Wichman v. Astrue
Cases that cite this one
5 later published cases cite this decision.
- Mercado v. Commissioner of Social Security (District Court, S.D. Texas 2022)
- Parson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration <B><font color=red>Do not docket in the case. Case remanded to (Commissioner of Social Security Administration).</font></B> (District Court, S.D. Texas 2021)
- Williams v. Saul (District Court, S.D. Texas 2021)
- Wyche v. Saul (District Court, S.D. Texas 2020)
- Ihde v. Colvin (District Court, W.D. Texas 2017)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Tamarae Wichman seeks review and reversal of the administrative denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
I have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). After the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for all matters in this case,
II. Jurisdiction
The court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
III. Administrative Proceedings
According to the record in this case, Plaintiff fully exhausted her administrative remedies prior to filing this action in federal court. Plaintiff applied for DIB on
On May 29, 2009, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ.
Plaintiff, who was forty-eight years old at the administrative hearing, testified that she lived with her husband and her seventy-one-year-old mother.
Plaintiff stated that she applied for work as a nurse with a flu clinic, but was not called in for an interview.
The ALJ also heard testimony from medical expert Dr. Alice Cox at the hearing.
Vocational expert Judith Harper also testified at the administrative hearing.
During questioning by Plaintiffs attorney, Ms. Harper opined that an individual who needs one work day off a week to attend a doctor’s appointment, or extra morning, afternoon and lunchtime breaks, cannot maintain employment.
On March 8, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff was not under a “disability,” as defined by the Social Security Act (“the Act”), at any time through the date of the decision.
After receiving the ALJ’s unfavorable decision dated March 8, 2010, Plaintiff requested review of the decision on March 25, 2010.
IV. Issue Presented
Whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and comports with relevant legal standards?
V. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision denying disability insurance benefits, I am limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence.
1. Entitlement to Benefits
Every individual who is insured for disability insurance benefits, has not reached retirement age, has applied for benefits, and is under a disability is entitled to receive disability insurance benefits.
2. Evaluation Process and Burden of Proof
The Commissioner’s Regulations prescribe a five-step process for evaluating disability claims.
The first step involves determining whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
In the instant case, the ALJ reached the unfavorable decision at step five of the evaluation process.
to perform light work ... Claimant can never crawl or climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. Claimant can understand, remember and carry out simple or detailed instructions (but not complex) and is able to make routine work-related decisions, attend and concentrate for extended periods, adequately interact with coworkers, supervisors and the public, and can respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting.68
At step five, the ALJ held that given Plaintiffs age (an individual closely approaching advanced age), education (at least a high school education), and vocational experience (transferable job skills from past relevant work),
B. Did the ALJ use the correct legal standards and support the decision with the substantial evidence of the record?
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision, asserting that the ALJ: (1) failed to apply the correct legal standard in concluding that some of Plaintiffs exertional impairments were not severe; (2) failed to accord appropriate weight to the opinions of Plaintiffs treating physicians; and (3) failed to consider and include all the effects of Plaintiffs fibromyalgia in the RFC assessment.
1. Did the ALJ properly assess all of Plaintiff’s severe impairments?
In her first point of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to cite and apply properly the standard for a severe impairment as articulated in Stone v. Heckler.
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must identify which of a claimant’s conditions constitute “severe” impairments.
‘[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality [having] such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience.’77
To ensure the adjudicator applies the correct legal standard, the Fifth Circuit requires an ALJ to cite to the Stone decision:
we will in the future assume that the ALJ and Appeals Council have applied an incorrect standard to the severity requirement unless the correct standard is set forth by reference to this opinion or another of the same effect, or by an express statement that the construction we give to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1984) is used. Unless the correct standard is used, the claim must be remanded for reconsideration.78
Stone does not require a wholesale remand of all severity cases. A case will not be remanded simply because the ALJ did not use ‘magic words.’ We remand only where there is no indication the ALJ applied the correct standard. We must read the opinion of the ALJ carefully to ensure that he or she used the ‘slight impairment’ standard in the non-severity determination.79
In this case, the ALJ articulated the severity standard in the following way:
An impairment or combination of impairments is ‘severe’ within the meaning of the regulations if it significantly limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. An impairment or combination of impairments is ‘not severe’ when medical and other evidence establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work (20 CFR 404.1521; Social Security Rulings (SSRs) 85-28, 96-3p, and 96-4p).80
Considering the language used in the decision, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ employed an incorrect standard for non-severity and, consequently, neglected to find her sleep disturbance, hypothyroidism and chronic fatigue syndrome severe impairments.
The Stone requirements were imposed on administrative adjudicators primarily in an effort to target the unfairly premature disposition of cases at step two of the sequential evaluation process.
The instant case went beyond the second step of the sequential evaluation process when the ALJ found, at the fifth step, that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform work available in the local and national economies.
However, the specific language the ALJ used in defining the nonseverity standard has, time and again, been found to be an erroneous construction of Stone. The ALJ’s nonseverity standard does not comport with the requirements of Stone in two important ways. First, the language in the ALJ’s decision misconstrues the “minimal effect” portion of the Stone requirement. According to Stone, the impairment is not severe only when it is a “slight abnormality” with “such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work....”
A similar misconstruction of Stone was the reason for remand in Loza v. Apfel even though that case was adjudicated at step five of the sequential evaluation process.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that she has diagnosed medical conditions which were not adjudicated as “severe impairments.”
2. Did the ALJ properly analyze the opinions of Plaintiffs treating physicians?
In her second point of error, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to assess the opinions of the treating physicians in accord with the relevant legal standards.
The ALJ may decide the weight to accord the various pieces of evidence in the record and receives great deference as to
To guide the ALJ through this process, the Regulations outline six factors for the ALJ to consider and discuss when explaining the weight accorded to the treating physician’s medical opinion.
The ALJ addressed this report in the decision.
Based on a thorough review of all evidence and testimony, the undersigned finds that the opinion of Dr. Valenta concerning the claimant’s ability to sit, stand, and walk is not consistent with the evidence as a whole and is not entitled to significant weight in the decision making process.125
Defendant implicitly concedes that the ALJ failed to perform the analysis mandated by the applicable regulation.
However, an ALJ’s failure to apply the correct legal standard is a different inquiry than whether the decision is supported by the substantial evidence of the record. When the ALJ fails to use the appropriate legal standard in assessing the opinions of a plaintiffs treating physician, the case must be remanded.
§. Did the ALJ properly consider Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia ?
In her third, and final, point of error, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to “completely consider the nature and limitations caused by the [fibromyalgia] condition when formulating the RFC and assessing Wichman’s credibility.”
The Court may not reweigh the evidence.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for relief is GRANTED, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this action REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. Docket Entry 1. See also Administrative Transcript ("Transcript”), at 7-19.
. Docket Entries 1, 11.
. Docket Entry 11, at 16.
. Docket Entries 6 and 9.
. Docket Entry 10.
. Transcript, at 155-161.
. Transcript, at 79-82.
. Transcript, at 84-86.
. Transcript, at 87.
. Transcript, at 25-73.
. Transcript, at 30-45, 55-58.
. Transcript, at 45-54, 63.
. Transcript, at 54-72.
. Transcript, at 31, 36.
. Transcript, at 34, 35.
. Transcript, at 36, 37.
. Transcript, at 41.
. Transcript, at 37.
. Transcript, at 39.
. Transcript, at 41.
. Transcript, at 42.
. Transcript, at 43, 44.
. Transcript, at 44.
. Transcript, at 45-54, 63.
. Transcript, at 45-46.
. Transcript, at 47.
. Transcript, at 51.
. Transcript, at 52, 54.
. Transcript, at 53.
. Transcript, at 54-72.
. Transcript, at 58.
. Transcript, at 59.
. Transcript, at 58-59.
. Transcript, at 59-62.
. Transcript, at 66-67.
. Transcript, at 71-72.
. Transcript, at 7-19.
. Id.
. Transcript, at 4.
. Transcript, at 1-3.
. Docket Entry 1.
. Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)).
. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995); Villa, 895 F.2d at 1021 ("The court is not to reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.”).
. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174.
. Id.
. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).
. Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
. Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
. id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564.
. Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2002).
. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1989).
. Transcript, at 7-19.
. Transcript, at 12.
. Id.
. Transcript, at 18.
. Transcript, at 14.
. Transcript, at 18.
. Transcript, at 19.
. Docket Entry 11.
. Docket Entry 11, at 8-11; Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1985).
. Docket Entry 11, at 8-11. The medical evidence in the record establishes that Plaintiff has obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). See, e.g, 321, 328, 535, 558, 632, 642, 680, 1198; Docket Entry 11. As a result, this Court construes the references to Plaintiff’s "sleep disturbance” in her brief as references to her OSA.
. Docket Entry 13, at 4-10.
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
. Stone, 752 F.2d 1099.
. Stone, 752 F.2d at 1101(quoting Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340, 341 (5th Cir. 1984)).
. Stone, 752 F.2d at 1106.
. Hampton v. Bowen, 785 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1986).
. Transcript, at 11.
. Docket Entry 11, at 8-11.
. Docket Entry 13, at 6-8.
. Docket Entry 13, at 8.
. Docket Entry 13, at 8-10.
. Stone, 752 F.2d at 1106.
. Id.
. See Lopez v. Bowen, 806 F.2d 632, 634, fn. 1 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding no reversible error because the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had severe impairments and decided the case at step four of the sequential evaluation process); Adams v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding there was no reversible error because the ALJ acknowledged the plaintiff’s "significant impairment” and adjudicated the case at step four of the sequential evaluation process); Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 527, n. 1 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that no error existed in the ALJ’s finding
. Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987).
. Chaparro, 815 F.2d at 1011.
. Transcript, at 7-19.
. Stone, 752 F.2d at 1101.
. Id.
. Transcript, at 11.
. Stone, 752 F.2d at 1101.
. Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 392-393, 398 (5th Cir. 2000). In Loza, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff’s mental impairment was not severe because plaintiff was " 'at most, slightly restricted by his mental impairment in his activities of daily living.’ ” Id., at 392. As in this case, the Loza ALJ’s nonseverity language allowed for some effect on the individual's ability to work and omitted the "irrespective of age, education or work experience” portion of the Stone language. Id.
. Padalecki v. Astrue, 688 F.Supp.2d 576, 580 (W.D.Tex. 2010) (citing Scroggins v. As-
. See Loza, 219 F.3d at 391-92; Padalecki, 688 F.Supp.2d at 581; Scroggins, 598 F.Supp.2d at 806-807; Stone, 752 F.2d at 1106. Because the ALJ clearly misconstrued the Stone language in the decision, the Commissioner's assertion that the ALJ's citation to SSR 85-28 complies with Stone is unavailing. See Docket Entry 13, at 6. It is evident that the ALJ used the wrong legal standard in the decision. Transcript, at 11.
. Docket Entry 13 at 9-10.
. Id.
. See, e.g. Transcript, at 287, 308, 320, 321, 328, 632, 680, 1198. Defendant is correct, however, that the chronic fatigue syndrome appears to be inextricably intertwined with Plaintiff's fibromyalgia and not a separate impairment. See Transcript, at 632.
. Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 142 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1220 (5th Cir. 1984))("To establish prejudice, a claimant must demonstrate that he or she ‘could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result.’ ”).
. Docket Entry 11, at 11-14.
. Id.
. Id.
. Docket Entry 13, at 10-16.
. Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985), "The administrative fact finder is entitled to determine the credibility of medical experts as well as lay witnesses and to weigh their opinions and testimony accordingly.” See also Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988).
. Loza, 219 F.3d at 393.
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). See also Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 393 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978)) (‘"[t]he expert opinion[] of a treating physician as to the existence of a disability [is] binding on the fact-finder unless contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary') (brackets in original).” See also Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). See Loza, 219 F.3d at 395 ("The ALJ cannot reject a medical opinion without an explanation.”).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5). See also Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Dorsey v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 597, 603 (5th Cir. 1983)).
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(6).
. Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to Treating Source Medical Opinions, SSR 96-2p (hereafter "SSR 96-2p”), July 2, 1996, at *4 ("treating source medical opinions ... must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 CFR 404.1527 ...”). See also Newton, 209 F.3d at 456 ("This court now ... holds that an ALJ is required to consider each of the § 404.1527(d) factors before declining to give any weight to the opinions of the claimant's treating specialist.”).
. Transcript, at 1109-1112 (cited in the hearing decision as Exhibit 2IF).
. Transcript, at 1109.
. Transcript, at 1110-1111.
. Transcript, at 17.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Docket Entry 13, 10-16. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-2p, at *5.
. Docket Entry 13, at 10-16.
. Docket Entry 13, at 11. The ALJ is not empowered to substitute his lay conclusions about a Plaintiff's ability to perform daily activities or exercise for medical opinion about functional limitations. Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003). Similarly, a Plaintiff can still "qualif[y] as disabled under the act ... even if he is sometimes capable of working for short spurts.” Frank, 326 F.3d at 621. In addition, there is a significant amount of conflicting evidence in the record about Plaintiff's ability to perform routine activities successfully on a sustained basis, as well as the range in severity of Plaintiff's pain. See Transcript, at 286, 308, 320, 328, 642, 680, 717, 960, 1199 & 1200-1201.
. Docket Entry 13, at 13. Plaintiff was not working at the time this comment was made in her treatment records. See Transcript, at 286. This same treatment record also stated that Plaintiff's pain could not be controlled. Transcript, at 286-287.
. Docket Entry 13, at 12, 14. See Frank, 326 F.3d at 622 ("Although common sense might dictate that a person who can [exercise] can hold down a job, common sense about medical matters is often wrong.”).
. See Newton, 209 F.3d at 456; SSR 96-2p, at *4; Martinez v. Chater 64 F.3d at 173; Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
. Docket Entry 11, at 14.
. Docket Entry 13, at 16-18.
. Johnson, 864 F.2d at 343.
. Id.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.