Robinson, Leo Demory

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0421-14

LEO DEMORY ROBINSON, Appellant v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS COUNTY

K ELLER, P.J., filed a concurring opinion in which H ERVEY, Y EARY and N EWELL, JJ., joined.

I join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to comment on appellant’s claim that the authorities rebuffed his attempts to register and to respond to Judge Alcala’s concerns relating to that claim. If authorities rebuff a sex-offender’s repeated attempts to register, the sex offender may be able to claim an exemption from or defense to criminal liability on the basis that his failure to act was involuntary. The Penal Code provides that an omission that gives rise to criminal liability must ROBINSON CONCURRENCE — 2 be voluntary.1 Due process may also require that the authorities not place significant hurdles to complying with a duty to register beyond those contemplated by the statute.2 Judge Alcala believes that applying a culpable mental state to a sex-offender’s omissions would somehow eliminate the possibility of individuals being punished for omissions that are truly involuntary, but it would not. “A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.”3 Even if a failure to comply with the registration statute is involuntary, the sex-offender who is rebuffed by public officials still knows that he is in fact failing to comply. The solution is not to impose a culpable mental state where it does not belong, but to recognize, in an appropriate case, that the voluntary-omission requirement and due process are the mechanisms to address any stonewalling by public officials that prevents a sex-offender from

ROBINSON CONCURRENCE — 3 complying with registration requirements.

Filed: July 1, 2015

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