Demond Mitchell v. the State of Texas

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00409-CR No. 02-24-00412-CR ___________________________ DEMOND MITCHELL, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 485th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 1718993, 1718994

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction Appellant Demond Mitchell appeals two cases in which the trial court revoked his deferred-adjudication community supervision and sentenced him to terms of imprisonment. Mitchell’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support of that motion, both of which assert that Mitchell’s appeals are frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). We agree, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

II. Background In trial court case number 1718993, Mitchell pleaded guilty to tampering with a governmental record and pleaded true to the habitual-offender notice. The trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed him on four years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. The trial court also ordered Mitchell to pay court costs and a reimbursement fee. Approximately fifteen months later, the State filed a first amended petition to proceed to adjudication alleging three community-supervision violations.

Meanwhile, in trial court case number 1718994, Mitchell pleaded guilty to fraudulent use or possession of identifying information and pleaded true to the enhancement; the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed him on four years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. The trial court also ordered Mitchell to The trial court’s written judgment adjudicating guilt in the tampering case includes a special finding ordering reparations in the amount of $1,328 but stating that they are to run concurrent with the sentence. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.09 (addressing credit for time served); Singletary v. State, No. 02-24-00216-CR, 2025 WL 938130, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Similarly, the judgment adjudicating guilt in the fraudulent-use case includes a special finding ordering reparations in the amount of $50 but stating that they are to run concurrent with the sentence.

III. Anders Discussion Mitchell’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief complying with Anders, both of which assert that Mitchell’s appeals are frivolous because the cases reveal “no grounds that could be argued non-frivolously on appeal.”

See 386 U.S. at 744–45, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. In accordance with Kelly v. State, counsel sent Mitchell a copy of the motion to withdraw and the brief; informed him of his right to file a pro se response, to review the record, and to seek discretionary review pro se should this court deny relief; and provided him with a pro se motion to access the appellate record. 1 See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Counsel’s motion and brief meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record showing why there are no arguable grounds for The letter that counsel sent to Mitchell said that it enclosed “the unsigned Pro Se Motion for Access to the Appellate Record,” but the letter that was filed with this court did not include the form. relief. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). This court gave Mitchell the opportunity to file a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief, but he did not do so. The State filed a letter in which it agreed with appointed counsel that the appeals are frivolous.

After an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw and a brief fulfilling the Anders requirements, we must independently examine the record for any arguable ground that may be raised on the appellant’s behalf. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only after examining the record and independently concluding that no arguable ground may be raised can we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). Here, we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeals; we agree with counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. Conclusion We accordingly grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Dabney Bassel Dabney Bassel Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 24, 2025