Segundo, Juan Ramon Meza
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-70,963-02
EX PARTE JUAN RAMON MEZA SEGUNDO, Applicant ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN CAUSE NO. C-3-W011370-0974988-B IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER THREE
FROM TARRANT COUNTY NEWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion in which HERVEY and KEEL, JJ., joined.
We have already recognized that the United States Supreme Court’s death-penalty test for determining intellectual disability does not answer whether an intellectually disabled capital murderer fits into that category of offenders whose moral blameworthiness is lessened by their intellectual disability. 1 The test, or at least the floor for the diagnostic criteria, has become untethered from the rationale for that test set out in Atkins v. Virginia. 2 This defendant, a serial killer who brutally raped and murdered eleven-year-old Vanessa Villa (as well as two other women while the Villa murder remained unsolved), could not provide a clearer example of the Supreme Court’s intellectual failure. Segundo does not fit the mold that the Supreme Court used to justify the intellectual disability exemption from the death penalty. 3
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that the execution of intellectually disabled defendants violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 4 When we decide cases involving the United States Constitution, we are bound by United States Supreme Court case law interpreting it. 5 If we disagree with the Court’s holding, too bad. It is up to the United States Supreme Court to fix it, not us.
In this case, Applicant presented some evidence of his intellectual disability during his trial, but he was denied a specific jury instruction on the issue. In his first habeas application, Applicant raised a claim regarding intellectual disability. The trial court made findings and conclusions regarding Applicant’s claims based in part upon the criteria we set out in Ex parte Briseno. 6 We deferred to those findings and denied relief. 7 The United States Supreme Court subsequently made clear in Moore v. Texas that we cannot rely upon the test set out in Briseno because it violates the federal constitution. 8 Applicant filed a subsequent writ application based upon Moore, and we remanded the case for the habeas court to resolve Applicant’s claim of intellectual disability. 9
Applying the standard set out in Moore, the habeas court resolved Applicant’s claim in his favor. The habeas court made factual findings to support its conclusion that Applicant is intellectually disabled under Moore. Those findings are supported by the record. 10 The State does not contest those findings and agrees that it cannot execute Applicant due to his intellectual disability. Applicant is entitled to relief under Supreme Court precedent, and the Court correctly grants it. We’ve already seen what happens when we ignore the Supreme Court on this issue. 11
With these thoughts, I join the Court’s order.
Filed: May 25, 2022 Publish
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.