In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00536-CV ___________________________ JERALD H. MILLER JR., Appellant V. TARRANT COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, TARRANT COUNTY REVIEW BOARD, TARRANT COUNTY, THE CITY OF FORT WORTH, AND TARRANT COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR COLLECTOR, Appellees

On Appeal from the 141st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 141-329967-21

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Jerald H. Miller Jr. attempts to appeal from the trial court’s order denying his “motion to join [a] necessary party defendant.” [Capitalization altered.]

But our appellate jurisdiction is limited to appeals from (1) final judgments and (2) interlocutory orders for which the legislature has authorized immediate appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a); Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, 718 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tex. 2025); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). The trial court’s order is neither. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (listing interlocutory orders for which immediate appeal is authorized); Kohler v. Pursley, No. 14-95-1364-CV, 1995 WL 755662, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 1995, no writ) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (holding that “[a]n order denying a motion to add defendants is an interlocutory order”); see AKMK Props., LLC v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist., No. 02-20-00329-CV, 2020 WL 7393733, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that order on motions for leave to amend pleadings was not final judgment or immediately appealable interlocutory order).

We notified Miller of this jurisdictional issue, and we warned him that we could dismiss his appeal unless he showed grounds for continuing it. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. Miller responded by arguing the merits of his appeal and by claiming that his complaints fall within this court’s appellate jurisdiction to, in his words, “correct abuses of discretion, legal error, and due-process violations.” But even assuming his complaints have merit, our appellate jurisdiction to “correct abuses of discretion, legal error, and due-process violations” is limited to appeals from (1) final judgments and (2) interlocutory orders for which the legislature has authorized immediate appeal. See Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., 718 S.W.3d at 237; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195.

Accordingly, we dismiss Miller’s attempted appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); AKMK Props., 2020 WL 7393733, at *1 (dismissing attempted appeal from order on motions to amend pleadings); Kohler, 1995 WL 755662, at *1 (dismissing attempted appeal from order denying motion to add defendants).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice Delivered: December 11, 2025