OPINION

delivered the opinion of the Court

In this case we decide that appellant committed one, continuous offense of evading arrest as defined by Tex. Pen.Code, Section 38.04(a), which provides:

A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.

The evidence shows that one evening at around 10:00 p.m., appellant fled in his vehicle from a police officer when the officer attempted to stop him.1 Appellant drove his vehicle into a field. The officer did not pursue appellant for fear of damaging his patrol car. The police set up a perimeter and began searching for appellant. They later found appellant’s abandoned vehicle in another field. Police, with the help of a dog, searched for appellant until 2:30 a.m. at which time the police suspended the search because the dog and the officers were tired and the field was too dark to effectively search for appellant. The police resumed the search at 8:30 a.m. and eventually found appellant hiding in a woodshed attached to a home eight miles from where appellant abandoned his vehicle.

A jury convicted appellant of felony evading arrest and burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit felony evading arrest. The jury assessed appellant’s punishment, enhanced by three prior felony convictions, at 40 years’ confinement for each offense. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently.

Appellant claimed on direct appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit felony evading arrest because the felony evading arrest offense was completed when appellant abandoned his vehicle before appellant’s entry into the habitation.2 The Court of Appeals rejected this claim and decided that the felony evading arrest “continued until appellant was later caught and arrested.” See *779Hobbs v. State, No. 11-03-00082-CR slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 350475 (Tex.App.-East-land, February 26, 2004) (not designated for publication). We exercised our discretionary authority to review this decision. The grounds upon which we granted discretionary review state:

1) Is felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle a continuing offense after the vehicle is no longer in use?

2) Is it legally possible to enter a habitation with the intent to commit the felony of evading arrest in a motor vehicle when the actor is not in possession of the vehicle?

Appellant’s complaint is two-fold. He alleges that he could not have intended to commit a felony evasion of arrest offense when he entered the habitation because any such offense was completed when he abandoned the vehicle. Thus, he claims no burglary as defined in Tex. Pen. Code, § 30.02(a)(1), (2), could have been committed as this section requires an entry into a habitation with the intent to commit a felony.3 The crux of appellant’s argument is that at most he committed two offenses of evading arrest. He claims that he committed one evading arrest offense which was completed when he abandoned his vehicle at which time his commission of the other evading arrest offense began when he continued his flight on foot. Appellant essentially argues that the different means of locomotion are what makes these two separate offenses.4

This presents an issue of statutory construction, particularly whether the different means of locomotion are “allowable units of prosecution” under Section 38.04(a) which, in relevant part, defines the offense as a person who “flees from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.”5 This language plainly does not define separate offenses (or “allowable units of prosecution”) when different means of locomotion are used.6 In addition, Section 38.04(b)(1), which elevates the punishment level for the offense defined in Section 38.04(a) when a vehicle is used, requires only that a vehicle be used at some time during the commission of this offense. As applied to this case, Section 38.04(b)(1) did not require that appellant intended to use his abandoned vehicle (or some other vehicle) when he entered the habitation.

Appellant also claims that the felony evading arrest was completed when, according to appellant, the police gave up the pursuit. Appellant further claims that, if evading is a continuing offense from the *780beginning of pursuit until apprehension, then the successful evader that commits a criminal trespass days, weeks, months or years later, is guilty of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit felony evading. Appellant argues in his brief on discretionary review:

The Court of Appeals determination that evading arrest is inherently a continuing offense and their ruling that it continued from the beginning of the chase until Petitioner’s apprehension and arrest would lead to absurd results. For example, any person that effectively evaded arrest on foot that was apprehended hours, days, weeks, months or even years later during a traffic stop where they were driving the vehicle would be guilty of evading arrest with a motor vehicle, even though at no time was a vehicle used in the successful evasion of the original pursuing officer.... Therefore, a person is only committing the offense of evading for so long as the officer is actively attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him. According to the plain language of the statute, once an officer gives up the pursuit, the suspect is no longer evading arrest, he has evaded arrest. While his fugitive status continues the active commission of the crime of evading arrest has been completed. In this case, officers gave up their pursuit of Petitioner on two occasions. The first being when [an officer] ceased pursuit in his patrol unit. (Citation to record omitted). Even if the court concludes that the pursuit was not given up then, it was certainly given up when [the officers] stopped for the night. (Citation to record omitted). Therefore, Petitioner had evaded the officers and the offense was complete. There is no evidence that he later knew they were searching for him.[7] Petitioner’s actions after the pursuit entered were those of secreting himself and seeking shelter.[8]

The record, however, does not support a finding that the police gave up the pursuit. Instead, the record reflects that the pursuit was temporarily suspended and resumed several hours later when it was feasible for the officers to effectively search for the appellant. This case does not present the situation described in appellant’s brief of the successful evader who commits a criminal trespass days, weeks, months or years later.

The dissenting opinion apparently agrees that the felony evading arrest offense continued until appellant’s apprehension and that appellant was still in the process of committing this offense when he *781entered the woodshed. See Hobbs v. State, slip op. at 1, 2004 WL 3S0475 (Tex.Cr.App. No. PD-0570-04, delivered this date) (Cochran, J., dissenting) (evading arrest may be a continuing offense and a change in the manner of locomotion — from fleeing in a vehicle to fleeing on foot — does not convert a single, continuous criminal act of evading arrest into separate crimes). The dissenting opinion, however, claims that the Court’s decision is not dispositive of whether appellant intended to commit this felony when he entered the woodshed. See Hobbs v. State, slip op. at 3-4, 2004 WL 350475 (Tex.Cr.App. No. PD-0570-04, delivered this date) (Cochran, J., dissenting) (fact that evading arrest may be a continuing offense not determinative of appellant’s intent when he entered the woodshed). The dissenting opinion claims that appellant is not guilty of the burglary offense unless the evidence shows that he intended to use a vehicle again to escape arrest when he entered the woodshed. See Hobbs, slip op. at 2 (Cochran, J., dissenting).

We disagree. A decision that the felony evading arrest offense continued until appellant’s apprehension is dispositive of whether appellant intended to commit this felony when he entered the woodshed. If (as everyone apparently agrees) the felony evading arrest offense in this case is a continuing offense, the evidence must show only that appellant used a vehicle at some time during the commission of this offense for him to be guilty of the burglary offense. It is not necessary for the evidence to show that appellant intended to use a vehicle again when he entered the woodshed. The dissenting opinion essentially would decide that appellant committed a separate misdemeanor evading arrest offense when he entered the woodshed9 while he was still in the process of committing the other felony evading arrest offense.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

filed a dissenting opinion, in which PRICE, J., joined.

I respectfully dissent to the majority’s resolution of this case of first impression. I agree with the majority that evading arrest may be a continuing offense and that a change in the manner of locomotion — from fleeing in a vehicle to fleeing on foot — does not thereby convert a single, continuous criminal act of evading arrest into separate crimes. However, that is not the determinative issue in assessing the sufficiency of evidence in this burglary prosecution. As I see it, the underlying legal issue that appellant presents (albeit inartfully)1 is as follows: Was there legally sufficient evidence to prove that, at the moment appellant broke into Barbara Wal-drip’s woodshed, he had the intent to commit the crime of felony evading arrest? Felony evading arrest requires the use of a vehicle to escape arrest. Burglary, however, focuses upon the future intent of the defendant at the moment he crosses the threshold. It matters not whether he has committed a felony before arriving at the house or whether he is continuing to commit a felony at the time he arrives at the house. The focus is entirely upon the present mens rea of the intruder concern*782ing his intended purpose in entering the house.

Therefore, I cannot understand how, unless there were a car within that woodshed, or at least nearby, a rational jury could determine that appellant’s intent in making a criminal entry into the habitation was to evade arrest by using a motor vehicle. There is ample evidence to support the inference that appellant entered Ms. Waldrip’s woodshed with the intent to hide from the pursuing police, but that is a misdemeanor evading arrest offense, not a felony. Therefore, I would reverse appellant’s conviction and forty-year sentence for burglary, although his forty-year sentence for the separate felony evading arrest conviction which was ordered to run concurrently with the burglary sentence would remain intact.2

In its burglary indictment, the State alleged that appellant entered Ms. Waldrip’s home (actually the woodshed attached to her home) with the intent to commit a felony, namely the felony offense of evading arrest with a vehicle. Burglary cannot be committed unless the felonious intent exists at the moment of the unlawful entry.3 But all of the evidence shows that appellant had a misdemeanor-ish intent— he was “on the lam” and hiding out to evade arrest. He exercised that intent by hiding in Ms. Waldrip’s woodshed. Felony evading arrest, however, requires an additional element — use of a vehicle while in flight.4 The fact that appellant had used a vehicle several hours earlier to evade arrest does not necessarily mean that he intended to use a vehicle to evade arrest after he entered Ms. Waldrip’s woodshed. The fact that evading arrest may be a continuing offense5 or that appellant may *783not have “completed” the offense of felony evading arrest with a vehicle is simply not determinative of his intent — his mens rea — at the brief shining moment that he entered Ms. Waldrip’s woodshed.6 Under the Texas burglary statute, the evidence must support a finding that appellant intended to commit a felony after he entered the woodshed.

Many states have followed the lead of the Model Penal Code and amended their burglary statutes such that an unlawful entry with the intent to commit any offense suffices to establish burglary.7 This may be a sound position because, as the Model Penal Code commentary notes, “an intrusion for any criminal purpose creates elements of alarm and danger to persons who may be present in a place where they should be entitled to freedom from intrusion.” 8 Further, broadening the burglary statute to include the intent to commit any criminal offense avoids the sometimes difficult problem of proof concerning exactly what kind or level of dime the intruder intended to commit after his unlawful entry.9

A comparison between legal outcomes under the Texas statute and the Model Code provision may be helpful. The facts in this case are strikingly similar to those set out in State v. Wallace,10 in which the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant unlawfully entered an apartment with the intent “to escape from the pursuing police.”11 Under Connecticut law, such an attempted escape constitutes the misdemeanor offense of interfering with a police officer.12 Under Texas law, those same facts constitute the misdemeanor offense of evading arrest.13 There is one small, but crucial, distinction between the Connecticut and Texas burglary statutes. Connecticut defines burglary as an unlawful entry with the intent to commit any crime,14 while the Texas statute requires an unlawful entry with the intent *784to commit “a felony, theft, or an assault.”15 The defendant in Wallace, like appellant in this case, argued that the crime of interfering with a police officer (a.k.a. evading arrest) was complete before the moment he entered the victim’s apartment. That argument was rejected by the Connecticut Court of Appeals,16 just as it was properly rejected by the court of appeals and this Court in the present case. The issue in Wallace is the same as the issue in this case: What was the defendant’s intent at the moment he unlawfully entered the victim’s home? In both cases the intent was the same: to hide from or evade arrest by pursuing police. In Connecticut, however, the intent to commit any crime after entry of the house suffices — even a misdemean- or. In Texas, only the intent to commit a felony (or any theft or assault) suffices— not misdemeanor evading arrest. Thus, the two cases must be resolved differently because the two burglary . statutes are drafted differently.

In sum, I do not think that there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that, at the moment appellant broke into Barbara Waldrip’s woodshed, he had the intent to commit, after his entry, the felony offense of evading arrest by using a vehicle. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.