Martinez, Ex Parte Miguel

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-1801-10

EX PARTE MIGUEL MARTINEZ, Applicant

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS

EL PASO COUNTY C OCHRAN, J., filed a concurring opinion in which P RICE, J., joined.

I agree that dismissing appellant’s appeal is “without prejudice to his ability to file future 11.072 writ applications in this matter.”1 I write separately because the solution to appellant’s legitimate dilemma is not intuitively obvious. The solution is this: He may file a subsequent writ application under Article 11.072 alleging the due-process violation–the deprivation of his right to appeal–that had not yet occurred at the time that he filed his original writ application, and request reconsideration of his original writ to remedy that second purported constitutional error. This is akin to our Article 11.07 writ process of granting an out-of-time appeal when either the appellate attorney fails to properly file a notice of appeal2 or there is a “breakdown in the system” that prevents the filing of a proper notice of appeal.3

I.

In 2003, appellant was charged with possession of cocaine. He pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor and was placed on community supervision for two years. He successfully completed his community supervision and obtained early release in 2004. On May 25, 2010, appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.072,4 alleging that his plea was involuntary because his trial attorney had not advised him that his plea would result in deportation.5 The State filed its answer on June 7, along with a proposed order. The trial judge signed the State’s order on June 11, but she inadvertently placed the signed order in the file under some other papers on her desk. And there it sat as the appellate clock silently ticked away.

Appellant’s counsel made several inquiries about the status of the writ: on June 17, he faxed a letter to the trial court requesting a status hearing.6 On June 30, he filed additional affidavits in support of his requested relief.7 Neither the State nor appellant knew that the trial judge had signed the order until July 19, when the court coordinator went through the files on the judge’s desk and found the missing order. Appellant’s counsel received the order by mail on July 21. By then, the thirty-day window to file notice of appeal had long expired, even though appellant’s counsel did not know, and could not possibly know, that the order had been signed over a month earlier.

The very next day, July 22, appellant’s counsel sent the trial judge a letter requesting a hearing to find out what had gone awry.8 On August 18, the trial judge held that hearing and she stated on the record that it was “unfortunate that the court was a participant in the fact that you didn’t get notice in time to” file the appeal. The court coordinator testified that she did not advise either the State or appellant’s counsel that the trial judge had signed the order because she did not know that the judge had done so until she went hunting for the missing file on July 19. Now armed with an official record and an explanation of what had prevented him from timely filing a notice of appeal, appellant’s counsel filed his notice of appeal in the trial court on August 18, the same day as the hearing.9

The Eighth Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s reliance upon the more liberal Rule 306a(4) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “if notice of judgment is not received within twenty days of signing, periods for appellate timetables begin to run on the date the actual notice of judgment is received.”10 This rule provides a due-process safety valve for situations such as this one. Rule 306a(4), however, applies only to civil cases in which money is at stake; it does not apply to criminal cases in which freedom is at stake. As the Eighth Court of Appeals aptly noted, this Court has not adopted that civil rule and we are extremely strict when it comes to the filing of a notice of appeal, even when the appealing party had no notice that the trial judge had signed an appealable order.11 “A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke [the appellate court’s] jurisdiction.” 12

We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review, which raised a single ground for review:

The Eighth Court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal for want of jurisdiction because Petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal, within thirty days of the date the trial court’s order denying relief was filed with the clerk and within thirty days of the date the trial court first made any of the parties aware of its order denying relief.

But the Court rejects appellant’s argument with a cite to our prior opinion in State v. Rosenbaum, in which we held that a trial judge “enters” an order when he signs it, regardless of whether the parties are informed of that act.13

II.

The Court concludes with the statement that appellant may file “future 11.072 writ applications in this matter.” Yes, he may, but Section 11.072, § 9(a), prohibits consideration of a subsequent application “unless the subsequent application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in an original application . . . because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application.” 14 Therefore, appellant may not simply refile his original application alleging an involuntary plea and hover over the judge’s shoulder until she signs the order denying relief so appellant can timely file a new notice of appeal and obtain the appeal to which he was statutorily entitled after the first order was signed.

But appellant may file a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 11.072 alleging that his due-process right to appeal the denial of his writ application alleging an involuntary plea was violated because of a “breakdown in the system.” 15 The facts that led to the denial of appellant’s right to appeal obviously were not known to him at the time he filed his original writ application and, even with the best due diligence, could not have been known because they had not yet occurred.

To remedy the due-process violation, the trial judge may reconsider her original ruling denying relief. She may then sign a new order–hopefully in open court. That signed order will reset the appellate timetable and provide appellant with his due-process and statutory right to appeal if the trial judge denies relief, and it will begin the appellate timetable for the State if she grants relief on reconsideration.16 Filed: June 29, 2011 Do Not Publish