OPINION

Appellant was convicted of prostitution in a trial before a jury. Punishment was assessed at $500.00 and 180 days in county jail. One ground of error is raised in this appeal.

The information in this case alleged in pertinent part that appellant:

“did knowingly and intentionally offer to engage in sexual conduct, to-wit: sexual intercourse, with Robert D. Meeker, for a fee payable to the said Linda Kay Thompson . . . ”

In his charge to the jury, the judge defined “sexual conduct” to include deviate sexual intercourse, sexual contact, and sexual intercourse. In applying the law to the facts, the court charged the jury as follows:

“Now if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 6th day of August, 1977, in Bell County, Texas, the defendant, Linda Kay Thompson, did knowingly and intentionally offer to engage in sexual conduct with Robert D. Meeker, for a fee payable to the said Linda Kay Thompson, then you will find the defendant guilty of prostitution as charged.”

*498Appellant contends that the above charge authorized the jury to convict if it found that she offered to engage in (1) deviate sexual intercourse, (2) sexual contact, or (3) sexual intercourse, while the information only charged that she offered to engage in sexual intercourse. Thus, appellant contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by charging the jury on a theory not alleged in the information.

The information in this case alleged a violation of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 43.02(a)(1),1 but did so by alleging specifically that the sexual conduct involved was sexual intercourse. Thus, appellant was brought to trial on that specific charge. By instructing the jury that sexual conduct means all three definitions set out in V.T. C.A. Penal Code, Section 43.01(4), and then authorizing conviction on a finding that appellant offered to engage in “sexual conduct,” the trial court did authorize the jury to convict on a theory not alleged in the indictment. We have held that such a charge is fundamentally defective regardless of whether an objection to the charge was made. Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Davis v. State, 557 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Robinson v. State, 553 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977).2

For this reason the judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded.

concurring.

There was no objection to the court’s charge before it was submitted to the jury. After a thorough review of the record I am of the opinion that the appellant was not harmed by the court’s charge which was submitted to the jury. However, I concur in the reversal of this judgment because the disposition of the appeal is controlled by a number of decisions including Gooden v. State, 567 S.W.2d 382 (1979); Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Robinson v. State, 553 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr. App. 1977); Davis v. State, 557 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977).

My view, which is not in accord with the majority of this Court, is expressed in Gooden v. State, supra (Concurring Opinion); Hill v. State, 576 S.W.2d 642 (1979); Williams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 241 (1979); Williams v. State, 535 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Cr.App. 1976).

I concur in the disposition of this appeal.

W. C. DAVIS, J., joins.