— Conviction is for tbe unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in tbe penitentiary for one year.

Tbe evidence reveals tbe fact that appellant was carrying in bis automobile a gallon of corn whisky. No evidence was introduced on behalf of tbe appellant.

Tbe contention that it was incumbent upon the State to prove that tbe liquor was transported for sale is unsound. See Stringer v. State, 92 Texas Crim. Rep., 46, 241 S. W. Rep., 159; Crowley v. State, 92 Texas Crim. Rep., 103, 242 S. W. Rep., 472.

Tbe indictment contained an averment that tbe liquor was whisky and that it was intoxicating. An .additional averment that it contained more than one per cent of alcohol was unnecessary. See Estell v. State, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 481, 240 S. W. Rep., 913.

Tbe fact that a search of appellant’s automobile was made without a search-warrant was not an impediment to proof by the officer who made tbe search that he found tbe whisky in the car. See Welchek v. State, 93 Texas Crim. Rep., 271, 247 S. W. Rep., 524.

Complaint is made of the receipt of testimony to tbe effect that appellant bad stated that be bad sold corn whisky. Tbe proof being conclusive and uncontroverted that be transported a gallon of corn whisky, and there being no defensive matter introduced and tbe minimum punishment having been assessed, tbe admission of the evidence was apparently harmless.

*595 While a State witness was testifying, appellant made threatening gestures towards him, and the judge admonished appellant to keep his hand down and cease making demonstrations. There is some conflict between the bill and the qualification, .but the latter prevails. Under the facts, the reprimand seems to have been justified. Cyc. of Law & Proc., Vol. 12, p. 538; Corpus Juris, Vol. 16, p. 829, Secs. 2095-2100.

The court,' in the second paragraph of his main charge, instructed the jury that the burden was upon the State to prove by the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant ‘ ‘ did unlawfully and knowingly transport intoxicating liquors. ’ ’

After retirement, the jury submitted to the court, in writing, the following question:

•“The word ‘knowingly’ in the second part of the Court’s charge is causing much dispute and disagreement in the jury room. We note that this word does not appear in the indictment.

“Must we give this word serious consideration and look for real evidence to support this particular portion of the Court’s charge?

“Perhaps you cannot, or dare not answer, however, we would appreciate what explanation you may be permitted to give us on Clause II of the Court’s charge.”

The Court made the following reply:

“In determining whether or not an act was knowingly done, the jury may, in their discretion, as in determining any other issue in the case, consider all the facts and circumstances, if any, in evidence. ’ ’

This is criticized as fieing upon the weight of the evidence. We think the complaint is without merit. See Code of Crim. Proc., Art. 754, Vernon’s Tex. Crim. Stat., Vol. 2, p. 567;; Benavides v. State, 31 Texas Crim. App., 173; 37 Amer. Dec., 799.

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

ON REHEARING.

November 7, 1923.

— Witness Leonard testified that in the evening of the same day appellant was apprehended with the whisky in his wagon appellant said to witness in substance:

“A man can’t make a little honest money without being arrested. I have been arrested and charged with selling com whisky. By, God, I did sell corn whisky and have the best corn whisky in the country.”

Objection was interposed because appellant was not charged with selling it, but with transporting it. While this objection was being *596 urged appellant made an angry demonstration towards the witness for which he was reprimanded by the court. These two matters are seriously urged as presenting error for which the judgment should have been reversed. We did not think it necessary in our former opinion to determine whether any error was committed in receiving Leonard’s testimony. We do not deem it necessary to discuss it now. We think it a sound rule that, generally speaking, even if an error is omitted during the trial it does not and should not call for a reversal unless it was such that we may say from the record it injured accused, or was of such character that it may have done so and the record does not authorize us to reach the conclusion that it did injure him. The question raised by both incidents complained of in this case may very justly be disposed of under the foregoing rule without reference to any other. There was no defensive evidence of any character. The State made a clear case against accused independent of the matters complained of. The jury under their oaths as honest men could do- no less than find appellant guilty; this being true and the lowest penalty having been assessed as shown by the record indicates that neither of the incidents complained of could or did work injury. To argue that regardless of the other evidence plainly showing guilt the jury might have acquitted in the absence of the matters complained of is to speculate that the jury might have stultified themselves under such circumstances.

Finding no reason justifying a conclusion other than as reached originally, the motion for rehearing is overruled.

Overruled.