*556OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Appellant was convicted by a jury, in a single trial, of two aggravated robberies. Punishment for each of the aggravated robberies was assessed at life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The Second Court of Appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction.1 Callins v. State, 680 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether Article 4.04, § 2, V.A.C. C.P.,2 prevents the Court of Appeals from reviewing appellant’s aggravated robbery convictions. Tex.Cr.App. Rule 302(c)(2). We will reverse and remand.

In dismissing appellant’s appeal of his aggravated robbery convictions, the Court of Appeals held that Article 4.04, § 2, supra, limits appellate jurisdiction of the aggravated robbery convictions to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, since the aggravated robbery convictions had been obtained in the same trial as a capital murder conviction, all three convictions constituted a single case and, therefore, must be directly appealed to this Court. Both appellant and the State seem to agree with this interpretation of Article 4.04, § 2, supra. We disagree.

Article 4.04, § 2, supra, in conjunction with Article V, § 5, supra, grants this Court direct appeal jurisdiction over “cases in which the death penalty has been assessed.” Article 4.03, V.A.C.C.P., grants the Courts of Appeals direct appeal jurisdiction “coextensive with the limits of their respective districts in all criminal cases except those in which the death penalty has been assessed.” As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the parameters of these jurisdictional limitations depend upon the meaning of a “case.”

Despite the fact that our direct appeal jurisdiction depends upon the meaning of a “case,” no definition of that term is provided under either Article 4.03 or 4.04, § 2, supra.3 The common definition of “case” provides little help because of its indefinite meaning.4 However, our examination of the use of the term “case” throughout the Code of Criminal Procedure, when com*557bined with the general meaning of that term, leads us to a more specific understanding of the meaning of “case” as used in Articles 4.03 & 4.04, § 2, supra. See and cf. Green v. State, 706 S.W.2d 653, 656, n. 5 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985) (meaning of “punishment” derived from context of its use throughout Code of Criminal Procedure).

For example, in Article 42.08, V.A.C.C.P., the term “case” is used to indicate a conviction for a single offense.5 Article 42.08(a), supra, begins by referring to a defendant being convicted in “two or more cases.” In the next sentence, Article 42.08(a), supra, grants the trial court discretion to cumu-late punishments “in the second and subsequent convictions.” The language of the statute requires the understanding that a conviction involves only one punishment and, therefore, only one offense. This replacement of “conviction” for “case” implies that a “case” consists of a conviction for a single offense.

This understanding of a “case” is consistent with Articles 4.03 & 4.04, § 2, supra, especially when considered in conjunction with the language of Article 37.071(h), V.A.C.C.P.6 Article 37.071(h), supra, begins by stating that the “judgment of conviction and sentence of death” is subject to automatic direct review by this Court. In the next sentence, Article 37.071(h), supra, states that “[s]uch review” has priority over “all other cases.” By directly referring to the “judgment of conviction and sentence of death,” the Legislature contemplated review of a single conviction for capital murder and in a single sentence of death. By then requiring preferential treatment for review of such a conviction as distinguished from other “cases,” the Legislature impliedly limited a “case” to a conviction for a single offense. Again, therefore, “case” equals conviction for a single offense. Logically, then, convictions and sentences for separate offenses, even if placed in the same document of judgment, are considered separate “cases.”

Placing the language of Articles 4.03 & 4.04, § 2, supra, in the above context, the jurisdictional limitations of those provisions become clear. A “case,” for appellate purposes, is that aggregate of facts that resulted in a conviction for a single offense. A “case” in which the death penalty has been assessed only refers to those facts that resulted in a conviction for the offense of capital murder and a sentence of death. Consequently, under Article 4.04, § 2, supra, only the direct appeal of a capital murder conviction “in which the death penalty has been assessed shall be to the Court of Criminal Appeals.” Any other “convictions” that might have been obtained in the same trial are separate and distinct “cases” and therefore fall under the direct review jurisdiction of the courts of appeals provided in Article 4.03, supra.

In the instant appeal, appellant was convicted of two aggravated robberies. The aggregate of facts that resulted in appellant’s aggravated robbery convictions obviously did not result in a capital murder *558conviction and sentence of death. While both offenses occurred close in time and place to facts that did result in a capital murder conviction and sentence of death, the aggravated robberies constituted cases separate from the capital murder case. As such, neither aggravated robbery case fits within the death penalty exception noted in Articles 4.03 & 4.04, § 2, supra. Therefore, for purposes of Art. 4.03 & 4.04, supra, we find that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review appellant’s aggravated robbery convictions.7

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. This cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for that court to consider appellant’s grounds of error.

concurring.

In the distinctly unusual posture of things in these causes, truly there is no extant precedent directly in point. Essentially, the opinions of the Court engage in an analysis of germane constitutional and statutory provisions to conclude that there has been a misjoinder of offense, such that “the trial court was required to sustain .appellant’s request for election,” and that “ ‘case’ equals conviction for a single offense [so that] convictions and sentences for separate offenses ... are considered separate ‘cases’ [for purposes of prescribing jurisdiction on direct appeal].” While harboring some reservations, mainly about incidental observations made along the way and what may be less than complete examination of the meaning of “case,” I join the opinions.1