You accessing their FMS platform(s) via a method other than an API, as well as any credentialing (i.e., user identifications, passwords), layer restrictions, proprietary systems, and automation related to accessing any such FMS platform.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it seeks user identifications and passwords. Plaintiff objects that this request is a compound request and therefore is vague and confusing. It is unclear from this request

-4- whether Defendants seek information regarding SafeLease's or the FMS platforms' "credentialing (i.e., user identifications, passwords), layer restrictions, proprietary systems, and automation." Plaintiff will interpret this portion of the request as seeking documents regarding the methods by which Plaintiff accesses FMS platforms other than Defendants' platforms. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it seeks documents relating to "software plans" without defining "software plans," and the meaning of this phrase is not obvious or clear. Plaintiff interprets this request as seeking documents related to any non- Storable FMS provider's requiring Plaintiff to access that provider's FMS via an APL Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control related to any non-Storable FMS provider's requiring Plaintiff to access that provider's FMS via an API, if such documents exist. Plaintiff is willing to meet and confer to understand what else, if anything, Defendants seek in response to this request.

9. All Documents relating to Your efforts, duties, and obligations to safeguard confidential, sensitive, or private Customer or tenant personally identifiable information ("PII"), including the source of such duties or obligations (i.e., contract, statute, or SOC-2 or other industry certification), measures You take or should take to protect PII, and communication with Your SOC-2 compliance vendor. See 2d Am. Pet. ,r 50.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and vague as to what it seeks because it requests documents regarding the measures Plaintiff "should take" without identifying the source of the purported duty.

Plaintiff objects that this request calls for legal conclusions to determine Plaintiff's "duties" and "obligations" based in "contract" or "statute." Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show its procedures or protocols to safeguard confidential, sensitive, or private Customer or tenant personally identifiable information and communications with its SOC-2 compliance vendor regarding Plaintiff's obtaining or maintaining its certification, if such documents exist.

10. All Documents relating to how You serve or have served Customers that do not use an FMS platform.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and vague as to what it seeks because it requests documents relating to how plaintiff "serve[s] or [has] served" customers without defining "serve." Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce documents in its possession, custody, or control relating to Customers without an FMS platform to whom it has provided tenant insurance or tenant protection services, if such documents exist.

11. All Documents reflecting what Customer or tenant data has been and is currently being accessed, collected, or stored by You. See 2d Am. Pet. ,r,r 50, 52.

-5-

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects that this request is overly broad and unduly burdensome because it appears to be seeking not just documents concerning the type of information Plaintiff accesses, but also the data itself. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague as to what it seeks because it appears to seek all tenant insurance and tenant protection plan documents for every SafeLease customer because these documents all reflect customer and tenant data that SafeLease has accessed. Plaintiff therefore interprets this request to seek documents sufficient to show what types of information Plaintiff accesses to provide tenant insurance to its customers. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce documents in its possession, custody, or control sufficient to show what types of information Plaintiff accesses to provide tenant insurance to its customers, if such documents exist.

12. All Documents relating to the retention of and all efforts to safeguard data You have obtained from Defendants' FMS platforms through Your Customers' accounts.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as redundant and duplicative of requests 9 and 11. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show what types of data, if any, SafeLease obtains through Defendants' FMS platforms via customer accounts and procedures or protocols to safeguard such data, if such documents exist.

13. All Documents relating to policies or procedures You use when accessing Defendants' FMS platforms, and all internal Communications, training materials, and materials for use with Customers relating to how You access Defendants' FMS platforms and the implications thereof.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague and confusing because it is unclear what Defendants mean by "the implications thereof." Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because documents relating to policies or procedures Plaintiff uses when accessing Defendants' platforms appears to include policies or procedures unrelated to access to Defendants' FMS platforms. Plaintiff interprets this request to mean policies or procedures for accessing Defendants' FMS platforms. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control relating to policies or procedures Plaintiff uses for accessing Defendants' FMS platforms, and internal communications, training materials, and materials for use with customers relating to how Plaintiff accesses Defendants' FMS platforms, if such documents exist.

14. All Documents relating to any offer made by a party to this Lawsuit to purchase the business assets or equity of any other party to this Lawsuit, in whole or in part.

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Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as not relevant to the claims or defenses in this case to the extent it seeks documents and communications relating to Plaintiff's business strategy in negotiations with Defendants.

Plaintiff objects to this request as overbroad and unduly burdensome to the extent it requests materials already in Defendants' possession, custody, and control. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

15. Documents sufficient to show Your existing Customers as of January 21, 2025.

Response: Plaintiff wi11 produce res onsive, non-2rivileged documents in its 2ossession, custody, and control sufficient to show the re uested information, if such documents exist.

16. Documents sufficient to show Your prospective and/or new Customers as of January 21, 2025.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as vague and unclear as to what it seeks to the extent it requests information on "prospective" customers without defining "prospective," given that any self-storage facility that is not a current SafeLease customer is, in some sense, a "prospective" customer. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague to the extent it requests documents relating to "new Customers as of January 21, 2025" without specifying whether it seeks a list solely of SafeLease's customers who became customers between January 21, 2025, and an unspecified earlier date or whether it seeks a list of SafeLease's customers who became customers after January 21, 2025. Plaintiff also objects to this request as overbroad and unduly burdensome because it is unclear what relevance who SafeLease's prospective or "new Customers" are has to any claim or defense in this case.

Subject to and without waiving these objections Plaintiff responds that it will not be producing any documents in response to this request at this time, but is willing to meet and confer to understand the intended scope and relevance of this request.

17. All Documents relating to complaints about You, including complaints about Your customer service, claim administration, claim adjustment, claim adjudication, pricing, billing, access to FMS platforms, or other aspects of the competitiveness of Your products and services.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it is unclear what "other aspects of the competitiveness of Your products and services" means. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control relating to complaints about Plaintiffs customer service, claim administration, claim adjustment, claim adjudication, pricing, billing, or access to FMS platforms, if such documents exist.

18. Documents sufficient to show the identity and number of Customers You have successfully acquired from Defendants.

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Response: Plaintiffs object to this request as unduly burdensome because it seeks documents that are equally available to Defendants. Plaintiff further objects to this request as vague and confusing to the extent it requests documents regarding Customers SafeLease has "successfully acquired" from Defendants; SafeLease interprets this request to relate to Customers who have chosen to stop using a tenant insurance product offered by Defendants and switch to a tenant insurance product offered by Plaintiff Subject to and without waiving this objection, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show the requested information, if such documents exist.

19. All Documents relating to any self-storage owner or operator switching from one of Defendants' FMS platforms to another FMS provider, including any communications You had with any existing or potential Customers or other FMS providers about such a switch.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague and unclear as to what it seeks because it requests information related to "potential" customers without defining "potential," given that any self-storage facility that is not a current SafeLease customer is, in some sense, a "potential" customer. Plaintiff also objects to this request as unduly burdensome because Defendants are in a better position than Plaintiff to know who has switched from one of Defendants' FMS systems to a competitor. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control relating to any self-storage owner or operator switching from one of Defendants' FMS platforms to another FMS provider, if such documents exist.

20. All Documents relating to how and when You accessed or used Defendants' FMS platforms before November 1, 2024, including the frequency, duration, method, and any automation and how You "further tailored" Your operations to make Your access of FMS "even more narrow and efficient." See 2d Am. Pet. at ,r 52.

Response: Plaintiff objects that this is an improper compound request and, as a result, it is unclear what information it seeks. Plaintiff also objects to this request as overly broad and unduly burdensome because it seeks extensive information, including the frequency and duration of every instance in which Plaintiff accessed or used Defendants' FMS platforms.

Plaintiff objects that this request is unduly burdensome because the information it seeks is equally or more accessible to Defendants as the operators of the FMS platforms. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds: Given the confusing, compound, and overly burdensome nature of this request, Plaintiff will not be producing documents in response at this time, but is willing to meet and confer to try to understand what relevant materials the request is actually seeking.

21. All Documents relating to how and when You accessed or used Defendants' FMS platforms (i) between December 17, 2024 and February 19, 2025 and (ii) since February 19, 2025, including the credentialing (i.e., user identifications, passwords), frequency, duration, method, and any automation as to each joint Customer of You and any Defendant.

-8-

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad to the extent it includes credentialing such as user identifications and passwords. Plaintiff objects that this is an improper compound request and, as a result, it is unclear what information it seeks. Plaintiff also objects to this request as overly broad and unduly burdensome because it seeks extensive information, including the frequency and duration of every instance in which Plaintiff accessed or used Defendants' FMS platforms. Plaintiff objects that this request is unduly burdensome because the information it seeks is equally or more accessible to Defendants as the operators of the FMS platforms. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds: Given the confusing, compound, and overly burdensome nature of this request, Plaintiff will not be producing documents in response at this time, but is willing to meet and confer to try to understand what relevant materials the request is actually seeking.

22. Documents sufficient to show the automation software or tools You have used or currently use to access Defendants' FMS platforms.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and vague because it seeks documents sufficient to show "automation software or tools" without defining this phrase.

Plaintiff interprets this request as seeking documents sufficient to show the technical methods Plaintiff has used or currently uses to access Defendants' FMS platforms. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show the requested information, if such documents exist.

23. Documents sufficient to identify Customers who do not or did not authorize You to have full administrative access to any FMS platform.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as vague and confusing because it appears to be seeking documents that would not exist given that authorization was not given. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it seeks information regarding "full administrative access" without defining this term; it is unclear what level of access Defendants consider to be "full administrative." Subject to and without waiving this objection, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to identify customers, if any, who have declined or limited Plaintiffs access to their FMS accounts, if such documents exist.

24. All Documents reflecting or substantiating Your alleged damages, including lost existing or prospective clients, out of pocket expenses, additional overhead, actual or potential exposure for lapsed or denied insurance policies or claims, or harm to goodwill.

Response: Plaintiff objects to the extent this request asks it to marshal its evidence prior to discovery completion. Plaintiff objects that this request seeks expert discovery, which Plaintiff will produce in accordance with the applicable scheduling order entered in this case. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Subject to and without waiving these

-9- objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged, non-expert documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

25. All Documents relating to any internal or third-party appraisal or valuation of You, including all 409A valuations and material provided to the appraiser or valuator.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and not relevant to any claims or defenses at issue in this case. Plaintiffs valuation is not at issue in this case. Plaintiff further objects to this request as unduly burdensome and vague because it seeks "any internal or third-party appraisal or valuation" without defining these terms. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce the current 409A report for Incase Holdings, Inc. 26. Documents sufficient to show the ownership, relationship, affiliation, and organization of the following entities: (a) Plaintiff; (b) Incase Holdings, Inc.; (c) Etude Reinsurance Company; (d) ProCure Technologies, Inc.; (e) Etude Capital, LLC; (t) Etude Capital Storage Holdings; (g) Capital Storage Holdings, LLC; and (h) Etude Storage Partners.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not relevant to any claims or defenses at issue in this case. Entities (b) through (h) are not parties here and any relationships they may have with Plaintiff are irrelevant. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show the organizational affiliation of the listed entities, if such documents exist.

27. Documents sufficient to show the sources of funds received or contemplated to financially support You, regardless of source (i.e., Etude Capital, Incase Holdings, Steven Stein individually, and any third parties), including the reasons and need for the financial support.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and not relevant to the claims at issue in this case. Plaintiffs funding sources are not at issue in this case. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it seeks information about funds "contemplated to financially support" Plaintiff without explaining who is "contemplating" these funds.

Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce financial statements sufficient to show SafeLease's funding that are in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents or funding exists.

28. All Documents relating to any Communications with any journalist, reporter, media outlet, or website regarding any Defendant, this Lawsuit, or any party's positions in this Lawsuit, including any marketing campaigns related to any Defendant.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad because it includes communications related to any defendant, regardless of whether the communications occurred before the defendant was affiliated with Storable or not. Plaintiff objects to this request as not relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in this case. Subject to and without wa1vmg these objections, Plaintiff will produce - 10- responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

29. All Documents relating to or referring to any Communications with current or prospective Customers regarding any Defendant, this Lawsuit, any party's positions in this Lawsuit, or any marketing campaigns geared towards any Defendant.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad because it includes communications related to any defendant, regardless of whether the communications occurred before the defendant was affiliated with Storable or not. For Defendants other than Storable, Plaintiff interprets this request as limited to communications or marketing campaigns that occurred after this lawsuit was filed. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

30. All Documents relating to or referring to any Communications with Scott Griffin or Chelsea McDaniel regarding any FMS platforms or Defendants, including but not limited to discussions about non-compete agreements and any Storable product or its pricing.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad, vague, and unduly burdensome because it includes communications "regarding any FMS platforms or Defendants" without limitation, which appears to include all communications related to any defendant-regardless of whether the communications occurred before the defendant was affiliated with Storable or not-and to any FMS platform, whether those communications have any relevance to a claim or defense in this case or not. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds: Plaintiff will not be producing documents in response to this request at this time, but is willing to meet and confer to try to understand what relevant information this request is seeking.

31. All Documents relating to Your financial condition, financial performance, and creditworthiness, including all audited and unaudited fmancial statements.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and not relevant to any claims or defenses at issue in this case because it appears to include all financial documents regarding Plaintiff. Plaintiff interprets this request to seek its balance sheets, income statements, cash flow statements, and statements of shareholders' equity. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce its current unaudited financial statement.

32. All Documents relating to or referring to Your employee and contractor hiring process, including any background checks, reviews of such employees or contractors, and a list of all current persons with access to Customer data from Defendants' FMS platforms.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeking irrelevant information. Employee background checks, employee reviews, and the names of all employees with access to customer data are not relevant to any claim or

- 11 - defense in this case and would include sensitive personal employee information. Having to search for, collect, and then redact this information would be needlessly burdensome and costly for Plaintiff given the irrelevance of any such documents. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Plaintiff will produce non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show its background check process and the SafeLease employee roles associated with levels of access to customer data from Defendants' FMS platforms.

33. All Documents relating to Communications with Customers about the level of access obtained by their grant of administrative credentials to You.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and vague because it requests documents relating to communications regarding "the level of access" without defining "level of access." Plaintiff will interpret this request as seeking communications with customers regarding granting SafeLease administrative access to an FMS platform. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

34. All Documents relating to any Customer data (including any general ledgers of Customers) that You accessed that are not necessary for the provision of tenant insurance or tenant protection plans.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad because it seeks "All Documents relating to any Customer data" when a subset of those documents would likely suffice. Plaintiff further objects to this request as overbroad and unduly burdensome to the extent it calls for documents or information in Defendants' possession, custody, or control. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff states that no such documents exist.

35. All Documents relating to Your agreements, negotiations, or consideration of potential agreements with any FMS provider, including Communications with such providers.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant because it includes documents and communications relating to negotiations and potential agreements with any FMS provider, regardless of whether Plaintiff and the FMS provider entered into an agreement. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it is unclear what "consideration of potential agreements" encompasses. SafeLease further objects to this request as overbroad and unduly burdensome to the extent it calls for documents already in Defendants' possession, custody, and control. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce API agreements between Plaintiff and any FMS provider that are in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

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36. All Documents relating to Your negotiations and business strategy with respect to any prospective agreement with any Defendant.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad because it seeks documents relating to Plaintiff's business strategy in negotiations with Defendants, regardless of whether those negotiations are ongoing or the information relates to settlement discussions. Plaintiff also objects to this request as overly broad because the request is not limited to a particular prospective agreement and instead encompasses "any prospective agreement" with any defendant, regardless of whether the defendant was associated with Storable at the time of the prospective agreement or whether the agreement has any relevance to any claim or defense in this case. Plaintiff also objects because this request is trying to seek the negotiation strategies of a negotiation counter- party through discovery, which have no relevance to this case and are improper. Plaintiff interprets this request to seek documents related to API negotiations with any defendant.

Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce any communications between Plaintiff and any defendant relating to a prospective API agreement that are in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

37. All Documents relating to Communications with or about potential investors in Your business, including Your assertion that You "turned down investors to stay true to Your vision."

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and irrelevant because it encompasses any documents relating to communications with or about potential investors regarding any aspect of Plaintiff's business without limitations. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it claims that Plaintiff asserted that it "turned down investors to stay true to Your vision" without citing a source for this alleged assertion. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds: Plaintiff will not be producing documents in response to this request at this time but is willing to meet and confer to try to understand the relevance of this request.

38. All Documents relating to any data incident or security breaches You have experienced.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it appears to include data incidents or security breaches to third party businesses such as FMS providers that indirectly impact Plaintiffs business. Plaintiff objects to this request as vague because it seeks documents relating to any "data incident" without defining "data incident" or describing how it differs from a security breach; Plaintiff interprets the phrases to be synonyms. Plaintiff also interprets this request as seeking document relating to any security breaches of SafeLease's systems. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

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39. All Documents relating to any Communications with state regulators, including state departments of insurance, about You or any Defendant, including licensing requirements and disclosures.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad because it seeks documents relating to communications with state regulators rather than seeking only the actual communications. Plaintiff further objects to this request as overly broad and unduly burdensome in seeking "All Documents relating to any Communications with state regulators," which encompasses a huge swath of communications on a wide array of topics not relevant to this dispute. Plaintiff objects to this request as not relevant to the claims or defenses in this case because SafeLease's regulatory process and licensing requirements are not at issue in this case. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce documents sufficient to show its licensing status in the states in which it operates.

40. Documents sufficient to show Your relationship with Obsidian Insurance.

Response: Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody, and control sufficient to show the business relationship between SafeLease and Obsidian Insurance, if such documents exist.

41. All Documents relating to how You use access to Defendants' FMS platforms or data obtained from such FMS platforms to help You market or sell Your products or services.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request as overly broad and vague because it is unclear what defendants mean by "market or sell ... products or services." Plaintiff interprets this request as seeking documents related to Plaintiffs using its access to Defendants' FMS platforms or data on those platforms to generate new business with new customers. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds that no such documents exist.

42. All Documents relating to Communications with Your Customers about Your ability to access any Defendant FMS platform.

Response: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it calls for information protected by the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. Plaintiff also objects to this request as vague because it is unclear what is meant by communications about SafeLease's "ability" to access one of Defendants' FMS platforms. Plaintiff interprets this request to be seeking communications with SafeLease's customers about its technological capabilities to access any Storable FMS. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff will produce responsive, non-privileged communications in its possession, custody, and control, if such documents exist.

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Date: April 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted, Judd E. Stone II Isl R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 R. Paul Yetter [email protected] State Bar No. 22154200 Christopher D. Hilton [email protected] State Bar No. 24087727 Susanna R. Allen [email protected] State Bar No. 24126616 Alexander M. Dvorscak [email protected] State Bar No. 24120461 Luke A. Schamel [email protected] State Bar No. 24106403 STONE HILTON PLLC [email protected] Congress Ave., Suite 2350 Shannon N. Smith Austin, Texas 78701 State Bar No. 24110378 (737) 465-3897 [email protected] YETTER COLEMAN LLP Adam T. Locke 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 State Bar No. 24083184 Houston, Texas 77002 [email protected] (713) 632-8000 LOCKELAW PLLC 2617 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 Houston, Texas 77005 (713) 832-0243 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of this response was served on all counsel of record via the Court's electronic filing system on April 28, 2025.

Isl Luke A. Schamel Luke A. Schamel

- 15 - Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101933933 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Safelease Response to Motion to Stay Discovery Order Status as of 6/12/2025 11 :00 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101933933 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Safelease Response to Motion to Stay Discovery Order Status as of 6/12/2025 11 :00 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT John Holler [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/12/2025 10:48:14 AM SENT

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 V. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. §

Storable's Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline

Storable respectfully submits this reply in support of the Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline and to address certain points raised in SafeLease's response.

First, the protective order and OCEO provisions will not adequately protect Storable's trade secrets in its FMS facility customer list. Trade secrets are a privilege. TEX. R. Evm. 507. In order to obtain them in discovery, SafeLease has the burden to prove why they are necessary---otherwise they are protected against disclosure, and it is an abuse of discretion to order their production. See Storable's Mot. to Reconsider Discovery Order (Jun. 9, 2025). SafeLease has never explained why the list is necessary given the multiple alternatives that Storable offered to provide SafeLease with the information it needs to determine Storable's FMS market share short of identifying every one of Storable's FMS customers. At minimum, a stay of the production deadline is warranted so that the Court can at least see if SafeLease can meet its burden.

Second, SafeLease's response acknowledges that this Court's jurisdiction is presently at issue in the Court of Appeals, and it does not dispute that the agreed protective order in this case would be void if the Court of Appeals determines that jurisdiction is lacking. Resp. at 3. Rather, SafeLease simply argues that Storable will not prevail on appeal. Resp. at 4. However, that is an issue for the Court of Appeals to decide. In the meantime, "[i]f a court orders a person to disclose a trade secret, it must take any protective measure required by the interests of the privilege holder and the parties and to further justice." TEX. R. Evm. 507(c) (emphasis added). Those interests favor a short deferral of Storable's deadline to produce this trade secret to ensure that this Court has jurisdiction to enforce its protective order.

Third, SafeLease attempts to equate its own insurance customer list with Storable's FMS customer list, which SafeLease purportedly produced. 1 This is apples and oranges. SafeLease's customer list is relevant because SafeLease alleges that Storable tortiously interfered with its contracts with those customers. Storable has a right to take discovery of who those customers are, and to know whether they or the contracts that SafeLease alleges that it has with them, even exist. By contrast, Storable's FMS customer list, which identifies Storable's FMS customers, is not relevant. The identities of those FMS customers are not relevant to SafeLease' s claims; SafeLease only needs to know the total number of those customers for purposes of determining Storable's FMS market share. The Court should not be persuaded by the false equivalency between the two lists. 2 Fourth, Storable did not waive its trade secret protection. Again, trade secrets are a privilege. TEX. R. Evm. 507. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a party to object to discovery requests on the basis of a privilege. TEX. R. C1v. P. 193.2(±). The ordinary procedure

1 Incidentally this production occurred at 10:13 AM, today June 12, 2025, almost immediately before SafeLease filed its response to the stay motion at 10:50 AM. As of this filing, Storable has not even had the opportunity to meaningfully review this production.

2 SafeLease's response admits that its customer list is also highly sensitive. Resp. at 6. That SafeLease chose to forgo whatever privilege it may have had with respect to its own customer list does not mean that Storable should have to do so for its FMS customer list. SafeLease cites no authority otherwise.

-2- under the rules is that Storable may withhold the document, produce a privilege log asserting the privilege (along with any other privileges as to other documents), and SafeLease could challenge any privilege assertions at that time. TEX. R. Crv. P. 193.3. Indeed, Storable has raised its privilege claim even earlier than it otherwise would have been required to in its briefing on the stay motion and its motion to reconsider the Court's discovery order. The fact that SafeLease is attempting to short circuit the ordinary procedures under the rules and obtain advance production of a privileged document is another reason why a stay is warranted. In any event, Storable stated in its pre-motion letter-and previously told SafeLease when meeting and conferring-that the list was "highly confidential"; that it did not use the magic word "trade secret" is not a waiver of Storable's right to assert this privilege, which it has now plainly done.

Fourth, SafeLease complains of the "irony" that Storable is moving for "no evidence" partial summary judgment on the attempted monopolization claim, while objecting to producing a single document related to that claim. Resp. at 6. This argument is wrong because Storable has moved for traditional summary judgment, not no-evidence summary judgment. It is also a red herring. Storable's FMS customer list is not relevant to Storable's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and SafeLease does not need it to respond to that motion. Notwithstanding SafeLease's unsupported statements, the list relates only to one element of SafeLease's attempted monopolization claim: whether Storable's has monopoly power in the alleged FMS market. 3 Resp. at 1. But Storable's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment does not move on that element.

That Motion is exclusively focused on the failure of multiple other, required elements of

3 SafeLease also states but fails to explain how the list is "critical" to "defining the relevant antitrust market" or assessing the "competitive impact of [Storable's] conduct." Resp. at 7. The list is not necessary much less "critical" for either purpose. Further, Storable's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment does not move on SafeLease's failure to properly define relevant antitrust markets, so even if the list were relevant to that element, SafeLease would not be prejudiced by staying production of the list until after the motion is heard and decided.

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SafeLease's attempted monopolization claim, including whether SafeLease has a dangerous probability of monopolizing the alleged tenant insurance market or an intent to monopolize that market. SafeLease seems to imply that the Storable's FMS facility list is somehow relevant to showing a "market-wide effect" for tenant insurance. Resp. at 6--7. It is not. In short, obtaining Storable's FMS facility customer list would not help SafeLease avoid summary judgment on other elements of this claim. The summary judgment motion is set for hearing on July 1, 2025. A stay of the deadline to produce the list is warranted until after the Court rules on that motion.

Finally, a stay would not cause prejudice. To deflect from its failure to show why production of the list is necessary, SafeLease accuses Storable of delaying discovery generally.

That is wrong. Storable has diligently participated in extensive meet and confers and detailed discussions regarding discovery objections, search terms, custodians, and other matters. Those discussions are partially reflected in the communications attached to SafeLease's response at Ex. 2-which demonstrate the volume and complexity of discovery in this case. SafeLease' s complaint about an alleged delay is untenable at the early stage in discovery.

Conclusion Storable requests that the Court grant its motion for an emergency stay of the June 13, 2025 production deadline as to SafeLease's Request for Production No. 10.

Respectfully submitted June 12, 2025. s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 John Holler (admitted pro hac vice) Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002-2755 Tel.: (713) 576--2400

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Fax: (713) 576-2499 Katherine. [email protected] [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth "Liza" Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226-6000 Fax: (713)226-6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320-7240 Fax:(512)320-7240 Dale. [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

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Certificate of Conference The Parties conferred regarding the relief requested in the foregoing motion, and counsel for Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff is opposed.

Isl Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 1,372 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates.

Isl Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on June 2, 2025.

Isl Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

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The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASEINSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff; § § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants.

§

Order Partially Granting Emergency Stay and Additional Relief

Before the Court is Storable' s Emergency Motion for a Partial Stay of the June 13, 2025 Court-Ordered Production Deadline (the Motion). The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Motion and ORDERS that, for purposes of Request for Production (RFP) No. 10 only, Storable's June 13, 2025 production deadline is stayed until June 24, 2025, during which time Storable' s pending motions for reconsideration of the Court's April 15 and May 28 discovery orders will be submitted to the Court.

Because the stay pushes the production deadline until after SafeLease's June 20, 2025 deadline to respond to Storable's motion for partial summary judgment, the Court extends that deadline to July 11, 2025 and extends Storable' s summary- judgment reply deadline from June 27, 2025 to July 18, 2025. Court staff will contact the parties about resetting the summary-judgment hearing.

Date signed: June 12, 2025

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division

E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court of Texas 6/16/2025 7:27 PM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING MODIFICATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii Factual Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 Applicable Legal Standards ............................................................................................................ 2 Argument and Authorities............................................................................................................... 3 1. The motion cites no new law. ................................................................................................. 3 2. The motion raises no changed facts or new concerns. ............................................................ 3 3. Westlake sheds no new light on these unchanged facts and original concerns. ...................... 5 4. SafeLease will suffer hardship without Locke’s continued access. ........................................ 9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 11 Certificate of Service .................................................................................................................... 12 Certificate of Compliance ............................................................................................................. 12 i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Federal Cases Advanced Magnesium Alloys Corp. v. Dery, 2021 WL 2915112 (S.D. Ind. May 5, 2021) ............................................................................10 Affymetrix, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., 2005 WL 1801683 (D. Del. July 28, 2005) .............................................................................12 Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’Ship v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 405 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ...........................................................................................9, 10 Blackbird Tech LCC v. Serv. Lighting & Elec. Supplies, Inc., 2016 WL 2904592 (D. Del. May 18, 2016) .............................................................................12 Blythe v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, L.L.C., 423 F. Supp. 3d 299 (E.D. La. 2019) .....................................................................................5, 7 Ecolab Inc. v. IBA, Inc., 2024 WL 3650464 (D. Minn. May 19, 2024) ..........................................................................11 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 2011 WL 13202057 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2011) .......................................................................12 Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 525 (N.D. Cal. 2000) .............................................................................................12 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 929 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................................12 PSI Marine, Inc. v. Seahorse Docking LLC, 2024 WL 5077849 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2024) ..........................................................................13 Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. NASA Elecs. Corp., 249 F.R.D. 378 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ..............................................................................................10 ST Sales Tech Hldgs., LLC v. Daimler Chrysler Co., LLC, 2008 WL 5634214 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2008) .......................................................8, 9, 13 Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Cardo Sys., Inc., 2019 WL 13472203 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2019) .......................................................................13 ii

State Cases 1776 Energy Partners, LLC v. Marathon Oil EF, LLC, 692 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) ....................................................4, 7 In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2008)......................................................................................................7 In re GreatAmerica Leasing Corp., 294 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, no pet.)....................................4 Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006)....................................................................................................12 Macy v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)...................................5, 7 Westlake Longview Corp. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 (May 16, 2025) .................................................................................. passim iii

This Court decided that all outside counsel of record may access Outside Counsel Eyes Only (OCEO) documents, including Adam Locke. Defendants now seek to reconsider and reverse that decision despite there being no change in facts or governing law. Their motion is baseless.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND The motion raises no new facts about Locke’s access to OCEO data or new concerns. This is reflected by the motion omitting a factual section. Defendants simply want a different ruling.

Locke is a seasoned, skilled, and respected young litigator. He still runs his own law firm, Lockelaw PLLC, of which SafeLease is one of many clients. He is not an employee of SafeLease or its CEO. And he provides no commercial advice to SafeLease, makes no business decisions for it, and is part of none of its non-legal decision-making. See Pltf. Resp. Mot. to Modify at 1-2. Since the April 15 order, he has continued zealously to represent SafeLease in this case, conferring with defense counsel, negotiating discovery and other disputes, and prosecuting his client’s claims.

Most important, Locke remains committed to abiding by the Court’s protective order. He participates in no SafeLease business dealings or negotiations that implicate OCEO information.

Id. at 5. In short, the dispositive facts that underlie the Court’s order are unchanged.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS To be sure, no court is required to reconsider prior rulings or even reach the substance of a motion to reconsider. See 1776 Energy Partners, LLC v. Marathon Oil EF, LLC, 692 S.W.3d 564, (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.). Courts “are not required to reconsider prior rulings,” and “it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse such petitions.” In re GreatAmerica Leasing Corp., 294 S.W.3d 912, 915 n.2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, no pet.).

This is especially true for motions to reconsider that raise no new facts. See Macy v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 638, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (no abuse to decline to reconsider ruling where “movant cites no additional evidence ‘beyond that available to him’” at the time of first ruling). “When there exists no independent reason for reconsideration other than mere disagreement with a prior order, reconsideration is a waste of judicial time and resources and should not be granted.” Blythe v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, L.L.C., 423 F. Supp. 3d 299, 304 (E.D. La. 2019). Merely disagreeing with a ruling, like defendants do here, is not enough.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES Defendants ask the Court to reverse its April 15 order but raise new no law or facts. They point to the same facts and raise the same concerns that the Court carefully considered earlier. The only new point they raise is the Court’s ruling in Westlake Longview Corp. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 (May 16, 2025). But Westlake creates no new law. Rather, it faithfully applies long-established precedent from other jurisdictions, all of which existed when defendants filed their original motion, to facts different from those here. The Court is well familiar with that case law, as well as the key facts in both cases, and may deny the motion summarily. Defendants simply reargue the same facts under new labels. Nothing has changed; nor should the result.

1. The motion cites no new law.

Defendants cite Westlake as intervening new authority, suggesting that it changes the law this Court should apply. Not so. Indeed, the motion cites the cases that Westlake cites, all of which existed before this case. Defendants could have cited the same cases and made the same points in their original motion but chose not to. A litigant’s decision not to raise legal arguments earlier is hardly good cause or a valid basis for reconsideration. See Macy, 294 S.W.3d at 651. Here, although the Westlake decision is certainly new, the law the Court considered is established.

2. The motion raises no changed facts or new concerns.

The parties fully briefed whether Locke’s access to documents creates a risk of disclosure or misuse. See Mot. at 2. Indeed, defendants’ repeated reliance on Locke’s declaration as supposed support belies any newness to their motion. The Court carefully considered the facts stated in that declaration when deciding this issue the first time. The motion rehashes old arguments and raises nothing new.

In brief, Locke’s access poses no risk of disclosure or misuse. His access is no different from any other outside counsel’s. As amply proved, he is not employed by SafeLease and has no business role in the company. See Resp. to Mot. to Modify at 2. Through his law firm, he provides outside counsel services to SafeLease and other clients. These are the same sort of services provided to clients by prominent law firms like defense counsel. Id. at 2 n.1. He gives no commercial advice to SafeLease, makes no business decisions for it, and is not involved in its commercial decision-making. Id. at 2. He has given unequivocal assurances that he accepts the limitations that the protective order puts on him and will abide by those limitations. In fact, he was clear that accessing OCEO materials limits his “participation in business dealings or negotiations between the parties if they implicate OCO information.” Id. at 5.

Defendants now worry that Locke “unconsciously” might take OCEO data “into account when providing legal advice on matters outside of this litigation.” Mot. at 3. Of course, that risk exists for all outside counsel on both sides. It is not unique to Locke, and it is no reason to treat him differently from all other outside counsel of record. He is just as committed to safeguarding the confidentiality of all sensitive materials exchanged between the parties.

Because nothing about the claimed risk of deliberate or inadvertent disclosure or misuse has changed or applies uniquely to Locke, reconsideration on that basis is unjustified.

Yet defendants try to use this Court’s decision in Westlake to repackage meritless concerns.

With no change in law or facts, they strain to put new labels on old concerns to re-urge an already decided issue. This repackaging without any “additional evidence ‘beyond that available to [them]’ at the time of the original ruling” is not persuasive. Macy, 294 S.W.3d at 651. Rather, the motion, based on mere disagreement with the ruling, is “a waste of judicial time and resources and should not be granted.” Blythe, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 304.

The Court would not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without considering its substance. See 1776 Energy, 692 S.W.3d at 586. The Court should do so.

3. Westlake sheds no new light on these unchanged facts and original concerns.

Even were the Court to reach the substance of this motion, Westlake would not change the outcome given the same facts and no change in law.

First, Westlake itself is not controlling. Defendants handwave over the specific facts in that dispute. Neither its facts nor its holding applies here. As the Court well knows, the dispute in Westlake was whether (1) the protective order should have two tiers and (2) in-house counsel could access the higher AEO tier. Id. ¶2. The Court denied access to the AEO tier because the parties presented no evidence on whether in-house counsel should have access. Id. ¶20.

Here, unlike in Westlake, the issues were thoroughly briefed and fully supported by proof.

And, unlike in Westlake, the protective order already was in effect, and it had been agreed by the parties. Courts often resolve disputes over what should be included in a draft protective order. But when “the parties conclude an agreement,” like they did here, the Supreme Court says that “the court should not lightly ignore their bargain.” In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. 2008). Westlake therefore sheds no new light on the facts of this dispute.

Second, the types of evidence that Westlake says can be relevant to denying an attorney access to sensitive documents are not present here, as shown by Westlake and the cases it relies on. As Westlake says, the core question is, given the attorney’s role, whether she “is involved in the client’s ‘competitive decision-making.’” 2025 Tex. Bus. 19 ¶16. Here, Locke is clear that his role and advice is limited to legal matters, not commercial decisions. No evidence disputes that.

Trying to re-label facts the Court already considered according to the types of evidence Westlake identifies does not change this simple fact: Locke is not a competitive decision-maker.

Nonetheless, defendants claim that five types of evidence support hamstringing Locke’s role in this case. They are wrong. They cite his past in-house roles to try to bar him from seeing OCEO documents when representing SafeLease in his current role as outside counsel through his law firm. But his current role is the one that matters. Even if Locke’s past role might have justified denying him access two years ago, his present role as outside counsel and law firm owner does not. The five types of evidence that defendants cite simply do not exist here.

Type 1. Defendants point to Locke’s “advising his employer on a gamut of legal issues, including contracts, marketing, and employment.” Mot. at 4, quoting Westlake. But SafeLease is not his employer. Defendants’ position would mean that virtually all outside general counsel, who routinely advise clients on “a gamut of legal issues,” presumptively would be barred from seeing OCEO information for a longtime client in litigation. That is not the law.

Type 2. Defendants point to Locke having once served as “general counsel and outside counsel for the company, [having] served an affiliate in a purely business capacity, played a major role in the company’s core business . . . and [having] worked directly under the company’s owner.”

Id. at 4, quoting Westlake. Westlake cites ST Sales Tech Hldgs., LLC v. Daimler Chrysler Co., LLC, 2008 WL 5634214 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2008), for this factor. In ST Sales, that factor was relevant where the attorney was uniquely and inextricably intertwined in the client’s core business of patent assertion, which would have failed to operate but for the attorney’s commercial guidance.

The ST Sales lawyer’s role was that of a “competitive decisionmaker,” akin to a business executive, and went “well-beyond the typical role of outside counsel, even outside counsel who might work with an entity for years.” Id. at *5. In contrast, Locke’s declaration is unequivocal that he fills the usual role of outside general advisor and litigator to a longtime client and is not a competitive decision-maker. Defendants cite no facts to the contrary. Rather, because he is not a competitive decision-maker, Locke’s story is hardly unique: lawyers routinely transition from in-house to outside counsel roles, and the mere fact that a lawyer served a client in an in-house role, as Locke did, does not serve as a lifetime bar from representing the client against a competitor.

Type 3. Defendants point to the “frequency and intensity of interactions between in-house counsel and company leadership and the critical nature of the litigation to the company’s future.”

Mot. at 6, quoting Westlake. They focus on Locke’s past job and make unfounded assumptions about his current work for SafeLease and its CEO. For this factor, Westlake relied on Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’Ship v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 405 (N.D. Ill. 2006), which offers no support for defendants’ position. Autotech says nothing about restricting access for outside counsel or condemning as a risk of disclosure a close attorney-client relationship from a prior job.

There, all agreed that access would be unrestricted for outside counsel. Id. at 406. The only question was whether access should be restricted for in-house counsel who were or might in the future be involved in competitive decision-making—indeed, the court began its analysis noting the important difference: “Where in-house counsel are involved in competitive decision making, . . . the risk of inadvertent disclosure is obviously higher than for retained counsel.” Id. at 408.

Locke is not in-house counsel or involved in competitive decision-making—he is outside counsel and professionally independent. The influence that SafeLease or any client can apply to him is no different than any other outside counsel in this litigation. Indeed, at least one court has rejected a similar attempt to extend this concern about independence beyond in-house counsel as “off base”: Autotech “recognize[s] that a lawyer who is involved in competitive decision making for his employer would have a very difficult time compartmentalizing the information he has access to and not allowing confidential information learned through litigation influence the business advice he gives his employer.” Advanced Magnesium Alloys Corp. v. Dery, 2021 WL 2915112, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Ind. May 5, 2021) (emphasis added).

What’s more, the relationship at issue in Dery is closer than the one alleged here—the person granted access was married to the plaintiff’s president—yet it created no risk of disclosure.

Id. at *1 (emphasis added). If being married to a party’s president doesn’t create a risk of disclosure, having a four-year professional relationship with a former employer and current client doesn’t either.

Type 4. Defendants point to evidence “‘that the attorney was director of legal and business affairs for the company’; was ‘responsible for supervising its efforts [regarding matters relating to the subject of the case]’; and ‘reported directly to company’s general counsel, even though she did not handle product development contracts or other corporate matters.’” Mot. at 8, quoting Westlake. Here, again, defendants focus on Locke’s prior job. The case Westlake relied on for this point, Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. NASA Elecs. Corp., 249 F.R.D. 378 (S.D. Fla. 2008), says nothing about a lawyer’s past in-house job erecting a permanent bar to participating in discovery after becoming outside counsel. If it had, this would run contrary to common practice.

Given the evidence that he is professionally independent of SafeLease, and not a commercial or competitive decision-maker, Locke’s past role does not bar his current access.

Type 5. Defendants point to “evidence that an attorney oversaw and advised the company’s business leaders on strategy for litigation of the same type as the pending case, even though the attorney was not involved in pricing, product design, sales, marketing, distribution, or day-to-day operations.” Mot. at 9, quoting Westlake. They say Locke’s representation of a different company in another case means he cannot see OCEO materials here because SafeLease’s CEO is president of the other company. But that case is not “of the same type” as this case. The other case is a fraud dispute involving a failed acquisition. Mot., Ex. H at 64-66. So, whether Locke advised litigation strategy there is irrelevant to his ability to access documents here. While defendants claim the same “tactics” are being used—as statement as vague as it is incorrect—neither Westlake nor the case it cites, Ecolab Inc. v. IBA, Inc., 2024 WL 3650464 (D. Minn. May 19, 2024), say anything about “tactical” similarity. Nor does either case discuss—let alone base its holding—on whether the attorney represents clients with overlapping officers.

In any event, the tactics point is a throwaway. Defendants make it just to recycle their past accusation that SafeLease filed this suit in bad faith to gain leverage in negotiations. Mot. at 9. The Court has heard the evidence, of course, and decided to the contrary.

* * * In short, Westlake changes nothing about the facts that the Court already considered. The motion ignores current facts and dwells on the past. Stripped of its rhetoric, defendants’ position is that Locke will not or cannot honor the protective order. Every fact in the record says otherwise.

4. SafeLease will suffer hardship without Locke’s continued access.

The motion fails to show Locke is involved in competitive decision-making or poses any more risk of disclosure or misuse than any other outside counsel. Indeed, Defendants do not even argue Locke is involved in competitive decision-making. Locke’s uncontroverted declaration establishes he is not. See Locke Decl. ¶¶19-21. “Unrebutted statements made by counsel asserting that he does not participate in competitive decisionmaking, which the court has no reason to doubt, form a reasonable basis to conclude that counsel is isolated from competitive decisionmaking.”

Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 525, 529 (N.D. Cal. 2000); accord Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 929 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court need not address whether Locke’s access to OCEO materials should be limited. See Affymetrix, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., 2005 WL 1801683, at *2 (D. Del. July 28, 2005) (conducting no need-for- access analysis after finding no risk of disclosure).

But were the Court to reach this step, the only conclusion is that there is a significant need: SafeLease will suffer hardship if Locke is denied access. A party suffers hardship when it is “prevented from using the attorneys of its choice.” Blackbird Tech LCC v. Serv. Lighting & Elec. Supplies, Inc., 2016 WL 2904592, at *5 (D. Del. May 18, 2016). “Public policy strongly favors a client’s freedom to employ a lawyer of his choosing.” Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. 2006). For this analysis, courts consider whether the attorney has “a unique set of experiences, breadth of knowledge, and specialized qualifications that make his fully informed advise essential to outside counsel’s ability to zealously and effectively represent” the client. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 2011 WL 13202057, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2011) (cleaned up).

Recognizing that the evidence cuts against them, the motion reverts to double-speak about Locke’s expertise. For example, it quotes a press release about his “expert knowledge of SafeLease’s products, market positioning, and the value the company delivers to its customers” to argue that he should be denied access. Mot. at 5-6. Then it says he “does not have, nor does he claim to have, any special experience rendering his insights particularly essential,” to argue that he has no need for access. Id. at 11. Defendants cannot have it both ways.

The unrebutted evidence is that Locke has special knowledge about SafeLease’s business, making him indispensable here. He has worked with SafeLease longer than its other counsel of record. See Locke Decl. ¶12. His history with and knowledge of SafeLease will aid discovery in this complex dispute. Its ability to prosecute its case will be significantly harmed if he is not allowed to evaluate OCEO documents using his knowledge and experience.

Moreover, denying him access to this information would de facto deny SafeLease its counsel of choice, since defendants have applied OCEO designations on virtually all of their productions thus far, even where this designation was highly suspect. See, e.g., Locke Decl. ¶46 (noting document marked OCEO even though it did not appear to be confidential).

The motion claims that because the case “is at an early stage” and SafeLease has “two fully capably [sic] outside law firms,” there is no hardship. Mot. at 11. Not so. Other counsel is significant where the excluded attorney has no unique role, and the risk of disclosure is “very high.” ST Sales, 2008 WL 5634214, at *8; see also Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Cardo Sys., Inc., 2019 WL 13472203, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2019). Neither is true here. As discussed above, Locke has developed special industry and company knowledge that makes him a unique advocate for SafeLease in this litigation. Moreover, Locke has repeatedly affirmed his professional independence and his commitment to the protective order. Under these circumstances, the stage of litigation and presence of other counsel does not affect the balancing test. See PSI Marine, Inc. v. Seahorse Docking LLC, 2024 WL 5077849, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2024) (granting access despite other counsel because the attorney had “litigation experience, and plaintiffs have asked her to serve as a trusted liaison to help them understand and weigh the advice of her co-counsel”).

SafeLease needs Locke as its counsel, and he needs to access OCEO materials.

CONCLUSION The Court should deny the motion for reconsideration of its April 15, 2025 order.

Date: June 16, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Paul Yetter Judd E. Stone II R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24087727 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] [email protected] Alexander M. Dvorscak Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24120461 State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] [email protected] STONE HILTON PLLC Shannon N. Smith Congress Ave. State Bar No. 24110378 Austin, Texas 78748 [email protected] (737) 465-3897 Julia C. Risley State Bar No. 24132932 Adam T. Locke [email protected] State Bar No. 24083184 YETTER COLEMAN LLP [email protected] 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 LOCKELAW PLLC Houston, Texas 77002 2617 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 (713) 632-8000 Houston, Texas 77005 (713) 832-0243 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via the Court e- filing service and/or by email, on June 16, 2025.

/s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 3,339 words, not including the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates.

/s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

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Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102078571 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: SafeLease Response to Motion to Reconsider April 15 Order Status as of 6/17/2025 9:02 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alyssa Smith on behalf of R. Yetter Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102078571 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: SafeLease Response to Motion to Reconsider April 15 Order Status as of 6/17/2025 9:02 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT John Holler [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/16/2025 7:27:46 PM SENT E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court986 of Texas 6/17/2025 6:52 PM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ______________________________________________________________________________ Storable’s Motion for Extension of Stay and Reply Deadline ______________________________________________________________________________ Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs (d/b/a storEDGE); SiteLink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (collectively, “Storable”) respectfully submit this motion for an extension of the stay of the deadline to produce Storable’s FMS customer list and the motion for summary judgment reply deadline set forth in the Court’s June 12, 2025 Order Partially Granting Emergency Stay and Additional Relief (“Stay Order”).

Storable would show as follows.

Summary Storable’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Partial MSJ”) regarding SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim does not implicate Storable’s FMS customer list. The customer list is only potentially relevant—but not necessary—to establishing Storable’s FMS market share, which, in turn, is relevant only to whether Storable has monopoly power in the alleged FMS market. But Storable’s Partial MSJ does not move on that element. Rather, Storable requests summary judgment as to other, mandatory elements of SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim. Granting summary judgment for Defendants as to any of these elements would be fatal to this claim.

The Court should therefore grant two extensions. First, the Court should extend the stay of the deadline to produce Storable’s FMS customer list through its decision on Storable’s Partial MSJ. In the alternative, if the Court needs further assurance that the list is not relevant to the Partial MSJ, it should at a minimum extend the stay until it has received the MSJ briefs and determines, if at all, that production of the FMS customer list is necessary to fairly adjudicate the Partial MSJ. If the Court can grant summary judgment for Defendants on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim without production of the FMS customer list, ordering production of the list, which is a trade secret, is not necessary and would be in error. Determining whether additional evidence is needed to rule on a summary judgment motion after receiving the parties’ submissions is consistent with the standard procedures for summary judgment motions under Rule 166a(g).

Extending the stay at least until the Court has reviewed the parties briefing on the Partial MSJ will also serve the interest of judicial economy by avoiding the need for emergency motions, responses, hearings, or requests for appellate relief regarding the stay in the event the Court does not reconsider the May 28 Discovery Order and the stay is dissolved, as it otherwise would be, on June 24.

Second, Storable requests a one-week extension of its deadline to file a MSJ reply to July 25, 2025 due to pre-planned absences of members of Storable’s counsel team. Storable is available for a hearing on the summary judgment motion promptly after briefing is complete during the week of July 28, 2025.

Plaintiff opposes the requested extension of the stay but does not oppose the requested extension of the reply deadline.

Relevant Background Storable filed its Partial MSJ on June 2, 2025. The Court’s May 28, 2025 Discovery Order (“Discovery Order”) set a deadline of June 13, 2025 for Storable to produce its FMS customer list

-2- in response to SafeLease’s Request for Production No. 10. The June 12 Stay Order stayed that deadline until June 24, 2025, which is the day after the submission date for the second of Storable’s two pending motions for reconsideration related to the Discovery Order. The June 12 Stay Order also sua sponte granted an extension of SafeLease’s time to file a response to Storable’s Partial MSJ to July 11, 2025 “[b]ecause the stay pushes the production deadline until after SafeLease’s [then-current] June 20, 2025 deadline to respond to Storable’s motion for partial summary judgment.” Stay Order. The Stay Order also extends Storable’s deadline to file a reply in support of its Partial MSJ to July 18, 2025.

Storable’s FMS customer list is not relevant to the Partial MSJ on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim. The Partial MSJ requests summary judgment on multiple elements of SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim, specifically that: (1) Storable has no dangerous probability of monopolizing the tenant insurance market; (2) Storable’s conduct did not harm competition for tenant insurance; (3) Storable’s conduct is not anticompetitive or predatory because Storable has not excluded or refused to deal with SafeLease and because this conduct has legitimate business justifications; and (4) Storable does not have a specific intent to monopolize the tenant insurance market.

Defs’ Partial MSJ (Jun. 2, 2025).

Storable carefully targeted these elements not only for their failure on the merits but also because they do not implicate its FMS customer list in any way. All these elements relate to the effect or implications of Storable’s conduct in the alleged tenant insurance market only.

Storable’s FMS customer list is not relevant to any of these elements or implicated by any of Storable’s arguments in its Partial MSJ.

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Legal Standard Discovery stays. A trial court may issue any protective order “in the interest of justice” to protect the movant from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, or annoyance. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(b). Such limitations may include modifying the timing of discovery. Id. Similarly, the Court may also schedule discovery in appropriate phases. Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4(b)(1)–(2).

Production of a trade secret. “A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose … a trade secret owned by the person, unless the court finds that nondisclosure will tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.” Tex. R. Evid. 507(a). Therefore, once the party resisting discovery establishes that the information is a trade secret, “[t]he burden then shifts to the requesting party to establish that the information is necessary for a fair adjudication of its claims.” In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (emphasis added).

Argument and Authorities I. The Court Should Extend the Stay Through its Decision on the Partial MSJ, or, Alternatively, at Least Until it Has Considered the Full Briefing on the Partial MSJ The interests of justice overwhelmingly support deferring production of Storable’s FMS customer list—a trade secret—until after the Court has determined whether SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim can be disposed of on grounds that do not implicate this list. If it can, as Storable has requested in its Partial MSJ, the list will no longer be discoverable, let alone necessary to any claim, as it must be to overcome Storable’s trade secret privilege. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a) (“a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action”); In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at 613 (trade secret may be produced only if “necessary for a fair adjudication” of the requesting party’s claims or defenses).

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SafeLease does not contend that the FMS customer list is relevant to any claim except the attempted monopolization claim. The list is not necessary for a fair adjudication of the Partial MSJ on that claim. The only element of SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim to which the list is allegedly relevant is “assessing Storable’s market power” in the FMS market— specifically, determining Storable’s FMS market share. Plaintiff’s Opp. to Stay Mot. at 7 (June 12, 2025). Storable did not move for summary judgment on that element in its Partial MSJ.

SafeLease attempted to argue around this point in its Opposition to Storable’s stay motion1—but it did not dispute that Storable’s Partial MSJ does not raise any issues that implicate Storable’s FMS market share. Rather, SafeLease seemed to imply that Storable’s FMS facility list is somehow relevant to showing a “market wide effect” for tenant insurance. Id. at 7. It is not, and SafeLease provided no explanation otherwise. Obtaining Storable’s FMS customer list would not help SafeLease avoid summary judgment on multiple elements of its attempted monopolization claim.2 Accordingly, the Court should extend the stay of the production deadline for Storable’s FMS customer list until after a decision on Storable’s Partial MSJ. Alternatively, if the Court needs further assurance that the FMS customer list is not relevant to the Partial MSJ, the Court

SafeLease stated but did not and cannot explain how the list is “critical” to “defining the relevant antitrust market” or assessing the “competitive impact of [Storable’s] conduct.” Plaintiff’s Opp. to Stay Mot. at 7 (June 12, 2025). The list is not necessary—much less “critical”—for either purpose. Storable’s FMS facility list is not relevant to the competitive impact of Storable’s conduct in the alleged tenant insurance market. Defs’ Reply to Stay Mot. at 2, 4 (June 12, 2025). And Storable’s Partial MSJ does not move for summary judgment on SafeLease’s failure to properly define relevant antitrust markets, so even if the list were relevant to that element, SafeLease would not be prejudiced by staying production of the list until after the Partial MSJ is heard and decided. Id. at 3 n.3.

SafeLease is also wrong that Storable’s Partial MSJ is a “no-evidence” motion. Plaintiff’s Opp. to Stay Mot. at 6 (Jun. 12, 2025). It is not. Storable moved for traditional summary judgment on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim. SafeLease cannot transform a traditional summary judgment motion into a no-evidence motion by selectively quoting parts of the Partial MSJ which correctly explain that the challenged elements of SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim fail as a matter of law. See id. Even if Storable had moved for no-evidence summary judgment, such a motion may be targeted only at “one or more essential elements” of a claim and “must state the elements as to which there is no evidence.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). None of the elements identified in the Partial MSJ implicate Storable’s market share in the FMS market.

-5- should extend the stay until the Court has received complete briefing on the Partial MSJ and has determined, if at all, that production of the FMS customer list is necessary to fairly adjudicate the Partial MSJ. If the Court can grant summary judgment for Defendants on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim without production of the FMS customer list, ordering production of the list, which is a trade secret, is not necessary and would be in error.

Staying production of Storable’s trade secret until the Court’s decision on the Partial MSJ—or at least until the Court has reviewed the parties’ briefing on the Partial MSJ and has determined, if at all, that the FMS customer list is necessary to fairly adjudicate that motion—is consistent with settled law in Texas that it is error to require production of a trade secret unless and until the requesting party proves that “the lack of the information will impair the presentation of the case on the merits to the point that an unjust result is a real, rather than a merely possible, threat.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 732–33 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).

Consideration of the parties’ summary judgment briefs and supporting evidence before determining whether additional discovery is necessary is also consistent with the ordinary procedures for resolving summary judgment motions under Rule 166a(g).

Extending the stay will also serve the interests of judicial economy by avoiding the need for Storable to submit emergency motions or other expedited filings regarding the stay, which would be necessary to protect its trade secret if the stay dissolves on June 24, 2025 pursuant to the Stay Order.

II. The Court Should Grant Storable an Additional Seven Days for the MSJ Reply Separate from the stay, Storable requests an extension of seven days to file its reply in support of the Partial MSJ (from July 18 to July 25, 2025) due to pre-planned absences of Storable’s counsel team that were not implicated under the original briefing schedule prior to the Stay Order. SafeLease has indicated that it is not opposed to the requested extension of Storable’s

-6- reply deadline. Storable is prepared to be available for and appear at a hearing on the Partial MSJ during the week of July 28, 2025 if the Court grants Storable’s requested extension for its reply.

Conclusion Storable requests that the Court extend the stay of the deadline to produce Storable’s FMS customer list until after a decision on the Partial MSJ (or, alternatively, until one week after the Court has received Storable’s MSJ reply and determined, if at all, that production of the FMS customer list is necessary to fairly adjudicate the Partial MSJ), grant a 7-day extension for Storable’s reply in support of the Partial MSJ, and grant any other relief to which Storable may justly be entitled.

Respectfully submitted June 17, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) John Holler (admitted pro hac vice) ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062

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Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

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Certificate of Conference The Parties conferred regarding the relief requested in the foregoing motion, and counsel for Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff is opposed to Defendants’ request for an extension of the stay but that Plaintiff is unopposed to the extension of the deadline to file a reply in support of its motion for partial summary judgment. s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 2,070 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates. s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on June 17, 2025. s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

-9- Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102132940 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Defendants' Motion for Extension of Stay and MSJ Reply Deadline Status as of 6/18/2025 8:48 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cathy Hodges on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102132940 Filing Code Description: Motions - All Other Filing Description: Defendants' Motion for Extension of Stay and MSJ Reply Deadline Status as of 6/18/2025 8:48 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT John Holler [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/17/2025 6:52:01 PM SENT

The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF MAY 28, 2025 DISCOVERY ORDER Defendants’ disagreement with the Court’s orders is no reason to serially relitigate them, which wastes judicial and party resources. Here, they ask for another bite at the apple by raising an argument that they now say they chose to hold back before. Their decision has consequences, of course, as regret over strategy is no basis for reconsideration. In any event, the new trade secret claim is too late and unsupported, and worries about harm are just speculation that SafeLease will not adhere to the Protective Order. Reconsideration of this order is unwarranted and needless.

LEGAL STANDARD Courts are not required to reconsider prior rulings and may deny a motion to reconsider without reaching its substance. 1776 Energy Partners, LLC v. Marathon Oil EF, LLC, 692 S.W.3d 564, 586 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.). “[I]t is not an abuse of discretion to refuse” a motion to reconsider. In re GreatAmerica Leasing Corp., 294 S.W.3d 912, 915 n.2 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, no pet.) (orig. proceeding). Motions to reconsider are particularly discouraged when they raise “arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003); accord Macy v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 638, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES The motion is a series of one- or two-liners that often fail to cite authority or meaningfully analyze the issues they raise. It asserts speculative worries about whether defendants’ information will be protected by an order they helped draft. And it fails to grapple with the fact that they waived any trade secret privilege and never established that their FMS customer list is a trade secret.

1. Defendants have waived their claim of trade secret privilege.

The Court need not address the merits of the trade-secret claim because it was waived.

Defendants repeatedly and consciously decided not to raise the privilege despite the need to do so earlier. Thus, defendants are barred from raising it now. If the Court accepts their word that they knew about and decided to assert the privilege later, the only conclusion is that they failed to preserve that privilege. The Court should deny the reconsideration motion.

A. Defendants have not preserved their claim of trade secret privilege.

A failure to raise a privilege is a failure to preserve it. Under Rule 193.3, to “preserve a privilege from written discovery,” the party must state that “information or material responsive to the request or required disclosure has been withheld” and “the privilege or privileges asserted.”

Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(a). If they do not, the privilege is forfeited. See In re Anderson, 163 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (orig. proceeding); In re Soto, 270 S.W.3d 732, 734-35 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (orig. proceeding).

Here, defendants withheld requested documents but never stated they were withholding them because of privilege, as required. They did not state it in their Objections and Responses, in multiple conferrals and emails about the requests, or in their discovery letter to the Court. See Ex. to Resp. to Emerg. Mot. to Stay (June 6, 2025); Ex. 2 to Resp. to Emerg. Mot. to Stay (June 6, 2025). “Trade secret” was not mentioned until their Emergency Motion for Stay, filed 46 days after their Objections and Responses. Compare Scrivner v. Casseb, 754 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Tex.

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App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (privilege unpreserved when asserted 40 days after discovery requests). That was far too late.

Even if their initial failures to timely raise privilege could be excused, their failure to raise it in their discovery letter cannot be. Per local court rules, once discovery letters are filed, the Court may “issue an order if the Court, in its discretion, determines no further briefing is necessary.”

L.R. 4(d)(4). Defendants were thus on notice that if they did not raise privilege in their letter, they may be ordered to produce without any adjudication of privilege. Their deliberate omission is forfeiture. See Anderson, 163 S.W.3d at 141; Soto, 270 S.W.3d at 734-35.

Defendants claim “ordinary procedure” allows them to argue other objections and then raise privilege if they lose. Defs.’ Reply ISO Emerg. Mot. to Stay at 2-3 (June 12, 2025). But this was not a situation where defendants may have been ordered to produce documents only some of which were privileged. They claim the entire list is a trade secret, so they had no reason to hold back any privilege claim.

Because defendants did not preserve privilege, the Court should deny reconsideration.

B. Defendants have waived their claim of trade secret privilege.

Defendants also waived privilege because, as they admit, they chose not to assert it at the appropriate time. “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a right actually known, or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right.” In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (quoting reference omitted). When a party makes “a tactical, yet erroneous, decision” not to make a certain argument, it is waived. Id. Here, defendants’ repeated failure to raise privilege is intentional conduct inconsistent with that claimed right, and they admit they consciously chose not to assert privilege in their letter brief: The Court noted in the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order that Storable did not claim that the customer list was a trade secret. Respectfully, Storable’s response to SafeLease’s pre-motion letter was subject to strict length limitations under the local

-3- 1000 rules. The Court ruled on this discovery dispute based solely on those letters, rather than requesting further briefing. Further briefing would have clarified that Storable’s customer list is a trade secret.

Defs.’ Emerg. Mot. for Stay at 3, n.1 (June 6, 2025).

Defendants’ choice not to argue privilege is an “intentional relinquishment of a right actually known.” In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d at 666. That they “would have” claimed privilege if allowed “further briefing” is immaterial. Defs.’ Emergency Mot. for Stay at 3, n.1 (June 6, 2025).

They argued other points without asking for more briefing or words. That’s textbook waiver.

2. Defendants agreed to a Protective Order that specifically protects trade secrets.

Procedural bars aside, reconsideration based on concerns over whether the information will be protected is unwarranted. Defendants do not argue that the Protective Order is inadequate, but only worry SafeLease will ignore it. They helped draft that Order, which fully protects confidential information including trade secrets.

The Protective Order adequately protects defendants’ interests by covering information designated as Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information (“OCEO”). Prot. Order ¶3 (Feb. 27, 2025). This includes “trade secrets,” which “may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or a subsequent Order by this Court.” Id. Obviously, defendants anticipated disclosure of trade secrets and agreed to appropriate safeguards. They do not challenge those safeguards now.

Instead, defendants speculate that SafeLease might violate the Protective Order. Mot. at 7.

They worry SafeLease will use the list to target potential customers, but don’t explain how an FMS customer list will reveal insurance customers. Rejecting a similar argument that protective orders are per se inadequate to protect trade secrets, the Supreme Court instructed courts to instead consider “specific, fact-based grounds for believing that trade secrets may be disclosed in violation

-4- 1001 of its protective order.” In re Continental Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). Defendants here identify no such grounds.

Without grounds to doubt the terms of the Protective Order, defendants instead speculate it might cease to exist: “the protective order would be void if the Court of Appeals holds that this Court lacks jurisdiction in the pending appeal.” Mot. at 9. This one-sentence throwaway cites no authority and can be ignored.

In any event, the pending appeal will not void the Protective Order because defendants challenge the removal’s timeliness not jurisdiction. See Ex 1, Appellants’ Br. at 16-18 (Apr. 17, 2025). A failure to timely remove is a “procedural defect—not a jurisdictional one.” Quintero Cmty. Ass'n Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 792 F.3d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir. 2015) (quote omitted). Thus, even if they win a remand, the Protective Order will not be void for lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, even if it is somehow voided, the parties’ Rule 11 agreement—which they relied on through the injunction hearing here—will remain effective and provides identical protections See Ex. 2 (parties “agree to abide by the protections of the PO for documents designated Confidential or Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only”); Ex. 3, Feb. 11, 2025 Tr. 234:4-6 (defense counsel recognizing “the Rule 11 agreement . . . is acting like a protective order”). The parties filed that signed agreement with the Court. See Prot. Order (Feb. 20, 2025).

The Protective Order adequately protects Defendants’ confidentiality interests. Their worries that it will be flouted or voided are baseless.

3. Defendants have not established that their customer list is a trade secret.

Under Tex. R. Evid. 507, a party asserting trade secret privilege “has the burden of proving that the discovery information sought qualifies as a trade secret.” In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).

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“Trade secret” is defined by the Texas Uniform Trade Secret Act. It includes business information, such as actual or potential customer lists, if “the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §134A.002(6). This definition is “instructive to” a Rule 507 analysis. Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Dolcefino Commc’ns, LLC, 702 S.W.3d 675, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

To be sure, “information that a firm compiles regarding its customers may enjoy trade secret status under Texas law.” Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 466 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied). “But this does not mean that trade secret status automatically attaches to any information that a company acquires regarding its customers[.]” Id. To be a trade secret, a customer list must have “actual or potential independent economic value to third parties because it is generally unknown and not readily ascertainable through proper means.”

HTS Serv. Inc. v. Abedin, 2025 WL 899844, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 25, 2025, no pet.). “Courts generally recognize that customer lists or financial information that can be used to obtain customers or to negotiate pricing or fees to obtain an advantage in the market qualifies as a trade secret.” Houston Livestock, 702 S.W.3d at 690. A customer list is entitled to no protection when the resisting party fails to show “the value of the information to [itself] and its competitors or how the information presents an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors.” In re Desa Heating, L.L.C., 2006 WL 1713489, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 22, 2006) (orig. proceeding) (cleaned up).

A customer list presents no advantage to competitors when the customers belong to a “well- defined” and “readily ascertained class.” Research Equip. Co., Inc. v. C.H. Galloway & Sci. Cages,

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Inc., 485 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. App.—Waco 1972, no writ); SCM Corp. v. Triplett Co., 399 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1966, no writ). See also DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 684 (Tex. 1990) (party “failed to show that its customers could not readily be identified by someone outside its employ” or “that such knowledge carried some competitive advantage”); Allan J. Richardson & Assocs., Inc. v. Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (“trade secret status does not automatically attach to a client list”; it “must be information that is not publicly available or readily ascertainable by independent investigation”); Kana Energy Servs., Inc. v. Jiangsu Jinshi Mach. Group Co., 565 S.W.3d 347, 355-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (no trade secret in customer identities ascertainable through internet searches and phone calls).

For example, customers of a window cleaning business are not a trade secret. “Everyone having show windows must clean them and will probably engage a professional window cleaner if the latter will do the work well enough and cheap enough.” SCM, 399 S.W.2d at 587. Likewise, auto insurance customers are readily ascertainable because they own a car. Id. Such customer lists “are not a trade secret” because “everyone knows [these customers] buy from someone.” Id. But an exterminator’s customer list could be a trade secret because “most property owners” don’t require extermination services, “and the ones who do need such service, do not advertise the fact,” so a “list of such prospects can be compiled only at considerable expense.” Id. Here, defendants fail to show that their customer list has economic value to third parties beyond their conclusory say-so. Like auto-insurance or window-cleaning customers, FMS customers belong to a “well-defined” and “readily ascertained” class. Research Equip., 485 S.W.2d at 956; SCM, 399 S.W.2d at 587; Allan, 718 S.W.2d at 837. Defendants provide FMS only to self-storage facilities, and almost all self-storage facilities use an FMS product. So, to identify

-7- 1004 potential FMS customers, one need only identify self-storage facilities. That’s not difficult to do.

Indeed, SpareFoot has a public website that locates self-storage facilities. See https://www.sparefoot.com/. Because the class of FMS customers is well-defined and can readily be ascertained through things like internet searches, defendants’ customer list is not a trade secret.

See SCM, 399 S.W.3d at 586 (no trade secret in customers that “could readily be obtained from a Chamber of Commerce list and telephone directory”); Kana, 565 S.W.3d at 355-56.

Conclusory arguments are not enough. Defendants fail to explain how their customer list constitutes “potential leads” to competitors. Mot. at 7. Or how a competitor would be advantaged by knowing the “geographic regions” of their customers—information defendants do not regard as a trade secret because they offered to disclose it. See Defs.’ May 23, 2025 Ltr. at 1; Mot. at 2.

Or how knowing who defendants’ customers are would allow SafeLease to steal those customers.

Simply alleging a trade secret does not establish one. See Desa, 2006 WL 1713489, at *3 (affidavit didn’t establish trade secrets: it didn’t state why customers’ “identity and contact information is important,” why it gives “a competitive advantage,” or why revealing it “would hurt its business or its relationships”).

The burden to establish this list as a trade secret is on defendants. They have not met it.

4. Defendants’ customer list has core relevance and is necessary.

Defendants do not carry their burden to establish a trade secret, so the Court need not decide whether “the information is necessary to the proof of one or more material elements of the claim and that it is reasonable to conclude that the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit.” In re Valero Ref.-Tex., LP, 2014 WL 4115917, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2014) (orig. proceeding) (cite omitted). But it undoubtedly is.

Here, the customer list is essential to SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim, which alleges that defendants are trying to leverage market dominance in the FMS market to monopolize

-8- 1005 the tenant-insurance market. See 2d Am. Pet. ¶¶93, 100, 109 (Jan. 28, 2025). The customer list is necessary for establishing both defendants’ FMS market share (and hence market dominance) and the relevant antitrust market.

Defendants do not dispute this. Instead, they argue that SafeLease doesn’t need the list because defendants’ MSJ might be granted and they offer alternative, less detailed information that they say would suffice. Mot. at 8-9. These arguments lack merit.

First, defendants’ invoking the possibility that a claim might in the future be dismissed is irrelevant. It has no bearing on whether information is needed to prove a live claim.

Second, defendants are trying to use their MSJ as a sword and a shield. They say SafeLease should not get discovery related to its antitrust claim because of the pending motion while arguing in the motion that SafeLease has “no evidence” and “zero evidence” to support its claim. Defs.’

Mot. for Part. Summ. J. at 3, 13, 15, 23-24 (June 2, 2025). That’s simply gamesmanship.

Third, defendants’ alternatives are insufficient because their representations have been unreliable and changing. Before this litigation began, defendants’ website showed that they served 36,000 facilities. Ex. 4, PX-185. After SafeLease filed its antitrust suit alleging a monopoly in the FMS market, defendants’ corporate representative claimed in his deposition that they serve only 33,000 facilities. Ex.5, Jan. 14, 2025 Corp. Rep. Dep. 15:20-22. Then, they changed the number on their website and, at the injunction hearing, claimed that the number was 30,000. Ex. 6, Feb.

13, 2025 Tr. 119:16-20. SafeLease should not have to rely on defendants’ representation of a number they keep changing.

Defendants’ customer list—including names, cities, states, and zip codes—is needed to ensure SafeLease has accurate and reliable evidence supporting its antitrust claim. Their confusion about what “verification of the list would entail” and why SafeLease’s expert used defendants’

-9- 1006 pre-litigation number (rather than the two other numbers they provided) for his preliminary market analysis are irrelevant distractions that do not change the list’s relevance. See Mot. at 8.

Even if defendants had established that their customer list is a trade secret, SafeLease needs the information to prove its antitrust claim, and any concerns about protecting the information are adequately addressed by the agreed Protective Order.

CONCLUSION The Court should deny the motion for reconsideration of its May 28, 2025 discovery order.

Date: June 19, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Paul Yetter Judd E. Stone II R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24087727 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] [email protected] Alexander M. Dvorscak Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24120461 State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] [email protected] STONE HILTON PLLC Shannon N. Smith Congress Ave. State Bar No. 24110378 Austin, Texas 78748 [email protected] (737) 465-3897 Julia C. Risley State Bar No. 24132932 Adam T. Locke [email protected] State Bar No. 24083184 YETTER COLEMAN LLP [email protected] 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 LOCKELAW PLLC Houston, Texas 77002 2617 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 (713) 632-8000 Houston, Texas 77005 (713) 832-0243 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

- 10 - 1007

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via the Court e- filing service and/or by email, on June 19, 2025.

/s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 2,934 words, not including the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates.

/s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

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Exhibit 1 ACCEPTED 1009 15-25-00020-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/17/2025 7:29 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE No. 15-25-00020-CV CLERK

IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/b/a storEDGE); Sitelink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP, Appellants, v. SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC, Appellee.

On Appeal from the Third Division of the Texas Business Court Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 APPELLANTS’ BRIEF

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 [email protected] Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 [email protected] West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 T: (512) 320-7200 F: (512) 320-7210 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 1010 irreparable harm. The harms for which SafeLease provided mere speculation are both supported by no evidence and contradicted by unrebutted evidence.

Second, the undisputed facts show that SafeLease cannot establish a probable right to recover. SafeLease cannot recover because Storable is justified in blocking access to its FMS based on Storable’s rights as owner of the FMS and party to the Terms of Use. At minimum, Storable conclusively demonstrated a good-faith belief in a colorable right, which is a complete defense to the only claim for which the business court found a probable right to recover—tortious interference with an existing contract.

Third, SafeLease’s unclean hands prevent it from receiving the equitable remedy of a temporary injunction. SafeLease dirtied its hands by deliberately creating the emergency it alleges, deceiving customers about its relationship with Storable, circumventing security measures, and forum shopping.

ARGUMENT I. SafeLease Untimely Removed To Forum Shop After An Adverse Ruling.

A. SafeLease was required to request removal within 30 days of when it discovered, or should have discovered, facts establishing the business court’s jurisdiction.

The right to remove to the business courts is created and circumscribed by statute. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(d), (f). While an agreed notice of

-16- 1011 removal may be filed at any time, opposed notices like the one at issue “must” be filed: not later than the 30th day after the date the party requesting removal of the action discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, facts establishing the business court’s jurisdiction over the action.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(f)(1) (emphasis added).

“If the business court does not have jurisdiction of the action, the business court shall remand the action to the court in which the action was originally filed.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(d) (emphasis added).

B. SafeLease requested removal to the business court more than 30 days after discovering facts establishing the business court’s jurisdiction.

1. SafeLease does not deny that it knew sufficient jurisdictional facts more than 30 days before filing its Notice of Removal.

SafeLease filed its Notice of Removal on January 29, 2025. CR5. Thirty days before that filing is December 30, 2024.

SafeLease did not deny that before December 30, 2024, SafeLease knew of facts that SafeLease asserts establish several independently sufficient grounds for the business court’s jurisdiction. Nor did SafeLease deny that it knew it could have initially filed its Original Petition in the business court. Instead, SafeLease argued that post-petition events also

-17- 1012 support jurisdiction and make SafeLease “even more certain” of jurisdiction.

CR550, Opposition to Remand at 15.

There is no basis in statutory text, or the purpose of the deadline, for resetting the 30-day clock every time a party learns additional facts beyond facts sufficient for initially “establishing the business court’s jurisdiction.”

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(f)(1).

2. SafeLease’s own petition, testimony, and emails proved that SafeLease knew of sufficient jurisdictional facts more than 30 days before requesting removal.

SafeLease’s petition, testimony, and contemporaneous emails show that it knew of sufficient jurisdictional facts weeks before December 30, 2024.

SafeLease’s Verified Original Petition described several independent grounds for jurisdiction that occurred before December 30. In addition, because SafeLease filed that petition on December 30, if SafeLease could reasonably have learned the grounds for its Original Petition even one day before filing it, SafeLease’s Notice of Removal was untimely. Since the allegations in a verified petition are made under penalty of perjury and must

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Exhibit 2 1014 Allen, Susanna From: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2025 8:10 AM To: Allen, Susanna Cc: Smith, Shannon; Torgerson, Ray T.; Yetter, Paul; Schamel, Luke; Smith, Alyssa; Alexander, Ken; Summers, Jonna N.; Kumar, Lex N.; Brunelle, Dolores; [email protected]; [email protected]; Smith, Shannon; Torgerson, Ray T.; Yetter, Paul; Schamel, Luke; Smith, Alyssa; Alexander, Ken; Summers, Jonna N.; Kumar, Lex N.; Brunelle, Dolores Subject: Re: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233 Attachments: image001.png; Agreed Protective Order(1189825.1).docx

External Sender - From: ("Eoff, Elizabeth F." Learn More <[email protected]>) This message came from outside your organization.

Yes, confirmed.

On Jan 16, 2025, at 7:59 AM, Allen, Susanna <[email protected]> wrote:

Hi Liza, can you please confirm that you are signed off on the Protective Order? If so, we can upload for the Court this morning as a proposed order.

Thanks, Susanna - Susanna Yetter Coleman LLP 713.632.8009 (office) 662.801.9185 (mobile) From: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, January 12, 2025 9:06 AM To: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected]>; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N. <[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233 Liza, See attached.

Thanks, 1015 Shannon Shannon Smith | Associate | Yetter Coleman LLP Main Street, Suite 4100, Houston, Texas 77002 (D) 713.632.8066 | (M) 281.770.2697 | (O) 713.632.8000 | www.yettercoleman.com

From: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 8:52 PM To: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected]>; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N. <[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233

Shannon, Y’all have suggested the last few rounds of edits. Please send us a clean and we can sign off.

Thanks.

Elizabeth F Eoff | Associate Porter Hedges LLP ______________________________________________________________________ 1000 Main St, 36th Floor | Houston, TX 77002 t 713.226.6732 c 281.630.6388 e [email protected] Bio • Web • V-Card

From: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 8:46 PM To: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected]>; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N. <[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233 Thank you, Liza. We agree. Please send us a clean copy of the PO, and we will review and affix a signature on our end.

Thanks!

Shannon Shannon Smith | Associate | Yetter Coleman LLP 1016 Main Street, Suite 4100, Houston, Texas 77002 (D) 713.632.8066 | (M) 281.770.2697 | (O) 713.632.8000 | www.yettercoleman.com

From: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 8:38 PM To: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected]>; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N. <[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233

Shannon, These changes are acceptable to us.

We agree to abide by the protections of the PO for documents designated Confidential or Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only. Please confirm you agree.

Best, Liza Elizabeth F Eoff | Associate Porter Hedges LLP ______________________________________________________________________ 1000 Main St, 36th Floor | Houston, TX 77002 t 713.226.6732 c 281.630.6388 e [email protected] Bio • Web • V-Card

From: Smith, Shannon <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2025 6:39 PM To: Eoff, Elizabeth F. <[email protected]>; Allen, Susanna <[email protected]>; Torgerson, Ray T. <[email protected]>; Yetter, Paul <[email protected]>; Schamel, Luke <[email protected]>; Smith, Alyssa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander, Ken <[email protected]>; Summers, Jonna N. <[email protected]>; Kumar, Lex N. <[email protected]>; Brunelle, Dolores <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: RE: Letter Ruling D-1-GN-24-010233 Thanks for the quick response, Liza. The attached redline adds our requested changes to paragraph 24. The rest of the redlines are the same as the last version I circulated. Please confirm that these additional changes are acceptable.

Thanks!

Shannon 1017

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, § INC. (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS [PROPOSED] AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER In order to expedite the flow of discovery material, facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality, adequately protect material entitled to be kept confidential, and ensure that protection is afforded only to material so entitled, entry of this A g r e e d Protective Order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6 is merited. This Protective Order applies to materials produced in advance of the Temporary Injunction hearing and functions as the operative Protective Order for this matter until such time as this Order is amended or replaced.

It is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information and Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information produced or exchanged by the parties in the course of this litigation, including information produced by third parties/non-parties, shall be used solely for the purpose of preparation, trial, and appeal of this litigation and for no other purpose whatsoever, and shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms hereof.

2. “Confidential Information” as used herein means any information of any type,

1018 kind, or character which is designated as “Confidential” by any of the supplying or receiving parties, including third parties/non-parties supplying said information, whether it be a document, information contained in a document, discovery materials, information or testimony revealed during a deposition, or otherwise.

3. “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information” as used herein means any information that is “Confidential” as described herein and additionally may not be disclosed to anyone except the Qualified Persons described in Paragraph 6, infra. “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information” includes trade secrets or other non-public, proprietary, or sensitive business or financial information. More specifically, an “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” designation means that the materials so denoted may not be disclosed to any party or employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or a subsequent Order by this Court.

4. In designating information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes only,” a party or third party/non-party supplying information will make such designation only as to that information that it in good faith believes contains “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information. Information or material which is available to the public, including industry materials, advertising materials, and the like shall not be classified as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.”

5. “Qualified Persons” as used herein for “Confidential Information” means: (a) Attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees and/or agents of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the information be shown for purposes of this litigation; (b) Actual or potential independent experts or consultants (and their administrative or

1019 clerical staff) engaged in connection with this litigation (which shall not include the current employees, officers, members, or agents of the parties or affiliates of the parties) who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (c) The parties and their respective in-house counsel, paralegals, legal staff or experts; (d) The Court and its staff, including court reporters; (e) Vendors engaged by the parties or the parties’ respective counsel, including independent copy services, printers, or illustrators, and court reporters for the purpose of this litigation who have signed a document in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person); (f) The authors and original recipients of the documents or information unless any such person no longer has a right to access or possess any such documents or information by virtue of a change in employment, position, or other circumstance; (g) The designated corporate representative for the party that produced the documents or information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only”; or (h) By agreement of the parties, or if this Court so elects, any other person designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all the parties and hearing.

6. For “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only Information,” “Qualified Persons” includes (a),

1020

(b), and (d) - (h).

7. Documents produced in this action may be designated by any party or parties or by any third party and/or non-party producing said documents as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information by marking each page of the document(s) with the word(s) “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.” However, for documents produced in electronic native form, such as Excel spreadsheets, the designation may be affixed to the drive, disk, or other medium on which the documents or materials are produced or in the file names without marking each page of the documents or materials “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only.”

8. In lieu of marking the original of a document, if the original is not produced, the designating party may mark the copies that are produced or exchanged.

9. Information disclosed at (a) the deposition of a party or one of its present or former officers, directors, employees, agents or independent experts retained by counsel for the purpose of this litigation, or (b) the deposition of a third party (which information pertains to a party) may be designated by any party, including a third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed, as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information by indicating on the record at the deposition that the testimony is “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” and is subject to the provisions of this Order.

10. Any party or third party/non-party disclosing said information or being deposed may also designate said information disclosed at such deposition as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by notifying all of the parties, in writing within 30 days of receipt of the transcript, of the specific pages and lines of the transcript which should be

1021 treated as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” thereafter. Each party shall attach a copy of such written notice or notices to the face of the transcript and each copy thereof in his possession, custody or control. All deposition transcripts shall be treated as “Confidential” for a period of 30 days after the receipt of the transcript, apart from any portions designated on the record as “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” which portions shall be treated as Attorneys’ Eyes Only.

11. To the extent possible, the court reporter shall segregate into separate transcripts information designated as “ Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” with blank, consecutively-numbered pages being provided in a non-designated main transcript. The separate transcript containing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information shall have page numbers that correspond to the blank pages in the main transcript.

12. “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information shall not be disclosed or made available by the receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons as delineated above. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Protective Order restricts the ability of a party and/or third party/non-party to review, disclose, or disseminate its own documents or information as it sees fit.

13. Documents produced prior to entry of this Protective Order may be retroactively designated “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by notice in writing of the designated class of each document by Bates number within 30 days of the entry of this Protective Order. Documents unintentionally produced without designation as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” may be retroactively designated in the same manner and shall be treated appropriately from the date written notice of the designation is provided to the receiving party. The

1022 burden shall be on the party claiming confidentiality to prove the confidential nature of the documents.

14. Documents to be inspected shall be treated as “Confidential” during inspection. At the time of copying for the receiving parties, such inspected documents shall be marked or stamped prominently “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” by the producing party.

15. If a receiving party learns of any unauthorized disclosure of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” the party shall immediately upon learning of such disclosure inform the producing party of all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure and shall make all reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure by each unauthorized person who received such information.

16. Nothing herein shall prevent disclosure beyond the terms of this Protective Order if each party or third party/non-party designating the information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” consents in writing to such disclosure or, if the Court orders such disclosure.

Nor shall anything herein prevent any counsel of record from utilizing “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information in the examination or cross-examination of any person who is indicated on the document as being an author, source or recipient of the “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information, or if counsel has a reasonable belief that such person was an author, source or recipient of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information irrespective of which party or third party/non-party produced such information.

17. A party shall not be obligated to challenge the propriety of a designation as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” at the time made, and a failure to do so shall not preclude a subsequent challenge thereto. In the event that any party to this litigation disagrees at

1023 any stage of these proceedings with the designation by the designating party of any information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” or the designation of any person as a Qualified Person, the parties shall first try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an informal basis, such as production of redacted copies. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the objecting party may invoke this Protective Order by objecting in writing to the party or third party/non-party who has designated the document or information as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” or designated any person as a Qualified Person. The designating party shall be required to move the Court for an order preserving the designated status of such information or person within 30 business days of receipt of the written objection. The disputed information shall remain “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” unless and until the Court orders otherwise. Failure to move for an order shall constitute a termination of the restricted status of such item unless the parties otherwise agree. The party or third party/non-party objecting to disclosure bears the burden of proof to establish the confidentiality of the document.

18. The parties may, by stipulation, provide for exceptions to this Protective Order, and any party may seek an order of this Court modifying this Protective Order.

19. Nothing shall be regarded as “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” information if it is information that either: (a) is in the public domain at the time of disclosure supported by appropriate evidence; or (b) becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the other party, as supported by appropriate evidence.

20. To the extent documents containing “Confidential” Information or “Outside

1024

Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information are filed before trial, in this or any other Court, or the substance of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information is revealed in papers filed in this or any other Court, or in the transcript of any proceedings, those documents, materials, or transcripts shall be filed in camera in an envelope marked “CONFIDENTIAL,” and this Order serves as a temporary sealing order, sealing such “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information under Rule 76a without the need for a separate motion or order. The temporary sealing order provided for under this paragraph will expire thirty days following the filing of the “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” Information unless the Designating Party moves for an order permanently sealing such material in accordance with Rule 76a prior to the expiration of such thirty-day period and thereafter complies with the permanent sealing requirements of Rule 76a. The party filing such materials in camera shall include the Bates Numbers of the specific documents used in the pleading filed and served to ensure the other parties will know which “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eye Only” materials are being filed in camera. Any pleading or attachment filed in camera shall be served on Counsel by email.

21. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the Court, all proceedings involving or relating to “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents or information shall be subject to the provisions of this Protective Order.

22. After the conclusion of this litigation and any appeal thereof, any “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents and all copies or reproductions of such documents produced by a party or third party/non-party in the possession of any of the “Qualified Persons” shall be returned to the producing party or third party/non-party within 60

1025 days of receipt of a timely written request by said producing party or third party/non-party, except as this Court may otherwise order or to the extent such information was used as evidence at the trial. As far as the provisions of any protective orders entered in this action restrict the communication and use of the documents produced thereunder, such orders shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this litigation, except (a) that there shall be no restriction on documents that are used as exhibits in open court, and (b) that a party may seek the written permission of the producing party or order of the Court with respect to dissolution or modification of such protective orders. Alternatively, at the conclusion of this litigation, in lieu of the actual physical return of “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents, counsel for each party may provide a certification certifying that (1) all experts and any other person(s) receiving “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents have been instructed to delete or destroy all documents; and (2) all “Confidential” or “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents in the possession of counsel have been deleted or destroyed.

23. Any party designating any person as a “Qualified Person” shall have the duty to reasonably ensure that such person observes the terms of this Protective Order.

24. For purposes of the Temporary Injunction hearing currently scheduled to take place on January 16, 2025, or any subsequent hearing in the case, if any party intends to discuss or offer a document or information marked as “Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only,” the offering party must alert opposing counsel and the Court of its intent to discuss or offer the document or information, and all persons who are not authorized under this Order to view the document will be excused during any discussion of such document or information. For purposes of any trial before a jury, the parties will propose to the Court an appropriate protocol for handling of such document or information.

1026

Signed this ____ day of _____________, 2025.

__________________________________ Judge Presiding

1027

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND ENTRY REQUESTED: /s/ Ray T. Torgerson Ray T. Torgerson SBN: 24003067 N. Kenneth Alexander SBN: 00996600 Jonna N. Summers SBN: 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff SBN: 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar SBN: 24144581 Porter Hedges LLP 1000 Main Street, 36Th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 713-226-6650 713-226-6250 (fax) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

/s/ R. Paul Yetter R. Paul Yetter SBN: 22154200 Susanna R. Allen SBN: 24126616 Luke A. Schamel SBN: 24106403 Shannon N. Smith SBN: 24110378 Yetter Coleman LLP Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 713-632-8000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

1028

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, § INC. (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SOFTWARE, LLC, EASY STORAGE § SOLUTIONS, LLC, BADER CO., AND § PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EXHIBIT A AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY TERMS OF PROTECTIVE ORDER My name is, _______________________, my date of birth is _______________, and my address is, _____________________________________. I have read and am familiar with the terms of the Protective Order concerning the records and testimony produced by the respective parties in this case, and I agree to abide by all terms of said Protective Order and not to reveal or otherwise communicate any of the information disclosed to me pursuant thereto to anyone except in accordance with the terms of said Protective Order. I agree not to make any use of that information or materials other than for the purpose of this litigation.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

______________________________________ Executed in ________ County, State of ______ Date:

1029

Exhibit 3 1030 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD 2 VOLUME 3 OF 13 VOLUMES CAUSE NO. 15-25-00020-CV 4 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 5 Sitting at Austin, Texas STORABLE, INC.; REDNOVA LABS, INC. (D/B/A STOREDGE); SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC; EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC; BADER CO.; AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP 9 V. 10 SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC -------------------------------------------------------- 12 REPORTER'S RECORD 13 FEBRUARY 11, 2025 -------------------------------------------------------- On the 11th day of February, 2025, the hearing on Discovery Motions and a Temporary Injunction came on to be heard in the above-entitled and -numbered cause; and the following proceedings were had before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in Austin, Travis County, Texas: 19 Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype machine; Reporter's Record produced by computer-assisted transcription.

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 1031 234

1 MR. TORGERSON: Well, in particular the contract is in evidence and I would like to show it to him, just to confirm the percentage split. He signed it, and it's been produced in this case. It has been designated by them under the Rule 11 agreement, which is acting like a protective order.

7 And to be clear there are really sort of two issues that I hear Mr. Hilton raising. His company's internal confidential information, I'm not going there at all. This is commercial information between the plaintiff SafeLease and MyStorage.

12 MR. HILTON: If he's going to talk about an exhibit that's in evidence that is subject to the protective order, no issue.

15 THE COURT: I think maybe to get started, because that way you don't feel like you're on the spot and having to decide these control issues for the first time.

19 THE WITNESS: Okay.

20 THE COURT: Since it's already in evidence, we'll go at it that way and make everybody most comfortable.

23 MR. TORGERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

24 (Whereupon, after those people falling under the rule left the courtroom, the following

KIMBERLY KIDD, DEPUTY COURT REPORTER [email protected] 1032

Exhibit 4 The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20241202161410/https://www.storable.com/about-us/ 1033

EXHIBIT P-185 25-BC03A-0001

HELPING SELF STORAGE OWNERS DO MORE Empowering business owners with information is why we come to work every day. It's our job to make your job easier and more effective. To give you more. More time back in your day, more revenue, more control, more access to leading technology. Whatever you need - we provide more. So, you can run your business better than you ever thought possible.

OUR MISSION Empowering Business Owners

SAFELEASE0036082 We help self-storage owners of every 1034 size solve problems and run their businesses more efficiently and effectively. Our comprehensive suite of tools provides more time back in your day to help you run your business with complete control.

t WHAT WE BELIEVE We Believe You Can: Maximize Revenue at Your Storage Facility Run Your Storage Business More Efficiently Create a Five Star Tenant Experience t OURVISION Driven to Innovate Being the first to innovate in our category is what drives us and leads us to ask, "what's next?" How can we create better tools and experiences for our customers? Being on the leading- edge only means the view is wide open to dream bigger and better.

SAFELEASE0036083 1035

550+ 15,000 41 &3 Storable proudly employs over The storage industry runs on Currently, our employees hail from employees, or as we like to Storable. We're proud to have a total of 41 states and 3 different call them, Storriors. 15,000 customers rely on us to Do countries. They make it happen, More every day. no matter where they are.

36,000 That's the number of self-storage so Our storriors love their pets and facilities that are currently between them all they count over managed with Storable Software. 50 different dog breeds as a part That number increases every year. of their families.

SAFELEASE0036084 1036

@.

ABOUT US SOLUTIONS PRODUCTS RESOURCES News Our Story Marketing Management Software Help Contact Our Culture Operations Access Control Learn Support Leadership Storage Marketplace Connect Request a Demo Corporate Responsibility Insurance Solutions Storage Beat Careers Facility Websites Payment Processing

© Copyright 2024 Storable. All rights reserved.

Storable. Privacy I Security a

SAFELEASE0036085 1037

Exhibit 5 1038 PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT MARKED CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 1 CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-010233 SAFELEASE INSURANCE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT SERVICES LLC § 3 § vs. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 4 § STORABLE, INC., ET AL § 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 8 ORAL DEPOSITION OF CHARLES GORDON 9 January 14, 2025 12 PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT MARKED CONFIDENTIAL 13 ATTORNEYS EYES ONLY 16 ORAL DEPOSITION OF CHARLES GORDON, produced as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff and duly sworn, was taken in the above-styled and numbered cause on January 14, 2025, from 9:28 a.m. to 2:56 p.m., before Annette E. Escobar, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, reported by computerized stenotype machine at the offices of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 300 W. 6th St., Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the provisions stated on the record or attached hereto.

Page 1 Veritext Legal Solutions 346-293-7000 1039 PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT MARKED CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 1 1 Q. Like, the number that you just gave is more up 2 2 to date than what is on the website?

3 A. That's the up-to-date number.

4 Q. Okay. How many facilities use each of your FMS 5 products? So first for SiteLink.

6 A. This is a rough split, but it's 12- or 13,000 I 7 SiteLink, ten-ish thousand Easy, and the rest -- 10 or I - 8 12,000 Easy and the rest Storage.

I 9 Q. Got it. Do you know how many -- roughly, how 10 many total actual storage units that entailed between ■ 11 the three of them?

12 A. Rough -- well, I don't know the exact number 13 from today, but I know that we, we did cross the ten 14 million-unit threshold in the last 12 months.

15 Q. How many self-storage facilities have used each 16 of your, your FMS products in each year dating back to 17 when you first acquired them? So If we can just walk 18 through year by year, you will be able to give me the

- 19 numbers?

20 MR. TORGERSON: Objection, form.

21 A. Yeah. No, I can't remember that.

22 MR. SCHAMEL: Okay. Can we go off the 22 Q. All right. Is that information you can get us?

23 record very briefly to let them back in? 23 MR. TORGERSON: We'll take that under 24 THE COURT REPORTER: We're off the 24 advisement.

25 record, 9:44 a.m. 25 Q. Is that information you can get us?

Page 14 Page 16 1 (Brief pause.) 1 A. We'll take it under advisement.

2 THE COURT REPORTER: We're on the record, 2 Q. Can you get us that information?

3 9:49 a.m. 3 A. How many we had in any given year?

4 Q. (By Mr. Schamel) Mr. Gordon, when -- just to be 4 Q. Yeah. So dating back to when you first clear, for questions going forward, when I say you, I'm 5 acquired each of the FMS products, so SiteLink in 2018, referring to you as corporate rep on behalf of 6 ESS in 2020 and Storage in 2018, how many facilities defendants unless I say otherwise, okay? 7 used each product in each year since acquisition?

8 A. Understood. 8 MR. TORGERSON: We'll see.

9 Q. Okay. So you offer a three facility management 9 A. By day? By month?

10 software products, true? 10 Q. By year.

11 A. That's true. 11 A. By year? So still to pinpoint in a year, I'm 12 Q. Is it okay if I call them FMS for short? 12 sure there's some way to get some data most likely, but 13 A. Sure. 13 it's going to be kind of dependent on how you look at 14 Q. It's SiteLink? 14 it.

15 A. Correct. 15 Q. Pick a time at the end of the year each year.

16 Q. Storage? 16 A. Probably can do that.

17 A. Correct. 17 Q. Is that information you can get us then?

18 Q. And Easy Storage Solutions or ESS? 18 A. We'll need to talk to counsel.

19 A. Correct. 19 MR. TORGERSON: We will -- we will work 20 Q. Today how many self-storage facilities in the 20 on that, counsel.

21 United States use your FMS products? 21 Q. You can answer the question.

22 A. Roughly 33,000. 22 MR. TORGERSON: I just answered the 23 Q. I think I saw on your website that it says 23 question.

24 36,000. Are you aware of that? 24 MR. SCHAMEL: I'm asking him the 25 A. I'm not aware of that. 25 question.

Page 15 Page 17 (Pages 14 - 17) Veritext Legal Solutions 346-293-7000 1040

Exhibit 6 1041 1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD 2 VOLUME 4 OF 7 VOLUMES 3 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 4 APPELLATE CASE NO. 15-25-00020-CV _______________________________________________________________ : SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC : TEXAS BUSINESS COURT : 7 Plaintiff, : : v. : : 9 : DIVISION 3A STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., : (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK SOFTWARE, : LLC, EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC, : BADER CO., AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, : LP : TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 12 Defendants. : _______________________________________________________________ 15 TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING _______________________________________________________________ 18 On the 13th day of February, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in person in Austin, Travis County, Texas.

22 Proceedings reported by stenographic machine shorthand.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 1042

1 market shares to have the right numerator and the right denominator. If you have a numerator that is too high, that's going to make the shares look higher than they are. If your numerator is too low, it's also going to make the share look higher.

6 Q. So, let's talk about Dr. Williams' numerator. What is your understanding of what he used and what he was measuring?

9 A. Yes, he was looking at the number of facilities that use Storable FMS, one of the Storable FMS products; and his number was 36,000.

12 Q. Okay. And based on your examination of the data, is that an accurate number?

14 A. No. 15 Q. Why not?

16 A. So, yeah. I had data available to me that showed that the number was 30,000. And I think we agreed if we could put up the exhibit, because I don't remember the numbers by heart; but it was 30,800 something. Yeah, 30,000 -- I was pretty close. Yeah, 30,806.

21 And one of the reasons for the discrepancy is because the numerator that Dr. Williams was including was non-U.S. customers; and that's important because his denominator and the way he defined the market was around U.S. customers. Right? So, you need to do apples to apples between Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 FILED IN BUSINESS COURT 1043 OF TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 6/20/2025

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants.

§ ═══════════════════════════════════════ Notice of Submission ═══════════════════════════════════════ Storable’s Motion for Extension of Stay has been set for written submission on Monday, June 30, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. Any response should be filed by Thursday, June 26, 2025. The reply, if any, should be filed no later than the submission deadline.

Date signed: June 20, 2025

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division 1044 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 102228708 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Notice of Submission - Motion for Extension of Stay Status as of 6/20/2025 10:00 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT 1045 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 102228708 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Notice of Submission - Motion for Extension of Stay Status as of 6/20/2025 10:00 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT John Holler [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/20/2025 9:31:28 AM SENT E-filed in the Office of the Clerk for the Business Court 1046 of Texas 6/23/2025 8:28 AM Accepted by: Alexis Jennings Case Number: 25-BC03A-0001 The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § ______________________________________________________________________________ Storable’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order ______________________________________________________________________________ I. Storable Did Not Waive Privilege Waiver is an “intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right.” Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 263 (Tex. 2017). “[T]he burden of proof is on the party relying on the waiver.” Lang v. Lee, 777 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ). Trade secret privilege is extraordinarily difficult to waive.

Even disclosure of the trade secret itself is not necessarily waiver. HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 266 (Tex. 2021). SafeLease’s waiver argument is that Storable did not use the exact “magic words” at the exact right moment. This is not how privilege works.

First, - - - SafeLease offers no evidence of waiver and instead asks the Court to infer waiver based on the timing of when Storable asserted a trade secret. That’s not enough to waive privilege.

“The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to avoid waivers of privilege.” In re Fisher & Paykel Appliances, Inc., 420 S.W.3d 842, 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, orig. proceeding). The Supreme Court has held that even a party “missing a statutory deadline does not mirror any of the conduct our rules and case law recognize as waiving a privilege” and that mere “delay,” 1047 absent actual disclosure, is not waiver. Paxton, 509 S.W.3d at 263 (emphasis added). These authorities foreclose SafeLease’s waiver claim.

Second, Storable has adequately asserted that the FMS customer list is a trade secret. Its response to RFP 10 objected that the request sought “confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree.” R&O to Plf’s RFPs (04/21/25) (excerpt at Ex. B).

Storable also objected to production of privileged documents. Id. Storable’s response to SafeLease’s pre-motion letter argued it should not have to produce the list, “a highly confidential document… to a hostile competitor”—i.e., trade secret privilege. Pre-Mot. Response (05/23/25).

Because customer lists are “generally recognize[d]” as trade secrets, Storable’s repeated objections are factually sufficient. Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Delcefino Commc’ns, LLC, 702 S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.). SafeLease’s emphasis on the specific phrase “trade secret,” Res. 2, is misleading and unsupported. Asserting a privilege does not require “magic words.” Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Franklin Ctr. for Gov’l & Pub. Integrity, 675 S.W.3d 273, 285 (Tex. 2023).

Third, SafeLease is wrong that Storable did not follow Rule 193.3. Rule 193.3 allows a privilege to be stated in a discovery response or a “separate document.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(a).

Beyond the multiple objections in its discovery responses and pre-motion letter noted above, Storable filed several additional “separate documents” asserting trade secret privilege. Mot. Partial Stay (06/06/25); Mot. Partial Recons. (06/06/25); Mot. Partial Stay Reply (06/12/25); Mot. Ext.

Stay (06/17/25).

Fourth, “[t]he rules do not set a time limit for asserting a privilege.” In re Halliburton Ener. Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 2513478, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 7, 2022, orig. proceeding) (emphasis added) (citing cases). The cases SafeLease cites regarding forfeiture are

-2- 1048 inapposite. The defendant in In re Anderson delayed asserting privilege for over a year. In re Soto involved a party who failed to assert - - objection or privilege. Scrivner v. Casseb occurred ten any years before Rule 193.3 became effective.

II. The Agreed Protective Order Does Not Bar Trade Secret Privilege SafeLease is wrong that the agreed protective order bars Storable’s trade secret privilege.

In re Continental Gen. Tire, Inc. rejected this exact argument, holding that because “Continental was willing to produce certain information under a protective order does not mean that Continental has waived its right to assert Rule 507 about other information which it may regard as more competitively sensitive or less necessary for the plaintiffs’ case.” 614 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Tex. 1998).

Further, contrary to SafeLease’s assertions, the entry of a “protective order with respect to trade secret information does not dispense with the requesting party’s burden to establish the necessity for the discovery of the trade secret information to fairly adjudicate a claim.” In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).

III. The List is a Trade Secret SafeLease does not dispute the FMS customer list is kept secret, Res. 5–8, so the first element of trade secret protection is undisputed. See Mot. 4–5. SafeLease contests only the second element—whether the list derives value from its secrecy. Res. 5–8. SafeLease’s arguments fail.

The list would provide competitors with “customer leads, insight into Storable’s presence in different geographic regions,” and “[w]ithout this list, the competitor may not otherwise know that a facility is a Storable customer or be able to leverage that information in its negotiations with potential customers.” Mot. 7, Ex. A ¶ 9.

Even if self-storage facilities generally can be identified by internet searches, Res. 8, Storable’s list of its FMS customers is still a trade secret. The list has immense economic value to

-3- 1049

Storable’s competitors, like SafeLease, as a rich source of potential customers to target. SafeLease actively targets Storable FMS customers for new tenant insurance business. See Mot. 7. Storable has invested resources in educating its FMS customers about tenant insurance and its other offerings. 02/14/25 Tr. 153:13–154:10 (Gordon) (excerpt at Ex. C). Storable FMS customers that use a Storable tenant insurance product are particularly valuable for someone like SafeLease to steal because they generate more revenue. See id. Further, SafeLease is actively encouraging Storable FMS customers to switch to other FMS providers. See Mot. 7. The argument that Storable doesn’t derive value from the list remaining confidential or that the list has no economic value for Storable’s competitors is absurd. Res. 7. For more detail, Storable submits a supplemental declaration from Mr. Gordon, attached as Exhibit D.

Storable’s FMS customer list is totally different from a public marketplace like Sparefoot, which is designed to help individuals find self-storage facilities. See Res. 8. The list SafeLease improperly seeks cannot be found through public searches and would enable Storable’s competitors to know and target facilities that Storable has invested in. Ex. D.

IV. SafeLease Does Not Need the List SafeLease must demonstrate “with specificity exactly” how not obtaining the list would impair its case. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 732–33 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). SafeLease’s insistence that the list is “essential to SafeLease’s attempted monopolization claim” to “establish [] defendants’ FMS market share” is wrong and not specific enough. Res. 8–9.

First, - - - SafeLease doesn’t explain why Storable’s proposed alternatives are insufficient.

They purportedly distrust Storable’s representations about its number of FMS customers, Res. 9; however, Storable offered to (i) have the number verified by a neutral, secure third party with temporary access to the list, or even to (ii) allow SafeLease’s own expert to review the list, in-

-4- 1050 person or remotely, while it remains in Storable’s custody. Pre-Mot. Response (05/23/25). Given that SafeLease only needs the number of Storable’s FMS customers to calculate its FMS market share, SafeLease has never explained why these other methods are inadequate.

Second, there is no “sword and shield” problem here. SafeLease fails to identify a single issue in the Partial MSJ for which they need the list. There are none. The Partial MSJ moves on elements unrelated to FMS market share. See Mot. to Ext. Stay (06/18/25). The sword-and-shield doctrine applies only when information over which privilege is asserted is “outcome- determinative.” Paxton, 509 S.W.3d at 264. The list is not outcome determinative if summary judgment is appropriate on unrelated grounds.

Respectfully submitted June 23, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) John Holler (admitted pro hac vice) ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581

-5- 1051

PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 1,250 words, excluding the case caption, any index, table of contents or table of authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or any required certificates. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on June 23, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Treistman Katherine G. Treistman

-6- 1052

ExhibitB 1053

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S FIRST MERITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION Defendants Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc.; SiteLink Software, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; and Property First Group, LP (“Storable” or “Defendants”) hereby submit the following objections and responses to the First Set of Merits Requests for Production served by Plaintiff SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC (“SafeLease” or “Plaintiff”). These responses will be amended and/or supplemented in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS 1. Storable objects to each of SafeLease’s Definitions as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent that SafeLease seeks information outside the scope of discovery or otherwise purports to impose discovery obligations beyond those set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Storable will therefore construe these requests as seeking non-privileged information within the bounds of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Storable objects to the Definition of “API” as vague and ambiguous.

3. Storable objects to the Definition of “Authorized User” as inaccurate and argumentative.

4. Storable objects to the Definitions of “Defendants,” “you,” and “your” as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent SafeLease seeks information in the possession, custody, or control of any third-party or all/any employees. Storable further objects to these definitions to the extent they include Storable’s attorneys, agents, 1054 consultants, representatives, and advisors, whether past or present, who have facilitated or provided legal advice to Storable. Storable will therefore construe the requests as seeking non-privileged, responsive documents in the possession, custody, or control of Storable.

5. Storable objects to the Definitions of “Document,” and/or “Documents,” to the extent such Definitions cause any request to seek irrelevant information, render any request overbroad, unduly burdensome, or disproportionate to the needs of this case, are duplicative, or purport to require the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, or other applicable immunities.

Storable will construe requests employing these definitions as seeking non-privileged information, reasonably giving words their ordinary meaning consistent with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Storable objects to the Definition of “Facility management software” in that it improperly characterizes facility management software as covering only products offered by Defendants.

7. Storable objects to the Definition of “Facility management software market” as calling for a legal conclusion.

8. Storable objects to the Definition of “Tenant insurance” as vague and ambiguous.

9. Storable objects to the Definition of “Tenant insurance market” as vague and ambiguous and calling for a legal conclusion.

OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS 1. Storable objects to each of SafeLease’s Instructions as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable to the extent that SafeLease seeks information outside the scope of discovery or otherwise purports to impose discovery obligations beyond those set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, including with respect to the production of native documents. Storable will therefore construe these requests as seeking non-privileged information within the bounds of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Storable objects to SafeLease’s Instructions to the extent that it seeks information that is not in Storable’s possession, custody, or control.

RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Request for Production No. 1: All documents that reflect communications with any customer, tenant, or other third-party (including consultants and the like) regarding SafeLease. This includes complaints or feedback regarding SafeLease’s access to your facility management software, discussions about purported performance or security issues caused by SafeLease’s access to your facility management software, discussions about any technical restrictions put in place to limit SafeLease’s access to

1055 selling of facility management software with any other product and restricting or controlling access to any other product or service offered by you.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 9: All documents concerning your strategy, decision making, business plans, or analyses concerning API access pricing for Third-Party Insurance Vendors or SafeLease.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “API access pricing” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to the extent this Request calls for the disclosure of any information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 10: Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that use your facility management software, including addresses for those facilities.

1056

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as seeking irrelevant information, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case, as well as on the basis that it seeks confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information of the highest degree. This Request seeks expansive information not related to the dispute at issue in this case. Storable further objects that this Request seeks confidential information of non-parties to this lawsuit. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable’s possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will not produce documents in response to this Request.

Request for Production No. 11: Documents sufficient to show all self-storage facilities that you contend constitute the relevant market for purposes of this dispute.

RESPONSE: Storable objects to this Request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Storable further objects to the term “relevant market” as vague and ambiguous. Storable further objects to this Request as calling for a legal conclusion. Storable further objects to the extent this Request seeks documents outside of Storable’s possession, custody, or control.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Request for Production No. 12: Documents sufficient to show all Authorized Users on your storEDGE and SiteLink facility management software during the relevant time period.

1057 protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine; Storable will construe this Request as not seeking the disclosure of privileged or protected information.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Storable will produce non- privileged, responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control based on a reasonable and good faith investigation.

Respectfully submitted April 21, 2025. /s/ Mikaila Skaroff Katherine G. Treistman State Bar No. 00796632 Andrew D. Bergman State Bar No. 24101507 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002–2755 Tel.: (713) 576–2400 Fax: (713) 576–2499 [email protected] [email protected] Mikaila Skaroff (admitted pro hac vice) Colorado Bar No. 60688 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 1144 Fifteenth St, Suite 3100 Denver, Colorado 80202 Tel.: (303) 863–1000 Fax: (303) 863–2301 [email protected] Ray T. Torgerson State Bar No. 24003067 Neil Kenton Alexander State Bar No. 00996600 Jonna N. Summers State Bar No. 24060649 Elizabeth “Liza” Eoff State Bar No. 24095062 Lakshmi N. Kumar State Bar No. 24144581 PORTER HEDGES LLP 1000 Main Street, 36th Floor Houston, Texas 77002

1058

Tel.: (713) 226–6000 Fax: (713) 226–6000 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dale Wainwright State Bar No. 00000049 Justin Bernstein State Bar No. 24105462 GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP West 6th Street, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 320–7240 Fax: (512) 320–7240 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Defendants

1059

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record on April 21, 2025.

/s/ Mikaila Skaroff Mikaila Skaroff

1060

ExhibitC 1061 1

2 REPORTER'S RECORD 3 VOLUME 5 OF 7 VOLUMES 4 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 25-BC03A-0001 5 APPELLATE CASE NO. 15-25-00020-CV _______________________________________________________________ : SAFELEASE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC : TEXAS BUSINESS COURT : 8 Plaintiff, : : v. : : 10 : DIVISION 3A STORABLE, INC., REDNOVA LABS, INC., : (d/b/a STOREDGE), SITELINK SOFTWARE, : LLC, EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC, : BADER CO., AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, : LP : TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 13 Defendants. : _______________________________________________________________ 16 TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING _______________________________________________________________ 19 On the 14th day of February, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Melissa Andrews, Judge Presiding, held in person in Austin, Travis County, Texas.

23 Proceedings reported by stenographic machine shorthand.

Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 1062

- ■ ■ ■ - - ■

■ 8 ■ 9 ■ 13 Q. Explain to the Court the value of a Storable insurance customer with regard to this pricing model.

15 A. Sure. So, I think there is a few components to that, and this is important. First is that you have to put yourself in the shoes and mindset of a self-storage owner.

18 Historically, they may not know about the existence of tenant insurance or tenant protection at all.

20 Our team has spent years and years going out to market, talking to our customers, educating them about what this concept is in the first place. Once we convince them that this is a good idea for them to do, then we bring them into our team. We spend time and resources training them up so that their managers can understand so that they can go amend all of Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 1063

1 their leases to include the language that they need to have.

2 We get that all set up in the system. We then help them get their enrollment rate up. We help them start making more money from this platform.

5 And so generally speaking, a customer that has been on Storable insurance has benefited from all of this investment that we have put in; and, therefore, they are producing more than the average customer and are more valuable to a different insurance company if they were to then take that customer from us.

11 Q. That last point that you made, Mr. Gordon, had we heard evidence from different witnesses in this proceeding about value to them of trying to take Storable's customers?

14 A. So -- 15 Q. Even at the higher end?

16 A. Yes, Mr. Manes said that he is still willing to pay that because it's worth it.

18 Q. What about for Mr. Kinet?

19 A. So, this is -- Mr. Kinet said that -- and then actually Mr. Stein today also confirmed that 65 to 70 percent of all the new customers they sign up every month are coming from Storable platforms. To me, that's not surprising because the ones that are our customers are more valuable because they are better at selling tenant insurance and they are going to benefit more from this type of offering that they have. And Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 1064

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS: TEXAS BUSINESS COURTS: 4 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 5 I, DONNA A. GOREE, Official Court Reporter in and for the Texas Business Courts, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-entitled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were stenographically reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

16 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 12th day of March, 2025. /s/Donna Goree _______________________________ DONNA A. GOREE, CSR, RPR, CRR 20 Official Court Reporter Texas Business Courts 21 3721 Carmen Avenue Rancho Viejo, Texas 78575 22 (979) 533-0422 [email protected] 23 Texas Certification No. 3909 Expiration Date: 07/31/2025 Donna A. Goree, CSR, RPR, CRR (979) 533-0422 1065

ExhibitD Docusign Envelope ID: 75AC238B-D464-49E0-8D39-6B8BC420838F 1066

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 v. § § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF CHARLES GORDON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S MAY 28, 2025 DISCOVERY ORDER 1. My name is Charles Gordon, my date of birth is February 23, 1987, and my business address is 10900 Research Blvd Ste 160C PMB 3099, Austin, Texas 78759. I submit this supplemental declaration in support of Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s May 28, 2025 Discovery Order. I am of sound mind and competent to make the statements in this declaration.

2. I am CEO of Defendant Storable, Inc. (“Storable”), which is the parent company of the other named Defendants in this action. I co-founded Storable and have served as CEO of Storable since its founding. As part of my job responsibilities, I am familiar with the types of information that Storable keeps confidential and which, if made public, could materially harm Storable’s business or ability to compete in the marketplace.

3. I understand that Storable is asking the Court to reconsider its order that Storable produce documents sufficient to show the name, city, state, and ZIP code of all self-storage facilities using Storable’s FMS platforms as of December 30, 2024. This information effectively constitutes Storable’s FMS customer list (the “Facility List” or “List”).

4. I also understand that SafeLease has claimed in its filings that the Storable customers on its Facilities List are “readily ascertainable.” Plaintiff’s Resp. to Mot. for Partial Reconsideration of May 28 Order at 7. This is false.

5. The List is one of Storable’s most valuable and protected assets. It is not publicly known or available and cannot be ascertained from other generally available sources. While publicly available websites and databases that are designed to be searchable as a tool to locate a self-storage facility near a prospective customer, such as Google or Sparefoot, can be used to find self-storage facilities, these sources do not indicate whether those facilities use FMS or, if they do, which company’s FMS they use. The value to Storable in maintaining the secrecy of its Facility List is not that self-storage facilities cannot be identified through other sources, but rather because the list indicates which of those facilities are specifically Storable’s FMS customers. If disclosed, Docusign Envelope ID: 75AC238B-D464-49E0-8D39-6B8BC420838F 1067 the List would empower Storable’s competitors to pinpoint exactly which facilities use Storable’s FMS platforms, which of Storable’s FMS products they use, and which facilities pay the prices that Storable charges. This is a trade secret of ours and the kind of information that Storable’s competitors could not obtain through any other means. The List would enable Storable’s competitors to compete unfairly based on information they otherwise would never have access to, including stealing Storable’s customers by undercutting Storable’s prices. This kind of unfair competition using Storable’s confidential trade secret would threaten Storable’s business and relationships with its customers.

6. Similarly, I understand that SafeLease has further claimed in its filings that Storable’s Facility List is not a trade secret because the identities of its customers do not have economic value to third parties, or to Storable in preventing third parties from obtaining that information. Plaintiff’s Resp. to Mot. for Partial Reconsideration of May 28 Order at 7. This too is incorrect.

7. Storable (and its affiliated operating entities) have spent considerable time and resources over more than a decade developing and maintaining the FMS customer base reflected in its Facility List. Storable has also invested significantly in developing and maintaining API connections that enable its FMS customers to connect to a wide range of third-party service providers, including other tenant insurance companies. Storable has also invested in building its business for ancillary products with its FMS customers. As to tenant insurance, Storable has spent years investing in educating its FMS facility customers about the benefits of tenant insurance, setting up their tenant insurance platforms, training them on how to amend tenant leases to incorporate tenant insurance, and helping them improve insurance enrollment rates, among other things.

8. Storable’s FMS customers have benefitted from these investments by enabling them to run their self-storage facilities more efficiently and to seamlessly connect with third-party service providers that have integrated into Storable’s FMS using an API. For the Storable FMS customers that also use Storable’s tenant insurance products, Storable’s investments have helped facilities increase their insurance enrollment rates and earn more revenue.

9. Storable’s investments in its FMS platform, its integration partners, and its tenant insurance business make Storable’s FMS customers more valuable sales targets for Storable’s competitors compared to self-storage facilities that are not Storable FMS customers. The List, if disclosed, would reveal to Storable’s FMS competitors not only which facilities are Storable FMS customers but also indicate that these facilities are likely to be more valuable customers due to Storable’s investment in these specific customers and the systems that support their businesses.

Moreover, a third-party service provider that is integrated into Storable’s FMS and competes with Storable could readily use the List to target new customers or steal existing Storable customers, which are customers that would have greater value to such a competitor than those it might find through public searches.

10. Should the Court require further information or have questions regarding Storable’s FMS Facility List, or why the List is Storable’s trade secret, I am willing to provide further testimony for the Court’s assistance.

Docusign Envelope ID: 75AC238B-D464-49E0-8D39-6B8BC420838F 1068

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Austin, Texas, on the 21st day of June, 2025.

Charles Gordon

1069 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Grace Ojionuka on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102281428 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Storable???s Reply in Support of its Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order Status as of 6/23/2025 9:09 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT 1070 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Grace Ojionuka on behalf of Katherine Ginzburg Treistman Bar No. 796632 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102281428 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Storable???s Reply in Support of its Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the May 28, 2025 Discovery Order Status as of 6/23/2025 9:09 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT John Holler [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/23/2025 8:28:38 AM SENT 1071

The Business Court of Texas Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 § STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF STAY Defendants ask to revisit another order. In their latest motion for reconsideration, styled as a motion to extend, they challenge the order staying production of their FMS customer list. And, again, they raise nothing new. Like before, they say the information may be irrelevant if their MSJ were granted. This is a rerun argument. The Court was aware of how the briefing for pending motions will overlap when it set the deadlines and when the stay would expire. Presenting nothing new in law, facts, or even arguments, this motion should be denied.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES It is “not an abuse of discretion to refuse” a motion to reconsider. In re GreatAmerica Leasing Corp., 294 S.W.3d 912, 915 n.2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (orig. proc.).

This is especially true when the motion raises no new facts. See Macy v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 638, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). “When there exists no independent reason for reconsideration other than mere disagreement with a prior order, reconsideration is a waste of judicial time and resources and should not be granted.” Blythe v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, L.L.C., 423 F. Supp. 3d 299, 304 (E.D. La. 2019).

A litigant wastes judicial and party resources by relitigating issues already considered and decided. This motion fits that bill. It should be denied for many reasons. Here are four.

1072

First, the Court considered the pending MSJ when it granted the stay. Defendants disagree with the stay timing, but nothing has changed since the Court decided this issue the first time.

Here, defendants again want to “extend the stay . . . until after a decision” on their MSJ because “ordering production of the list, which is a trade secret, is not necessary and would be in error.”

Mot. at 5-6. They sought the same thing for the same reason in their motion to stay 17 days ago, asking for a stay of the June 13 production deadline because if the Court grants the MSJ “the need for production of the customer list will become moot.” Emerg. Mot. to Stay at 4, 6. The Court considered this point and stayed production through June 24. Defendants’ new motion offers “mere disagreement” with that decision, so “reconsideration is a waste of judicial time and resources.”

Blythe, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 304.

Second, no rule or law freezes discovery while an MSJ is pending. Defendants cite no authority that says otherwise. To be sure, a court may issue a protective order “in the interest of justice,” as defendants note. Mot. at 4. But no one is seeking a protective order, which had to be done “within the time permitted for response to the discovery request.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(b).

That time is long past. And the interests of justice and common-sense case management practices cut the other way. A policy of halting discovery just because an MSJ is pending would allow litigants to use such motions to avoid discovery and inject needless delay into cases. This would not serve the interests of justice or efficiency.

Third, this repeat request for more delay because of defendants’ claim that the list isn’t “necessary” to decide its MSJ—and hence that ordering production would be error—assumes that the customer list is a trade secret, which is wrong. Defendants have not proven that their list is a trade secret, and by failing to timely assert this privilege, they waived it anyway. See Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider (June 19, 2025). Because the list isn’t a trade secret, defendants’ denial that the list

-2- 1073 is needed to fairly decide the MSJ is inapposite. See In re. Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1998) (no burden to show information is “necessary for a fair adjudication” of the party’s claims until resisting party “establish[es] that the information is a trade secret”).

Moreover, even if the necessary-for-a-fair-decision analysis were applicable here, defendants misunderstand it. That analysis asks whether evidence is needed to decide the requesting party’s “claims”—not a motion. Id. The analysis is done once, in deciding whether information is a trade secret and, if so, whether production is necessary to decide a claim. See id. Here, defendants hope to turn a one-time analysis about a claim as a whole into an ongoing one about each motion a party files. This would in effect allow a party to perpetually delay discovery by filing motion after motion that doesn’t implicate the trade-secret information—e.g., alleging dispositive procedural defects or the lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction—forcing a court to decide over and over whether the information is needed to resolve each motion before it can order production. But that is not how the analysis is done. So a court’s order compelling production of a trade secret because it is needed to fairly decide a claim isn’t later transformed into error whenever a party files a motion that can (allegedly) be resolved without the trade secret.

Defendants cite no case law to the contrary. See Mot. at 4-6 In any event, defendants are wrong that the customer list isn’t needed to fairly decide their MSJ. As SafeLease has explained, the list is important evidence for assessing FMS market share.

Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider Discovery Order at 8-9. Defendants have a dangerous probability of monopolizing the insurance market because of their FMS market dominance, which they can and did leverage to limit competition in the insurance market. Understanding the extent of defendants’ FMS dominance—and having hard evidence to back this understanding—is critical to fairly assess the elements they challenge in their MSJ. See Mot. at 3. This and other evidence, plus expert

-3- 1074 analysis, is needed from the discovery process to combat defendants’ “no evidence” or “zero evidence” points, despite their odd denial of making such points. Mot. at 5 n.2.

Fourth, a longer stay will not save anyone’s resources. If defendants have to produce their customer list, they plan to petition for mandamus relief. Emerg. Mot. for Stay at 3 (defendants “will have to pursue a petition for writ of mandamus”). Extending the stay won’t save resources; it will only delay the inevitable. Indeed, it simply may invite another round of motions when that stay is about to expire.

The motion raises nothing new in law or fact. An extension of the stay is not supported by the law, is not grounded in any established privilege, would deprive SafeLease of evidence needed for its summary judgment opposition, and would not serve the interests of justice or judicial efficiency. The motion should be denied.

CONCLUSION The Court should deny defendants’ motion for extension of stay.

-4- 1075

Date: June 23, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Paul Yetter Judd E. Stone II R. Paul Yetter State Bar No. 24076720 State Bar No. 22154200 [email protected] [email protected] Christopher D. Hilton Susanna R. Allen State Bar No. 24087727 State Bar No. 24126616 [email protected] [email protected] Alexander M. Dvorscak Luke A. Schamel State Bar No. 24120461 State Bar No. 24106403 [email protected] [email protected] STONE HILTON PLLC Shannon N. Smith Congress Ave. State Bar No. 24110378 Austin, Texas 78748 [email protected] (737) 465-3897 Julia C. Risley State Bar No. 24132932 Adam T. Locke [email protected] State Bar No. 24083184 YETTER COLEMAN LLP [email protected] 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 LOCKELAW PLLC Houston, Texas 77002 2617 Bissonnet Street, Suite 503 (713) 632-8000 Houston, Texas 77005 (713) 832-0243 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that this brief was served on all counsel of record via the Court’s e-filing service and by email on June 23, 2025. /s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document complies with Local Rule 5(a) and contains 1,110 words, not including any case caption, index, table of contents or authorities, signature blocks, attached evidence, or required certificates. /s/ Luke Schamel Luke Schamel

-5- FILED IN BUSINESS COURT 1076 OF TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 6/23/2025

The Business Court of Texas, Third Division SAFELEASE INSURANCE § SERVICES LLC, § Plaintiff, § § v. § Cause No. 25-BC03A-0001 STORABLE, INC., et al., § § Defendants.

§ ═══════════════════════════════════════════ Order on Motions for Reconsideration; Other Relief ═══════════════════════════════════════════ Before the Court are Storable’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s April 15, 2025 Order Denying Modification of the Protective Order and Storable’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Court’s May 28, 2025 Discovery Order (collectively, the Motions). The Court DENIES both Motions but elects to provide Storable with other relief detailed below. The Court therefore ORDERS as follows: 1. The customer information requested in SafeLease’s Request for Production (RFP) No. 10 qualifies for OCEO protection under the Agreed Protective Order in this case.

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2. For purposes of Storable’s production in response to RFP No. 10 only, Mr. Locke will be excluded from the attorneys of record permitted to view OCEO material under the Agreed Protective Order. 1 3. For all other OCEO material, Mr. Locke may continue to have access as an attorney of record in this case.

4. Consistent with the offer in his March 26, 2025 letter, Mr. Locke must refrain from participating in any future business negotiations between SafeLease and Storable that are outside the context of legal disputes or potential settlements of legal disputes, unless all parties agree otherwise.

Date signed: June 23, 2025.

Hon. Melissa Andrews Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division

This precaution in no way reflects on the integrity or professionalism of Mr. Locke, which the Court does not question.

1078 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 102291622 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Order on Motions to Reconsider Status as of 6/23/2025 10:54 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Ray TTorgerson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Delonda Dean [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Yetter Coleman [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Carolyn Reed [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Courtney Smith [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Melissa Sanchez [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Edockets Calendaring [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Andrew Bergman [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Elizabeth FEoff [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Katherine G.Treistman [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Luke A.Schamel [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Christopher Hilton [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Judd Stone [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Alyssa Smith [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Bonnie Chester [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Jonna NSummers [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Lakshmi NKumar [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT R. PaulYetter [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Susanna R.Allen [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Justin Bernstein [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Business Court Division 3A [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT 1079 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.

The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 102291622 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Order on Motions to Reconsider Status as of 6/23/2025 10:54 AM CST Case Contacts Dolores Brunelle [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Cathy Hodges [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Mikaila Skaroff [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Rosalinda Luna [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Adam Locke [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT John Holler [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Alexander Dvorscak [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Shannon Smith [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Dale Wainwright [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT Julia C.Risley [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:47:25 AM SENT

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.