MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant Terry Sanders has filed a Motion to Suppress certain evidence which he asserts was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

*43I. BACKGROUND1

Late in the evening2 of September 27, 1993, police stopped a blue Chevrolet van driven by Terry Sanders on U.S. Highway 59, immediately north of Garrison, Texas. A subsequent search of Sanders’ vehicle revealed approximately 200 pounds of marijuana. The marijuana was contained in garbage bags covered with blankets in the rear of the van driven by Sanders. The officers arrested Sanders and took him to the Nacogdoches County jail. The United States subsequently indicted Sanders for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Sanders argués that the search exceeded the scope of consent and the officers lacked probable cause to conduct an automobile search for marijuana. Consequently, he urges the evidence (200 pounds of marijuana) was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and should be suppressed. This Court disagrees.

II. DISCUSSION

It is now well-settled that a dual inquiry guides the judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Under Terry v. Ohio, the Court asks whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the initial interference. 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993) (applying Terry to automobile stops for violations of traffic laws).

In this case, the initial stop was justified. At approximately 11:40, Officer Keith A. Kiplinger, deputy marshal for the City of Garrison, observed a blue Chevrolet van proceeding northbound on Highway 59 through downtown Garrison. While under his watch, the van twice veered from its course in the far right-hand northbound lane to enter the left-hand northbound lane. Officer Kiplinger then stopped the van. Under Texas law, failing to maintain a single lane is a traffic offense. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701d § 60 (Vernon 1977). Plainly, the initial stop was justified, and Terry’s first prong is met.

Terry’s second prong asks whether the subsequent questioning and detention were within the scope of the purpose of the original stop. In the Fifth Circuit, police may question a suspect on matters unrelated to the initial stop without violating the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993). Because the second prong is concerned with unlawful seizures, the inquiry turns on whether the length of the physical detention of the suspect exceeded the scope of the original stop — and not necessarily the subject matter of the inquiries. Id. at 436.

Sanders’ detention did not exceed the scope of the original stop. When Sanders lowered the window to greet the officers, Officer Kiplinger detected a strong odor of air freshener.3 Officer Kiplinger then requested Sanders’ licénce and proof of insurance, which were produced. Upon inquiry as to where he had been and where he was going, Sanders responded that he had been painting office buildings in the Houston area. However, when asked the location of the buildings, Sanders had no response.4 Immediately thereafter, an exchange occurred whereby Sanders consented to some species *44of search.5 The entire conversation lasted roughly two minutes.6 Under Terry and Shabazz, the Court concludes Sanders’ detention did not outlast the permissible duration of the stop.

As discussed, there is no serious dispute that Sanders consented to a search. The principal issue is whether the officers exceeded the scope of Sanders’ consent.7 Of course, the scope of consent is measured by a standard of objective reasonableness. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). Under Jimeno, the test is what the reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the suspect and the officer. Id; see also United States v. Henao, 835 F.Supp. 926, 929 (E.D.Tex. 1993). Officer Kiplinger testified that Sanders told him the only things in the back of the van were painting tools and asked Kiplinger “would he like to see?” Officer Kiplinger acquiesced and then escorted Sanders to the rear of the van where Sanders unlocked the back doors and revealed the inside.8

The Court concludes that a reasonable person would have concluded the scope of consent extended to that portion of the van where the blankets and garbage bags were located. By stating that the only things in the back of the van were painting tools, Sanders implied that he was not transporting drugs. Similarly, by asking Officer Kiplinger if he would “like to see,” Sanders expressly invited the examination of the rear of the van. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have concluded the scope of the search extended to the general area in the rear of the van. The blankets were within Officer Kiplinger’s immediate view, and the bags were underneath. The fact that the marijuana was found in a closed bag is immaterial. The Supreme Court has held that consent to search in a general vicinity necessarily contemplates consent to search closed containers located within that area. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). As a result, the Court concludes the search was within the scope of consent given by Sanders. Because the evidence was obtained as a result of this lawful search, Sanders’ motion to suppress is DENIED.9