C.E. Spalding, C.E. Dubois, Wright Wynne and Tayloe Cornell, for appellant. — Where ownership is alleged in the general owner, and defense offers evidence tending to show that at the time of the taking the alleged animal was in the actual care, control and management of another, it is error for the court to charge as complained
of without qualification, since if there be a general and special owner, an animal upon its accustomed range is in contemplation of law in the possession of the special owner.
If two charges upon a material issue be given which are contradictory, and which have the effect to neutralize each other, the jury is left without instruction upon such issue, and it becomes the duty of the higher court to reverse and remand the case. Bibby v. State, 65 S.W. Rep., 193; Blair v. State, 26 Texas Crim. App., 387; 9 S.W. Rep., 890; Arcia v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 198; 12 S.W. Rep., 599; Schauer v. State, 60 S.W. Rep., 249; Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 73 Tex. 277 ; 11 S.W. Rep., 327, and numerous cases cited as supporting it in Rose's Notes.
We believe there is no question that the animal alleged to have been stolen was shown to be on his accustomed range at the time it was taken. The testimony of Billings to the effect that the horse was gentle, never strayed far from the house, and watered every day at the ranch house well on his twelve section ranch, which was uncontradicted, shows this beyond question. We do not doubt the correctness of the proposition that an animal upon its accustomed range is in contemplation of law in the possession of its owner, as a general proposition. The decisions of our higher courts announcing this as the rule are numerous. However, it is just as well settled that when there is a special owner, one having actual care, control and management of the property, that an animal upon its accustomed range is then in contemplation of law in the possession of such special owner. Clayton v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App., 348; Prator v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App., 363; McAfee v. State, 14 Texas Crim. App., 668; Curlin v. State, 23 Texas Crim. App., 681; Lacey v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. Rep.; 19 S.W. Rep., 896; Morrow v. State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 239; 2 S.W. Rep., 624.
On the question of misconduct of the jury: Hambright v. State, 84 S.W. Rep., 597; Dixon v. State, 79 S.W. Rep., 310; Ysaguirre v. State, 58 S.W. Rep., 1005; Blalock v. State, 62 S.W. Rep., 571; Sims v. State, 70 S.W. Rep., 90; Mitchell v. State, 33 S.W. Rep., 367; 36 S.W. Rep., 456; McWilliams v. State, 22 S.W. Rep., 970; Terry v. State, 38 S.W. Rep., 986; Tate v. State, 42 S.W. Rep., 595; Lucas v. State, 11 S.W. Rep., 443; McKissick v. State, 9 S.W. Rep., 296; Anschicks v. State, 6 Texas Crim. App., 534; Wyers v. State, 13 Texas Crim. App., 57.
Howard Martin, Assistant Attorney-General, and W.A. Anderson,
for the State. — Simpson v. State, 85 S.W. Rep., 15.