*412 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This personal injury and products liability case was transferred here from the Eastern District of Louisiana. Pending at the time of transfer were: Defendants Pride International, Inc. and Mexico Drilling, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on Basis of Prescription (Document No. 46), and Motion to Dismiss Tesco Corporation Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (Document No. 57). After the transfer Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice (Document No. 154) and Motion for Leave to File Timely Superseding Fourth Supplemental Amended Complaint (Document No. 185). After considering the motions, responses, replies, the arguments made by the parties at the June 23, 2011 scheduling conference, and the applicable law, the Court concludes as follows:

I. Background

Plaintiff Keith Taylor alleges he was injured aboard a fixed oil platform in the Bay of Campeche off the coast of Mexico on January 1, 2009. About four months later Plaintiffs sued Tesco Corporation (US) (“Tesco US”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and strict liability arising out of Tesco US’s manufacture of the top drive on which Taylor was injured.1 Plaintiffs more than a year later filed two amended complaints, adding Defendants Tesco Corporation (Canada), Pride International, Inc. (“Pride”), and Mexico Drilling Limited, LLC (“Mexico Drilling,” and together with Pride, the “Pride Defendants”).2 Plaintiffs substituted Defendant Tesco Corporation for the incorrectly-named “Tesco Corporation (Canada)” by a third amendment to the complaint, filed September 2, 20103

Defendant Tesco U.S. in April 2010 filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, which was later denied, and in July and August of 2010 Tesco Corporation and the Pride Defendants, respectively, moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against them based on the Louisiana one-year prescriptive law.4

In February, 2011, the case was transferred to this Court “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).5 Plaintiffs now seek to dismiss this action without prejudice in light of their desire instead to prosecute a substantially similar case that they filed in the 113th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.6 The Pride Defendants, *413Tesco Corporation, and Tesco U.S. oppose Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss, asserting that dismissal of this case without prejudice would deny to the Pride Defendants and Tesco Corporation their valid limitations defenses under Louisiana law; and they would be left to defend Plaintiffs’ claims in Texas state court in a suit that is not barred under Texas’s two-year statute of limitations.

II. Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 governs voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff. A plaintiff’s dismissal of suit without prejudice is an “absolute right” if done “before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A); Harvey Specialty & Supply, Inc. v. Anson Flowline, 434 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 2005). After the opposing party serves either an answer or motion for summary judgment, voluntary dismissal may occur only “by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Even then, however, “as a general rule, motions for voluntary dismissal should be freely granted unless the non-moving party will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.” Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2002).

A. Tesco Corporation

Although styled a “motion to dismiss,” Plaintiffs March 18, 2011, filing had the effect of a Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal as to any defendants who had not yet served either an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that a notice of dismissal is styled ‘motion to dismiss’ rather than ‘notice of dismissal’ is without consequence.’ ” (citing Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1976); Carter v. United States, 547 F.2d 258, 259 (5th Cir. 1977))).

Tesco Corporation did not answer Plaintiffs complaint until June 20, 2011, after Plaintiffs had filed their Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal.7 Tesco Corporation had previously filed only a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)-(6).8 A motion to dismiss, unless converted to one for summary judgment by receipt of matters outside the pleadings,9 is not the equivalent of an answer or a motion for summary judgment *414pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1). See Exxon Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 599 F.2d 659, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that the right of unilateral dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) “is not cut off by a motion to dismiss” unless the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may properly be converted to a motion for summary judgment due to “the trial court’s receipt of matters outside the pleadings”); see also In re LaChance, 209 F.3d 720, 2000 WL 284032, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2000) (unpublished op.) (“[F]or purposes of Rule 41, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion becomes a motion for summary judgment unless all extraneous material presented is excluded by the court.” (citing Exxon Corp., 599 F.2d at 661-62)); Bldg. Concepts and Designs Constr., Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., No. Civ.A. 06-2777, 2006 WL 2294866, at *2 (E.D.La. Aug. 7, 2006) (Vance, J.) (holding that “the tide of the strong weight of authority” supports a reading of Rule 41 wherein “the task before the Court is merely to determine whether an adverse party filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment before the entry of the notice of dismissal,” and collecting cases).

At the Rule 16 scheduling conference, all parties agreed that there was no need for the Court to consider matters outside the pleadings on Tesco Corporation’s and the

Pride Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and that conversion of that motion into one for summary judgment would be inappropriate.10 Accordingly, neither motion was converted into one for summary judgment. Plaintiffs March 18, 2011 Rule 41(a)(1) “motion to dismiss” therefore effectively dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims against Tesco Corporation. See Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that Rule 41(a)(l)(A)(i) dismissal is “immediately self-effectuating” without any action by the court); see also Plains Growers, Inc. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[W]e conclude that it was intended by the rule-makers to permit dismissal against such of the defendants as have not served an answer or motion for summary judgment, despite the fact that the case might remain pending against other defendants.”).

Moreover, because Tesco U.S. opposes Plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of suit based solely upon alleged prejudice to Tesco Corporation, it has not shown any “plain legal prejudice” to Tesco U.S. to preclude application of the general rule that voluntary dismissals should be “freely granted.” See Elbaor, 279 F.3d at 317. Plaintiffs’ claims against Tesco U.S. will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.11

*415B. The Pride Defendants

1. Rule Jpl Dismissal Without Prejudice

The Pride Defendants, on the other hand, did answer Plaintiffs’ suit before Plaintiffs requested voluntary dismissal.12 Moreover, they have demonstrated that dismissal without prejudice will cause them “plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second suit,” Elbaor, 279 F.3d at 317, because they have shown that the claims Plaintiffs filed against them in Louisiana are barred on their face by Louisiana’s13 one-year prescriptive statute.14 Indeed, Plaintiffs do not contest that “the claims have prescribed on the face of the complaint,” but instead assert that prescription is either interrupted or avoided because of its timely suit of Tesco US, whom they assert is either a joint tortfeasor or “solidary obligor.” However, Plaintiffs’ arguments to avoid prescription are immaterial to analysis of their request for dismissal without prejudice. See Hyde v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 511 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In Elbaor, we agreed with the district court that ‘dismissal would potentially strip [the defendant] of a viable statute of limitations defense’ under Texas law, even though the plaintiffs asserted that the discovery rule applied and even though it was not known whether limitations would be unavailable as a defense in a forum in which the suit might be refiled.” (quoting Elbaor, 279 F.3d at 318)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss without prejudice will be denied as to the Pride Defendants.

2. Prescription

“[W]hen the plaintiffs petition has clearly prescribed on its face, as here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that prescription has been suspended or interrupted.” Rizer v. Am. Sur. & Fid. Ins. Co., 669 So.2d 387, 388 (La. 1996). As noted, Plaintiffs assert that the Pride Defendants are either joint tortfeasors or solidary obligors with Tesco US, whom they timely sued. The filing of suit against one tortfeasor interrupts the running of prescription as against all joint tortfeasors. La. Civ.Code art. 2324(C). Likewise, “[t]he interruption of prescription against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors.” Rizer, 669 So.2d at 388 (citing La. Civ.Code arts. 1799, 3503). Plaintiffs may carry their burden of proof if the allegations in their petition and amended petitions, accepted as true, establish that the sued defendants are joint tortfeasors or solidary obligors. See Vincent v. Tusch, 618 So.2d 385, 385 (La. 1993);15 see also Marchand v. State Farm *416Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 897 So.2d 643, 646-47 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that timely filed petition interrupted prescription against later-sued defendants where “both the original and amending petitions involve the same accident and assert that the named defendants were jointly at fault in causing the accident” (following Doyle v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 764 So.2d 1041, 1044-45 (1st Cir.), unit denied 765 So.2d 338 (La. 2000))); accord Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true”).

Here, the complaint and amending complaints allege that Plaintiff Keith Taylor was seriously injured while inspecting a top drive “manufactured and/or sold by Tesco Corporation (US) and/or Tesco Corporation,” 16 that the top drive was unreasonably dangerous “due to ... negligence and/or to poor product design and/or fabrication defects,”17 and that each of the Pride Defendants “knew or should have known” about the allegedly defective top drive, but “failed to exercise safety precautions necessary to prevent injuries to workers.”18 As in Marchand and Doyle, Plaintiffs’ allegations “involve the same accident and assert that the named defendants were jointly at fault in causing the accident,” Marchand, 897 So.2d at 647, thereby carrying Plaintiffs’ burden.

The Pride Defendants nonetheless assert that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden because Plaintiffs have not shown that Louisiana substantive law applies to this case, and therefore have not shown that the defendants are joint tortfeasors.19 However, nothing in article 2324 appears to limit the concept of “joint tortfeasor” to a joint tortfeasor under Louisiana substantive law, and the Pride Defendants have cited no case in support of such a limited reading of the statute. To the contrary,

[t]he Louisiana Supreme Court has long held that “prescriptive statutes are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished; thus, of two possible constructions, that which favors maintaining, as opposed to barring, an action should be adopted.”

Richard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 559 F.3d 341, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624, 629 (La. 1992)). Moreover, the concept of a joint tortfeasor is not unique to Louisiana law. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1497 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “joint tortfeasors” as “[t]wo or more tortfeasors who contributed to the claimant’s injury and who may be joined as defendants in the same lawsuit”). To conclude that “joint tortfeasors” under *417article 2324 refers to “joint tortfeasors” only when Louisiana substantive law is applied is a less reasonable reading of this prescriptive statute than one that views the term as identifying a well-established concept in American jurisprudence.20 It is therefore not pertinent that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Louisiana — or any other jurisdiction’s — substantive law specifically will apply to this suit.

The Pride Defendants’ motion will therefore be denied, but without prejudice because the Court’s determination at this stage is based solely upon the pleadings. Presently there can be no ultimate determination whether Tesco U.S. is liable to Plaintiffs for this accident and, if not, then Tesco U.S. would not be a joint tortfeasor with the Pride Defendants. In the latter event, Plaintiffs’ suit against Tesco U.S. would not have interrupted the prescriptive period. See Hughes v. Pogo Producing Co., No. 06-1894, 2009 WL 367513, at *4 (W.D.La. Feb. 12, 2009) (“The Court notes it cannot determine at this time whether the plaintiffs’ claims against ENI are prescribed____ The liability of the timely-sued defendants in this matter— Pogo and Discovery — has not been determined by this Court and must be determined either by way of motion prior to trial or at trial.”); accord Renfroe v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. and Dev., 809 So.2d 947, 950 (La. 2002) (“[A] suit timely filed against one defendant does not interrupt prescription as against other defendants not timely sued, where the timely sued defendant is ultimately found not liable to plaintiffs, since no joint or solidary obligation would exist.” (emphasis added)).21

III. Order

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice (Document No. 154) is GRANTED with respect to Defendant Tesco Corporation simply as a memorial of Plaintiffs’ dismissal without prejudice of Tesco Corporation, which was effective on March 18, 2011, when the motion was filed; the motion is GRANTED with respect to Tesco Corporation (US) for the reasons stated in the foregoing *418Memorandum; and the motion is otherwise DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Tesco Corporation Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12 (Document No. 57) is DENIED AS MOOT. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants Pride International, Inc. and Mexico Drilling, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on Basis of Prescription (Document No. 46) is DENIED, but without prejudice to the motion timely being reasserted on their claimed defense of prescription if at a future time it is adjudicated that Tesco U.S. is not a joint tortfeasor with the Pride Defendants.