MEMORANDUM ORDER

This is an action for refund of estate taxes, brought by all the beneficiaries under the will of Mary Elizabeth Patterson.1 The United States has moved for partial summary judgment as to that portion of the complaint and claim for refund dealing with the determination by the Internal Revenue Service that Mrs. Patterson possessed a general power of appointment at her death.2

Mary Elizabeth Patterson, who died in 1972, was a beneficiary under the will of her husband, J. W. Patterson, who died in 1962. The relevant portions of the will of Mr. Patterson are set forth in the margin.3 Briefly stated, the will bequeathes all of Mr. Patterson’s property to his wife for her *493lifetime, with power to sell, convey, or encumber any or all property and to receive, use, and appropriate the proceeds thereof. On Mrs. Patterson’s death, any property “then remaining undisposed of” is to pass to the children of Mr. Patterson. Mrs. Patterson and her son, William Patterson, are appointed joint independent executors. The will specifies that the joint action of the executors shall be necessary during their lifetime.

The problem before the court may be stated simply: Did paragraph two of Mr. Patterson’s will give Mrs. Patterson a general power of appointment within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2041? The answer to this question in turn depends on whether paragraph four of the will, appointing co-executors and requiring their joint action, required Mrs. Patterson, the life tenant, to obtain William Patterson’s consent before she could sell, convey, or encumber any of the property in her husband’s estate. Plaintiffs maintain that the will required such consent, while the United States argues that it did not. All parties concede that if consent was required, the property in Mr. Patterson’s estate is not properly includable in the gross estate of Mrs. Patterson, and, conversely, that if consent was not required, the property is properly includable.4

Under Texas law, the starting point in a will construction case is the interpretation of the document itself. Indeed, if the testator’s intention can be determined from the language contained therein, the four corners of the document represent the ending point of the inquiry as well. In Huffman v. Huffman, 161 Tex. 267, 339 S.W.2d 885 (1960), the Supreme Court of Texas, quoting with approval from 4 Page on Wills § 1617, stated:

In determining the testator’s intention, the true purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain not what he meant to express apart from the language used, but what the words he has used do express. Accordingly, when there is no dispute as to what words were written in the will, it is a fundamental principle that extrinsic evidence cannot be received to show that the testator intended something outside of, and independent of such written words, to add words to those in the will, to contradict its language, or to take words away from those in the will, even though the court may believe that the actual disposition of the testator’s property which results through changing circumstances was not contemplated by him. The only purpose and justification of the admission of extrinsic evidence is to explain testator’s meaning which is set forth in the words of the will. Assuming that there is a valid will to be construed, *494it is the place of the court to find the meaning of such will, and not under guise of construction or under general powers of equity to assume to correct or redraft the will in which testator has expressed his intentions.

339 S.W.2d at 888.

The language used in the will of J. W. Patterson is plain and unambiguous. It confers powers and responsibilities on Mary Elizabeth Patterson in two capacities. Her status and powers as a life tenant are derived from and defined by the second paragraph of the will; her status and powers as an executrix are derived from and defined by the fourth paragraph. In her capacity as life tenant, she had complete and unrestricted authority to dispose of the property bequeathed to her. In her capacity as co-executrix, she was limited by the provision of paragraph four of the will requiring the concurrence of the co-executor during their joint lifetime.5 As executors Mrs. Patterson and her son had certain duties, including the duty to pay and collect the estate’s debts, to prepare and file tax returns, to bring suit on behalf of the estate if needed and to defend suits brought against the estate, and to distribute the estate’s assets. See Tex. Probate Code § 146. While Texas law requires the executors to deliver the property of the estate to the devisees after the affairs of the estate have been settled, Freeman v. Banks, 91 S.W.2d 1078 (Tex.Civ. App. — Fort Worth 1936, writ ref’d), it is possible that the period of estate administration may be protracted. Hence the requirement for consent of the co-executors during their joint lifetime represents a reasonable precaution on the part of the testator. It follows that the restriction of Mrs. Patterson’s power as executrix in paragraph four presents no inconsistency with her unrestricted power as a life tenant. That is, there is no inconsistency in the testator’s dispositive plan internal to the will.

This construction of the will gives effect to each paragraph, and construes its provisions in harmony with each other. See Roberts v. Drake, 380 S.W.2d 657, 659-60 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1964, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Jackson v. Evans, 305 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n. r. e.). In Dougherty v. Humphrey, 424 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1968), the Supreme Court of Texas refused to construe a paragraph appointing a co-executor as enlarging the estate of a beneficiary/executrix, stating: “One would not expect to find in a paragraph, which provides in part for a co-exeeutor, a sentence that would vitiate the general scheme of the entire will.” 424 S.W.2d at 620. The reasoning of the court applies equally to a construction which would restrict the scope of the estate granted to the co-executrix.

Plaintiffs argue that the language of the will must be construed as creating a testamentary trust, with the co-executors as co-trustees, Mrs. Patterson as life beneficiary, and the children as beneficiaries of the corpus on Mrs. Patterson’s death. The power to invade and consume corpus would then constitute a joint discretionary power in both trustees, exercisable in a fiduciary capacity, to distribute corpus to the life beneficiary. As such, it would not constitute a general power of appointment. 26 C.F.R. § 2041-3(c)(2). It is true that there is no set semantical formulation essential to the creation of a trust. But this judicial willingness to deal with reality even when inartfully but plainly present does not create a trust when the will contains no language even remotely suggesting that the property is to be held in trust or that the power of invasion is exercisable only in a fiduciary capacity.6

*495Plaintiffs have presented as a part of their opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment the affidavit of John G. Patterson. This affidavit, to be considered if the court finds the language of the will ambiguous, purports to explain the alleged requirement that the co-executor consent to transfers of property in terms of the testator’s concern over Mrs. Patterson’s lack of business experience and susceptibility to overreaching by her brothers.7 Plaintiffs thus argue that a genuine issue of material fact is presented as to the testator’s intent, precluding summary judgment. While it does not form the basis of this order, it must be recognized that a strong argument can be made that a genuine issue of material fact is not presented even if the will is regarded as ambiguous. Texas law is clear that “an express bequest or devise cannot be cut down by a subsequent clause of doubtful meaning and an estate granted in plain and unequivocal language in one clause of a will therefore cannot be lessened or cut down by a subsequent clause, unless the language therein is as clear, plain and unequivocal as that in the first grant.” Winston v. Griffith, 108 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1937), aff’d, 133 Tex. 348, 128 S.W.2d 25 (1939); Gilliam v. Mahon, 231 S.W. 712, 713 (Tex.Com.App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Phillips v. Currie, 246 S.W.2d 257, 258-59 (Tex.Civ.App.— Eastland 1952, no writ); Killough v. Shafer, 358 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1962, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Darragh v. Barmore, 242 S.W. 714 (Tex.Com.App.1922, jdgmt adopted); Roberts v. Drake, supra.8

The motion of the defendant for partial summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.