Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth), 2025

Jesus Eduardo Salas v. the State of Texas

Jesus Eduardo Salas v. the State of Texas
Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) · Decided October 9, 2025
Jesus Eduardo Salas v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00304-CR ___________________________ JESUS EDUARDO SALAS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1830004

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Jesus Eduardo Salas attempts to appeal his convictions for sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11(d), 22.011(a)(2). Appellant pleaded guilty to both offenses pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, and the trial court sentenced him to two concurrent ten-year confinement periods. Although no reporter’s record exists from the hearing on the plea agreement, under the written plea admonishments that Appellant signed, Appellant waived his right to appeal.

Appellant specifically acknowledged, “I am aware of the consequences of my plea,” and “I waive all rights of appeal in this case.” He also acknowledged that his “attorney [had] discussed with [him] the law and facts” and that he made the plea agreement “knowingly, freely, and voluntarily.” Consistent with Appellant’s plea- bargain agreement, the trial court’s “Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal” reflects that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.”

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

On August 21, 2025, we notified Appellant of the trial court’s certification and warned him that we would dismiss the appeal unless we received a response by September 2, 2025, showing grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d), 44.3. Although Appellant filed a jurisdictional response including a motion to abate, he failed to show grounds for abating or continuing the appeal.

Appellant suggests the possibility that his trial counsel—who had not withdrawn—may have been ineffective by not filing a motion for new trial: “If [Appellant] was deprived of counsel during that thirty-day period, then his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated.” He asks this court to abate the appeal to permit him to file an out-of-time new-trial motion. But when a new-trial motion is not filed, a rebuttable presumption arises that the defendant was adequately advised by counsel and that the defendant considered and rejected the new-trial motion. Oldham v. State, 977 S.W.2d 354, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). This presumption arises, in part, because counsel remains as defense counsel for all purposes until expressly permitted to withdraw. See Ward v. State, 740 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

Appellant’s response does not overcome this presumption, and he has not shown any “truly extraordinary circumstances” that would allow for an out-of-time new-trial motion. See Anthony v. State, No. 02-23-00023-CR, 2023 WL 4780926, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 27, 2023, no pet.) (amended mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 360). Accordingly, we deny Appellant’s motion to abate to permit him to file such a motion. Because Appellant has not shown grounds for continuing this appeal, we dismiss it. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f); see Anthony, 2023 WL 4780926, at *1 n.2.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: October 9, 2025

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.