Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2025

C. P. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

C. P. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided September 23, 2025

C. P. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00465-CV

C. P., Appellant v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-19-008360, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

C.P. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment finding by clear and convincing evidence that three statutory grounds existed for terminating Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), (2).1 Mother’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief concluding that her appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in

The trial court’s order specified that the findings as to the three predicate grounds had been made by a prior trial court and were not challenged in a prior appeal; therefore, “no further findings are required as to statutory grounds.” See N.N. v. C.P., No. 03-22-00705-CV, 2023 WL 3853627, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin June 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing and remanding for new trial solely on best interest where Mother had not challenged predicate findings). appeals from termination of parental rights because it “strikes an important balance between the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to prosecute frivolous appeals” (citations omitted)). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in parental-termination case). Mother’s counsel certified to this Court that he provided her with a copy of the Anders brief and a copy of the entire appellate record and informed her of her right to file a pro se brief. Mother subsequently filed a pro se brief.

We have conducted a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous, as we must when presented with an Anders brief. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). After reviewing the record, the Anders brief, and Mother’s pro se brief, we find nothing in the record that would arguably support Mother’s appeal. We agree with Mother’s counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of Mother. We deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to withdraw.2

The Texas Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings [in the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

Accordingly, counsel’s obligations to C.P. have not yet been discharged. See id. If after consulting with counsel appellant desires to file a petition for review, her counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. __________________________________________ Karin Crump, Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis Affirmed Filed: September 23, 2025

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.