OPINION

Habeas corpus denied.

filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of relief,

I respectfully dissent to the denial of relief on this post-conviction habeas corpus petition. Applicant is currently confined in prison for violating a parole condition that required him to pay for and take a polygraph test as a part of his sex-offender-treatment parole conditions. However, neither the treatment conditions nor the polygraph requirement should have been automatically imposed on applicant who was on parole for burglary of a building, not any sex-related offense.

In 2001, when applicant was placed on parole, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did not authorize a parole board to impose a condition such as paying for a mandatory polygraph on all parolees, regardless of the nature of the offense for which the inmate was being released. Rather, the onerous parole conditions associated with sex-offender treatment could be automatically imposed only if the inmate was required to register as a sex offender under Article 62.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the time of his release. Under Article 62.11 as it existed when applicant’s parole conditions were imposed in 2001, he was not required to register as a sex offender. Because the polygraph examination condition was imposed solely as a result of applicant’s improper categorization as a person required to register as a sex offender, the polygraph examination requirement was improperly imposed. Therefore, applicant is entitled to have his parole reinstated without sex offender registration or sex offender treatment conditions.

I.

Before discussing applicant’s facts in relation to the applicable law, a brief look at his criminal history is in order. Applicant’s first contact with the criminal justice system stemmed from a second-degree-rape offense in 1979. Applicant was nineteen at the time, did not use a deadly weapon, was arrested immediately, pled guilty seven days later, and was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. We know nothing more about the underlying facts. In 1988, after serving four years of his sentence, applicant was released on parole. At that time, the sex-offender registration and treatment statutes did not exist.

Not long after being released on parole, applicant ran afoul of the law again, although not in relation to any sexual offense. In 1985, applicant was convicted of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit theft. His parole on the rape case was revoked and he served the remainder of that sentence plus the burglary sentence concurrently. In 1988, applicant fully discharged both of these sentences.

For the next three years, applicant’s ties to the criminal justice system were no greater than that of any law-abiding Texas *929citizen. The state could no more force applicant to attend and pay for any counseling session, be it sex-, drug-, or alcohol-related, than it could a dewy-eyed kindergarten teacher.

However, applicant’s problems with the law were not at an end. In 1991, he was charged with burglary of a building with intent to commit theft. Applicant contended that the building was an abandoned warehouse within which he sought shelter. Unlike his other two cases, applicant pled “not guilty” and went to trial. Nevertheless, a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

In 2001, applicant was released on mandatory supervision, subject to a number of onerous conditions.1 Applicant’s Certificate of Mandatory Supervision listed each condition. The first condition required applicant to register as a sex offender, and the second required him to participate in a Sex Offender Program. The imposition of the treatment program condition, despite the fact that applicant’s only sexual offense occurred in 1979 and no record evidence suggests that applicant posed any threat of committing additional sexual offenses during the intervening twenty-four years, strongly suggests that the parole panel tacked on the sex-offender-treatment program based solely on applicant’s label as an inmate subject to sex offender registration.

Applicant agreed to all of the many other parole conditions except those relating to sex offender registration and treatment. He refused to sign the form acknowledging agreement with those conditions. Despite applicant’s initial refusal to sign the agreement, he did follow all the sex offender registration and treatment conditions. And for over a year he did so, despite the substantial difficulty of finding steady employment because he had to notify all prospective employers of his status as a registered sex offender enrolled in a sex offender treatment program. Not surprisingly, no one wanted to hire applicant.

On November 14, 2003, applicant failed to comply with one condition imposed as part of the sex-offender-treatment program: he did not pay the $200 cost of a polygraph test. At the hearing to revoke his parole, applicant offered evidence that he was not financially able to pay for the polygraph because he did not have a steady job. Four other witnesses testified on applicant’s behalf:

• a former employer testified that applicant had indeed sought employment, and that he himself had employed ap-*930plieant sporadically for lawn maintenance and general labor;

• applicant’s brother and girlfriend both testified that they, on different occasions, had driven applicant to numerous employment interviews, but that all interviews were unsuccessful because of applicant’s registered sex offender status;

• a pastor testified that he had known applicant for three years, and that applicant actively participated in church and community activities, performed free labor for the church, and had always obeyed all of his parole conditions prior to the demand that he pay for a polygraph exam.

Nonetheless, the board revoked applicant’s parole because he failed to pay for the polygraph exam.

II.

Applicant contends that because his 1979 rape conviction was fully discharged in 1988, and the offense for which he was released on mandatory supervision was not a sex-related offense, imposition of the sex offender registration and treatment conditions were improper, and constituted an ex post facto, equal protection, and due process violation. Based upon applicant’s writ allegations, this Court ordered the trial court to hold a hearing and make findings regarding whether applicant was required to register as a sexual offender as a condition of parole or mandatory supervision for the 1991 burglary of a building offense. In response to that order, the trial court found that applicant was required to register as a sex offender as a condition of mandatory supervision, regardless of the offense for which he was paroled, because he had a twenty-four-year-old rape conviction.

III.

Under Government Code Section 508.186, the Sex Offender Registration statute, a parole panel shall require as a condition of parole or mandatory supervision that a releasee be subject to a number of special sex-offender conditions.2 However, before a parole panel may impose these conditions, the releasee must be required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.3 That is, only those who are required to register as sex offenders may be required to comply with the special sex-offender conditions of parole.

Under Chapter 62’s version in effect at the time the parole conditions were imposed on applicant,4 Article 62.11 listed categories of offenders who were required to register as sex offenders. The article provided that sex offender registration requirements were applicable only to a person who: (a) had a “reportable conviction or adjudication” occurring on or after September 1,1970; and (b) was confined on or after September 1, 1997, for a “reportable conviction or adjudication” or was under the supervision or control of a probation, community supervision and corrections department, or paroles divisions, with respect to a “reportable conviction or adjudication.”5 In other words, Article 62.11 *931required a person to register as a sex offender if he had a “reportable conviction or adjudication” after September 1, 1970, and was still under some form of state supervision imposed because of that “reportable conviction or adjudication” on or after September 1,1997.6

*932Article 62.01(5) defines “reportable conviction or adjudication” as a conviction or adjudication that is one of the ten listed types of offenses, all of which relate to some form of sexual offense.7 Of particular significance, one of the listed offenses is burglary.8 However, not all burglary offenses fall into the “reportable conviction or adjudication” category. Rather, a “reportable” burglary is one punishable under Subsection (d) of § 30.02 of the Penal Code (burglary of a habitation), and committed with the intent to commit a felony listed in Paragraph (A) or (C) of Article 62.01(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Paragraph (A) refers to indecency with a child, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, or prohibited sexual conduct. Paragraph (C) refers to aggravated kidnapping committed with the intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually. Thus, a burglary is a “reportable conviction or adjudication” only if it is burglary of a habitation, and the person entered the habitation with the intent to commit (or did or attempted to commit) a sexual offense.

Applicant’s criminal history did not meet both requirements for application of Article 62.11 sex-offender registration. He did have a “reportable conviction or adjudication” occurring after September 1, 1970-his 1979 conviction for rape. However, he was not confined, or under any form of supervision, after September 1, 1997, for a “reportable conviction or adjudication.” When applicant was placed on parole, he was confined for burglary of a building with the intent to commit theft. Because he did not commit burglary of a habitation or enter that habitation with the intent to commit one of the specified felony sex offenses, he does not fall under Article 62.01(5)(D). Nor does he have any other conviction fisted under Article 62.01(5) that qualifies as a “reportable conviction or adjudication.”

Therefore, because the offense for which applicant was released on parole did not qualify as an Article 62.01(5) “reportable conviction or adjudication,” he was not automatically required to register as a sex offender.9 Because applicant was not required to register as a sex offender, he should not have been subject to sex offender registration and treatment requirements absent independent evidence that he posed such a high present risk of sexual re-offending that imposition of a sex offender treatment program was constitutionally reasonable and remedial rather than punitive.

Thus, applicant’s parole was revoked based on non-compliance with a condition that he should not have been subject to absent any showing of a particularized *933need. Revocation of parole based on noncompliance with a condition that was wrongfully imposed is no different than revocation based on non-compliance with a condition that was never imposed. Neither is compatible with the federal Constitution or the laws of Texas.

Therefore, I would grant applicant’s requested relief and reinstate his parole without sex-offender registration or treatment program conditions.