Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1893

Long v. State

Long v. State
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · Decided May 10, 1893 · No. 70. · Simkins
22 S.W. 409; 32 Tex. Crim. 140; 1893 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 236 (South Western Reporter)

Counsel

Charles S. Todd, for appellant. — 1. The statute prescribes no precise stage of the proceedings at which an application for change of venue shall be filed, and does not require that the supporting affidavits shall be filed simultaneously with the application. This court has held, that an application for change of venue made before the defendant's announcement, though after the State has announced ready for trial, is in proper time. Carr v. The state, 19 Texas Cr. App., 635. In this case, the supporting affidavit of Anderson, Castle, and Barrett was filed before the defendant was called on to announce. It was being prepared at the time the controverting affidavit of Williams was filed by the State. The court had permitted the State to delay the trial a whole day to get up Williams' affidavit; the district attorney knew that additional compurgators would be procured by defendant. It might have been proper for the court to have allowed the district attorney a further reasonable time to controvert the second supporting affidavit. However, he did not ask it, but moved to strike out the affidavit filed by defendant, because it was filed a few minutes after the affidavit of Williams, the single witness making the controverting affidavit. The court might have been justified in its action, if it had appeared that defendant was only trifling with the time of the court for delay; but defendant was in good faith asserting a valuable legal right, and it is submitted, that to summarily deprive him of the benefit of the affidavit of three compurgators was an abuse of discretion, for which alone the judgment should be reversed. If the affidavit was improperly stricken out, then, not having been controverted by the State by attacking the credibility or means of knowledge of the compurgators, defendant was entitled as a matter of right to the change of venue. Davis v. The State, 19 Texas Cr. App., 201. 2. It was flagrant error to allow the district attorney to call the jurors who had tried and convicted appellant to testify on the hearing of the motion for new trial, as to the deliberations of the jury during their retirement and the conduct of the juror Law. The issue was simply, was the juror Law prejudiced against defendant, and not whether his prejudice did or did not injure the defendant. The matters stated in the affidavit of Blocker and Ryburn were substantially admitted by the juror Law, and the statements charged to have been made by him were not denied, his only explananation being that he was drunk and did not remember. Blocker, Ryburn, and Collins swear positively to the statement made by Law, showing a deep-seated prejudice against defendant, and the fact that he was drunk is but an illustration of the ancient maxim, in vino veritas. Could the effect of these facts be neutralized and avoided by calling the jurors to prove that "Law did not show any prejudice in the jury room?" If he felt the prejudice, if he spoke the truth in his cups, would he not have acted just as he did? How can the court adjudge that a defendant accused of crime was not injured by a juror who had expressed a wish to get on the jury for the express purpose of convicting him? In Long v. The State, 10 Texas Criminal Appeals, 186, this court said a trial should be above suspicion of unfairness. In the other cases cited, remarks by a juror showing far less vindictiveness were held to require a new trial. Hanks v. The State, 21 Tex. 527 ; Henrie v. The State, 41 Tex. 574 ; Nash v. The State, 2 Texas Cr. App., 362. In Washburn v. The State, 31 Texas Criminal Reports, 352, a new trial was granted for similar cause; and in a very able and admirable opinion in a very recent case (Sam Massey v. The State, 31 Texas Criminal Reports, 371), this court decides the very point in question, using the following emphatic language: "But it may be contended that the appellant, notwithstanding all these facts, had a fair trial; that the jury was composed of the very best men, and passed upon the case in a proper spirit, without being influenced by extraneous and improper matter. * * * Must appellant, under such a state of facts, go with his evidence into the jury room and show that the jury was uninfluenced, * * * or will the State be permitted to show by jurymen that they were not so influenced? If so, our statutes on the subject of changing the venue are nonsense, sheer foolishness." R.L. Henry, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State. — 1. This court will not disturb the action of the trial court in refusing a change of venue, unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Myers v. The State, 7 Texas Cr. App., 640; Cox v. The State, 8 Texas Cr. App., 254; Willson's Crim. Stats., sec. 2212. 2. The court did not err in overruling defendant's amended motion for a new trial, based upon the bias and prejudice of the juror Law. Nash v. The State, 2 Texas Cr. App., 362.

Long v. State

Opinion of the Court

SIMKINS, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of embezzlement, and his punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary, from which judgment he appeals.

1. Appellant complains that the court erred in striking out the supporting affidavits of P. P. Anderson, J. A. Castle, and K. M. Barrett, as compurgators, and in overruling the motion for change of venue. We can not see any possible inj ury to appellant from striking out the supporting affidavits filed by appellant after issue joined. There was a full investigation of the question whether appellant could obtain a fair and impartial trial in Franklin County, in which the said witnesses could and did testify. We do not think the showing for a change of venue was sufficient, and the district judge did not err in overruling it. Myer’s case, 7 Texas Cr. App., 640; Cox’s case, 8 Texas Cr. App., 254; Willson’s Crim. Stats., sec. 2212.

2: The serious question arises from the fact that the juror Tobe Law sat in this case. After the verdict, appellant moved for a new trial, upon the ground that a prejudiced juror sat in the cause, and was influenced by his prejudice in his verdict. He stated further, that he had a dispute with Law, in the presence of Blocker and Ryburn, but never Imew that Law had any ill feeling against him, or had made the statements imputed to him, which were made August 14, 1892, prior to the trial on November 24,1892. It was shown by Blocker and Ryburn, that the juror Law, on the 14th of August, had a quarrel with Long, both parties drinking; and, after Long had left, he remarked that he (Long) had a case in court, and he (Law) hoped that when the son-of-a-bitch was tried he (Law) could get on the jury; that he would send him to the penitentiary. The juror denied the prejudice, but was unable to deny the charge. He stated that he had no recollection of saying so, but remembers he apologized to Long sometime after for language he had used, and Long told him no apology was necessary, as both were drunk, and shook hands with him. Long, however was not aware of the statements made by said juror in his absence, and the juror qualified himself as being without bias for or against *145 the defendant on his voir dire. Another witness also spoke of some disparaging remarks made of Long by said juror, to the effect that he would not allow him to sleep at his house, but would treat him as a negro. The juror denies any recollection of this conversation also, stating that he was drinking on both occasions referred to, and may have used the language. In further answer, the State proved that the juror’s conduct in the jury room manifested no prejudice against appellant.

The affidavits offered in support of the motion for a new trial show with reasonable certainty that one of the jurors who tried this case was not a qualified juror; that apparently, without even having formed a conclusion as to appellant’s guilt, he announced his intention of sending him to the penitentiary if he sat on the case, presumably whether he was guilty or innocent. By some coincidence he did get on the jury, and voted as he had threatened to do. His denial of the charges is by no means satisfactory. He remembers the occasion, repeats verbatim the conversation he had with Long, but can not remember a word of the conversation with Byburn and Blocker, immediately afterwards. Bemem bers their going home, and Byburn turning back, yet can not remember his repeated threats of sending appellant to the penitentiary, made to Blocker. He remembers the apology, three weeks afterwards, he made to appellant, yet forgets the conversation with Brice Collins. If such conversations occurred, the juror should not have sat in the cause, and the court should have granted anew trial, or else held, that because appellant is probably guilty, he was not entitled to an impartial jury. We think it is very probable that the threats imputed to the juror were made by him, and the court erred in not granting a new trial. Gilleland’s case, 44 Texas, 364; Graham’s case, 28 Texas Cr. App., 584. We find no error in any other ruling. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

never sed and remanded.

Judges all present and concurring.

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