concurs with note:

*31Adhering to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 816 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (op. on reh’g), I concur only in the judgment of the Court.

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Appellant was convicted in a single trial of three crimes: two deliveries of heroin and a delivery of cocaine. His punishment was assessed at 25 years confinement in the penitentiary for each offense. The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed these convictions because the trial judge permitted the State to identify the controlled substances alleged in its indictments by eliciting the opinion of an expert witness who had not performed the chemical analyses himself. Aguilar v. State, 850 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1993). The Court thought this to violate our holding in Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). We granted the State’s petitions for discretionary review to explore the impact of Cole upon the admissibility of expert testimony under Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 703 and 705. Tex. RApp. Proc. 200(c)(2).

*28The controlled substances in question were sold by appellant to undercover Officer Leo Alonzo of the San Antonio Police Department, and later turned over for analysis to the Bexar County Forensic Science Center (BCFSC), formerly known as the Medical Examiner’s Regional Crime Lab. At trial, Joe Castoreña, who described himself as a toxicologist “for the medical examiner,” was called to testify. After first being qualified as an expert drug analyst,1 Castoreña told how and when BCFSC received the substances here in question, which tests were performed to identify them, and who performed the tests. Throughout his testimony, Castoreña evidently had before him several written reports, none of which was offered in evidence or made a part of the appellate record for any other purpose. It is clear from his testimony that Castoreña sometimes took his answers directly from these reports, although it is not possible to tell from the record exactly how often he did so. Finally, Castoreña was asked whether he had himself formed an opinion about the identity of each substance brought to his lab for analysis. It was at this point that defense counsel raised his first objection.

Your Honor. Unless the chemist has personal knowledge of making the test, himself, we object to him testifying.

The defense attorney made a similar objection each time Castoreña was asked to give an opinion about the identity of a substance tested by BCFSC, but he made no other complaint of any kind about Castorena’s testimony.2 Each objection was overruled without comment by the trial judge. Castoreña then stated that, in his opinion, two of the substances were heroin and one was cocaine.3

In Cole, we held that chemists employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety who test blood, semen, and hair samples in an adversarial context and make subjective judgments about the properties of those substances are “law enforcement personnel” for purposes of Rule 803(8)(B).4 Accordingly, their reports prepared out of court, if offered to prove the truth of matters asserted therein, may not be received in evidence over a hearsay objection upon the ground that such reports are public records exempted from the hearsay rule.

In the instant cause, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that Castorena’s testimony was objectionable as hearsay under our opinion in Cole. Although the Court’s analysis was not entirely clear, it did depend upon three implicit conclusions. First, the Court evidently found that chemists at BCFSC are law enforcement personnel within the meaning of *29Rule 803(8)(B).5 Second, the Court evidently believed that the testimony of Castoreña put matters from laboratory reports prepared by chemists other than himself before the jury over appellant’s objection. And finally, the Court held that testimony of Castoreña taken from such laboratory reports would only have been admissible, according to Judge Maloney’s concurring opinion in Cole, if the State had expressly tendered Castorena’s testimony for the limited purpose of supporting his expert opinion, and not for the truth of matters asserted in the reports. In our judgment, each of these conclusions evinces a profound misunderstanding of our opinion in Cole.

In the first place, it is evident from the nature of appellant’s trial objections that his hearsay complaint was directed only at Ca-storena’s expert opinion, and not at testimony taken from laboratory reports prepared by Castorena’s subordinates.6 Yet it is clear under our rules of evidence that the present opinion of a testifying witness does not meet the definition of hearsay because it is not, and never can be, a statement “other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearingL]” Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 801(d). Even if the expert relies in whole or part upon information of which he has no personal knowledge,7 communicated to him at or before the time he testifies,8 the admissibility of his opinion is not affected “unless the court determines that he does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion.” Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 705(c).9 Nothing we said in Cole pur*30ported to change, nor did it have the necessary effect of changing, this rule. See Henderson v. State, 822 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991).

It is true, as Judge Maloney emphasized in his concurring opinion, that the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence include a subparagraph which limits the conditions under which the basis for an expert’s opinion may be revealed to the jury.10 Hearsay not exempted from exclusion by Rule 803(8)(B) is, of course, subject to these conditions. But the limitation does not apply to an expert’s opinion itself. Only the “underlying facts or data” upon which the opinion was based are excludable if the danger of unfair prejudice is too great. Judge Maloney’s suggestion that evidence of the kind at issue in Cole should not be received for the limited purpose of explaining or supporting an expert opinion under Rule 705(d) unless it is expressly tendered for that purpose does not imply otherwise. Rather, it suggests only that the offering party should not be deemed to have intended his offer of a laboratory report for a limited purpose unless he says so, and that a hearsay objection under Cole should be sustained if the laboratory report is instead offered without limitation.

In the instant cause, however, the problem envisioned by Judge Maloney did not arise. Clearly, in order to make an accurate identification at trial, Castoreña needed to know that the chromatograms he examined were produced by tests performed on the very substances he was asked to identify. It is apparent from his testimony that he relied for this information upon the laboratory reports prepared by his subordinates. But, aside from the necessary implication that the substances tested were the same as those offered in evidence at trial, it does not appear that any of the underlying data upon which Castoreña relied to reach his expert opinion was actually elicited before the jury, either by introduction of the laboratory reports themselves or through testimony given in open court. While Castoreña did apparently “read” to the jury some information from the reports, the information thus offered merely identified relevant dates, the chemist who ran the tests, and the weight of the substances.11 The test results upon which Ca-storeña relied for his conclusion that the substances contained heroin and cocaine were neither introduced in evidence nor described for the jury by Castorena’s testimony. Compare Davenport v. State, 856 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).

In the final analysis, therefore, it is dispos-itive of appellant’s claim that no material of the kind at issue in Cole was ever actually offered or received in evidence at trial over his objection, either for the truth of the matters asserted therein or as the basis for an expert opinion. It follows that the trial judge did not err for any of the reasons given by the Court of Appeals in overruling appellant’s objections to Castorena’s testimony.

The judgment of the Fourth Court of Appeals is reversed and this cause is remanded for consideration of appellant’s remaining points.

concurring.

The opinion of the Court indicates the gravamen of objections made by appellant to the toxicologist testifying as to his opinion about identity of the substances in question is that “the chemist [lacked] personal knowledge of making the test, himself.” Maj. opinion at 28. In my judgment the trial judge had no choice but to overrule that objection, and the court of appeals was remiss in addressing, much more deciding, points of error complaining of “inadmissible hearsay.” Aguilar v. State, 850 S.W.2d 640, at 641 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1993).1

Although the Court quickly notices that “appellant’s objection does not seem to invoke the hearsay rule,” it is willing to conjure that the court of appeals “must have assumed that these objections were based on [Rule 802].” Maj. opinion, at 28, n. 2. Moreover, from similarity between language of the objections and the text in Rule 602, the Court graciously surmises that appellant had in mind the latter rule, but then points out that “[Rule 602] is not the same as the hearsay rule and, in particular is not subject to the hearsay exceptions of Rule 803.” Ibid.

Given these premises, contrary to the majority, I would not “accept” for any purpose that “appellant’s objection was sufficient to apprise the trial judge of his reliance on Rule 802.” Ibid. Instead of creating a facade to mask a faulty presentation of what we may deem a significant question, we should, just like the majority is so want to do in other instances, dismiss the petitions as improvidently granted.

That failing, because the court of appeals also “reached out” to decide questions not properly preserved for appellate consideration, I join only the judgment of the Court.